[EAI Working Paper] Series on Liberalism ①_ An Apology for Liberalism

I. The Current State of Liberalism: The Paradox of Excess and Deficiency

As economic polarization has become blatant worldwide in the latter half of the 20th century, liberalism has come to be seen as the cause of various social problems. In particular, as criticism of neoliberalism has intensified since the 2008 economic crisis, liberalism is often pointed to as the structural cause of all social ills. Although there are variations domestically and internationally, critical discourse on liberalism has been fierce in the 21st century.[1] Has liberalism as an ideology reached the end of its lifespan?

However, upon closer examination of the voices criticizing liberalism, the object of criticism is not the liberal ideology itself, but rather social systems or phenomena that appear to be aligned with liberal ideology. Criticizing an ideology based on unsatisfactory social phenomena without closely examining the causal relationship between ideology and social phenomena distorts the purpose of the ideology and unfairly undermines the values that should be preserved. The prevalent criticism of liberalism in our society today shows these signs. Those who criticize liberalism often reduce socially prominent issues of unfairness or inequality to problems of liberalism and pursue their partisan interests by making liberalism a scapegoat. To them, liberalism is merely an incomplete and flawed ideology. Of course, there are also those who vigorously defend liberalism. However, they too utilize liberalism as a means to gain partisan advantage, not by defending the original values of liberalism, but by opposing the critics of liberalism.

It is understandable that ideologies are used as partisan tools in real politics. However, if an ideology is completely reduced to a partisan tool, it will inevitably become hollowed out. In the case of liberalism, its fundamental values recede, and it tends to be arbitrarily interpreted according to political advantage or disadvantage. If this situation continues, we may even forget why we have defended liberalism all along and what it means for its values to be enshrined in the Constitution. All ideologies may fade away at the appropriate time. However, we must refrain from missing out on the values that still need to be defended through an ideology due to prejudice against that ideology. It is time to re-examine the fundamental values of liberalism.

Given the current situation of widespread dissatisfaction with liberalism, the first question that arises is, as briefly mentioned earlier, whether this dissatisfaction is with the liberal ideology itself or the values it pursues, or whether it is about its application, i.e., the scope and extent to which liberalism should be applied. In other words, where does the dissatisfaction with liberalism stem from? At first glance, dissatisfaction with liberalism seems to stem from disappointment and vigilance regarding the fact that all areas of our society are dominated by the 'logic of the market'—competition and pursuit of profit—as can be seen in the aversion and lament towards neoliberalism. The argument is that even if the logic of the market is accepted in the economic sphere, its application in the political, educational, and cultural spheres represents an excessive expansion of liberalism.

Viewed this way, the common denominator of criticism of liberalism is not dissatisfaction with liberalism itself, but dissatisfaction with its 'excessive' expansion, its 'overreach.' If so, what does it mean to curb the 'excessive' expansion of liberalism and maintain its 'appropriate' level? Some, contrary to concerns about the excess of liberalism, point to its deficiency. They argue that the values of liberalism that should be upheld are not being properly respected. Then, to what extent should liberalism be maintained? Above all, what are the values of liberalism that should be maintained? Beyond economic liberalism, represented by the logic of the market, what other values does liberalism encompass? This paper will address a series of issues related to the excess and deficiency of liberalism and ultimately argue that it remains a useful ideology for setting the direction that our society and nation should pursue.

There was a time when liberalism clearly demonstrated its value as an ideology. This was in the post-World War II era when totalitarianism threatened the world. At that time, liberalism was the ideological bulwark of humanity against the inhuman actions of totalitarianism and was considered an ideal for political communities to pursue. During the Cold War, liberalism played a leading role as the ideology that saved humanity from communism. Now, the threats of totalitarianism and communism no longer exist. The 'evil' ideologies that would clearly present liberalism ideologically have disappeared. In this situation, it is not easy to argue for the ideological usefulness of liberalism. However, this paper seeks to persuade readers of the value and usefulness of liberalism in two ways:

The first is to confirm the values of liberalism by examining its political and ideological origins. This is not to pursue academic rigor regarding liberalism. Discussing liberalism as an ideology is somewhat distant from academic rigor. Rather, it is to examine the origins of liberal political thought as a mirror to reflect on why we criticize or defend liberalism. One of the purposes of this paper is to clearly show the values with which liberalism began by examining its political and ideological origins. Whether we continue to respect and maintain those values or consider them unnecessary in the 21st century is our choice.

