[EAI Working Paper] Post-COVID World Political Economy Order Series ⑦_ COVID-19 and the Governance Debate in the Post-Crisis Era: State Capacity vs. Authoritarianism

I. Introduction

The response to the COVID-19 crisis, which emerged at the end of 2019, has varied significantly across countries. A range of policies have been implemented, not only concerning healthcare for virus spread and treatment but also for epidemic prevention, such as lockdowns, social distancing, and mask mandates. Against this backdrop, a debate is ongoing about which approach is most effective. To date, the debate has primarily focused on the number of confirmed cases and deaths, implying that policies adopted by countries with fewer casualties are more effective.

Following a global stabilization of the pandemic in 2021, the focus of crisis response shifted from epidemic prevention to vaccine development and treatment. Consequently, the debate's focus moved from epidemic control to resilience. This shift is necessary because readjusting policies and institutions is required to lift measures like lockdowns, social distancing, and mask mandates and return to pre-crisis conditions. In this regard, governance, which influences resilience, is receiving greater attention than epidemic prevention and treatment in evaluating crisis response (Stasavage 2020).

The most frequently compared cases in the governance debate are the United States and China (Cukierman 2020). The US, with its advanced healthcare system, initially failed in crisis management, whereas China, despite its less developed system, succeeded in rapidly controlling the large-scale spread of the virus (Burki 2020). The US's poor performance in epidemic prevention and China's success were reflected in their economic outcomes. In 2020, despite massive fiscal deficits and ultra-low interest rates for economic stimulus, the US's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate plummeted to -3.4%. China's economy, despite the impact of lockdowns in some regions, grew by 2.3% (Lin 2020).

In China, the differences between the US and China are explained by state capacity, measured by the efficiency of policy decision-making and implementation. It is argued that the US lacks the systems and organizations capable of rapid, large-scale mobilization like China. Conversely, the US criticizes China's top-down policy decision-making and its lockdowns, which infringe upon freedom and privacy, as undesirable and unsustainable. It is also pointed out that China's authoritarian epidemic prevention methods cannot be applied to democratic countries.

Against this backdrop, this paper comparatively analyzes the crisis response methods of the US and China. As the COVID-19 crisis is not yet over, the possibility that current assessments may be overturned cannot be ruled out. Despite these challenges, the attempt at comparison is motivated by the significant implications that the evaluation of crisis response methods holds for future US-China competition (Brands and Gavin 2020; Reich and Dombrowski 2020; O'Rourke and McInnis 2021; Maull 2021; Norrlöf 2020). Evaluations of governance tend to be determined by ex-post outcomes due to the absence of ex-ante standards or benchmarks. Consequently, countries that successfully overcome crises are likely to emerge as international standards or benchmarks for governance models. If China overcomes the crisis faster than the US, its governance model emphasizing state capacity might be evaluated as a more efficient alternative than the US model that prioritizes democracy (Dunford and Qi 2020; Buckley 2020).

The discussion proceeds as follows. First, the crisis responses of the US and China are comparatively analyzed through various statistics and indicators. The controversy surrounding the Chinese case is examined focusing on state capacity and authoritarianism. China emphasizes state capacity, its ability to efficiently mobilize human and material resources, while the US highlights authoritarianism embedded in its coercive lockdown measures and mass testing. Finally, the implications of the governance model debate for US-China competition are summarized.

II. Crisis Response Governance in the US and China

Which governance model was effective in crisis management? Answering this question is not easy. The fundamental issue is the absence of an a priori definition of good or desirable governance (or quality of government). Discussions on governance have not moved beyond the compromise or combination of various concepts such as the demands of public ethos, the virtues of good policymaking and rational reasoning, the rule of law, efficiency, stability, and the principle of benefits (Agnafors 2013). Furthermore, there is no governance concept that consistently adheres to specific norms or standards, either synchronically or diachronically. While governance based on liberal democracy is considered a universal model, China is exploring alternative approaches (H. Li 2020).

