[EAI Working Paper] Liberalism Series ①_ A Defense of Liberalism

I. The Current State of Liberalism: The Paradox of Excess and Deficiency

As economic polarization has become blatant worldwide in the latter half of the 20th century, liberalism has come under scrutiny as the cause of various social problems. Particularly since the 2008 economic crisis, as criticism of neoliberalism has intensified, liberalism is often pointed to as the structural cause of all social ills. While there are variations domestically and internationally, critical discourse surrounding liberalism has been fierce in the 21st century.[1] Has liberalism, as an ideology, run its course?

However, upon closer examination of the voices criticizing liberalism, the target of criticism is not the ideology of liberalism itself, but rather social systems or phenomena that appear to be aligned with liberal ideology. Criticizing an ideology based on unsatisfactory social phenomena without closely examining the causal relationship between the ideology and social phenomena distorts the purpose of the ideology and unfairly damages the values that should be preserved. These signs are evident in the widespread criticism of liberalism in our current society. Those who criticize liberalism often reduce socially prominent issues of unfairness or inequality to problems of liberalism, and use liberalism as a scapegoat to pursue their own partisan interests. To them, liberalism is merely an incomplete and flawed ideology. Of course, there are also those who vigorously defend liberalism. However, they too, rather than defending the original values of liberalism, merely utilize liberalism as a means to gain partisan advantage, from the opposite side of the critics of liberalism.

We cannot fault ideologies for being used as partisan tools in real politics. However, if an ideology is reduced entirely to a partisan tool, it inevitably becomes hollowed out. In the case of liberalism, its fundamental values have receded, and it tends to be arbitrarily interpreted based on political expediency. If this situation persists, we may even forget why we have defended liberalism thus far, and what it means for its values to be enshrined in the Constitution. All ideologies may fade away at the appropriate time. However, we must refrain from missing out on the values that still need to be protected through an ideology due to prejudice against it. It is time to re-examine the fundamental values of liberalism.

Given the prevailing dissatisfaction with liberalism, the first question worth asking is, as briefly mentioned earlier, whether this dissatisfaction is directed at the ideology of liberalism itself, or the values it pursues, or rather at its application, that is, the scope and degree to which liberalism should be applied. In other words, where does the dissatisfaction with liberalism originate? At first glance, dissatisfaction with liberalism appears to stem from disappointment and apprehension that all areas of our society are dominated by 'market logic' of competition and profit-seeking, as evidenced by the aversion and lament towards neoliberalism. Even if market logic is accepted in the economic sphere, applying it to politics, education, and culture is seen as an excessive expansion of liberalism.

Viewed this way, the common denominator of criticism against liberalism is not dissatisfaction with liberalism itself, but dissatisfaction with its 'excessive' expansion, its 'overreach.' If so, what does it mean to curb the 'excessive' expansion of liberalism and maintain its 'appropriate' level? Some, conversely to concerns about the excess of liberalism, point to its deficiency. They argue that the values of liberalism that should be upheld are not properly respected. Then, in which areas should liberalism be fully maintained? Above all, what are the values of liberalism that should be maintained? Beyond economic liberalism, represented by market logic, what other values does liberalism encompass? This paper will address a series of issues related to the excess and deficiency of liberalism, ultimately arguing that liberalism remains a useful ideology for setting the direction our society and nation should pursue.

There was a time when liberalism clearly demonstrated its value as an ideology. This was in the post-World War II era when totalitarianism threatened the world. At that time, liberalism was the ideological bulwark of humanity against the inhuman actions of totalitarianism and was considered the ideal that political communities should strive for. During the Cold War, liberalism played a leading role as the ideology that saved humanity from communism. Now, the threats of totalitarianism and communism no longer exist. The 'evil' ideologies that would clearly champion liberalism have disappeared. In this context, it is not easy to argue for the ideological utility of liberalism. However, this paper seeks to persuade readers of the value and utility of liberalism in two ways:

First, we aim to confirm the values of liberalism by examining its political and ideological origins. This is not to pursue academic rigor regarding liberalism. Discussing liberalism as an ideology is somewhat distant from academic rigor. Rather, we intend to use the origins of liberal political thought as a mirror to reflect on why we criticize or defend liberalism. One of the objectives of this paper is to more clearly demonstrate the values with which liberalism began by examining its political and ideological origins. Whether we continue to respect and maintain those values, or consider them obsolete in the 21st century, is our choice.

Second, we aim to explore the utility of liberalism by discussing its relationship with other ideologies pursued by our community. For example, we will examine the relationship between fairness, a topic of recent controversy in our society, and liberalism. Fairness is valued as an important value in any society. However, opinions differ on what constitutes true fairness. As the saying 'What I do is romance, what others do is adultery' (내로남불) prevails, the issue of fairness has recently become a spark for conflict and confrontation among those who advocate for fairness from different perspectives (Kim Seok-ho et al. 2021). This paper will discuss the relationship between liberalism and ideologies that are at the center of controversy, such as fairness. Beyond fairness, other values that our society pursues but are subject to controversy include democracy, the rule of law, and conservatism.[2]

Our current society is in serious confusion regarding the scope and degree of application of various ideologies and the prioritization of values. Based on this awareness, this paper aims to contribute to identifying what values and ideologies we truly desire by discussing the relationship between various ideologies and liberalism. This endeavor will be an act of reflecting our own image in the mirror of liberalism. Of course, we are not claiming that liberalism is a comprehensive ideology that encompasses all other ideologies and values, nor an absolute standard. Rather, by examining the ideological origins of liberalism and establishing its relationship with other values, we aim to identify what we truly desire and to paint an ideological self-portrait.

II. The Political and Ideological Origins of Liberalism: Hobbes, Locke, and Mill's Liberalism

It is clear that liberalism has its origins in Western thought. Nevertheless, the reason why this Western thought is considered important to us is that we largely sympathize with its ideological value. Why do we sympathize with the values of liberalism? What are its ideological origins?

The first figure who can be identified as an ideological origin of liberalism is the 17th-century political thinker Thomas Hobbes. Interpreting Hobbes's political philosophy, well-known for advocating absolute monarchy, as an ideological origin of liberalism may sound unusual. However, according to Leo Strauss, one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th century, Hobbes was the one who opened new horizons for liberalism (Strauss 2007).

Considering Hobbes as the undisputed ideological origin of liberal thought stems from his understanding of the establishment of the modern state as the result of a covenant, a social contract, between individuals. As is well known, the Leviathan that emerged from this social contract is a monster with absolute power that no one can challenge (Hobbes 1996). Therefore, individuals living under the Leviathan are far from enjoying the negative liberty advocated by Mill. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the existence of this Leviathan is based on the will of individuals who wish to escape the state of nature. The reason Hobbes grants absolute power to the Leviathan reflects the will of individuals who judge that they will not return to the state of nature, described as the worst possible condition. This is because the state of nature is a state of war of all against all, where one cannot let their guard down for a moment. While it is debatable whether the state of nature, devoid of state power, is indeed a state of war as Hobbes conceived it, what we want to focus on here is that Hobbes was the first modern social contract theorist to base the existence of the state on the guarantee of individual survival and liberty. We still question whether Hobbes's Leviathan effectively guaranteed the survival and liberty of individuals. Nevertheless, we agree with Hobbes's conception that the most fundamental reason for the existence of the state is to guarantee the life, safety, and liberty of individuals.

Before Hobbes's social contract theory emerged, the generally accepted reason for the existence of the state was understood as a means to realize God's will or a path to fulfill nature's hidden purpose (telos) (Strauss 1965). Before Hobbes, the existence of the state took precedence over the existence of the individual. It was only with Hobbes that the establishment of the state began to be discussed based on individual rights. By defining the reason for the state's existence as individual survival and liberty, Hobbes took the first step toward liberalism. Since the birth of the modern state, it has been taken for granted that the state must protect the lives and liberties of its citizens. However, the fact that Hobbes was the one who opened this door to liberalism has not received much attention. Hobbesian liberalism makes it clear that the state can never precede the individual and is an artificial construct created according to the will of individuals. If we argue that individuals are never a part or appendage of the state, or at least implicitly prioritize the existence of the individual over the state, then we can be said to be on the same side as Hobbesian liberalism.

Of course, Hobbesian liberalism has serious flaws. Although the state is established to guarantee individual life and liberty, the sovereign with absolute power can threaten individual life and liberty at any time. For Hobbes, the emergence of such absolute power is an unavoidable consequence of escaping the state of nature he posits. Without the existence of absolute power, individuals can never escape the state of nature, which he describes as the worst possible condition. If we prioritize the existence of the individual over the state, does this paradoxically lead to the inevitable birth of the Hobbesian state? John Locke, another modern social contract theorist, was a political thinker who, while accepting Hobbesian liberalism's prioritization of individual survival and liberty, agonized over how to alleviate concerns about the possibility of an absolute state infringing upon individual liberty.

Locke's liberalism subordinates state power to law to prevent its abuse. Law grants authority to state power while also defining its limitations. For modern people, Locke's liberalism, which codifies the limitations of state power through the rule of law, is more familiar than Hobbes's liberalism. If Hobbesian liberalism emphasized individual rights, Lockean liberalism emphasized the rule of law for their practical guarantee. To justify the limitation of state power through law, the necessity of the state having absolute power must be denied. The basis for Hobbes's justification of the state's absolute power was the misery of the state of nature. For Hobbes, the state of nature is the worst possible condition, so anything that can lead to escaping it is justifiable.

Locke modifies the character of the state of nature described by Hobbes. Locke's state of nature is not a perpetual state of war but a generally peaceful state where natural law operates. However, since violations of natural law occasionally occur, a judge is needed to prevent them and restore infringed rights. The legislator assumes this role and, as the de facto sovereign, limits the exercise of state power. It is important to note that this theory of the state of nature in Locke's thought is heavily influenced by a Christian worldview. According to this view, humans in the state of nature are God's creations, and as long as God permits, humans enjoy freedom and equality among themselves. Furthermore, while the state of nature is not perfectly harmonious, it does not possess destructive properties that would lead to the annihilation of all humanity. As creatures, humans are endowed by God with an innate capacity, reason, to preserve themselves and all of humanity. Through this reason, humans can discern natural law, which dictates what they can and cannot do to others. It is beyond the scope of this paper to debate which of the states of nature posited by Hobbesian and Lockean liberalism is more persuasive. However, what we wish to point out here is that if we accept Lockean liberalism, which limits state power, we must acknowledge that natural law is discovered and observed through reason, and implicitly accept the Christian value of the preservation of all humanity (Locke 1996).

If the rule of law is one pillar of Lockean liberalism, the other pillar is the recognition of individual property rights. Locke argued that even in the state of nature, individuals can possess property through their labor. God granted all of nature as a common inheritance to humanity, and Locke asserted that individuals could claim ownership over the fruits of their labor, which were exclusively their own (Locke 1996). Locke further made this property right a core right that individuals must be guaranteed by the state. The state must not only guarantee property rights in relations between private individuals but also should not demand more than the cost of security and safety from individuals. If Lockean liberalism is based on the rule of law to limit state authority and the guarantee of individual property rights, then such liberalism fundamentally aims for a limited government, a 'small government.' In this context, Lockean liberalism is distant from the welfare state.

The guarantee of individual property rights by a small government can foster wealth accumulation and consequently lead to wealth inequality. From the perspective of Lockean liberalism, this inequality of outcomes is just, as it is the result of individual choices and efforts under the same conditions. The evaluation of individual choices and efforts is determined by the market, in which individuals voluntarily participate. Any intervention in this market logic, whether by private individuals or the state, is considered unjust. Market principles are not only a principle for individuals to justly receive their due but are also considered the most efficient way to operate a community.

Finally, the most fundamental reason we support liberalism is that we can never abandon individual liberty. However, the pursuit of individual liberty is not a simple matter when considering coexistence with others within a community. The pursuit of individual liberty directly conflicts with the pursuit of others' liberty, and appropriate measures are needed to resolve this conflict. The pursuit of individual liberty is immediately intertwined with the limitation of liberty, and the guarantee of individual liberty can ultimately be defined as limiting the limitation of liberty. What serves as the standard for simultaneously guaranteeing my liberty and the liberty of others? At least, should not my actions that do not harm others be freely guaranteed? If you agree with this line of reasoning, you have stepped into the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, the 19th-century British philosopher and utilitarian.

Mill emphasizes the liberty that individuals should be guaranteed by the state or society. Within the scope of not harming others, individuals' ways of life, individuality, and above all, freedom of thought and expression should be broadly guaranteed. Mill's liberalism argues that even if the guarantee of such freedom leads to consequences detrimental to the individual, the decisions made by the individual should be respected. The state or society should not act as a guardian for adults, and individual happiness should be left entirely to individual decisions. In this way, the liberty enjoyed by individuals is freedom from interference by the state or society, i.e., negative liberty. As a utilitarian, Mill applies the utilitarian perspective that the guarantee of such negative liberty ultimately contributes to the development and progress of society, i.e., enhances the overall utility of society (Mill 2007).

We also sympathize with the necessity of negative liberty. The strict regulation of state or societal intrusion into private life is a reflection of this thinking. However, it is questionable whether modern people strictly adhere to the guarantee of negative liberty as advocated by Mill. Modern states already take responsibility for individual well-being on a broad scale. Beyond traditional responsibilities such as national defense and public safety, the state is responsible for individual welfare in a wide range of areas, including education, health, and old age. To this end, the state manages a considerable amount of personal information. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the state's responsibility and authority over public health have been significantly strengthened.[3] In this situation, a return to traditional liberalism, as advocated by Mill at least, seems impossible. However, negative liberty cannot be entirely abandoned. Abandoning negative liberty invites totalitarianism. So, how can we guarantee individual negative liberty while acknowledging the state's responsibilities and authority? We need to recall Mill's principle of 'liberty within the bounds of not harming others.' As long as that condition is met, individual liberty should be guaranteed.

One thing is worth noting. The judgment of 'harming others' can be applied very broadly depending on the perspective. An action that might seem entirely personal to the actor can be seen as harming others from a macroscopic viewpoint. Mill pointed out that drugs and gambling can harm others by not only ruining the individual's life but also incurring social costs. In fact, as long as humans live in a community, nothing exists that does not affect others. From this perspective, guaranteeing individual negative liberty becomes difficult. For this reason, Mill argued that the definition of 'harming others' or actions that socially affect others must be very narrowly defined. Otherwise, negative liberty can be interfered with by the state or society at any time.

From Mill's perspective, the responsibilities and authority of the modern state would be at a concerning level. Paradoxically, the expansion of the modern state's responsibilities and authority is the result of continuous demands from individuals to the state since the 20th century. The problem is that we are relatively unaware of the resulting contraction of negative liberty. We are not arguing for minimizing the state's role to restore negative liberty. However, when we demand greater responsibility from the state regarding individual lives, we must also keep in mind that this entails a reduction in negative liberty. Demanding that the state be responsible for individual lives and well-being comes with a price. Mill's liberalism prompts us to consider how far we should allow state authority and responsibility, and how much we want to secure the guarantee of negative liberty. In particular, we need to consider how much responsibility we should demand from the government, which is striving to respond to the pandemic, for individual health, and even life and death, and to what extent we should tolerate the price of reduced negative liberty that we inevitably pay.

Despite our various 'dissatisfactions' with liberalism, there is a fundamental reason why we still hold onto it. This fundamental reason is confirmed through the ideological origins of liberalism. As examined earlier, although Hobbes advocated for the absoluteness of state power, his absolutism is predicated on the guarantee of individual liberty and rights. Locke, through the rule of law, limited state power and made the guarantee of individual property rights a primary role of the state. Mill sought to prevent the abuse of state and societal power by guaranteeing negative liberty. These ideological origins are the reasons why we still cannot abandon liberalism. Hobbesian liberalism, Lockean liberalism, and Mill's liberalism are the fundamental reasons why we ultimately defend liberalism.

However, we do not unilaterally advocate for any one of these liberalisms. On one hand, we reject interference from state power, but on the other hand, we recognize the supremacy of state power and state sovereignty. On one hand, we recognize state sovereignty, but on the other hand, we believe that the exercise of state power must be limited by law. Furthermore, on one hand, we believe the reason for the state's existence lies in guaranteeing individual rights, especially property rights, but on the other hand, we believe the state should play a role in redistribution to address extreme inequality resulting from this. Where is the balance between individual liberty and the role of the state? We have confirmed that negative liberty, state sovereignty and limitation, and the guarantee of individual property rights are important values of liberalism with their own ideological foundations. However, questions remain about how to pursue these harmoniously. How to maintain harmony and balance among the various elements of liberalism becomes clearer when we coordinate its relationship with other values. As mentioned earlier, we consider not only liberalism but also fairness, justice, democracy, and the rule of law as precious values that our society must follow. We now intend to further clarify what values we ultimately pursue by specifically examining the correlation between liberalism and these values.

III. The Practice and Application of Liberalism: Conservatism, Democracy, Fairness

The values of liberalism, rooted in the political thought of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, possess a universality that transcends time and place. However, the practice and application of liberal values manifest differently depending on the era and the circumstances of each country. While American liberalism, contrasting with republicanism from its founding, represents a progressive and pluralistic flow of social ideology, European liberalism contrasts with socialism, representing an individualistic and market-centric flow. Furthermore, while American liberalism acknowledges the role of the state in creating a more equal society and tolerates a 'big government,' European liberalism tends to emphasize individual capabilities and restrain state intervention.[4] While American and European liberalism are not entirely mutually exclusive, the application of liberalism can manifest in entirely different ways within their respective contexts.

Looking back at Korean political history, Korean liberalism has also developed in unique ways according to its historical context. Since the founding of the Republic of Korea, liberalism was understood as a Western and modern view of the state, departing from traditional views, and as the representative ideology opposing communism. During the democratization period, liberalism was equated with democracy or accepted as an ideological tool to resist undemocratic state mechanisms (Moon Ji-young 2011). Meanwhile, after democratization, Korean liberalism, along with the global trend of neoliberalism, became associated with the New Right movement and is generally understood as the ideological foundation of conservatism and conservative parties. In this context, liberalism has been viewed as an aspirational ideology depending on conservatism's status in Korean society, or as an oppressive ideology that perpetuates vested interests.

If it is an undeniable fact that the current state of Korean liberalism is largely linked to conservatism, then there is a need to discuss the relationship between liberalism and conservatism (Kang Jung-in & Kim Hyun-ah 2006). First, it is important to note that conservatism is not simply the ideology of conservative parties but a political ideology with its own unique characteristics. Conservatism means maintaining and preserving something. Therefore, conservatism refers to an attitude or disposition to politically conserve institutions, values, or ideologies. However, this conservative disposition does not reject all change. If we take Burke's conservatism as the archetype, conservatism respects existing institutions and traditions as the rational outcomes of human reason and approaches changes to them with great caution. This attitude does not reject clear improvements or progress. It simply prefers gradual reform over revolution (Kirk 1986).

If conservatism implies respect for tradition based on gradual reform, it differs somewhat from the image of conservatism prevalent in Korean society. In Korean society, conservatism is largely perceived as an ideology used by ruling powers to protect vested interests. This image often makes conservatism a target of criticism, and it has created a social atmosphere where people are reluctant to identify as supporters of conservatism. 'Shy conservatives' is a term that emerged from this background. However, can the protection of vested interests by the ruling power simply be called conservatism? If so, could the behavior of the so-called democratization generation, the '586 generation,' in asserting their vested interests also be called conservatism? They would undoubtedly reject being called conservatives. They consider those who hold vested interests not to be themselves, but the previous generation, the so-called authoritarian generation, and groups that appear to share roots with them. However, with several democratic regime changes since democratization, vested interests have also rotated. Nevertheless, to attribute the 'bad' image of conservatism to the opposing camp and to perpetuate their own vested interests is to fall into the 'bad conservatism' they themselves have created.

The fundamental issue of conservatism is not who holds vested interests, but what should be conserved and what are the values of conservatism. In principle, the values of conservatism are not fixed in content. While conservatism in Korean political history has represented anti-communism, the ROK-US alliance, and industrialization, these cannot be considered values of conservatism in themselves. Rather than aiming for fixed values, conservatism is an attitude and disposition that rejects radical change and prefers gradual reform, as mentioned earlier. However, the question arises as to what constitutes radical change and what constitutes gradual reform. Liberalism can provide conservatism with the substantive values it should preserve in response to this question. As confirmed through the ideological origins of liberalism, liberalism is the most universal value that has defined the relationship between individuals and the state since modernity, and it possesses ideological elements that modern states can consider traditional values. To reiterate, conservatism does not blindly preserve tradition but pursues gradual reform. That is, when liberalism and conservatism are combined, it is possible to adhere to the principles of liberalism while allowing for practical adaptations and reforms. For example, limiting state power and roles is a principle of liberalism, but how much to limit and allow depends on how liberalism is applied in practice. How much state interference in privacy should be allowed as a response to the COVID-19 situation, or how much state intervention in the market should be allowed to solve housing problems, is not a question of liberalism versus anti-liberalism, but rather a question of how to practice liberalism in reality and how to adjust liberalism to address the dissatisfaction that arises in this process.

Viewed this way, conservatism is a form of adaptation of liberalism, indicating how the principles of liberalism should be accepted and improved in reality. Furthermore, liberalism is the content that tells conservatism what values to preserve. For example, the state guaranteeing individual property rights can be considered one of the basic principles of liberalism. However, if the state is entrusted with the responsibility not only for individual safety but also for welfare and even for addressing inequality, then limitations on individual property rights become unavoidable. The adaptation of liberalism does not inherently object to the state limiting individual property rights. However, there can be disagreements regarding the extent and scope of such limitations. To what extent can the state limit individual property rights to resolve economic polarization? Broad and rapid limitations on individual property rights, regardless of their purpose, can lead to the negation of liberalism itself. Conservatism can serve as a mechanism to adjust the degree and speed of change within the scope of not undermining traditional liberal values. Conservatism can rationally moderate the adaptation of liberalism, while liberalism can provide conservatism with essential values, thus maintaining an interdependent relationship.

Democracy is another ideology that needs to be considered in relation to liberalism. Fundamentally, liberalism and democracy are understood as a harmonious ideological combination. If democracy is understood as a form of government that contrasts with tyranny or dictatorship, meaning a government where the people hold sovereignty, then democracy pursues the values of liberalism, which prioritize individual liberty and rights. However, if democracy is understood not as a form of government but as an ideology of majority rule, where the community should be governed by the will of the majority, then democracy has the potential to conflict with liberalism. Majority rule can be confused with the tyranny of the majority or populism. The tyranny of the majority or populism has the potential to infringe upon the individual liberty and rights pursued by liberalism. However, it is practically very difficult to determine at what point democracy moves beyond legitimate majority rule to become the tyranny of the majority. Furthermore, the distinction between opinion politics for gaining democratic legitimacy and populism is not clear.

In this situation, the value of liberalism has the effect of making us aware of the point at which democracy is abused and deviates. As confirmed in the ideological origins of liberalism, liberalism allows the state to limit individual liberty, but bases that limitation on the rule of law. Fundamentally, democracy and the rule of law are in a state of tension (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). This is primarily because the will of the present majority does not need to be bound by laws enacted by the deceased past. If the law is disregarded in the name of democracy, it can no longer protect individual liberty and rights. Therefore, the Constitution exists as the ultimate safeguard of the rule of law. While the Constitution can be amended by democratic will, the procedures are very stringent, and changing the fundamental spirit of the Constitution often entails revolution. The Constitution takes liberal values as the fundamental principle governing the relationship between individuals and the state. Therefore, democracy must respect the liberal values pursued by the Constitution. If there is an attempt to disregard the rule of law and undermine the liberal values enshrined in the Constitution under the pretext of 'democratic' will, this can be seen as a sign that the abuse and deviation of democracy are beginning.

Fundamentally, liberalism permits state intervention for the common good. However, this common good can include not only minimalist common goods such as public safety and national defense but also expanded common goods required by modern society, such as welfare, poverty reduction, and the realization of global values. The expansion of the common good is legitimized through democracy. However, the abuse and deviation of democracy can potentially lead to the indiscriminate infringement of individual liberty and rights in the name of the common good. Respecting the liberal values inherent in the Constitution, based on the rule of law, will prevent democracy from devolving into the tyranny of the majority or populism, or the state from unjustly infringing upon individual liberty and rights. It is necessary to recall that liberalism is unequivocally the most core principle of social organization pursued by our Constitution (Moon Ji-young 2019).

Finally, we will discuss the relationship between fairness, which has become the most controversial issue in our society recently, and liberalism. In any society, fairness and justice are pursued, and when they are perceived as not functioning properly, the community faces a crisis of collapse. In this context, rising dissatisfaction with fairness and justice can be seen as a sign of crisis in our society. What perspective can liberalism offer on the social crisis surrounding fairness?

Fairness fundamentally questions whether the rules and processes of competition towards a common goal are equitable for all participants. Procedural fairness requires that the rules of competition be transparent to participants and consistently maintained. Above all, procedural fairness emphasizes whether all participants in the competition have equal opportunities without discrimination. If someone has a head start or is excluded from participation from the beginning for any reason, it cannot be considered fair. Liberalism advocates for accepting outcomes that result from a fair process. By the nature of competition, not all participants can achieve the results they desire. Differential benefits are bound to accrue based on individual choices and efforts. An individual who acted according to liberal principles but did not achieve the desired benefits may regret the outcome, but they cannot complain about the rules and processes.

Nevertheless, do those who achieve lower results still express dissatisfaction with fairness because they do not understand that the concept of fairness cannot go beyond equality of opportunity given in the competitive process? Liberalism answers this affirmatively on one hand, but with a caveat. It argues that we must examine whether equality of opportunity has been properly provided. Fundamentally, liberalism views demands beyond equality of opportunity as exceeding the boundaries of liberalism. However, the apparent equality of opportunity can be a very limited equality that does not consider the diverse environments and conditions individuals are in. An applicant who was born into a wealthy family, received extensive private education, and an applicant who studies diligently in difficult circumstances cannot be said to be at the same starting line. However, there is a blind spot here. Can equality of opportunity truly be perfectly provided? Innate tendencies, aptitudes, and talents significantly influence outcomes. Not only the economic status of parents but also the family atmosphere and environment can affect the outcome of competition. Placing all competitors at a perfectly identical starting line is impossible from the outset. However, there is another blind spot. Those who are dissatisfied with the results claim disadvantage in the process due to unequal starting lines, but it is also difficult to prove whether this was truly decisive. We often meet people who fail even in good family environments, and people who succeed under difficult conditions. In such situations, the solution of liberalism is to exclude discrimination that is clearly evident, thereby providing equality of opportunity, but acknowledging that this is insufficient and striving to compensate for the resulting inequality as much as possible. The resulting inequality is partly due to unfair processes that are not sufficiently revealed, and partly not. Most outcomes are a mixture of these.

In conclusion, liberalism holds that it is impossible to make all outcomes just. This does not mean that injustice in outcomes does not exist. However, it cautions against negating the entire social system by presupposing injustice in outcomes. Taking university admissions as an example, liberalism argues that all applicants should be given equal opportunities as much as possible, but acknowledges that this does not lead to perfectly just outcomes. For this reason, affirmative action, rather than a purely competitive system, can be adopted. Of course, such affirmative action does not fully restore justice. It is incomplete on its own. However, since the principle of competition in admissions cannot be denied, we pursue compensation to the extent socially agreed upon. Liberalism aims, as a solution to injustice in outcomes, to first restore fairness in the process, and if that is insufficient, to compensate for the resulting injustice.