The second is to explore the usefulness of liberalism by discussing its relationship with other ideologies pursued by our community. For example, we will examine the relationship between liberalism and the issue of fairness, which has recently become controversial in our society. Fairness is valued as an important value in any society. However, opinions differ on what true fairness is. As the saying 'If I do it, it's romance; if others do it, it's an affair' (내로남불) is rampant, the issue of fairness has become a spark for conflict and confrontation between those who advocate fairness from different perspectives (Kim Seok-ho et al. 2021). This paper will discuss the relationship between liberalism and ideologies that are at the center of controversy, such as fairness. In addition to fairness, other values that our society pursues but are subject to controversy include democracy, the rule of law, and conservatism.[2]

Our society is currently in a state of severe confusion regarding the scope and extent of application of various ideologies and the priority among values. Based on this awareness, this paper aims to contribute to finding out what values and ideals we truly desire by discussing the relationship between various ideologies and liberalism. This process will be an act of holding up a mirror to ourselves in liberalism. Of course, this does not claim that liberalism is a comprehensive ideology that encompasses all other ideologies and values, nor that it is an absolute standard. Rather, by examining the ideological origins of liberalism and establishing its relationship with other values, we aim to confirm what we truly desire and to paint an ideological self-portrait of ourselves.

II. The Political and Ideological Origins of Liberalism: Hobbes, Locke, and Mill's Liberalism

It is clear that liberalism has its origins in Western thought. Nevertheless, the reason why this Western thought is considered important to us is that we largely sympathize with its ideological value. Why do we sympathize with the value of liberalism? What are its ideological origins?

The first figure who can be identified as the ideological origin of liberalism is the 17th-century political thinker Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes's political philosophy, well-known for advocating absolute monarchy, may sound unusual as an interpretation of the ideological origin of liberalism. However, according to Leo Strauss, one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th century, Hobbes is precisely the figure who opened up new horizons for liberalism (Strauss 2007).

Considering Hobbes as the undisputed ideological origin of liberal thought is because he views the establishment of the modern state as the result of a covenant, that is, a social contract, entered into by individuals. As is well known, the Leviathan that emerges from this social contract is a monster with absolute power that no one can challenge (Hobbes 1996). Therefore, individuals living under the Leviathan are far from enjoying the passive liberty advocated by Mill. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the very existence of this Leviathan is based on the will of individuals who wish to escape the state of nature. Hobbes grants absolute power to the Leviathan to reflect the will of individuals who judge that they will not return to the state of nature, which he describes as the worst possible condition. This is because the state of nature is a state of war of all against all, where one cannot relax for a moment. In such a state of war, individuals can hardly guarantee their survival, let alone their freedom. While it is debatable whether the state of nature, devoid of state power, is indeed a state of war as Hobbes conceived it, what is noteworthy here is that Hobbes was the first modern social contract theorist to base the existence of the state on the guarantee of individual survival and freedom. We still question whether Hobbes's Leviathan effectively guaranteed individual survival and freedom. Nevertheless, we agree with Hobbes's conception that the most fundamental reason for the existence of the state is to guarantee the life, safety, and freedom of individuals.

Before Hobbes's social contract theory emerged, the generally accepted reason for the existence of the state was understood as a means to realize God's will or a path to fulfill nature's hidden purpose (telos) (Strauss 1965). Before Hobbes, the existence of the state took precedence over the existence of the individual. It was only with Hobbes that the establishment of the state began to be discussed on the premise of individual rights. By defining the reason for the state's existence as individual survival and freedom, Hobbes took the first step toward liberalism. Since the birth of the modern state, it has been taken for granted that the state must protect the lives and freedoms of its citizens. However, the fact that Hobbes was the one who opened this door to liberalism has not received much attention. Hobbesian liberalism makes it clear that the state can never precede the individual and that it is an artificial construct created by individual will. If we argue that individuals are never a part or an appendage of the state, or at least implicitly prioritize the existence of the individual over the existence of the state, then we can be said to be on the same side as Hobbesian liberalism.