Against this backdrop, most comparative studies on crisis management governance have focused on four categories: political economy (GDP per capita, democracy, government effectiveness, federal structure), socio-cultural factors (tradition vs. rational/secular values, survival vs. self-expression values, female heads of state), demographic and geographic factors (capacity for prohibition, MERS experience, elderly population ratio, date of first confirmed case, early exposure to crisis, ethnic divisions, Gini coefficient, obesity, urbanization, population density, population), and policy orientation (pandemic preparedness, rapid international travel restrictions, length and intensity of domestic travel restrictions/coercive social distancing) (Hendrix 2021). Countries that succeeded in crisis management commonly implemented international and domestic travel restrictions. Although the number of cases is small, countries with female heads of state tended to respond relatively well to crises. Beyond these, no other factors have been particularly helpful in explaining national commonalities and differences.

Since systematically comparing and analyzing crisis response based on one or two factors is practically impossible, governance research is based on typologies derived from comparative analysis of various cases. Following the tradition of varieties of capitalism research, which analyzes the relationship between the state, market, and society, Jan Nederveen Pieterse classified crisis response approaches into liberal, cooperative, and state-led models.

[Table 1] Institutions in Various Market Economies

Source: Nederveen Pieterse (2021, 3)

Based on decision-making processes and response outcomes, Sheila Jasanoff categorized countries into control, consensus, and confusion.

[Table 2] Crisis Response Approaches: Three Types

Source: Jasanoff et al. (2021, 21)

In both typologies, the crisis responses of East Asian countries received generally high evaluations. Based on the number of confirmed cases and deaths, Taiwan, South Korea, China, and Japan managed the crisis much more successfully than developed countries in Europe and North America (Fukuyama 2020; Kennedy 2020; Cha 2020b; Lee 2021). These countries share the common characteristic of having pursued industrialization in a state-led manner, sparking a debate about the role of the state in crisis response (Acemoglu 2020; Rajan 2020; Mazzucato and Quaggiotto 2020).

A clear correlation was observed between state capacity and the number of confirmed cases, mortality rate, and case fatality rate. Notably, the number of confirmed cases and mortality rate were low in South Korea and Japan, which have high state capacity. However, the impact of state capacity on the case fatality rate was not clearly evident. Nevertheless, it is clear that the case fatality rate was exceptionally high in countries with low state capacity.

[Figure 1] State Capacity and Health Impacts of COVID-19

Source: Gisselquist and Vaccaro (2021, 12)

The countries that generate the most controversy in the debate over the state's role in crisis management are arguably the US and China. Although the crisis originated in Wuhan, Hubei Province, around November 2019, China succeeded in preventing its nationwide spread by March 2020 through strict lockdowns. Based on this experience, China asserted that its crisis management system is effective for epidemic prevention. Chinese state media propagated the argument that China's state-led approach is more efficient than Western methods based on citizens' voluntary cooperation. In contrast, the US not only failed in epidemic prevention and treatment but also experienced amplified socio-political turmoil. Consequently, self-reflection emerged within the US, suggesting that the US is inferior to China (Tellis 2020; Schaus and Freier 2020).

It is difficult to understand why the US lags behind China in epidemic prevention and healthcare systems, which are essential for responding to large-scale pandemics. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Health System Index, there is no category where the US ranks lower than China. In the Universal Health Coverage Index, the US scored 86 points, while China scored 79. In terms of basic sanitation, crucial for epidemic control, the US scored 100, and China scored 85, indicating a significant gap.

[Table 3] Health System Index

Source: World Health Organization (2019: 108-112)

The difference between the US and China was even more pronounced in the Global Health Security (GHS) Index (Ranking) for global pandemic prevention, such as COVID-19. The US ranked first in the world, while China was 51st. The US demonstrated world-class performance in all categories except for 'dangerous environments,' whereas China ranked between 30th and 60th. Notably, China ranked very low, 141st, in compliance with international norms.

[Table 4] Global Health Security (GHS) Index (Ranking)

Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (2019: 20-29)

This disparity aligns with the outcome of the 2004 SARS crisis. China suffered the most significant damage globally, with 5,327 confirmed cases and 349 deaths. In contrast, the US had only 27 confirmed cases. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, which are geographically close to China and have extensive interactions with it, also suffered considerable damage.

[Table 5] SARS Crisis

Source: World Health Organization (2004)

Comparing epidemic prevention performance to date, it is certain that China has suffered significantly less damage than the US. The trends in cumulative cases and deaths per million population shown in Figures 2 and 3 make it difficult to dismiss China's claims as baseless. As Figure 4 illustrates, the US had an advantage over China in vaccine development and rollout. While the US led China during the period of rapid vaccine distribution, this advantage was short-lived. In the US, vaccination rates plateaued after exceeding 50%, failing to reach the 70% level required for herd immunity. Given the strong resistance to vaccination in the US, it is highly unlikely that the US will surpass China.

[Figure 2] Cumulative Cases per Million Population

Source: Our World in Data (OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus)

[Figure 3] Cumulative Deaths per Million Population

Source: Our World in Data (OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus)

[Figure 4] Vaccination Rate (%)

Source: Our World in Data (OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus)

Regarding future recovery from the crisis, it is necessary to consider not only epidemic prevention but also resilience to manage the post-crisis situation. The "COVID-19 Resilience Ranking" published by Bloomberg since November 2020 comprises crisis indicators (cases per 100,000 in 1 month, mortality rate, positivity rate, vaccine access, vaccinations per 100 people), reopening indicators (vaccination rate, lockdown severity, air capacity, post-vaccination travel routes), and quality of life (community mobility, projected GDP growth in 2021, universal health coverage, Human Development Index). Reviewing the ranking changes over the past ten months, Taiwan, New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea were highly rated among the 53 surveyed countries. Vietnam and Japan saw their initial high rankings plummet after large-scale outbreaks in May 2021.

[Table 6] Bloomberg COVID-19 Resilience Ranking (November 2020 – August 2021)

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/

The evaluations of the US and China have been reversed multiple times. From the outbreak in Wuhan, Hubei Province, in late November 2019 until April 2020, when the crisis spread, China was considered a case of failure. After April 2020, as the virus spread in the US and cases and deaths surged, the US became a much larger failure case than China. The "COVID-19 Resilience Ranking" reflects this trend. However, the evaluations in June and July 2021, when the US ranked higher than China, are controversial. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian pointed out that the US ranked higher than China despite the incomparable difference in cases and deaths per capita (Foreign Ministry 2021).

III. Factors Behind China's Success: State Capacity vs. Authoritarianism

1. State Capacity

Chinese state media began emphasizing China's state capacity from March 2020, after the spread of the virus was contained (Jacques 2020). The core argument is that China minimized damage because the government took decisive measures proactively. "Western political systems lack the capacity for large-scale mobilization and organization" (Song 2020). The mobilization capacity of Western governments was limited by individualism that prioritizes freedom, uncooperative relationships between central and local governments, and resistance from civil society. In China, by March 1, 2020, a total of 42,000 medical personnel from 344 teams had been dispatched to Hubei Province, where the large-scale outbreak occurred. Furthermore, Chinese citizens complied well with government epidemic prevention guidelines, unlike in some Western countries where protests against lockdowns and refusal to wear masks occurred (Ding 2020). The criticism that China's lockdown policy was authoritarian and suppressed individual freedom was countered by the argument that there is no link between political systems and epidemic prevention. That is, the difference between democracy and authoritarianism has no impact on epidemic prevention. "As long as human lives can be saved, any measure, whether democratic or authoritarian, is worth trying" (Shi 2020).

After June 2020, as China's success and the US's failure became more apparent, the assessment that China was responding more effectively than the US grew. China's mobilization capacity, where the government guides citizens' adherence to epidemic prevention guidelines, was superior to that of the US (Beeson 2020). Of course, China's success is problematic in that it was based not only on voluntary cooperation but also on coercive pressure, with severe penalties for violations. However, if the government had not intervened, the collective action problem of citizens' lack of voluntary cooperation could have persisted, exacerbating the crisis. In this regard, the evaluation of China depends not on government intervention itself, but on whether the situation was serious enough to warrant government intervention. "When faced with dangerous external effects such as rapid transmission, even enlightened leaders in democracies might consider imposing temporary restrictions" (Cukierman 2020).

Emphasis on state capacity can be considered a characteristic of Chinese governance. Unlike the West, which focuses on improving accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, efficiency is at the core of China's governance debate. This difference is a product of the specificity of reforming governance within the Communist Party system. Therefore, enhancing governance efficiency is linked to strengthening the legitimacy of the system (Q, Li 2020).

This argument is reflected in the white paper "The Chinese People's Fight Against COVID-19" (抗击新冠肺炎疫情的中国行动) published by the State Council Information Office in June 2020. China's ability to control the crisis early on can be summarized in three points. First, success in coordinating prevention, control, and treatment. This included a centralized decision-making system, a prevention and control system covering all sectors of society, comprehensive efforts to treat patients, transparent information disclosure, and the utilization of science and technology. Second, mobilization capacity. Society and individuals organically combined with the state's mobilization system to prioritize human lives. Finally, China emphasized not only receiving international support but also sharing its experience. (State Council Information Office 2020).

There is also an explanation that China's success in epidemic prevention is the result of political meritocracy and policy integration. Although criticized as authoritarian or totalitarian compared to Western democratic countries, it is undeniable that the organic cooperative structure between the Communist Party and the State Council contributed to the speed and consistency of policy decision-making and implementation. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Party and President of the State, and Li Keqiang, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party and Premier of the State Council, led the Party-government cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation between the central and local governments began to improve with the establishment of the Wuhan Epidemic Prevention and Control Headquarters on January 20, 2020. On the 25th, the Central Epidemic Prevention and Control Leading Group, chaired by the Premier, was established to direct the National Epidemic Prevention and Control Mechanism. These bodies established by the central government played a crucial role in the rapid construction of large-scale temporary hospitals for treating patients and the swift supply of essential goods to Wuhan and Hubei Province during the lockdown period. The speed and scale of resource and personnel mobilization in China are unimaginable in other countries.

[Figure 5] China's Crisis Management Governance

Source: Wang (2021, 434)

In August 2021, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Taihe Institute, and HaiGuoTuZhi Institute published the report "'America First'? The Truth About America's Epidemic Prevention" (“美国第一”？！美国抗疫真相), showcasing China's superiority over the US. The immediate goal of this report was to refute the "COVID-19 Resilience Ranking" in June 2021, which ranked the US first. The report vehemently criticized the US as the world's worst failed state in epidemic prevention, ranking first in eight categories: political scapegoating, COVID-19 spread, political division, currency inflation, chaos during the epidemic period, misinformation, and origin investigation terrorism. Due to these problems, the US has fallen into a vicious cycle of 'anti-epidemic measures, resistance, and economic recession' (Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies 2021, 14).

This report cited the US system as the cause of its crisis management failure. It argued that effective crisis response requires the entire nation to pursue consistent policies, but the US federal system led to conflicting policies adopted by individual states and local governments. Furthermore, policy decisions were delayed due to conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. Policies were also prioritized towards bailing out the stock market rather than treating patients. These issues exacerbated wealth inequality, racial tensions, and social unrest. By adhering to "America First," the US abandoned its role as a global leader. Its failure to control international travel contributed to the spread of the virus, and its pursuit of vaccine nationalism hindered international cooperation.

This report also refuted the claim that the virus originated from the Wuhan Institute of Virology. China asserted that a flu similar to COVID-19 was prevalent in the US in 2019, and that COVID-19 cases occurred as early as December 2019 in Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. To verify these claims, China demanded inspections of the Army Institute of Medical Research (USAMRID), which studied biochemical weapons until its closure in July 2019, and laboratories at the University of Texas (Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies 2021, 20-22).

2. Authoritarianism

In the US, China's success in epidemic prevention is explained by authoritarianism rather than state capacity. Policy decisions were led by the Communist Party and the government, and the approach was top-down rather than bottom-up, leaving little room for voluntary cooperation from the private sector or consideration of specific local circumstances in crisis response. Due to these shortcomings, China's crisis management governance may achieve short-term results but is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, it is unlikely that China's authoritarian crisis management governance will serve as an international standard or benchmark for other countries to follow (Wright 2020; Huang 2021).

The limitations of authoritarianism were recognized from the early stages of the crisis. The nationwide epidemic prevention system, improved after the SARS crisis, did not function properly during the current crisis. The first problem that emerged was the bureaucratic inertia of fragmented authoritarianism embedded in the central-local relationship. It took more than two weeks for the central government to be aware that the COVID-19 outbreak had occurred in Wuhan. The city-province-central administrative system delayed reporting. Even after the central government became aware of the facts, it took an additional week for inspectors dispatched to Wuhan to grasp the severity of the situation. The attempts by officials, fearing punishment, to conceal the facts exacerbated this problem. Communist Party officials and local government representatives attending the Two Sessions at the time were reluctant to disclose the facts. Bureaucratic inertia also exists in democracies. However, due to the activation of public discourse, concealment of facts in democracies is only temporary. In contrast, in authoritarian regimes where the media is controlled, facts can be hidden for a considerable period (Swaine 2020a; Cho Young-nam 2021).

Authoritarianism also negatively impacts the potential for the spread of China's crisis management model (von Carnap et al. 2020; Swaine 2020b). The first issue is the criticism of being the origin of the crisis. This criticism is based on the assumption that if China had managed the initial response well, the crisis would not have spread globally, regardless of where the virus originated. The second issue concerns the reliability of China's statistics. There are ongoing suspicions that China is not providing accurate statistics since the outbreak and is manipulating them to conceal initial response failures. The third issue relates to the timing and manner of China's self-assessment. In June 2020, while the crisis was still spreading globally, China published a white paper declaring victory over the crisis. This white paper effectively halted discussions on the causes, response, and outcomes of the crisis, at least within China, by blocking any possibility of views other than the government's official stance emerging. Finally, doubts remain regarding the efficacy of Chinese vaccines. Among the vaccines developed by China, Sinovac and Sinopharm, only Sinopharm received emergency use approval from the World Health Organization (WHO) on May 7, 2021 (Scissors et al. 2021).

China's authoritarianism also hinders international cooperation. Taiwan is unable to join the World Health Organization (WHO) due to China's opposition to the One China principle. From 2009 to 2016, when cross-strait relations were relatively friendly, Taiwan could attend the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer under the name Chinese Taipei. However, since the election of a pro-China administration, China has continuously blocked Taiwan's participation. Although the G7 publicly supported Taiwan's attendance this year, there was no seat allocated to Taiwan at the 74th WHA held last month. Consequently, Taiwan is excluded from international cooperation on epidemic prevention (Lu and Chung 2020).

3. The Potential for Combining Democracy and State Capacity: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan

In contrast to China, South Korea and Taiwan are recognized for leading epidemic prevention efforts through democratic means. In both countries, the government succeeded in epidemic control not by imposing lockdowns that unilaterally suppressed the freedoms of individuals and businesses, but by encouraging voluntary cooperation from citizens and the market through social distancing measures. In terms of combining democracy and state capacity, these two countries are considered alternatives to China's authoritarianism (National Assembly Research Service 2020; Ahn 2020; Cha 2020a; Klingner 2020; Wong 2020; Rowen 2020; Yen 2021).

The state-led crisis management in South Korea and Taiwan has not been without criticism. Concerns have been raised about the excessive infringement of personal information and rights during the process of tracking and isolating confirmed cases to prevent virus transmission. Although the data is encrypted and automatically deleted after a certain period, the disclosure of personal information on government agency websites, as well as through text messages, violates the principle of privacy protection. Furthermore, excessive attention and prejudice towards specific religious and social groups where cluster infections occurred became a social issue (Lee 2021).

Moreover, in mid-2021, both South Korea and Taiwan faced significant criticism due to delayed vaccine rollouts and rising case numbers. In South Korea, daily new confirmed cases exceeded 1,000, and deaths increased, marking a third wave. Taiwan, which had experienced over 200 days without new cases at the beginning of 2021, saw a rapid increase in new infections after a cluster outbreak with unclear transmission routes emerged in early May. On May 22, daily new cases surged to 723, and by June 4, the cumulative number of confirmed cases surpassed 10,000. As a result, the international reputation of both South Korea and Taiwan significantly declined. Taiwan's ranking in the "COVID-19 Resilience Ranking" dropped by 10 places from 5th to 15th between May and June.

The low vaccine procurement rate can be attributed to misjudgments by the Taiwanese government and China's obstructionist tactics. As Taiwan had no confirmed cases for a long period, the urgency for rapid vaccine administration was not strongly felt. The Tsai Ing-wen administration prioritized developing its own vaccines over actively participating in the international race for vaccine procurement from the outset. China's interference also complicated Taiwan's vaccine acquisition. Just before contracts were finalized, the German company BioNTech changed its stance, stating it would provide vaccines through Fosun Pharma, the Chinese pharmaceutical company holding the rights for China, Hong Kong, and Macau, rather than directly to Taiwan. President Tsai Ing-wen publicly criticized China for orchestrating Taiwan's vaccine purchase blockage (Chi 2021).

IV. Conclusion

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, East Asian countries that implemented state-led crisis response measures achieved relative success in epidemic prevention. Notably, China, despite its inferior healthcare system, achieved significant results in terms of infection and mortality rates, and vaccination rates, through stringent controls. In contrast, the United States, possessing superior medical technology and epidemic prevention systems but unable to achieve strong federal intervention, recorded the highest number of infections and deaths globally. In this regard, the importance of state capacity in crisis management is acknowledged.

To accurately assess the impact of state capacity on crisis management, further research is needed in three areas. First, the fact that the "COVID-19 Resilience Ranking" fluctuated significantly over several months clearly illustrates the risks of evaluating epidemic prevention performance in the short term. Controlling an epidemic through herd immunity takes at least several years, making it impossible and undesirable to definitively judge success or failure at any specific point in time. Becoming complacent with short-term achievements can lead to neglecting issues that may result in greater harm later.

Second, a review of the state-society-individual relationship is essential. There is no systematic analysis yet as to why and how the responsibility and agency for epidemic prevention in East Asia were assigned to the state rather than individuals or society. One hypothesis suggests that the legacy of developmental states, with their commonality of state-led industrialization, had a positive impact. Furthermore, the improvement of epidemic prevention systems after suffering from SARS and MERS is also a significant similarity (World Health Organization 2017). However, China and the other countries have fundamentally different political and economic systems. Consequently, they hold vastly different perceptions of individual rights and responsibilities. A systematic comparison of these similarities and differences is necessary to properly understand state capacity in East Asia.

Third, a re-examination is needed on how and why state capacity influenced crisis management governance. Lockdowns and social distancing are policies that severely infringe upon individual freedoms and privacy, making them unsustainable in the long run. If the authoritarian nature inherent in state-led epidemic prevention is not overcome, it will be difficult to encourage voluntary cooperation from civil society and the market in similar situations in the future. Therefore, institutions and policies that can implement state capacity in a democratic rather than authoritarian manner must be sought.

The debate over state capacity following the COVID-19 crisis has the potential to significantly influence the broader governance debate. Neoliberalism, prevalent in the era of globalization, prioritized markets over the state. According to this ideology, the best governance is characterized by large markets and small government. The cases of East Asian countries after the crisis provide new grounds for the counterargument that a large state and a small market might be more effective. Therefore, neoliberal governance will be re-evaluated based on the outcomes of this crisis (Stiglitz 2021).■

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■ Author: Lee Wang-hwi_ Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ajou University. Received a Ph.D. in International Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His main research areas are international political economy, US-China economic relations, and the relationship between corporations and states. His books include “Prospects for China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Biden Era” (2021), and his major papers include 〈South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Covid-19〉 (2021), 〈China’s New World Strategy: The Rise of the Chinese Economy and the Belt and Road Initiative〉 (2021), and 〈The Impact of Changes in US-China Relations on Korea after the COVID-19 Crisis〉 (2021).

■ Responsible for and edited by: Yoon Ha-eun_ EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr