[EAI Working Paper] Liberalism Series ④_ A Liberal Exploration for the Inclusion of Others in Korean Society

I. Introduction: What is the 'Other'?

The halted mosque construction in Daegu is reportedly in a state of 'unresolvable conflict.' Conflicts surrounding the approximately 20 mosques nationwide remain latent. The issue of who constitutes 'the people' also becomes significant in the context of national disaster relief related to COVID-19. Crimes committed by foreign workers, which are often highlighted more than other crimes, and the emergence of individuals referred to as 'non-citizens' in the Korean media are now commonplace. Beyond incidents involving foreigners, matters previously considered 'abnormal' and distinct from the 'normal' are still attracting media attention, even if they no longer carry the label of 'abnormal.' The case of Private First Class Byun Hee-soo, who was forcibly discharged and ultimately died, is a representative recent example. The issue of gender identity, specifically being transgender, and exclusion within the military, perhaps the most masculine of institutions, led to another tragedy. The stark difference in voting patterns between men and women in the recent 2021 local by-elections, particularly for the Seoul mayoral race, symbolically represented the accumulated gender conflict. With 'fairness' emerging as a major theme in Korean society, issues of gender difference or 'unfairness' related to discrimination have also surfaced, as evidenced by the voting patterns in the recent by-elections.

Ultimately, these patterns of conflict indicate a situation where various issues are superimposed or intertwined, making them difficult to resolve in a uniform manner, rather than being a single agenda item. Nevertheless, what is common to these conflicts is the intensification of hostile emotions, leading to the exclusion and oppression of the opposing party, a phenomenon of 'othering.' 'Other' is an expression referring to those excluded and not included in the category of 'sameness' that constitutes 'us.' The perception of such others has always varied with the times. First, problems arise from defining who is set as the 'other' in society. Although the discussion began with the issue of foreigners or migrant workers at the outset, their problems are likely a very recent phenomenon. Even if we limit our examination of the 'other' in Korean society to the post-liberation period, we can discover others appearing at various levels and in various spaces. Particularly since modernity, Korean society has a historical process of 'identification' emphasizing collectivism, and this process of identity formation ultimately encompasses inclusion, forced assimilation, and the accompanying exclusion, in essence, a process of 'other-making.'[1]

The process of nation-building on the Korean Peninsula since modernity has had unique characteristics due to experiences and influences such as colonialism, war, and division, followed by North Korea's socialist construction and South Korea's pursuit of its own path of capitalist economic development and democratization. In this process, the experience of 'other-making' accompanying identity formation also existed. Furthermore, the specificities that emerged in the context of economic crises and the neoliberalization of society after democratization are also key to understanding Korean society. We focus on the fact that Korean society has shown changes, marking a certain break from previous periods after experiencing democratization in 1987 and the economic crisis in 1997. We aim to provide diagnoses of these various phenomena and propose ways to overcome the reality of intensified confrontation through various othering phenomena in Korean society. The principles of these proposals are fundamentally linked to efforts to overcome the inherent limitations of liberalism, particularly modern liberalism, while simultaneously seeking solutions to the liberal challenges in Korean society. This is because overcoming the modern limitations of liberalism is simultaneously about resolving the liberal and post-modern challenges confronting Korean society.

II. What Creates the 'Other'?

The series of events surrounding the Yemen refugee crisis several years ago clearly demonstrated how hollow the 'multiculturalism' policy pursued for a long time in Korean society had been. When news spread nationwide about the approximately 500 asylum seekers from Yemen in Jeju, a petition titled 'Petition to Abolish/Amend the Refugee Act, Visa-Free Entry, and Refugee Status Recognition Regarding the Illegal Refugee Issue in Jeju Island' was posted on the Blue House's online petition board, quickly exceeding 200,000 signatures within days. Protests demanding the expulsion of Yemen refugees were organized multiple times in Gwanghwamun Square, Seoul, drawing numerous participants. The decision to halt the mosque construction in Daegu, mentioned earlier, can be seen as an extension of this.

The rejection of Yemen refugees and the halt of mosque construction involved more than just a general aversion to foreigners; complex issues were intertwined. Primarily, the common element in the rejection of Yemen refugees and mosque construction was the expression of aversion towards Muslims. The anti-Yemen refugee movement in 2018 did not inquire about why they came or the suffering they might have endured in Yemen; it focused solely on the fact that they were Muslims from the 'Middle East.' It then resurrected certain cultural stereotypes about Muslims held within Korean society. Our cultural stereotypes about Islam and Muslims are an extension of Western Orientalist perspectives, which we have readily adopted. Particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the IS group incidents in the Syrian region several years ago that led to a refugee crisis in Europe, the solidified view of Islam has dominated our perceptions and was thus invoked. Specifically, a prominent concern raised in the rejection of Yemen refugees was the need to protect 'our women's safety' from Muslim men. The placards held by those opposing Yemen refugee acceptance at the time bore slogans such as 'Not Hate. We Want Safety.' and 'Expel Illegal Fake Refugees · National Safety First.' The formation of an 'emotional alliance' among 'conservative politicians, fundamentalist Christians, youth, and women' contributed to generating these voices opposing refugee acceptance, and within that alliance, Korean women were utilized as passive symbols, either as protectors of right-wing politicians and conservative Christians or as objects of protection for Korean men (Kim Hyun-mi 2020; 2018, 220-222). In this context, self-proclaimed radical feminists and conservative Protestant hate groups formed a 'dangerous alliance' in the name of women's rights to reject refugees as a common 'enemy' (Kim Na-mi 2018; Jeong Hye-sil 2018). In other words, an ironic alliance was formed with long-standing 'enemies' when faced with a common 'enemy' right before their eyes.

Meanwhile, the Afghan refugees who suddenly arrived in Korea following the abrupt withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 – local Korean collaborators – were largely accepted without significant opposition, with growing calls for their acceptance to be considered natural. Their status as collaborators with the Korean Embassy or businesses was the primary consideration – not appeals to humanitarianism or the duties of global citizens – leading to their acceptance without substantial objection. However, reports of five Taliban members infiltrating among the French collaborators who arrived in France around the same time served as a warning of other threats. In this regard, it is difficult to easily predict how they will be treated in Korean society, given that they are also Muslims, whom Korean society fears. It is not coincidental that reports expressing fear about their long-term stay have recently begun to emerge. It is possible that they are anticipating a situation similar to the Vietnamese Boat People in the 1970s, who were housed in Busan and subsequently forced to relocate to other countries, with none remaining in Korea.

The issue of refugees began to emerge as a legal and social problem in Korean society with its accession to the 'Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees' and its 'Protocol' in 1992.[2]Accordingly, provisions related to refugees were added to the Immigration Control Act in December 1993 and its Enforcement Decree in June 1994, and applications for refugee status recognition began to be accepted from July 1994. However, not a single refugee was recognized until 2000. After South Korea became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee in 2000, the first refugee status was granted in 2001 to Tadase Lerese Degu, an activist from Ethiopia. From 1994 to 2020, a total of 71,041 asylum applications were filed, but only 799 individuals were granted refugee status. This starkly contrasts with South Korea's recognition rate of just over 1%, compared to the average recognition rate of 37% in developed countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[3]

Despite South Korea's promotion of its status as an international human rights nation by enacting a separate 'Refugee Act' in 2012, the first in East Asia, thereby guaranteeing the procedural rights of asylum seekers, the reality falls short. While it is well-known that Korean society has emphasized tolerance and made efforts towards integration for foreigners, migrant workers, and marriage immigrants entering Korean society under the banner of multiculturalism, the Yemen refugee crisis in 2018 revealed how hollow these slogans were and how temporary and ad hoc the measures taken had been. Through the anti-Yemen refugee movement, latent anti-multicultural and anti-immigrant sentiments are being channeled to stigmatize refugees under labels such as 'potential terrorists' or 'potential sex offenders.' Furthermore, by combining these with dangerous stereotypes of immigrants, undocumented individuals, and ethnic Koreans from China, a process is underway to define them as 'non-citizens' who threaten 'national safety.'

In this process, multiculturalism, which has formed a major discourse in Korean society, is now being characterized as outdated or as an ideology that disadvantages the nation, and is beginning to be attacked. Anti-multiculturalists define the government's multicultural policies as reverse discrimination against the nation, unilaterally implemented without national consensus, and express resentment towards media outlets that label them as racists and defend multiculturalism (Yuk Ju-won 2016, 120). The discourse of anti-multiculturalism aligns with the logic of 'protecting our women' that emerged in the movement to reject refugees. By insisting on an obsession with the symbolic representation of 'ethnic purity,' women are objectified, and the logic of 'protecting our women' is invoked, leading to the expression of aversion towards multiculturalism (Yuval-Davis 2012, 58-62). In this sense, the alliance between anti-multiculturalism's rejection of refugees and feminism is ironic, even dangerous. Nevertheless, its effectiveness stems from the logic created by neoliberalism, particularly the stimulation of self-preservation instincts in an absolute competitive society where individuals must fend for themselves.

Just as the 'absence of the state' was witnessed during the Sewol ferry disaster, a new change has led to the invocation of a 'state' that will protect 'the people.' The slogan 'People First' has been transformed into 'Citizens First,' demanding a strong state to protect them. Simultaneously, it seeks to re-summon the state, which has long been fading under the dominance of neoliberalism. In a neoliberal society, competition has become extreme, and the state has disappeared from the public sphere; however, a demand is being made for the state to create a framework for competition and build a fence that allows for 'free competition among citizens' to ensure at least 'fair' competition. The fervent support for Trump in the United States was likely driven by the expectation that a strong state would create a free society through free competition exclusively among Americans. In both the US and Korea, there is a renewed hope for a strong state that can expel refugees, migrant workers, stateless persons, and illegal entrants crossing borders, and erect barriers against them, while simultaneously weakening state power. Multiculturalism is perceived as if it reveals the erosion of borders and the absence of the state.

As a result, the Yemen refugee issue subsided without further major disruption. At the time, three Yemen refugees applied for asylum, and two were accepted. Subsequently, three individuals applied for 'humanitarian stay,' but this was also rejected by the court with the ruling that 'the right of a foreigner to apply for humanitarian stay against the government of the Republic of Korea is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, and the right to apply for humanitarian stay is a request for protection from the government of the Republic of Korea, not a fundamental constitutional right recognized as a 'human right.'
[4] This ruling clearly adheres to the exclusive attribute of sovereignty stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the modern characteristic that human rights can only be realized as rights of members of the political community known as the nation-state.

Looking at the European example regarding the refugee issue, we can infer its contentious aspects. When Syrian refugees entered Europe several years ago, countries were not quick to open their doors. Even appeals to human rights were not easily successful, leading to the implementation of quota systems at the European Union level. Germany was the country that showed the most active response to the Syrian refugee issue. Merkel's favorable measures, often praised as 'Mutti (Mother) leadership,' were possible ultimately due to the conditions of the German economy. While countries like the UK, France, and Italy were experiencing difficulties due to prolonged economic recession and high unemployment, Germany, exceptionally, had a booming economy, low unemployment, and even a labor shortage, allowing it to be favorable towards the Syrian refugee issue (Lee Seung-hyun 2016). Of course, despite this, far-right nationalism with racist undertones continues to gain traction in various European countries.

In light of this, the rapid emergence of the 'other' issue in Korea, leading to aggressive hate speech and even collective exclusion, is intertwined with the rapid neoliberalization of Korean society following the 1997 economic crisis. Individuals thrown into the struggle for survival in a thoroughly competitive society are being pushed into situations where they must step on others to get ahead. This results in society being structured not through a model of coexistence but through a model of pushing others out. Individuals constantly strive to win by exhibiting a vulgar mentality, and those who fail in this competition are treated as 'surplus' beings. A tendency to 'other' competitors arises within this competition.

Viewed in this light, the Yemen refugee issue in 2018 was not merely a problem of a specific group called refugees but rather an instance of intersectionality, where feminism and various social issues intersected (Joo Won 2020). In particular, the feminist issues that are currently topical in Korean society intersected with intergenerational conflict, creating a situation where various social problems are being condensed. The exclusion of Yemen refugees on the grounds of being Muslim reinforces long-standing prejudices against Islam. Simultaneously, a 'pseudo-feminist' logic of protecting women is employed as a justification for their exclusion.[5] However, in the vacuum left by the refugee issue, feminism has disappeared, and patriarchal logic has re-emerged, once again designating women as objects of othering. Recently, claims have been persistently made that male workers and job seekers in their 20s and 30s are experiencing double oppression in the labor market. First, they must compete with the entry barriers set high by the existing regular workforce of those in their 40s and 50s, and second, they must compete with women of the same generation. The sense of victimhood experienced by men in their early 20s due to military service inevitably leads them to direct their blame towards women in their 20s. Furthermore, resentment towards the quota system for women in the fierce job competition adds another layer of burden to this accumulated sense of victimhood.

Observing the expression or explosion of conflict in Korean society today, it is evident that various social conflicts, alienation, and othering phenomena are superimposed, intertwined, and condensed. Consequently, specific groups designated as 'others' become targets and objects of attack, condensing the contradictions manifested within Korean society's socioeconomic and political problems. Gender conflict is one of the persistent issues that has not subsided since the refugee issue first emerged. The 'Gangnam Station murder case' served as a symbolic trigger for gender conflict. The issue, expressed through symbolic phrases like 'killed because she was a woman,' was an explosion of accumulated gender conflict, and the emergence of the term 'misogyny' led to an intensification of gender conflict. Since then, through various 'Me Too' movements and protests in Hyehwa-dong, this issue has continued in Korean society with latent explosive potential, showing no signs of subsiding. In particular, this issue has also created extreme manifestations of misandry, where men as a whole are considered potential murderers or sex offenders, alongside the suffering of women and the term 'hate.' Attacks on men have merged with conflicts between generations in their 20s and 30s facing employment, such as the issue of military service credit. The contrasting voting patterns of men and women in their 20s and 30s, revealed in the Seoul mayoral election, were a political expression of such conflict. The female quota system, implemented under the name of affirmative action, has led to controversy over reverse discrimination, and lingering conflicts related to men's mandatory military service and its effects remain. Overlapping with this, the skyrocketing real estate prices are causing intergenerational conflict. This also aligns with the discourse of 'fairness' promoted by the Democratic Party and the Moon Jae-in administration. Various incidents, including the Cho Kuk scandal, coupled with the relative deprivation and accumulated dissatisfaction with unfairness due to soaring real estate prices and speculation, have brought the administration to the brink of explosion as it nears the end of its term, betraying the public's expectations for 'justice as fairness' emphasized since President Moon Jae-in's inauguration.

While the refugee issue emerged temporarily due to visible incidents, the accumulated elements of conflict in various fields and through various means are leading to extreme exclusion by 'othering' specific groups or entities. While various social problems are intertwined and layered within these conflicts and exclusionary phenomena, the politics responsible for resolving them are 'absent.' The logic of neoliberal competition has taken the place of politics for resolving various social conflicts, leaving society with only the logic of survival, akin to a jungle where only the fittest survive. Therefore, the method for surviving in this jungle-like competition is to exclude competitors, which creates the logic of 'othering.'

III. Who Has Been the 'Other'? The Ways of Constructing the 'Other' in Korean Society and Their History

Following liberation, the history of division and war led to the formation of South Korea's own national identity and citizen identity. The process of nation-building in South Korea after liberation, on the remnants of Japanese rule, involved the construction of the state and the creation of a 'citizen' distinct from the 'people' of North Korea. In the First Republic, established with the government's founding in 1948 following liberation in 1945, 'anti-communism' became the operational principle for 'nation-building.' With the end of World War II, the Cold War shaped the global political landscape, and the Korean Peninsula was at its forefront. The confrontation between North and South was confined within the frameworks of anti-communism and anti-imperialism, and South Korea highlighted the existence of 'reds' as targets to be eliminated. As a form of homo sacer, 'reds' were the first political 'others' in Korean society. The 'enemy' designated as 'reds' was equated with the people of North Korea, who were in confrontation with South Korea, and thus they were also considered 'enemies' to be eliminated. For the singular 'anti-communist citizen' of South Korea, no further 'others' could exist. The criterion for distinguishing between friend and foe was 'anti-communism.'

Following the 5.16 coup by Park Chung-hee, the regime introduced 'economic development' as a new driving force for nation-building, alongside existing anti-communism. Consequently, the invocation of the citizenry as subjects of economic development acquired new dynamics. While the April 19 Revolution immediately preceding the 5.16 coup pursued 'freedom' against Syngman Rhee's oppression, the masses also needed 'bread.' The masses' desire to escape poverty could be channeled by the regime that seized power through the coup into the path of economic development as an opportunity to secure new legitimacy. Combining the masses' desire to escape poverty with the legitimacy of the coup, South Korea in the 1960s was mobilized under the slogan of economic development. In this process, new 'others' also emerged. For example, in the process of creating citizens called upon as subjects of economic development, those forcibly mobilized were vagrants or thugs who had existed on the periphery of society; they were systematically confined and forced into labor to incorporate the entire nation as subjects of economic development. Anti-communism remained a principle during Park Chung-hee's rule. Thus, the work of invoking and creating citizens as subjects of anti-communism and economic development, and the 'others' excluded from this, were created, and even extremely excluded.

From the 1970s onwards, the line between democracy and anti-democracy was clearly drawn, and it became even clearer after the May 18 Gwangju Uprising in 1980. In that confrontational structure, 'others' would have been a secondary issue. On the other hand, nationalism, since the 1970s, was an important ideology to be appropriated by both Park Chung-hee and his opponents. They sought to preemptively claim the correct interpretation of 'the national,' and they clashed over who was more nationalistic. In that sense, since liberation, or even before, there has been a time of mobilization to be included in the collective subject of the nation or the people. Even those who led the democratization movement did not reject the discourse of nationalism; while they invoked a new subject through the term 'minjung' (the people), it was still 'national minjung.' In other words, South Korea was, in the long term, nationalistic minjung as members of a unified nation-state. In that sense, until the 1980s, it was the era of grand subjects.

After democratization in 1987, individuals who had been latent began to awaken, and under the name of the new generation, they sought to assert themselves as individual subjects rather than part of a grand subject. The 1990s were remarkable for the emergence of various social beings in terms of the expansion of individualism, and this was also positive in terms of the birth of new democratic subjects. With the emergence of new generations in the 1990s, various minorities 'came out,' and simultaneously, they emerged as 'others' in our society. Of course, newly emerged minorities had always existed within our society, but they were beings that existed but were not recognized, and did not seek recognition. However, with their coming out, they emerged as existing beings, and the issue of recognizing their existence began to arise. With the emergence of individuals, various forms of pursuing individuality appeared, and furthermore, those who had not appeared in public spaces under the name of the socially vulnerable began to gradually assert their rights. Homosexuals coming out, conscientious objectors, and people with disabilities began to publicly demand their legitimate rights in an open society. Korean society also implemented various affirmative action policies, such as quotas for people with disabilities and women, and alternative service systems, to provide various considerations and inclusion policies for social minorities.

The economic crisis of 1997, which occurred amidst these changes, paradoxically led to the extreme individualization of Korean society. While Korean society had previously protected individuals through frameworks such as family, workplace, and state, the 1997 economic crisis created a social atmosphere where nothing could protect individuals. Simultaneously, new neoliberal economic policies allowed for the entry of new 'others' from abroad through globalization, such as migrant workers, and Korean society needed these strangers. The number of these strangers has been steadily increasing. They have settled around us, showing significant differences in appearance and culture, and have emerged as new 'others' in Korean society.

Ultimately, who constitutes 'the people'? Furthermore, who is the primordial populace that makes up 'the people'? We must calmly answer these questions. The boundaries of the people, which were long taken for granted after liberation—anti-communist and subjects of economic development on the one hand, and thoroughly patriarchal and male-centric thinking on the other—are now beginning to crumble, leading to the emergence of groups exhibiting extreme tendencies and the amplification of extreme confrontations. One of the situations accelerating this and complicating the nature of the confrontation is neoliberal globalization. Perhaps these factors have simultaneously become deadlocked, creating more complex and amplified phenomena. That is, globally, after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the progression of neoliberalization, and the transition to democracy in Korea, the 1990s saw Korea gradually seeking to deepen its democracy, leading to a complex entanglement of the emergence of various social groups and the expression of individual desires of citizens. Furthermore, with the globalization of capital and labor, the influx of foreigners has increased, leading to the emergence of new members. In this context, politics, which should be the driving force for social integration, is largely absent, and the logic of neoliberal competition has taken its place since the 1997 economic crisis. Ultimately, it seems that only the logic of survival, which requires oppressing and excluding others to survive, remains, rather than the logic of coexistence for everyone to live together.

IV. What Should Be Done?

Korean society has long been a time of nationalism. After the failure to transition from a traditional dynastic state to a modern nation-state in the early modern period, and through Japanese colonial rule, the invocation of the nation or people as the subject of liberation and nation-building has proceeded through nationalism. In that sense, Korea has long been a nation where nationalism prevailed. In that time of nationalism, there was no place for strangers. Ironically, the catalyst for retrospective reflection on this nationalism and a new turning point came with the influx of migrant workers due to neoliberal globalization, that is, the influx of new 'others' and the subsequent search for coexistence. The term 'multiculturalism' became a trend in Korean society, and 'multicultural families' and the modifier 'multicultural' even became terms referring to specific people. However, this also implies that multiculturalism inherently contained exclusivity towards strangers. In fact, although 'multiculturalism' is not merely a descriptive concept of the existence of diverse cultural identities but a normative ideal where individuals can coexist while fully recognizing their cultural identities and differences as members of society, it functions as a term with exclusivity. In that sense, Canada, often cited as a model of multiculturalism, can be likened to a mosaic society, where individuals are recognized for their cultural identities and simultaneously contribute to forming the new societal landscape.

There is an assessment that Korea underwent a transition to an open and less exclusive nationalism through its unique form of 'open' nationalism during the 2002 World Cup応援 (cheering) events, following the 1990s. However, what is being done under the name of multiculturalism, the extreme expressions of hatred seen in the recent Yemen refugee incident, and countless other examples of exclusive emotional expression prior to this, suggest that Korea's past strong nationalistic characteristics have transformed in peculiar ways. Through the rapid influx of neoliberalism, individualistic characteristics have been strengthened, and while striving to embody global citizenship within globalization, we must question whether this is not merely a transformation of the citizen as a subject of economic development during the Park Chung-hee era into an extreme form of an economic animal.

In other words, while acknowledging that exclusive nationalism should normatively be avoided, it is currently adrift without finding a new ideology for integration within the Korean community or a new form of transformation. Multiculturalism, once accepted as a normative value, has shown its limitations and is being rejected by the public, making it unlikely to be invoked again. Since 2010, various European countries have also recognized the limitations of multiculturalism and are attempting new directions. The republican model, or melting pot model, which gained attention in contrast to the mosaic integration model of the US and Canada after 9/11, also revealed its limitations in various conflict situations in France since the 2010s. Republicanism, particularly constitutional republicanism proposed by figures like Habermas in the process of strengthening political integration within the European Union, emphasizes the formation of identity based on consensus on political principles, unlike the nationalism of the nation-state era which emphasized cultural elements of national identity. However, recent developments in French republicanism show that the principles of republicanism, especially the principle of laïcité (the French principle of secularization), are being applied in ways that exclude and oppress Muslims in practice.[6] This is because even political principles pursuing a certain universality can be difficult to understand without considering Western-centric perspectives or completely abstracting cultural backgrounds. Nevertheless, republicans argue that the basic principles they emphasize are necessary because they hold a significant position as the minimum requirements for forming a community and, at the same time, encompass the duties and rights that members of the community should possess.

The accelerated globalization since the 21st century, characterized by the constant movement of capital, labor, and goods, appears to be gradually eroding the borders of the nation-state era, which were once like impenetrable walls. In this sense, it is perhaps a natural reality that republicanism, which was an effective ideology for integration during the nation-state era, is showing certain limitations. In the context of globalization, where borders are becoming blurred and the limits of state power are evident, demanding republican patriotism, similar to that of the nation-state era, from the numerous people crossing borders may be an excessive demand. Nevertheless, it is also necessary for the nation-state community, which still remains valid, to function and for the people living within it to exercise their duties and rights as members of the community. In this regard, a balance must be found between the members and the community. It is necessary to first establish principles for finding such a balance.

First, the most important recognition should be given to their very existence and their subjectivity. Before being objects of integration or exclusion, they are social beings and subjective beings. They exist as human beings who must have their existence recognized and realize their value in society, rather than beings who seek recognition from power. Regardless of where they come from, what skin color they have, or what preferences they hold, these are matters of individual subjectivity and should be tolerated by liberalism as long as they do not cause 'harm' to the community or others. We are all subjects and, at the same time, 'others.' At the end of the 19th century, Simmel emphasized that strangers are not beings outside of us but rather 'elements that constitute our own group, just like the poor or various 'internal enemies'' (G. Simmel 2005, 79-80). Furthermore, as Derrida pointed out, Socrates was a stranger to the language of the court when he was in court, and Oedipus was a stranger in a foreign land, but those living there could also be strangers to Oedipus; thus, we can all be strangers to each other at any moment, in any place, and at any time (J. Derrida 2004). Of course, the problem is that such strangers are continuously othered, excluded, and oppressed from the community. However, the community that must be built should be one where everyone can be a subject in a situation where everyone is a stranger. Following the modern rational individual as a grand subject, a community by these subjects, mindful of the emergence of diverse subjects and their infinite potential for emergence, is needed.

In that sense, the second principle is the necessity of an ideology of solidarity that connects communities of diverse subjects. This means that no one should be subjected to 'othering' within the community. Solidarity as fellow citizens is necessary. Since the influx of neoliberalism, particularly after the 1997 economic crisis, Korean society exists in a state of individual self-reliance through enhanced individual competitiveness and the absence of the state and society. The grand subjects of the nation or people, which were mobilized or invoked for a long time under the goals of economic development and democratization, have disappeared, and competitive individual subjects have taken their place. Individuals in such communities are required to develop a 'vulgar mentality' to step on their competitors to survive and avoid becoming 'surplus humans' left behind in the competition. This way of life has become mainstream and is accepted as natural since the establishment of a neoliberal society after the 1997 economic crisis. In that sense, we need to revive the memory of national solidarity formed for economic development and democratization before that economic crisis. Furthermore, such national solidarity must be newly constituted as an opportunity for individuals to realize their subjectivity in a society where individuality has expanded after democratization. Therefore, we must create a newly constituted ideology of solidarity suitable for the new society. Ultimately, it is a time when an ideology of solidarity is needed to bring together these scattered individual subjects and enable them to live while maintaining communal life. This ideology of solidarity should not be a way of strengthening internal bonds and building external barriers like the existing nationalist ideology, but rather, in line with the context of globalization, it should enable simultaneous consideration of global citizen duties and the duties to our community. Therefore, solidarity among individuals must be possible in a way that does not homogenize their subjectivity, based on the individual subjectivity mentioned in the first point.

Third, connecting the first and second tasks, is the necessity of a new social contract to find a point of contact between individual freedom and the value of the community. National identity in the modern nation-state era was formed through the process of nationalistic invocation by the state, and this was simultaneously the process of forming national subjects. However, now, rather than the bestowal of identity, a process of subjectivation, where individuals construct their own identity, is necessary, and this is the starting point of individual freedom. However, at the same time, the community's values must be realized, and the state must provide the conditions for the realization of the freedom of these individuals, thereby constructing the community's values. It is within the community where individuals' subjectivities are realized, and ultimately, the realization of individual subjectivity must include the role of a citizen within the community. As Durkheim stated, the community in the name of the state must be a space where the collective consciousness of its members, i.e., the citizens, is represented. The individual, as the bearer of rights and duties as a citizen, must be positioned in relation to the community called the state. Just as citizens' rights are realized with the recognition of state power, citizens must become bearers of duties to the community called the state. Here, duty is a duty to the community and also a duty to fellow members of the community. Sacrificing personal interests for the public good, as strongly demanded by republicanism, is difficult in modern society. In that sense, it is necessary to create a structure where individual interests and the interests of the community can converge. This is a structure where individual interests are maximized when realized as members of the community. When such a structure is realized, individual freedom and community virtue can expand simultaneously.

One of the phenomena currently becoming an issue in the political sphere, not only in Korea but globally, is populism. Translated as 'pandering' or 'demagoguery,' populism is often criticized for politicians engaging in indiscriminate budget waste or unplanned expenditures to gain votes. However, populism can also be understood as a form of active expression of the masses' will. It is a phenomenon that emerges from the outpouring of desire to directly express one's intentions amidst distrust of existing representatives. Particularly in a situation of accelerating neoliberal competition, individuals driven into competition become sensitive and demand immediate satisfaction of their interests, leading to populist politics. Furthermore, populism becomes a tool of oppressive politics by engaging in the othering of specific groups—by making them 'public enemies' or scapegoats. However, populism is clearly a phenomenon that has emerged from the limitations of modern politics, particularly the limitations of representative politics. In that sense, it could even serve as a new opportunity to overcome the limitations of modern politics. This is possible when it is used as an opportunity for the subjectivation of the masses, transcending the limitations of representative politics. It is also an opportunity to transition into new democratic and popular subjects.

The absence of politics following the rapid neoliberalization of Korean society and the emergence of populist mass politics in its place also represent a time for the renewal of politics. This is also the possibility of expanding democracy demonstrated by the citizens during the candlelight vigils in the winter of 2016, who 'were cynical about politics but never turned their backs on it' (Lee Ji-ho 2017, 7). To transform a society of intensified competition into a society of solidarity, and to mature individuals as citizens of the community rather than simply making them competitive, the first priority is to find the place for politics. And this endeavor must be undertaken by attempting to seek coexistence for various beings by presenting a new vision for social integration. ■

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[1] “Hate speech” is also part of the continuous and ongoing process through which we are subjected (J. Butler 2016, 61).

[2] Of course, the previous experience in South Korea related to the acceptance of refugees involved Vietnamese boat people who arrived for over a decade after the fall of Vietnam in 1975. At that time, 1,335 people evacuated with the South Korean military and 216 refugees rescued by South Korean cargo ships in the waters near Vietnam were housed in a temporary refugee camp in Busan. Of these, 977 people, excluding those who married South Korean men and obtained nationality, were resettled abroad. Then, the full influx of boat people began in 1977 and they were housed in the <Vietnam Refugee Relief Center> established in Dongnae-gu, Busan. However, not a single one of them was allowed to settle, and for the Vietnamese, South Korea was not a country they wished to settle in (Jeong In-seop 2009, 204).

[3] Refer to the Ministry of Justice Immigration and Foreign Policy Bureau, <Immigration and Foreign Policy Statistics Monthly Report> 2020.

[4] “Yemen Refugee Humanitarian Stay Permit Lawsuit Dismissed for Lack of Standing.” *Munhwa Ilbo*, September 2, 2021.

[5] This is akin to the patriarchal logic of needing to protect the nation, likened to a woman or a sister, during the Japanese colonial period.

[6] Notably, Marine Le Pen of the far-right nationalist party 'National Front' (FN) has adopted a strategy of gradual moderation from its previous racist tendencies, often referred to as de-demonization, while advocating for French republicanism. This serves as an example of how republicanism, despite being based on political principles, can sufficiently reinforce an exclusive ideology, a form of 'national' republicanism.

■ Author: Hong Tae-young_Professor at the Graduate School of National Security, Korea National Defense University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Paris School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences. He has served as a visiting scholar at the University of Washington and was the editor-in-chief of the Korean Political Science Association for 2021/2022. His main research areas include national security, political thought, Korean politics, and European politics. His recent works include *Beyond the Nation-State*, and his articles include “Nationalist Governability and Nation-Building” and “The Birth of the French Republic and Republicanism.”

■ Editor: Yoon Ha-eun_EAI Research Fellow

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