Of course, Hobbesian liberalism has serious flaws. Although the state is established to guarantee individual life and freedom, a sovereign with absolute power can threaten individual life and freedom at any time. For Hobbes, the emergence of such absolute power is an unavoidable consequence of escaping the state of nature he postulates. Without the existence of absolute power, individuals can never escape the state of nature, which he describes as the worst possible condition. If individual existence is prioritized over state existence, is the birth of the Hobbesian state paradoxically unavoidable? John Locke, another modern social contract theorist, was a political thinker who, while accepting Hobbesian liberalism's prioritization of individual survival and freedom, grappled with how to allay concerns about the possibility of an absolute state infringing upon individual freedom.

Locke's liberalism subordinates state power to law to prevent its abuse. Law not only grants authority to state power but also prescribes limitations. For modern people, Locke's liberalism, which enshrines the limitation of state power through the rule of law, is more familiar than Hobbes's liberalism. If Hobbesian liberalism emphasized individual rights, Lockean liberalism emphasized the rule of law for their practical guarantee. To justify the limitation of state power through law, the necessity of the state having absolute power must be denied. The basis for Hobbes's justification of the state's absolute power was the misery of the state of nature. For Hobbes, the state of nature is the worst possible condition, so anything that can escape it is justifiable.

Locke modifies the character of the state of nature described by Hobbes. Locke's state of nature is not a perpetual state of war but a generally peaceful state where natural law operates. However, since violations of natural law occasionally occur, a judge is needed to prevent them and to restore infringed rights. The legislator should fulfill this role, and the legislator, as the de facto sovereign, limits the exercise of state power. It is worth noting that this theory of the state of nature by Locke reflects a predominantly Christian worldview. According to this view, humans in the state of nature are creatures of God, and as long as God permits, humans enjoy freedom and equality among themselves. Moreover, although the state of nature is not perfectly harmonious, it does not possess destructive properties that would annihilate all of humanity. As creatures, humans are endowed by God with an inner capacity, reason, to preserve humanity as a whole, and through this reason, humans can know the natural law that governs what they can and cannot do to others. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue which of the states of nature posited by Hobbesian liberalism and Lockean liberalism is more persuasive. However, what we want to point out here is that if we accept Lockean liberalism, which limits state power, we must acknowledge that natural law can be discovered and observed through reason, and implicitly accept the Christian value of preserving humanity as a whole (Locke 1996).

If the rule of law is one pillar of Lockean liberalism, the other pillar is the recognition of individual property rights. Locke argued that even in the state of nature, individuals can possess property rights through their labor. God granted the entire natural world as a common possession to humanity, and the results of an individual's labor, which are exclusively attributable to that individual, can be claimed as property (Locke 1996). Locke further made these property rights the core rights that individuals should be guaranteed by the state. The state should not only guarantee property rights in relations between private individuals but also should not demand costs beyond security and defense from individuals. If Lockean liberalism is based on the rule of law to limit state power and the guarantee of individual property rights, then this liberalism fundamentally aims for a limited government, a 'small government.' In this context, Lockean liberalism is distant from the welfare state.

The guarantee of individual property rights by a small government can foster wealth accumulation and consequently lead to wealth inequality. From the perspective of Lockean liberalism, this inequality of outcomes is justified as the result of individual choices and efforts under the same conditions. The evaluation of individual choices and efforts is determined by the market in which individuals voluntarily participate. Interfering with this market logic is an artificial intervention and is therefore unjust, whether it is carried out by private individuals or the state. Market logic is not only a principle that justly allocates each person's share but is also considered the most efficient principle for operating a community.

Finally, the most fundamental reason we support liberalism is that we can never give up individual freedom. However, the pursuit of individual freedom is not a simple matter when considering coexistence with others within a community. The pursuit of individual freedom directly conflicts with the pursuit of freedom by others, and appropriate measures are needed to resolve this conflict. The pursuit of individual freedom is immediately intertwined with the limitation of freedom, and the guarantee of individual freedom can ultimately be defined as limiting the limitation of freedom. What serves as the standard for guaranteeing both my freedom and the freedom of others? At least, should not my actions that do not harm others be freely guaranteed? If you agree with this line of reasoning, you have stepped into the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, the 19th-century British philosopher and utilitarian.

Mill emphasizes the freedom that individuals should be guaranteed by the state or society. Within the scope of not harming others, individuals' lifestyles, personalities, and above all, freedom of thought and expression should be broadly guaranteed. Mill's liberalism argues that even if the guarantee of such freedom leads to consequences detrimental to the individual, the decisions made by the individual should be respected. The state or society should not act as a guardian for adults, and individual happiness should be left entirely to individual decisions. In this way, the freedom enjoyed by individuals is freedom from interference by the state or society, i.e., negative liberty. As a utilitarian, Mill applies the utilitarian perspective that the guarantee of such negative liberty ultimately contributes to the development and progress of society, i.e., enhances the overall utility of society (Mill 2007).

We also sympathize with the need for negative liberty. The strict regulation of state or societal intrusion into private life is a reflection of this thinking. However, it is questionable whether modern people strictly adhere to the guarantee of negative liberty as advocated by Mill. Modern states already take responsibility for individual happiness on a broad scale. Beyond traditional responsibilities such as national defense and public safety, they are responsible for individual welfare in broad areas such as education, health, and old age. To this end, the state manages a considerable amount of personal information. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the state's responsibility and authority for public health have been significantly strengthened.[3] In this situation, a return to traditional liberalism, at least as advocated by Mill, seems impossible. However, negative liberty cannot be completely abandoned. The abandonment of negative liberty invites totalitarianism. So, how can we guarantee individual negative liberty while acknowledging the state's responsibilities and authority? We need to recall Mill's principle of 'liberty within the bounds of not harming others.' As long as that condition is met, individual freedom should be guaranteed.

One thing is worth noting: the judgment of 'harming others' can be applied very broadly depending on one's perspective. Actions that appear to be solely the concern of the individual actor can, from a macro perspective, be seen as harming others. Mill points out that drugs and gambling not only ruin individual lives but also impose social costs, thereby harming others. In fact, as long as humans live in a community, nothing exists that does not affect others. From this perspective, it becomes difficult to guarantee individual negative liberty. For this reason, Mill argues that actions that harm others or affect society must be defined very narrowly. Otherwise, negative liberty can be interfered with by the state or society at any time.

From Mill's perspective, the responsibilities and authority of the modern state would be a cause for concern. Paradoxically, the expansion of the responsibilities and authority of the modern state is the result of constant demands from individuals to the state since the 20th century. The problem is that the resulting contraction of negative liberty is relatively unnoticed. This is not an argument for minimizing the state's role to restore negative liberty. Rather, it is to keep in mind that when we demand greater responsibility from the state regarding individual lives, a reduction in negative liberty follows. Demanding that the state be responsible for individual lives and welfare comes with a price. Mill's liberalism makes us reconsider the extent to which we should allow state authority and responsibility, and how much we want to secure the guarantee of negative liberty. In particular, we need to consider how much responsibility we should demand from the government, which is struggling to respond to the pandemic, for individual health, and indeed life and death, and to what extent we should accept the price of reduced negative liberty that we inevitably have to pay.

Despite our various 'dissatisfactions' with liberalism, there is a fundamental reason why we still cling to it. This fundamental reason is confirmed through the ideological origins of liberalism. As examined earlier, although Hobbes advocated for the absoluteness of state power, his absolutism presupposes the guarantee of individual freedom and rights. Locke, through the rule of law, limited state power and made the guarantee of individual property rights a primary role of the state. Mill sought to prevent the abuse of power by the state and society through the guarantee of negative liberty. These liberal elements originating from its ideological roots are the reasons why we cannot abandon liberalism.

However, we do not unilaterally advocate for any one of these liberalisms. On the one hand, we reject interference from state power, but on the other hand, we recognize the supremacy of state power and the sovereignty of the state. On the one hand, we recognize the sovereignty of the state, but on the other hand, we believe that the exercise of state power must be limited by law. Furthermore, on the one hand, we believe that the reason for the state's existence is to guarantee individual rights, especially property rights, but on the other hand, we believe that the state should play a redistributive role in the face of extreme inequality resulting from it. Where is the balance point between individual freedom and the role of the state? We have confirmed that negative liberty, state sovereignty and limitation, and the guarantee of individual property rights are important values of liberalism with their own ideological foundations. However, questions remain about how to pursue them harmoniously. How the various elements of liberalism maintain harmony and balance becomes clearer when we coordinate their relationship with other values. As mentioned earlier, we consider not only liberalism but also fairness, justice, democracy, and the rule of law as precious values that our society must follow. Now, by specifically examining the relationship between liberalism and these values, we intend to further clarify what ultimately our desired values are.

III. The Practice and Application of Liberalism: Conservatism, Democracy, Fairness

The values of liberalism, rooted in the political thought of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, possess a universality that transcends time and place. However, the practice and application of liberal values manifest differently depending on the era and the circumstances of each country. While American liberalism, from its founding, has contrasted with republicanism and represented a progressive and pluralistic social ideology, European liberalism contrasts with socialism and represents an individualistic and market-centered trend. Furthermore, while American liberalism accepts the state's role in creating a more equal society and tolerates a 'big government,' European liberalism emphasizes individual capabilities and tends to check state intervention.[4] While American and European liberalism are not entirely mutually exclusive, the application of liberalism can appear in completely different ways in their respective contexts.

Looking back at Korean political history, Korean liberalism has also developed in a unique way according to the historical context. Since the founding of the Republic of Korea, liberalism has been understood as a Western and modern view of the state, departing from traditional views, and as the primary ideology opposing communism. During the democratization period, liberalism was equated with democracy or accepted as an ideological tool to resist undemocratic state mechanisms (Moon Ji-young 2011). Meanwhile, after democratization, Korean liberalism, along with the global trend of neoliberalism, has been linked to the New Right movement and is generally understood as the ideological foundation of conservatism and conservative parties. In this context, liberalism has been regarded as an aspirational ideology depending on the status of conservatism in Korean society, or as an oppressive ideology that perpetuates vested interests.

If it is an undeniable fact that the current state of Korean liberalism is largely linked to conservatism, then there is a need to discuss the relationship between liberalism and conservatism (Kang Jung-in and Kim Hyun-ah 2006). First, it is important to note that conservatism is not simply the ideology of conservative parties but a distinct political ideology in its own right. Conservatism means maintaining and preserving something. Therefore, conservatism refers to an attitude or disposition to conserve institutions, values, or ideologies politically. However, this conservative disposition does not reject all change. If we take Burke's conservatism as the archetype, conservatism respects existing institutions and traditions as rational outcomes produced by human reason and approaches changes to them very cautiously. This attitude does not reject clear improvements or progress. It simply prefers gradual reform over revolution (Kirk 1986).

If conservatism implies respect for tradition based on gradual reform, it is somewhat distant from the image of conservatism prevalent in Korean society. In Korean society, conservatism is strongly perceived as an ideology used by the ruling power to protect its vested interests. This image often makes conservatism a target of criticism, and it creates a social atmosphere where people are reluctant to identify themselves as supporters of conservatism. 'Shy conservatives' is a term that emerged from this background. However, can the protection of vested interests by the ruling power simply be called conservatism? If so, can the behavior of the so-called democratization generation, the '586 generation,' in asserting their vested interests also be called conservatism? They would certainly refuse to be called conservatives. They consider not themselves but the previous generation, the so-called authoritarian generation, and groups that seem to share roots with them, as those holding vested interests. However, with several democratic government changes since democratization, vested interests have also been circulating. Nevertheless, to attribute the 'bad' image of conservatism to the opposing camp and to perpetuate their own vested interests is to fall into the bad conservatism they themselves have created.

The fundamental problem of conservatism is not who holds vested interests, but what should be conserved and what are the values of conservatism. In principle, the values of conservatism are not fixed. In Korean political history, conservatism has represented anti-communism, the ROK-US alliance, and industrialization, but these cannot be considered values of conservatism in themselves. Conservatism is not about pursuing fixed values but rather an attitude and disposition that rejects radical change and prefers gradual reform. However, the question arises as to what constitutes rejecting radical change and preferring gradual reform. Liberalism can provide conservatism with substantive values to preserve in response to this question. As confirmed through the ideological origins of liberalism, liberalism is the most universal value that has defined the relationship between individuals and the state since modernity and possesses ideological elements that modern states can consider traditional values. To reiterate, conservatism does not blindly preserve tradition but pursues gradual reform. That is, when liberalism and conservatism are combined, it is possible to adhere to the principles of liberalism while allowing for practical reforms. For example, limiting state power and role is a principle of liberalism, but how much it should be limited and allowed depends on how liberalism is applied in reality. How much state interference in private life should be allowed as a response to the COVID-19 situation, and how much state intervention in the market should be allowed to solve housing problems, are not issues of liberalism versus anti-liberalism, but rather issues of how to practice liberalism in reality and how to correct liberalism to address the dissatisfaction that arises in this process.

Viewed this way, conservatism is a form of modification of liberalism, indicating how the principles of liberalism should be accepted and improved in reality. Furthermore, liberalism provides the content for what values conservatism should preserve. For example, the state's guarantee of individual property rights can be considered a basic principle of liberalism. However, if the state is responsible not only for individual safety but also for welfare and even for alleviating inequality, then limitations on individual property rights are inevitable. The modification of liberalism does not inherently object to the state limiting individual property rights. However, there can be disagreements about the extent and scope of such limitations. To what extent can the state limit individual property rights to resolve economic polarization? Broadly and rapidly limiting individual property rights, regardless of the purpose, can lead to the negation of liberalism itself. Conservatism can serve as a mechanism to regulate the degree and speed of change within the bounds of not undermining traditional liberal values. Conservatism can rationally adjust the modification of liberalism, while liberalism can provide essential values to conservatism, thus maintaining an interdependent relationship.

Democracy is another ideology that requires consideration of its connection with liberalism. Basically, liberalism and democracy are understood as a harmonious ideological combination. If democracy is understood as a form of government that contrasts with tyranny or dictatorship, meaning a system where the people hold sovereignty, then democracy pursues the values of liberalism, which prioritizes individual freedom and rights. However, if democracy is understood not as a form of government but as a political ideology that the community should be governed by the will of the majority, then democracy has the potential to conflict with liberalism. The rule of the majority can be confused with the tyranny of the majority or populism. The tyranny of the majority or populism has the potential to infringe upon the individual freedom and rights pursued by liberalism. However, it is practically very difficult to determine at what point democracy crosses the line from legitimate majority rule to the tyranny of the majority. Furthermore, the distinction between opinion politics for the acquisition of democratic legitimacy and populism is not clear.

In this situation, the value of liberalism has the effect of making us aware of the point at which democracy is abused or deviates. As confirmed in the ideological origins of liberalism, liberalism allows the state to limit individual freedom, but the basis for that limitation lies in the rule of law. Fundamentally, democracy and the rule of law are in a state of tension (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). This is primarily because the current will of the majority does not need to be bound by laws enacted by the deceased past. If the law is disregarded in the name of democracy, it can no longer protect individual freedom and rights. Therefore, the Constitution exists as the last bastion of the rule of law. Of course, the Constitution can be amended by democratic will, but the procedures are very stringent, and changing the fundamental spirit of the Constitution often entails revolution. We consider the Constitution to be the fundamental principle that defines the relationship between individuals and the state, embodying liberal values. Therefore, democracy must respect the liberal values pursued by the Constitution. If there is an attempt to disregard the rule of law in the name of 'democratic' will and undermine the liberal values enshrined in the Constitution, this can be seen as a sign that the abuse and deviation of democracy are beginning.

Fundamentally, liberalism allows state intervention for the common good. However, this common good can include not only minimalist common goods such as public safety and national defense but also expanded common goods required by modern society, such as welfare, alleviation of inequality, and realization of global values. The expansion of the common good is legitimized through democracy. However, the abuse and deviation of democracy can potentially lead to indiscriminate infringement of individual freedom and rights in the name of the common good. Respecting the liberal values inherent in the Constitution based on the rule of law will prevent democracy from devolving into the tyranny of the majority or populism, or the state from unjustly infringing upon individual freedom and rights. It is necessary to remember that liberalism is undeniably the most core principle of social organization that our Constitution pursues (Moon Ji-young 2019).

Finally, we will discuss the relationship between fairness and liberalism, which has become the most controversial issue in our society recently. In any society, fairness and justice are pursued, and when it is felt that they are not functioning properly, the community faces a crisis of collapse. In this context, an increase in dissatisfaction with fairness and justice can be seen as a sign of crisis in our society. What perspective can liberalism offer on the social crisis surrounding fairness?

Fairness fundamentally questions whether the rules and processes in competition towards a common goal are fair to all participants. Procedural fairness requires that the rules of competition be transparent to participants and consistently maintained. Above all, procedural fairness requires that all participants in the competition have equal opportunities without discrimination. If someone has a head start or is excluded from participation from the beginning for any reason, it cannot be considered fair. Liberalism's principle is to accept outcomes that result from a fair process. By the nature of competition, not all participants can achieve the results they desire. Differential benefits are naturally distributed according to individual choices and efforts. An individual who acted according to liberal principles but did not achieve the desired benefits may lament the outcome, but they cannot complain about the rules and processes.

Nevertheless, do those who achieve lower results still express dissatisfaction with fairness because they do not understand that fairness cannot go beyond equality of opportunity in the process of competition? Liberalism answers this question affirmatively, but with a caveat. It argues that we must examine whether equality of opportunity has been properly provided. Fundamentally, liberalism considers demands beyond equality of opportunity to be outside the scope of liberalism. However, the apparent equality of opportunity can be a very limited equality that does not consider the diverse circumstances and conditions individuals face. An applicant who was born into a wealthy family, received extensive private education, and an applicant struggling through difficult circumstances cannot be said to be at the same starting line. But there is a blind spot here. Can equality of opportunity be perfectly provided? Individual innate tendencies, aptitudes, and talents significantly influence outcomes. Not only the economic status of parents but also the family atmosphere and environment can affect the outcome of competition. It is impossible from the outset to place all competitors at a perfectly identical starting line. But there is another blind spot. Those who are dissatisfied with the outcome claim the disadvantage of the process due to unequal starting lines, but it is also difficult to prove whether this was the decisive factor. We often meet people who fail even in good family environments, and people who succeed under difficult conditions. In such situations, the solution of liberalism is to provide equality of opportunity by excluding discernible discrimination, but to acknowledge that this is insufficient, and to strive to compensate for the resulting inequality as much as possible. The resulting inequality is partly due to an unfair process that was not fully revealed, and partly not. Most outcomes are a mixture of these.

In conclusion, liberalism views it as impossible to make all outcomes just. This does not mean that the injustice of outcomes does not exist. However, it cautions against negating the entire social system based on the premise of injustice in outcomes. Using the example of university admissions, liberalism argues that as much as possible, all applicants should be given equal opportunities, but it acknowledges that this does not perfectly ensure justice in outcomes. For this reason, affirmative action, rather than a purely competitive approach, may be adopted. Of course, such affirmative action does not fully restore justice. It is incomplete on its own. However, since the principle of competition itself, which is the basic principle of admissions, cannot be denied, we pursue compensation to the extent agreed upon by society. Liberalism aims to restore fairness in the process as a primary solution to injustice in outcomes, and if that is insufficient, to compensate for the injustice revealed in the outcomes.

What can be considered injustice in outcomes? As economic polarization has deepened recently, the rise in the proportion of financial income, the uneven rise in real estate prices, and the extreme inequality in wages between management and labor have been cited as causes. Liberalism considers it impossible to fully restore the resulting inequality justly. However, it does not justify these phenomena as they are. Liberalism allows for compensation to strata, groups, and individuals in unequal positions. The issue is the scope and extent of such compensation. Liberalism believes that compensation should occur to the extent that liberal values are accepted by society, that it is generally recognized as fair by our society, and that trust in the social system can be built upon this foundation. Therefore, which strata, groups, or individuals should be designated as recipients of compensation becomes a subject of debate. From the perspective of liberalism, the criterion will be the establishment of social trust that enables the full realization of liberal values. Although a fair process does not lead to perfectly just outcomes, at least compensation should be made to the extent that trust in the social system is maintained.

IV. 결론

In real politics, it is inevitable that political ideologies are used as tools for partisan struggle. Perhaps, the moment the partisan utility of liberalism as an ideology diminishes, liberalism will eventually remain as a relic of intellectual history. All political ideologies are frameworks of thought and values used to better understand the society and community we inhabit, and to lead our society and community in a more desirable direction. In this context, if the ideology of liberalism were to disappear, it would mean that it has fulfilled its value as an ideology, so there is no need to worry or lament it. However, there is something to ask ourselves at this point. Has liberalism fulfilled its utility as an ideology at this juncture? Is liberalism no longer a useful ideology for our society to develop into a better place? To answer this question, this paper has re-examined the values contained within the ideology of liberalism.

Earlier, we identified Hobbesian liberalism, Lockean liberalism, and Mill's liberalism as the ideological origins of liberalism and reaffirmed the most fundamental values of liberalism from them. If Hobbes's liberalism, contrary to its outward appearance, opened up a horizon for liberalism that prioritizes individual freedom and rights over the state, Locke's liberalism emphasized that state authority should be limited by the rule of law while acknowledging the state's responsibilities and authority centered on the guarantee of individual property rights. Mill's liberalism reaffirmed individualism, which excludes paternalism in the relationship between individuals and the state.

Liberalism, with these ideological origins, inevitably undergoes various modifications in its practice and application. In particular, when connected with various ideologies or values embraced by our society, such as conservatism, democracy, and the issue of fairness, liberalism cannot pursue purely liberal values and faces various challenges. Nevertheless, in the current situation of confusion and intermingling of political ideologies, liberalism offers a certain utility. In relation to conservatism, liberalism provides the substantive values that conservatism should preserve, while conservatism suggests how liberalism should be newly transformed. Democracy and the rule of law have historically been in a state of tension, and liberal values play a role in providing balance and centrality. In the recent discussion of fairness, liberalism also offers a constructive direction. Amidst the clashing of various political ideologies, liberalism can serve as a beacon, illuminating what values we truly desire and what path our society should take. ■

References

Berkowitz, Roger & Taun N. Toay.eds. 2012. The Intellectual Origins of the Global Financial Crisis. NY: Fordham University Press.

Brown, Wendy. 2019. In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West. NY: Columbia University Press.

Deneen, Patrick J. 2018. Why Liberalism Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America: an Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution. NY: Harcourt Brace.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1996 (org. 1651). Leviathan. ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, Russell. 1986. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot. Washington DC: Regnery Publishing.

Locke, John. 1988 (org. 1689). Two Treatises of Government. ed. Peter Laskett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maravall, José & Adam Przeworski. eds. 2003. Democracy and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mill, John Stewart. 2007 (org. 1851). On Liberty and the Subjection of Women. ed. Alan Ryan. NY: Penguin Classics.

Strauss, Leo. 1965. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, Leo. 2007 (org. 1929). “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political.” in Carl Schmitt. The Concept of the Political. trans. George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Кан Чон-ин, Ким Хён-а. 2006. “Консервативный взгляд в Южной Корее после демократизации: конвергенция к либеральной демократии?” «Социальные науки» 14(2).

Ким До-гюн. 2020. «Что такое справедливость в корейском обществе: грамматика справедливости и честности в нашей Конституции». Аканет.

Ким Сок-хо и др. 2021. «На пути к справедливому обществу». Сигунса.

Мун Чжи-ён. 2011. «Власть и сопротивление: два лица корейского либерализма». Гуманитас.

Мун Чжи-ён. 2019. ««Базовый порядок либеральной демократии» и конституционные идеалы Кореи: сосредоточение на проблемах пересмотра преамбулы Конституции» «Человек, Окружающая Среда, Будущее» № 23 (осень).

Пак Сон-у. 2021. «Размышления о человечности, государственности и глобальности в эпоху пост-короны». Рабочий документ Института международных исследований Сеульского национального университета.

[1] Редакция, посвященная политико-идеологическому рассмотрению связи финансового кризиса 2008 года и либерализма, со ссылкой на Berkowitz & Toay (2012). В частности, ссылка на Brown (2019) как на исследование, критикующее возможность связи неолиберализма с антидемократическими политическими группами.

[2] О ценностях честности и справедливости, закрепленных в нашей Конституции, см. Ким До-гюн (2020).

[3] О расширении полномочий государства и связанных с этим проблемах после пандемии коронавируса см. Пак Сон-у (2021).

[4] О либеральных основах основания Соединенных Штатов см. Hartz (1955).

■ Автор: Пак Сон-у_ Профессор факультета международных отношений Сеульского национального университета. Получил докторскую степень по политологии в Чикагском университете. Работал преподавателем в Чикагском университете, доцентом в Университете Чунг-Ан и др. Основные области исследований: международная политическая мысль и классическая политическая философия. Автор книги «Политика заботы о душе: истоки и развитие политической философии Платона», а также статей, таких как «Философско-политическая критика теории ответственности Лео Штрауса за войну в Ираке», «Моральные пределы преследования национальных интересов и политика блага Аристотеля».

■ Ответственный за выпуск и редактирование: Юн Ха-ын_ Исследователь EAI

   Контакт: 02 2277 1683 (доб. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr