[EAI Working Paper] Liberalism Series ②_ Social Liberalism and the Problems of Representative Democracy in Korea

I. Introduction: Liberalism as the Idea of Universal Equality and Its Implementation

Is it truly possible for all members of a state or society to enjoy equal freedom? If this is merely an ideal, what are the most feasible ways to approach it, even if not perfectly?

This paper argues that, at least in the case of South Korea, transitioning to a consensus-based democracy is the most realistic approach.[1]Let us examine the arguments for this claim one by one.

Liberalism, which took shape between the 16th and 18th centuries, was a progressive social ideology that contributed to the dismantling of absolute monarchies and hereditary social systems through civil revolutions, thereby establishing an egalitarian society based on democracy and the rule of law (Lee Keun-sik 2009). However, in the 19th century, as liberalism became distorted with the development of capitalism into a form of economic laissez-faire—as if liberalism were synonymous with extreme economic freedom—its egalitarian and dynamic spirit was shackled by markets and the wealthy. Liberalism became impotent, degenerating into a conservative ideology that primarily benefited those in power and the rich.

In the late 19th century, a strong movement arose to rectify this untenable situation and restore the progressive nature of liberalism. The emergence of 'social liberalism' or liberal revisionism, spearheaded by figures like John Stuart Mill, Thomas Hill Green, and Leonard Hobhouse, was a manifestation of this effort. Throughout the 19th century, often referred to as the era of 'economic liberalism,' advanced European nations saw immense growth in national wealth due to capitalist development. However, this led to widening wealth disparities, pushing the majority of citizens, including laborers, into increasingly dire circumstances. Social liberals began to argue that the threats to the freedom of the majority were now the ills of capitalism, such as poverty, unemployment, the tyranny of large capital, and the scarcity of public goods. Therefore, they contended that government intervention in the market was essential to resolve these issues and protect the freedom of social citizens.

This marked the birth of a distinct liberal path, 'social liberalism,' which diverged from 'classical liberalism' distorted into economic liberalism (Kloppenberg 1986). It was a new liberal ideology that emphasized freedom from poverty, alienation, and fear for all citizens, including the socio-economically disadvantaged. Subsequently, to distinguish it from earlier forms of liberalism that emphasized or accepted minimal government or economic liberalism, this strain of thought, which stressed the role of government, came to be known as 'progressive liberalism.'

Let us recall the core principle of liberalism, famously emphasized by J. S. Mill, one of the proponents of social liberalism, in On Liberty, through the translation by Byung-hoon Seo (Mill 2013, 177): “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” In other words, each individual's freedom is permissible only when it does not cause undue harm to others. Lee Keun-sik refers to this as Mill's first principle of liberalism (Lee Keun-sik 2011, 38-39).

Mill's principle once again clarifies that freedom is a value predicated on the idea of universal equality. Since all individuals are equally important, no one's freedom should be unjustly infringed upon; therefore, each individual's freedom can only be permitted within this limit. According to this principle, just as ordinary citizens in past pre-democratic Europe limited the political power or freedom of political power enjoyed by royalty and nobility in the name of liberalism through civil revolutions, in the 19th century, with its rapid capitalist development, it became necessary to regulate the market freedom of the wealthy and large corporations in the name of social liberalism. This is because the unlimited exercise of power by economic actors (akin to political actors in the pre-democratic era) could now cause serious harm to ordinary citizens. To ensure that all citizens could equally enjoy social freedom, the freedom of economic actors needed to be placed under democratic control.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this social liberal ideology spread widely. As a result, at least in advanced Western societies, liberalism came to be recognized as a progressive ideology synonymous with social liberalism. This is also the background for why the English word 'liberal' came to be used to mean progressive or a progressive.

As briefly reviewed above, liberalism has, at times, emphasized freedom from political power, and at other times, freedom from economic power. This is why classical liberalism, which advocated economic freedom, evolved into progressive liberalism, which emphasizes social freedom, and even into egalitarian liberalism. While the emphasis appropriately shifts according to the times, the value to be protected remains constant: the freedom that all individuals should enjoy equally. Therefore, the protection of the freedom of the socio-economically disadvantaged is a paramount task for progressive liberals. The power of any group or organization that could undermine or threaten this freedom must be limited and controlled in the name of liberalism. This power could be the government, large corporations, the media, or religious groups.

Then, how is the universal and equal freedom that liberalism so highly values protected? Social liberalism emphasizes freedom from poverty, anxiety, and fear for ordinary citizens. But what are the concrete mechanisms for protecting this social freedom, particularly from economic power?

II. The Methodology of Social Liberalism: Revitalizing Representative Democracy

As mentioned above, from the formative period of liberalism, its proponents identified democracy and the rule of law as the institutional mechanisms for protecting freedom. That is, universal freedom for all should be protected through democracy and the rule of law, which presuppose the political freedom of all individuals. This remains true today. Times may change, but there is little else that can be done beyond this. What more can a democratic state or society achieve than maintaining social justice and peace by having the state intervene in and regulate the market economy within the scope of laws, institutions, and policies decided through democracy?

In essence, the methodology of social liberalism is the theory of expanding democracy itself. It entails imposing democratic control over all forms of power that could unjustly oppress free citizens. This ultimately means fostering and maintaining the countervailing power of the weak and the poor against the strong and the rich through the operation of democratic politics. In other words, the core mechanism for realizing social liberalism is the provision of political countervailing power (for the socio-economically disadvantaged), a point that requires relatively detailed discussion.

Strictly speaking, according to textbook definitions, South Korea's 1987 system is difficult to classify as a proper representative democracy. Representative democracy is a form of democracy where citizens, the sovereign power in a democratic state, indirectly govern the national community through their elected representatives, whom they appoint as 'agents.' Therefore, if the majority of citizens lack political representatives, or are 'left without' representatives, it is difficult to recognize such a state as a representative democracy. However, the majority of South Korean citizens do not have competent political agents who represent their preferences and interests. This is evident even when considering groups like laborers, small business owners, and young people, who constitute the largest segments of South Korean society. Consider this: which of them has a prominent political representative?

The fundamental role of representative democracy is to ensure adequate political representation for ordinary citizens, especially the socio-economically disadvantaged, thereby equipping them with the political countervailing power to confront the socio-economically powerful. If laborers can maintain equal partnership with capital, small and medium-sized businesses with large corporations, young people with older generations, and the poor with the rich, at least in the political arena, then policies, laws, and institutions that protect the freedom and equality of the socio-economically disadvantaged can be adequately supplied. Had representative democracy functioned vigorously as intended since the establishment of the 1987 system, and thus had politics effectively provided socio-economically disadvantaged groups with countervailing power in the market, South Korea's economic democratization, welfare state level, and consequently, the level of social freedom enjoyed equally by all would have reached a considerable level by now.

However, the 1987 system failed to provide adequate political representation for the disadvantaged. It did not incorporate them into the political and policy-making processes. The result was the deepening of socio-economic inequality and the entrenchment of polarization. It is not too late. By establishing a representative democracy where the preferences and interests of the socio-economically disadvantaged, who constitute the majority of the nation's members, are properly reflected, the institutional guarantee of social freedom—namely, economic democratization and the construction of a welfare state—can still be achieved starting now. However, this necessitates constitutional reform, and its core objective must be to ensure the proper functioning of 'politics of inclusion' by guaranteeing political representation to all citizens (Crepaz and Birchfield 2000).

Politics of inclusion refers to a political system where major political and socio-economic forces with conflicting interests are all 'included' within the political system, and their path to consistent and effective participation in internal political and policy processes is open. In other words, it means a politics where all conflicting parties 'share political and policy power,' enabling them to resolve their conflicts through dialogue and compromise on a politically equal footing. There are numerous examples of countries with severe conflicts that have successfully maintained social integration by preventing the unjust infringement of the social freedom of the disadvantaged through this solution of power-sharing.

In a representative democracy, the participation of conflicting groups and citizens in political and policy processes fundamentally occurs through political parties. Particularly, the interests and preferences of the socio-economically disadvantaged, such as (non-regular) laborers, small and medium-sized business owners, and young job seekers, can only be effectively reflected in the policy-making process when there are prominent parties representing them, unlike in the case of capitalists and large corporations. Therefore, constant democratic control over (economic) power becomes possible only when multiple parties capable of adequately representing the main conflicting groups in society, including these disadvantaged groups, are present in the legislature, form the government, and manage the state. Ultimately, the development of party politics is a prerequisite for the fair guarantee of political representation, the proper functioning of representative democracy and inclusive politics, and the realization of social liberalism.

III. Development of Party Politics and Electoral System Reform for the Realization of Social Liberalism

1. The Pre-modern Party System in Korea and Its Causes

Metaphorically speaking, the main goods traded in the 'political market' are policies, laws, and institutions. In places where representative democracy operates, the primary suppliers of these goods are political parties, and the consumers are citizens, each with one vote. If the market is fair and free, parties that produce and provide the goods desired by the majority of consumers in a timely manner will thrive, while those that do not will decline.

In the current South Korean context, the most sought-after political goods would undoubtedly be policies, laws, and institutions targeting the needs and preferences of 'vulnerable majority groups' such as non-regular laborers, small business owners, and young job seekers. These groups are substantial, numbering around 8 million, 7 million, and 6 million respectively, and are socio-economically vulnerable, desperately seeking political goods to protect them. However, despite the existence of these large consumer groups with strong purchasing intent, prominent parties that cater to them have not emerged in the South Korean political market. Supply is inexplicably failing to meet demand, even after more than 30 years since the declaration of political market freedom, i.e., political democratization, starting in 1987.

In the 1987 democratic system, the parties that thrive are not the class-based parties promising to supply the goods desired by these large consumer groups, but rather regional parties that claim to represent specific regions. This is the case even though the regional preferences and their intensity regarding major policies, laws, and institutions related to growth, distribution, and security are unlikely to differ significantly. For example, how different would the policy preferences for economic democratization and a welfare state be between non-regular laborers or small business owners in Honam and Yeongnam? Yet, inexplicably, while there are 'Honam parties' or 'Yeongnam parties' of considerable size and influence, there are no 'Labor Party,' 'Small Business Owners' Party,' or 'Youth Party.' In other words, non-regular laborers, small business owners, and young people are marginalized or excluded from the South Korean political market. Consequently, they are left frustrated, unable to obtain the goods they desperately need.

This peculiar and unfortunate phenomenon continues to persist because South Korea's party system remains pre-modern, even after more than 30 years of democratization. The reason for this state of affairs is that the 1987 constitutional system is a so-called 'stubborn' majoritarian democracy (Choi Tae-wook 2014, 82-83). The 1987 system operates on two main institutional pillars: the parliamentary election system centered on single-member districts with a first-past-the-post rule, and a monarchical presidential system. The problem is that both of these systems contribute to the formation and maintenance of a monopolistic party system centered on individuals or regions, often in conjunction with regionalism.[2] This is the core problem of the 1987 system, where 'politics of exclusion' operates instead of inclusion.

From the perspective of party politics, politics of inclusion can be defined as a political system where all parties have fair access to participation rights (proportional to their support) in the nation's political and policy processes, thereby opening avenues for effective participation in the political process for all citizens and interest groups represented by each party. This stands in contrast to politics of exclusion or winner-take-all politics, where one or two parties representing the powerful and the majority monopolize legislative and executive political power, pushing out all other parties.

In a 'politics of inclusion' that functions properly, where competent parties representing the disadvantaged consistently participate effectively in the decision-making processes for economic and social policies, the likelihood of adopting policies such as economic democratization and strengthening the welfare state, which are favored by the disadvantaged, is always high. Therefore, the assertion that the revitalization of party politics enables politics of inclusion, which in turn drives economic democratization (fostering an inclusive economy that values economic disadvantaged groups like laborers and small business owners) and enhances the development of the welfare state (creating an inclusive society that considers social disadvantaged groups like the disabled, multicultural individuals, and youth), is accurate. Thus, for politics of inclusion to function properly, that is, to ensure adequate political representation for the disadvantaged, relevant provisions of the constitution and laws must be revised to allow for the establishment of a modern party system and the revitalization of party politics. This is because, within a representative democracy, political parties are ultimately the entities that guarantee political representation.

Inclusive politics operates when multiple parties capable of balanced and effective representation of the diverse interest groups in society are present, and when national political decisions are made by these parties. Otherwise, for example, if parties representing major interest groups such as labor or small and medium-sized businesses do not exist or are powerless, the preferences and demands of the socio-economically disadvantaged, who constitute the majority of society, will not be adequately reflected in the political process, while the interests of specific powerful groups like large corporations may be excessively represented. In such circumstances, it is difficult to expect progress in economic democratization or the welfare state, as politics of exclusion will prevail. Ultimately, inclusive politics requires the existence of prominent parties capable of representing the interests and preferences of all citizens, including the socio-economically disadvantaged.

As mentioned above, under the 1987 constitutional system, party politics has been dominated by large parties based in specific regions such as Honam or Yeongnam. The central focus of parties has not been ideology, values, or policy direction, but rather charismatic regional prominent figures who command the expectations and trust of specific regional populations, such as Honam or Yeongnam people. Naturally, this pre-modern regional or personality-centered party system fails to provide adequate political representation to the socio-economically disadvantaged, who are dispersed throughout the country. This is because the primary base of a party is not socio-economic class, stratum, or sector, but simply a specific region.

In the current socio-economic situation in South Korea, the groups most urgently and desperately requiring political representation are undoubtedly non-regular laborers, small business owners, and young people. A significant portion of them continue to lead precarious lives due to poverty, unemployment, and other socio-economic anxieties. They too must be provided with an adequate level of social freedom. There seems to be no other solution than a political one. However, within the current party system, there are no prominent parties representing them. The greater problem is that under the current constitutional system, such parties are unlikely to emerge in the future.

2. Development of Consensus-Based Democracy and Electoral System Reform

To enhance the level of social liberalism in South Korea, the constitutional system must be reformed. The key political institutions constituting the 1987 system must be boldly overhauled. The direction of institutional reform is clear: a transition from winner-take-all majoritarian democracy to power-sharing consensus-based democracy.

As mentioned above, if the development of party politics, where multiple prominent parties representing the major conflicting forces in society are arrayed from left to right in the legislature (based on differences in ideology and policy direction), and they form the government (primarily in coalition form) and manage the state (through power-sharing rather than winner-take-all), is considered progress, then this is generally an outcome expected from consensus-based democracy, not majoritarian democracy. The core characteristic of consensus-based democracy is a well-developed multi-party system centered on policies and ideologies. This multi-party system operates in conjunction with a parliamentary electoral system with high proportionality and a coalition-based power structure. In other words, a highly proportional electoral system drives a multi-party system centered on policies and ideologies, and as the existence of multiple prominent parties makes it impossible for any single party to secure an absolute majority, a consensus-based power structure becomes institutionalized, which in turn promotes the development of a multi-party system.

The most crucial determinant of the party system is the electoral system. For instance, as widely known through 'Duverger's Law,' single-member district plurality systems tend to foster a two-party system, while proportional representation systems foster a multi-party system. Ultimately, by introducing a new electoral system that ensures proportionality between each party's vote share and seat share, diverse parties with vote and seat shares in the 10%, 20%, or 30% range can emerge, representing the diverse preferences and interests of our society. This will establish a 'structured multi-party system' centered on policies, values, and ideologies, which is a prerequisite for the functioning of inclusive politics.

Despite the electoral law revisions in 2019, South Korea's electoral system remains largely based on single-member districts with first-past-the-post, where proportionality is not sufficiently guaranteed. Furthermore, this disproportional electoral system operates in conjunction with regionalism. Consequently, the distortion of public will caused by the electoral system is severe. As everyone knows, the maintenance of a regional monopolistic system by specific parties is one of the core problems.

In countries like South Korea, where regionalism remains a major variable in electoral politics, it is extremely difficult for candidates from national parties formed around ideology or policy to win in single-member districts, surpassing incumbent candidates from established regional parties rooted in the area. Candidates from large regional parties like the Yeongnam or Honam parties enjoy a 'regional premium,' giving them a relative advantage over competitors from 'out-of-region' or national parties. Moreover, since it is not necessary to secure over 50% of the vote, but only one more vote than the competitors, the first-past-the-post system inherently favors regional party candidates who can maximize regional votes by appealing to regional sentiments whenever necessary. In short, as long as the single-member district plurality system, combined with regionalism, remains central to the parliamentary election system, the possibility of developing a multi-party system centered on ideology, values, and policy is very low.

The introduction of a de facto fully proportional representation system or reform towards a more proportional electoral system remains the most critical political task for South Korea. The 2019 electoral law revision, if not a regression, was at best an incomplete reform.

Among countries with low electoral system proportionality, it is difficult to find examples where a structured multi-party system centered on policy and ideology has developed and where politics of inclusion and consensus-based democracy operate stably. Countries with high levels of economic democratization and welfare state development—that is, countries that adequately protect and guarantee the interests and preferences of the socio-economically disadvantaged—are almost invariably proportional representation-based consensus-based democracies. The realization of social liberalism in South Korea necessitates electoral system reform.

IV. Conclusion: Electoral System Reform, Once Again!

2019 was a year filled with hope that South Korea might finally become a proportional representation country. In December of the previous year, 2018, leaders of the so-called 'three minor parties'—the Bareunmirae Party, the Democratic Peace Party, and the Justice Party—engaged in hunger strikes and tent protests, accompanied by civil society's calls for reform, which lasted for over ten days in the harsh winter cold. Public opinion began to shift unfavorably towards the Democratic Party (DP), which was opposed or lukewarm to electoral system reform, and the Liberty Korea Party (LKP), now the People Power Party, which was also hesitant. Feeling considerable pressure, these two major parties finally made progress in the reform discussions. Consequently, in mid-December, the floor leaders of five parties met and issued a joint statement expressing their intent to 'actively consider concrete measures for the introduction of a mixed-member proportional representation system.' Despite numerous twists and turns thereafter, discussions on electoral law revision officially began in 2019.

The intention behind the electoral law revision was, of course, to increase the proportionality of the parliamentary election system in response to the long-standing aspirations of civil society. However, during the discussion process, the two major parties consistently exhibited self-serving partisan behavior. As a result, the purpose of the law revision was significantly undermined. Although a new electoral law was introduced at the end of 2019, few believed that it would stably enhance the proportionality of the parliamentary election system and consequently foster a multi-party system, due to the inadequacy of the new law's provisions.

In fact, under the 1987 system, the two major parties, while constantly in opposition, shared the benefits of a two-party system. Therefore, both parties were reluctant to introduce a highly proportional electoral system that would promote the development of a multi-party system. However, in 2019, the DP changed its stance. In order to secure the cooperation of minor parties needed to pass the bill establishing the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), they became willing to cooperate on electoral system reform, which the minor parties ardently desired.

The reality was that the DP, which had previously held a negative or at best passive stance, finally adopted a forward-looking attitude towards electoral system reform, exciting the minor parties. Driven by the desire to conclude the reform quickly before the DP's stance changed, they fell prey to the temptation of pushing through the reform using the power of the majority, bypassing the consensus process. The method adopted was the so-called 'fast-track alliance,' and the introduction of the 'quasi-mixed-member proportional representation system' was the result of this 'majority alliance strategy.' The electoral system, ostensibly for the sake of 'consensus-based' democracy, was adopted in a rather coercive manner through a 'majoritarian' approach.

Consequently, the LKP openly opposed the reform, resorted to all sorts of underhanded tactics with impunity, and blatantly disregarded the intent of the revised electoral law. The establishment of satellite parties was part of this effort. Even more egregious was the DP's attitude. The DP, which had pledged to complete electoral system reform in alliance with minor parties, ended up undermining the newly revised electoral law it had championed by establishing its own satellite party, just like the LKP.

The results of the 2020 general election clearly demonstrated how South Korea's party politics, and thus its representative democracy, would unfold under the current electoral system: the strengthening of the two-party system, the deepening of winner-take-all democracy, the exacerbation of politics of exclusion and confrontational politics, and the weakening of democracy's functions of providing political representation and mediating social conflicts. In this situation, there is little room for social liberalism to develop.

Electoral system reform must be pursued again. And this reform must aim at strengthening proportionality. Consequently, the current monopolistic party system based on regions must be dismantled, and an inclusive party system that adequately reflects public will, capable of properly representing diverse socio-economic interests, and a consensus-based democracy based on it must be established.

To reiterate, South Korea is a 'stubborn' majoritarian democracy. In the confrontational politics of South Korea, characterized by winner-take-all and loser-perishes dynamics, it is difficult to expect the efficient and sustained protection of the freedom of the disadvantaged and minorities. This means that the possibility of a significant increase in South Korea's level of social liberalism is very low as long as the current 1987 majoritarian democratic system persists. For a majoritarian state to evolve into a consensus-based democratic state, and for all citizens to enjoy a considerable level of social freedom, the winner-take-all electoral system must first be transformed into a power-sharing electoral system. The introduction of a proper proportional representation system may not be the only way to raise the level of social liberalism, but it is clearly the most effective method. ■

References

Lee Keun-sik. 2009. *Sangsaengjeok Jayu-juui: Jayu, Pyeongdeung, Sangsaenggwa Sahoe Baljeon* [Cooperative Liberalism: Freedom, Equality, Cooperation, and Social Development]. Seoul: Dolbegae.

Lee Keun-sik. 2011. “Jinbojeok Jayu-juuiwa Hanguk Jabonjuui” [Progressive Liberalism and Korean Capitalism]. In *Jayu-juui-neun Jinbojeok-il Su Inneunga* [Can Liberalism Be Progressive?], edited by Choi Tae-wook, 35-64. Seoul: Politeria.

Choi Tae-wook. 2011. “Hanguk-hyeong Jojeong Sijang Gyeongjewa Habuije Dokrijuui” [Korean-style Coordinated Market Economy and Consensus-Based Democracy]. In *Jayu-juui-neun Jinbojeok-il Su Inneunga* [Can Liberalism Be Progressive?], edited by Choi Tae-wook, 149-176. Seoul: Politeria.

Choi Tae-wook. 2014. *Hanguk-hyeong Habuije Dokrijuui-reul Malhada* [Talking About Korean-style Consensus-Based Democracy]. Seoul: Chaeksesang.

Mill, John Stuart. 2013. *Jayu-ron* [On Liberty]. Translated by Seo Byung-hoon. Seoul: Chaeksesang.

Crepaz, Markus M., and Vicki Birchfield, 2000. “Global Economics, Local Politics: Lijphart's Theory of Consensus Democracy and the Politics of Inclusion."Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Kloppenberg, James. 1986. Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[1] This article is a revised and supplemented excerpt from chapters 8 and the preface of the author's edited volume, "Can Liberalism Be Progressive?" The 'consensus democracy' used here is a concept that forms one axis of the two major types of democracy classified by Lijphart (2012). If the other axis, 'majoritarian democracy,' is called a winner-take-all democracy, then this consensus democracy can be called a power-sharing democracy.

[2] Therefore, while the reform of electoral systems and the restructuring of power are the two major tasks for the development of inclusive politics, this article focuses on the issue of electoral system reform.

■ Author: Choi Tae-uk_Director of the Korea Liberal Arts Center. Obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from UCLA. Served as a professor at Handong Global University, a professor at Hallym University of Graduate Studies, an editorial board member at Changbi, and a co-representative of the Proportional Representation Democracy Alliance. His main research areas include democracy and market economy, political economy of the welfare state, and East Asian economic integration. His major works include "Can Liberalism Be Progressive?" (edited), "Making a Welfare Korea" (edited), "Discussing Korean-style Consensus Democracy," and "The Youth Party."

■ Editor: Yoon Ha-eun_EAI Research Fellow

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