What can be considered as resulting injustice? As economic polarization has deepened recently, the rise in financial income, the uneven increase in real estate prices, and the extreme disparity between executive and labor wages are cited as causes. Liberalism considers it impossible to fully and justly restore such resulting inequality. However, it does not justify these phenomena as they are. Liberalism allows for compensation to strata, groups, and individuals in unequal positions. The issue is the scope and degree of such compensation. Liberalism posits that compensation should occur to the extent that liberal values are accepted by society, to a degree that can be considered generally fair by our society, and to a degree that builds trust in the social system based on this. Therefore, which strata, groups, or individuals should be designated as recipients of compensation becomes a subject of debate. From the perspective of liberalism, the criterion will be the creation of social trust that enables the full realization of liberal values. While fair processes do not lead to perfectly just outcomes, at least compensation should be made to the extent that trust in the social system is maintained.

IV. Conclusion

It is inevitable that political ideologies are used as tools for partisan struggle in real politics. Perhaps, the moment the partisan utility of liberalism as an ideology diminishes, liberalism will ultimately remain a relic of intellectual history. All political ideologies are frameworks of thought and values used to better understand the society and community we belong to, and to guide our society and community in a more desirable direction. In this context, if the ideology of liberalism were to disappear, it would mean that it has fulfilled its value as an ideology, and there would be no need to worry or lament it. However, there is a question to ask ourselves at this point. Has liberalism fulfilled its utility as an ideology at this juncture? Is liberalism no longer a useful ideology necessary for our society to develop into a better place? To answer this question, this paper has re-examined the values contained within the ideology of liberalism.

Earlier, we identified Hobbesian liberalism, Lockean liberalism, and Mill's liberalism as the ideological origins of liberalism and reaffirmed the most fundamental values of liberalism from them. If Hobbes's liberalism, contrary to its outward appearance, opened the horizon of liberalism by prioritizing individual liberty and rights over the state, Locke's liberalism emphasized that state power must be limited by the rule of law while acknowledging the state's responsibilities and authority, centered on the guarantee of individual property rights. Mill's liberalism reaffirmed individualism, excluding paternalism in the relationship between the individual and the state.

Liberalism, with these ideological origins, inevitably undergoes various adaptations in its practice and application. Particularly when connected with various ideologies or values held by our society, such as conservatism, democracy, and the issue of fairness, liberalism cannot pursue purely liberal values and faces various challenges. Nevertheless, in the current situation of confusion and intermingling of political ideologies, liberalism offers a certain utility. In its relationship with conservatism, liberalism provides conservatism with the values it should substantively preserve, while conservatism suggests how liberalism should be newly adapted. Theoretically, democracy and the rule of law have long been in a state of tension, and liberal values play a role in providing balance and a central point. In the recent discussion of fairness, liberalism also offers a constructive direction. Amidst the clashing of various political ideologies, liberalism can serve as a beacon, illuminating what values we truly desire and where our society should head.■

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[1] This is an edited volume that politically examines the connection between the 2008 financial crisis and liberalism, referencing Berkowitz & Toay (2012). In particular, it references Brown (2019), a study criticizing the possibility of neoliberalism being linked with anti-democratic political groups.

[2] For the values of fairness and justice embedded in our constitution, see Kim Do-kyun (2020).

[3] For the expansion of state authority and related issues in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, see Park Sung-woo (2021).

[4] For the liberal foundations of the American founding, see Hartz (1955).

■ Author: Park Sung-woo_ Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. Received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Previously served as a lecturer at the University of Chicago and an associate professor at Chung-Ang University. His main research areas are international political thought and classical political philosophy. His books include *The Politics of Soul-Care: The Origin and Development of Plato's Political Philosophy*, and his representative papers include ‘A Philosophical Critique of Leo Strauss's Responsibility for the Iraq War’ and ‘The Moral Limits of Pursuing National Interest and Aristotle's Politics of the Good Life’.

■ Editor: Yoon Ha-eun_ EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr