[EAI Working Paper] Series on Global Political Economy After the COVID Crisis ⑥_ The State and Democracy After COVID-19

I. Introduction

The global spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has delivered a significant shock to various aspects of human life. In particular, as political systems and governance methods, which had previously enjoyed dominant legitimacy and influence, face a critical crisis, revealing their contradictions and limitations, we are confronted with a situation that necessitates a thorough re-examination of latent issues and the exploration of alternatives. The threat of the infectious disease, which has swept the globe, resulting in over 240 million confirmed cases and approximately 5 million deaths as of November 1, 2021, has above all else reignited discussions about the role of the state. In a situation where individual survival is threatened, the role of the community and the state becomes more important than ever, and the question of which state can protect the safety and lives of its citizens more efficiently and effectively emerges as a critical issue.[1]What is particularly noteworthy is that certain East Asian countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China, appear to have responded relatively well to the COVID-19 crisis. While it is difficult to generalize these achievements as characteristics of East Asian countries simply due to the diversity within the region and various domestic variables that can influence the number of confirmed cases and deaths, it is an undeniable fact that the pandemic control performance of these countries differs significantly from that of Western European and North American developed nations.

Analyses focusing on the superior response capabilities of East Asian countries often cite not only technological superiority and institutional efficiency that enabled rapid tracing and testing (BBC 2020b; Brookings 2020; Reuters 2020; Wall Street Journal 2020c) but also the smoothly functioning state control and management systems, and the collectivist societies and citizen cooperation that generally accept state intervention (The Diplomat 2020a; Tiberghien 2021; Wall Street Journal 2020b). These analyses highlight the role of the communitarian or statist political traditions shared by East Asian countries. In this context, the case of China, which declared the end of COVID-19 early despite being the origin of the disease, has drawn even more attention. China's use of the state's strong control over individuals and society, employing extreme measures such as full city lockdowns to manage the infectious disease relatively stably and maintain economic growth and social order, has been further highlighted in contrast to the severe amplification of COVID-19, the collapse of healthcare systems, and the social chaos experienced in the United States and Western Europe (Barron’s 2020; Global Times 2020; The Conversation 2020).[2]Conversely, the vulnerability exposed by traditional 'Western developed countries' when faced with the unpredictable crisis of an infectious disease was sufficient to provoke critical discussions about liberal democratic systems. In particular, the deficiencies in public services that the state is expected to provide, such as healthcare and welfare, and the disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations were starkly revealed, raising fundamental questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of liberal democratic political systems.

In this situation, instances where democratically elected leadership failed to foster community integration, widespread citizen resistance occurred against state controls such as mask-wearing and assembly restrictions, and social unrest combined with issues like racial discrimination and xenophobia to violently escalate, cast doubt on whether the democratic political systems of these countries are truly based on consensus and trust among citizens. If a political system cannot effectively protect its citizens and provide adequate public services when the lives and safety of the majority are threatened, and if it cannot elicit consensus, trust in politics, and voluntary compliance with the state during a community crisis, can it truly be considered legitimate?[3]Based on this critical perspective, this paper aims to revisit the academic discussions on the role and capacity of the state, which have been actively pursued focusing on East Asian cases in the latter half of the 20th century, to examine the usefulness of the 'strong state' through China's response to COVID-19, cited as a successful case of pandemic control, and to reflect on the problems of liberal democracy exposed by COVID-19. First, Section II will re-examine the discussions on state capacity, which were actively pursued in the context of East Asian state-led economic growth in the latter half of the 20th century, within the context of the COVID-19 era. Subsequently, Section III will analyze China's response to COVID-19, a prime example of a 'strong state' and a test case for authoritarian effectiveness. In particular, based on extensive domestic and international data, it will examine the Chinese government's response during the first two months following the outbreak of COVID-19, demonstrating how China's strong state, by leveraging its control and mobilization capabilities over society, failed to effectively curb the initial spread of COVID-19 by concealing the occurrence of the infectious disease. Finally, the conclusion will briefly discuss the questions regarding the persistent crisis of liberal democracy, despite the limitations of authoritarianism revealed by the Chinese case.

II. Theoretical Discussion: The Role and Capacity of the State

II. Theoretical Discussion: The Role and Capacity of the State

The debate surrounding the role of the state in the latter half of the 20th century was significantly shaped by the issue of economic growth in Third World countries. Following World War II, pessimism and optimism clashed regarding the economic development of newly independent nations. According to modernization theorists, based on liberal beliefs, political and economic development is a linear progression that all societies undergo, and thus, in a free market competition, latecomer economies can achieve development more rapidly and easily by imitating the development paths of advanced economies while leveraging their comparative advantages. Conversely, from a critical perspective, such open competition and equal development were illusory. According to dependency theory, the exploitative structure of the core over the periphery, established since the colonial era, persisted even after peripheral countries achieved political independence, and in this structured relationship of dependency, the so-called 'free market' merely served to deepen the dependency of the periphery on the core.

The successful rise of East Asian economies offered a third possibility to this dichotomous debate. Not only Japan, which had already begun to recover in the 1950s-60s after the devastation of World War II, but also South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which were merely underdeveloped peripheral economies, began to show remarkable growth from the 1960s-70s. Comparing the average annual growth rate of per capita GNP by region from 1965 to 1990, East Asian countries exceeded the average growth rate of OECD countries by more than double and showed growth rates approximately three times higher than the average for South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. From 1960 to 1985, the real per capita income in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore increased by more than fourfold (World Bank 1993, 2).

Interestingly, in this growth process, the state played a strategic role in controlling market excesses, subordinating them to the economic interests of the political community, and overcoming the structural constraints that latecomer economies inevitably face (White 1988). By the early 1990s, while there was room for debate on whether the state's role was more important than the market's in the success of East Asian economies or whether it ultimately yielded positive results, scholars had reached a certain consensus that state intervention had made a significant contribution.[4]The success of East Asian economies demonstrated that pathways from the periphery to the core could be opened for latecomer peripheral economies under 'specific conditions' (Haggard 1990), and that the state, rather than the market, could play a decisive role in opening those pathways. This served as a crucial case that challenged liberal development theories, including modernization theory (Islam and Chowdhury 2000, 2-3). Consequently, 'state-led economic development' as a third way became a central theme in the study of East Asian political economy, and the role of the state in economic development was re-examined.

A representative theory explaining 'state-led economic development' is the well-known 'developmental state theory.' Developmental state theory posits that market-conforming state intervention can be the engine driving the leap forward of latecomer economies.[5]Crucially, for latecomer economies to overcome market failures prevalent in resource mobilization, investment allocation, and technological catch-up, the role of a state equipped with the capacity to intentionally distort markets and pursue industrial development policies is paramount. The key here is to break down the dichotomy where the market is a tool of capitalism based on market rationality, and planning is a tool of socialism prioritizing ideology.[6]The argument is that 'plan rationality,' which effectively combines market and planning to achieve the paramount goal of economic development, can exist. A developmental state is one that serves the ideology of 'development' with plan rationality. The functions and policy priorities of a developmental state are set based on the goal of development, and through the realization of that goal, the developmental state gains legitimacy (Johnson 1982, 315-320; Johnson 1987, 141). This evokes the image of a powerful state, akin to Leviathan, a vast organism moving with its own independent reason and purpose, rather than a voluntary combination of various actors and sectors.

This leads to the question of state capacity. If not all state interventions lead to effective economic development, then which states possess the capacity to effectively achieve the ultimate goal of development while maintaining plan rationality? Here, the 'capacity' of the state required to achieve its objectives is often equated with the 'strength' of the state. In other words, a capable state is a strong state. Here, a strong state is defined as a state that possesses control over society in a zero-sum power relationship between the state and society. The perspective that a state, as an independent entity with its own purposes and will distinct from society, can achieve significant political and economic change by realizing its objectives against the resistance of dominant social groups, without being swayed by various political and social interests, is prevalent in statist research. In particular, it is argued that to overcome the structural limitations faced by latecomer economies and achieve political and economic mobilization for development, a strong state is necessary—one that has the power to pursue policies and strategies for economic development independently of various political and social pressures, to limit or alter the actions of key actors and groups, and to restructure domestic industrial structures and economic systems (Gourevitch 1978, 902; Krasner 1978, 60; Skocpol et al. 1985, 9; Weiss 1998, 25-28).

In this context, 'autonomy' is emphasized as a core element of state capacity. The ability to maintain rationality for achieving the paramount task of economic development, without being captured or swayed by short-sighted political interventions or specific socio-economic interests, and to focus on the common goal of growth in the long term, stems from the state's autonomy from other actors. In particular, in Chalmers Johnson's archetypal developmental state theory, the source of state autonomy is isolation. Autonomy, which allows the state to independently select the best policies without interference or influence from key political, social, and economic actors, and to unilaterally enforce those policies on social actors, becomes a crucial condition for the state to maintain consistent plan rationality without distorting the goal of development.

However, viewing power as the ability to make an adversary do what it does not want to do, and interpreting state capacity as the power to unilaterally impose the state's choices and will on society, is based on a one-dimensional definition of power.[7]Furthermore, positing a state that is a singular, unified entity, dedicated to the public good of development, and possesses a rational intellect to know the best choices for it, is not only unrealistic but also potentially controversial as it can be interpreted as advocating for the legitimacy of 'authoritarianism' or 'illiberal political systems.' The perspective that authoritarian states can possess nationalist appeals and performance-based legitimacy to mobilize the majority of their citizens for economic development (Johnson 1999, 52), and can be efficient by suppressing rent-seeking and resolving collective action problems to pursue consistent policies (Haggard 1990, 254-267; 2018, 47-50), has been a sensitive subject of debate, both explicitly and implicitly, and has also served as a basis for criticism of developmental state theory.

Following the political democratization of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s and the East Asian financial crisis, discussions on state capacity, particularly those centered on East Asian cases, declined. Resistance to authoritarian control, structural problems arising from excessive state intervention, and the trend of global marketization led to a more negative perception of state economic intervention. The developmental state was seen as having lost its relevance in an era characterized by liberalization and marketization, due to structural vulnerabilities that fostered moral hazard and led to economic crises (Haggard 2000), limitations on policy autonomy in the new international economic environment (Islam and Chowdhury 2000), or failure to adapt and transform due to structural rigidity (Amyx 2004; Moon and Rhyu 2000).

However, over twenty years later, the challenge of COVID-19, faced globally, has once again raised the need to actively consider the role and capacity of the state. In the past, the focus was on the role and capacity of the state to intervene by limiting free markets to solve the paramount task of economic development in latecomer countries. Now, in the face of a common human threat like an infectious disease, there is a need to re-examine the role and capacity of the state in terms of how to better ensure the survival and safety of its citizens. Interestingly, the representative success stories once again come from East Asian countries. While traditional developed democratic nations in Western Europe and North America have shown critical weaknesses in persuading citizens of the need for limitations and controls, failing to overcome the crisis through voluntary consensus and cooperation, East Asian cases like Taiwan and South Korea have demonstrated a more stable response to the pandemic through relatively effective government control and intervention, coupled with relatively voluntary citizen cooperation.

Particularly noteworthy is the experience of China. In 2021, the Chinese government completely controlled the city of Wuhan, the epicenter of the disease, for over 70 days, placing its nearly 9 million residents under house arrest. Although extreme measures were taken to restrict citizens' freedom, the result was an impressive achievement of maintaining daily confirmed cases generally below 100 since early March 2020. Just as in the past, when the capacity of East Asian states was measured by metrics like per capita GDP, if state capacity is judged by the number of confirmed cases and deaths, then a strong state that can control its population and enforce controls and interventions for the safety and stability of the community, even against their relatively 'petty and selfish' interests or opposition, may appear competent. If so, could an authoritarian state, which can enforce public interest on its citizens and prove its legitimacy through its performance, be superior in effectively overcoming threats to the community, such as infectious diseases, just as the perspective emerged that authoritarian states with the power to lower collective action problems and achieve goals are advantageous for economic development? The following section will present a critical discussion by analyzing in detail China's initial response to COVID-19.

III. Case Study: China's Initial Response to COVID-19[8]

1. Authoritarian Success?

In contrast to the global spread and escalating damage of COVID-19, China claims to have overcome the national crisis caused by COVID-19 early on. Driven by strong control measures, such as the drastic lockdown of Wuhan city on January 23, 2020, the daily number of confirmed cases in China plummeted after peaking at 15,152 on February 13,[9]and by March 8, the number of new daily confirmed cases fell below 100. On September 8, 2020, seven months after the Wuhan lockdown, China held a national commendation ceremony for COVID-19 prevention and control at the Great Hall of the People, effectively declaring the end of COVID-19. President Xi Jinping celebrated, stating, 'The great victory China has achieved in the war against COVID-19 fully demonstrates the superiority of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese socialist system' (Yonhap News 2020a).

However, concealed behind these results is the fact that during the crucial first two months following the outbreak of the infectious disease, the Chinese government did not take proactive measures to warn citizens of the danger early on and effectively prevent the spread of the disease. It was nearly a month after the first case of pneumonia of unknown cause occurred in Wuhan, China, on December 1, 2019, that the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission reported the occurrence of cases to the central government on December 31, 2019. A study by researchers at Northeastern University in the United States estimates that between 2,300 and 4,000 infections may have occurred during this month (BBC 2021). After receiving the report from Wuhan, the Chinese central government delayed for another three weeks before acknowledging the possibility of human-to-human transmission of this new disease on January 21, 2020, and then abruptly implemented the Wuhan lockdown on January 23. However, by then, over 5 million people had already left Wuhan for the Spring Festival and dispersed throughout China, and along with them, the infectious disease spread nationwide. By January 31, the cumulative number of confirmed cases in China had reached 9,720, and the total number of deaths was 213. By February 29, these figures increased to 79,389 and 2,838, respectively.[10]Furthermore, as the infectious disease spread across borders, the graph of daily confirmed cases worldwide began to rise sharply from March 2020. By March 6, 2020, the cumulative number of confirmed cases worldwide exceeded 100,000,[11]and on March 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 situation a global pandemic.[12]According to experts, the most crucial factors in preventing the spread of infectious diseases like COVID-19 are rapid detection and isolation. A study published in Nature suggests that if the Chinese government had intervened just one week earlier, the number of COVID-19 cases in China would have decreased by 66%, and if it had been three weeks earlier, it would have decreased by 95% (Lai et al. 2020; New York Times 2020). The criticism from the international community and experts that the spread of COVID-19 could have been significantly reduced if the Chinese government had disclosed information early on to warn the public about the possibility of infection and taken measures such as isolating suspected cases and close contacts is based on this (BBC 2021; Huang et al. 2020; Lai et al. 2020; The Diplomat 2020b; The Heritage 2020; Tian et al. 2020).

Examining the process by which Chinese local and central governments denied the severity of the infectious disease, blocked information, and delayed proactive responses during the approximately two months from December 2019, we can see the immense harm caused by a 'strong' authoritarian state, which possesses the ability to unilaterally impose its defined public good on citizens, in a critical crisis situation.

2. Local Government Concealment

After the first case occurred in early December 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission reportedly first became aware of the infectious disease outbreak on December 27 through reports from local hospitals and officially reported the occurrence of cases to the central government on December 31. In the approximately two months leading up to the Wuhan lockdown on January 23, 2020, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission's response was characterized by neglect of the infectious disease situation and concealment of information.

Although the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission announced that the first COVID-19 case in Wuhan occurred on December 8, 2019 (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020b), according to over 30 doctors, including the vice director of Jinyintan Hospital (a specialized infectious disease hospital in Wuhan), who published in the medical journal The Lancet, the first case is presumed to have occurred on December 1 (BBC 2020a). Subsequently, by at least December 12, numerous patients with pneumonia of unknown cause were found in hospitals near the Huanan Seafood Market, and testimonies emerged of doctors requesting tests from external institutions and transferring patients to specialized infectious disease treatment hospitals like Jinyintan Hospital.

[13]Cases of patients with similar symptoms admitted to hospitals in Wuhan, such as Wuhan Central Hospital, Wuhan Tongji Hospital, Wuhan University People's Hospital, Wuhan No. 6 Hospital, Wuhan Puren Hospital, and Hubei Provincial Hospital of Integrated Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine, followed one after another (Huang et al. 2020; Ren et al. 2020; China Economic Net 2020). Next-generation sequencing (NGS) tests commissioned from external institutions revealed that patients with pneumonia of unknown cause admitted to Wuhan Central Hospital were infected with a 'novel virus' that showed 87% similarity to bat coronavirus and 81% similarity to SARS virus. This result was delivered to the hospital and the Wuhan Center for Disease Control on December 27 and 28, respectively ('Huoli' WeChat public account release 2020). The test results for patients at Wuhan Tongji Hospital, reported on December 30, also indicated that the virus had a genetic sequence similarity of up to 80% with the SARS virus (China Business Net 2020). Cases of patients with similar symptoms were admitted to hospitals in Wuhan, including Wuhan Central Hospital, Wuhan Tongji Hospital, Wuhan University People's Hospital, Wuhan No. 6 Hospital, Wuhan Puren Hospital, and Hubei Provincial Hospital of Integrated Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine (“活粒” WeChat Official Account 2020; Huang et al. 2020; Ren et al. 2020; China Economic Net 2020). Subsequent testing by next-generation sequencing (NGS) commissioned to an external institution revealed that patients with unexplained pneumonia admitted to Wuhan Central Hospital were infected with a 'novel virus' that showed 87% similarity to bat coronavirus and 81% similarity to SARS virus. This result was communicated to the hospital and the Wuhan Center for Disease Control on December 27 and 28, respectively (“活粒” WeChat Official Account 2020). Test results for patients at Wuhan Tongji Hospital, reported on December 30, also indicated that the virus shared approximately 80% genetic sequence similarity with the SARS virus (China Business Net 2020).

On December 27, 2019, a report on four patients with abnormal symptoms at Hubei Provincial Hospital of Integrated Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine was finally submitted to the Jianghan District Center for Disease Control, the hospital's administrative district, and on December 29, it was also reported to the Hubei Provincial and Wuhan Municipal Centers for Disease Control. On December 29, Wuhan Central Hospital also reported to the Jianghan District Center for Disease Control that four patients admitted to the emergency room that day showed pneumonia symptoms (Sina Net 2020a). The inclusion of a patient with no direct contact with the Huanan Seafood Market among the four reported cases at this time also raised the possibility of 'human-to-human transmission'.

Despite the potentially serious nature of the situation, the municipal government did not respond immediately. The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission did not follow the administrative regulation requiring reporting to superiors within two hours of an infectious disease outbreak (China Government Portal 2005), instead conducting its own epidemiological investigation. On December 30, it issued an order prohibiting the leakage of treatment-related information to medical institutions within the city (Hubei Channel of People's Daily Online 2019). However, on the same day, Ai Fen, director of the emergency department at Wuhan Central Hospital, shared the test results indicating SARS coronavirus infection with fellow doctors online, and ophthalmologist Li Wenliang at the same hospital sent this information via WeChat to his medical school classmates, making the fact that the pneumonia of unknown cause was due to the SARS coronavirus public for the first time. As the situation became uncontrollable, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission finally reported the relevant facts to the central government on December 31 (Economic Observer Net 2020). On the same day, the municipal government stated that while 27 cases of pneumonia had occurred within its jurisdiction, they were viral pneumonia, and no human-to-human transmission or medical personnel infection had been detected (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2019).

It is unconvincing that the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission only recognized the occurrence of the infectious disease on December 27, despite the fact that numerous suspected cases, primarily among merchants at the Huanan Seafood Market, were observed from mid-December, and doctors from various hospitals had requested external tests, the results of which would have been transmitted to the Wuhan Center for Disease Control. While the severe delay in understanding the situation can be attributed to incompetence and inefficiency, such as hospitals evading responsibility, lack of diagnostic capacity, and a bureaucratic and complacent early warning system (Cho Young-nam 2020; CNN 2020), it is difficult to deny the municipal government's complacency and intent to conceal information. Although the municipal government announced on December 31 that no human-to-human transmission or medical personnel infection had been detected, as mentioned above, it appears that test results indicating a 'novel virus' similar to coronavirus and SARS had already been delivered to the authorities before that date, and the possibility of human-to-human transmission could not be ruled out. Furthermore, the fact that suspected patients began to be isolated and treated even before the official recognition date of the 27th suggests that the municipal authorities were aware of the potential severity of the virus. However, even during isolation, neither the patients themselves nor their families were provided with adequate information about the illness, and measures to protect or isolate family members or medical personnel who were close contacts were not taken. Even after that, until the central government's official announcement on January 20, 2020, acknowledging the possibility of human-to-human transmission, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission did not implement systematic isolation measures.

The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission's attitude of attempting to conceal and downplay the situation, rather than swiftly preventing the spread of the infectious disease through information sharing and early warning, became overtly apparent after the situation was disclosed. On January 2, 2020, shortly after the outbreak was reported to the central government, Ai Fen, director of the emergency department at Wuhan Central Hospital, who was the source of the information leak, was severely reprimanded by the hospital's disciplinary inspection department for causing social chaos and hindering Wuhan's development and stability through her irresponsible actions (South China Morning Post 2020a). The hospital prohibited staff from publicly discussing the pneumonia situation and instructed medical personnel to exchange related information only verbally, not through text messages or photos (South China Morning Post 2020a; Duowei News 2020b; Sina Weibo 2020). On January 3, Li Wenliang and seven others who had disclosed the occurrence of the Wuhan virus via WeChat were summoned by the Wuhan Public Security Bureau on charges of spreading rumors and were only allowed to return to work after signing documents admitting to spreading rumors (Wall Street Journal 2020a; Wuchang Branch of Wuhan Public Security Bureau, Zhongnan Road Police Station 2020; Xinhua Net 2020).

On January 3, Wuhan stated that there were a total of 44 cumulative confirmed cases, but no clear evidence of transmissibility (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020b), while continuing to exert pressure on doctors through individual hospitals and the Center for Disease Control. On January 6, when a patient with symptoms consistent with infection was found at Xinhua Hospital in Hubei Province, despite no visit to the Huanan Seafood Market, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issued an order prohibiting the disclosure of infectious disease-related information (Caixin Weekly 2020). According to Ai Fen, on the same day, Wuhan Central Hospital, upon learning that one of its nurses had been infected with the virus, was instructed to change the nurse's medical record from 'viral pneumonia infection in both lungs' to 'diffuse infection in both lungs' (Caixin Net 2020).

Under the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission's concealment, the actual situation was progressing quite severely. On January 9, the first death from novel coronavirus occurred in Wuhan. Notably, the deceased's wife, who had no contact with the Huanan Seafood Market, was also infected, strongly suggesting human-to-human transmission (Dongwang 2020; Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020b, 2020c). On January 10, Wuhan University Zhongnan Hospital's respiratory ward was paralyzed, and Jinyintan Hospital's ICU was already full, unable to admit more patients, prompting the need to secure temporary wards (Southern Weekend 2020). On this day, Lu Jun, a doctor at Tongji Hospital, was also infected (Caixin Weekly 2020), and cases of infection began to appear outside Wuhan, with suspected cases reported at the fever clinic of Huanggang Central Hospital. On January 12, Li Wenliang was confirmed infected after contracting the virus from a patient. He knew it was a novel coronavirus infection based on the patient's CT scan results, but he could not take adequate protective measures because Wuhan Central Hospital prohibited medical staff in departments other than emergency, respiratory, and ICU from wearing masks. Li Wenliang eventually died on February 6 (Global Times 2020).

Interestingly, despite the chaos of saturated city hospitals, no confirmed cases were reported in Wuhan between January 3 and January 17. The period from January 6 to 10 was the time of the Wuhan Municipal People's Congress, and the need to maintain political stability appears to have been a significant background factor. On January 10, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission announced that there had been no new infections since January 3, and no human-to-human transmission or medical personnel infection had been confirmed (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020c). During the week of the Hubei Provincial People's Congress, from January 11 to 17, there were also no additional confirmed cases reported. The secret was information control. After three nurses were diagnosed on January 13, Wuhan strengthened the conditions for reporting confirmed cases: 'Discovered cases must first undergo various relevant tests within the hospital, be diagnosed after a group expert consultation, then request consultation and approval from the district health and health commission, and only after district, city, and provincial level examinations, if it is still determined to be pneumonia of unknown cause, can a case report be submitted with the consent of the provincial health and health commission' (Sina Net 2020b). Making the process of confirming and approving case reports so complex and difficult at a time when diagnosis and isolation were urgent appears to be an intention to reduce the number of confirmed cases. This significant delay in the confirmation process meant that suspected cases were not properly isolated, and it is difficult to avoid criticism that this contributed to the spread of infection (Caixin Net 2020).

3. Central Government's Neglect

If the Wuhan city government threatened doctors and focused on controlling information and downplaying the situation, the central government, which recognized the crisis on December 31, 2019, also failed to respond appropriately. Instead of intervening promptly to assess the situation and provide full support, it appeared to adopt a hands-off approach to the crisis unfolding in Wuhan, focusing on controlling the leakage of information about the disease and continuing to deny its potential risks.

The central government's response, while seemingly swift, was largely formal. On December 31, 2019, the day the Wuhan city government officially reported the outbreak, the central government immediately dispatched an initial investigation team to Wuhan. However, according to a report by Hong Kong's *Ming Pao*, the investigation team's report, which suggested that "although human-to-human transmission has not yet been confirmed, immediate actions such as controlling public gatherings should be taken," was ignored. Gao Fu, director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, proposed activating a Level II alert, but this was not implemented. The article claims that the central government did not accept the investigation team's report warning of the possibility of human-to-human transmission in order to maintain the Lunar New Year atmosphere (JoongAng Ilbo 2020; Ming Pao 2020), which supports the general suspicion that the Chinese central government concealed a potentially dangerous situation for political reasons.

The Chinese central government claims it reported the information received from Wuhan to the WHO on December 31, 2019, in accordance with international law. However, this was only a report to the WHO Beijing office, and the formal notification to the WHO of the outbreak of an unknown pneumonia occurred on January 3. Furthermore, the content of this report was merely that 44 cases of infectious disease had occurred,[14] and detailed information was not released for nearly three weeks. Consequently, the Chinese central government violated the International Health Regulations, which stipulate that new infectious diseases must be reported to the WHO within 24 hours. It faced criticism for neglecting initial responses by refusing to disclose related information, ultimately leading to an international pandemic (BBC 2021; Henderson 2020; McCaul 2020; Radio Free Asia 2020a).

Information on the outbreak of infectious diseases was hardly covered by the Chinese domestic media. Instead, on January 3, the National Health Commission issued guidelines requiring that any individual or organization collecting samples related to the novel virus must either dispose of them or submit them to state institutions, and that hospitals could not outsource testing to third-party institutions. In other words, rather than diversifying testing channels to facilitate rapid diagnosis and isolation, control measures were hastily implemented to restrict testing solely to state institutions.[15] According to CNN, on January 5, the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center analyzed the base sequence of the novel virus and submitted a document to the National Health Commission suggesting that preventive measures were necessary in public places due to its 87.11% similarity to the SARS virus (163.com 2020). However, the following day, the content was deleted, and the laboratory was temporarily closed under the pretext of needing "corrections."

As criticism mounted both domestically and internationally regarding the central government's delayed response, it was belatedly revealed on January 7 that Xi Jinping had already ordered measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party (Duowei News 2020a; Central News Agency 2020). However, a closer examination of the specific directives reveals that Xi Jinping stated, "While striving to control the epidemic situation, maintain the stability and order of production and daily life, and avoid causing public anxiety such as an increase in confirmed cases or shortages in the supply of daily necessities, which could lead to a secondary disaster." (Qiushi 2020). This can be interpreted as prioritizing social stability and order over epidemic control, which would then explain Wuhan's active concealment of cases as an effort to faithfully implement the central government's directives.

On January 8, the National Health Commission finally identified the cause of the pneumonia as a "novel coronavirus" (National Health Commission 2020). As mentioned earlier, the first death from the novel coronavirus occurred in Wuhan on January 9, and the infection of the deceased's wife, who had no contact with the Huanan Seafood Market, suggested human-to-human transmission. However, the investigation results announced on January 10 by the second investigation team dispatched to Wuhan on January 8 stated that "human-to-human transmission is unlikely and the disease is controllable." This analysis was completely detached from the reality of the rapidly spreading coronavirus in Wuhan. On the same day, Lunar New Year travel began, but the central government issued no warnings to citizens traveling to or from Wuhan. On January 12, the Chinese government announced, based on research conducted jointly by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, and the Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, that there was no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and that medical personnel had not been infected (Sina Weibo Official Account 2020).

However, the situation changed dramatically starting January 18. On this day, Wuhan reported four new confirmed cases (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020d), and a third investigation team was dispatched to Wuhan (Yangtze Net 2020). On January 19, 17 confirmed cases were reported in Wuhan (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020e), and on January 20, Zhong Nanshan, the head of the third investigation team, held a press conference announcing the investigation results: "Human-to-human transmission has been confirmed, and 14 medical personnel have been infected, necessitating a fundamental shift in existing policies" (Tencent News 2020a; China Government Network 2020; CCTV 2020). This finally brought the dangers of COVID-19 to national attention. On January 23, Wuhan was placed under a complete lockdown, with all flights and trains suspended. Approximately 9 million people who remained in Wuhan during the Lunar New Year holiday were placed under house arrest for over 70 days.

Examining the process by which China's central and local governments denied the severity of the epidemic for over two months after the first COVID-19 case, focusing on information control rather than active response, reveals how a "strong authoritarian state" can leverage its power in a critical crisis to prioritize political stability at the cost of immense harm and sacrifice to individuals and society. Behind the seemingly decisive intervention of the Wuhan lockdown, which ostensibly blocked the spread of the epidemic, were the local governments that had been busy suppressing information and downplaying the situation for nearly two months, and the central government that concealed the risks of the epidemic and withheld appropriate warnings, citing social instability. It was not a competent and strong state that achieved effective epidemic control through decisive intervention, but rather an authoritarian regime that, by blocking information and delaying its response, was ultimately pushed into a situation where only extreme lockdown and control could provide a solution. Until the severity of the epidemic was suddenly revealed and Wuhan was locked down, the citizens of Wuhan received neither adequate warnings nor effective quarantine measures. By early April 2020, when the lockdown was lifted, the total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Wuhan was approximately 50,000, accounting for 60% of China's total confirmed cases. The death toll exceeded 2,500, representing about three-quarters of China's total deaths (Yonhap News 2020b).

IV. Conclusion

The shock of COVID-19 provided an opportunity to expose the contradictions and limitations of existing political systems and structures. In particular, the difficulties experienced by "advanced" countries in the United States and Western Europe have led to fundamental skepticism about the legitimacy of the liberal democratic system, which had enjoyed firm legitimacy. If a political community cannot elicit consensus among free citizens and voluntary compliance for the common good even in urgent crisis situations, what is the value of liberal democracy? On the other hand, the crisis of community brought about by COVID-19 also prompts a reconsideration of the roles and capabilities required of the state. A "powerless" state and political system that fails to effectively protect its citizens and provide adequate support when their lives are threatened cannot maintain legitimacy.

Based on this critical perspective, this paper re-examines the discussion on state capacity, which was actively pursued in the context of state-led economic growth in East Asia in the latter half of the 20th century, within the context of East Asia in the COVID-19 era. In contrast to the United States and the United Kingdom, where liberal democracies with deep traditions have shown the image of incompetent and divided states through citizens' resistance to control and the failure of healthcare systems, the East Asian cases, which have relatively stably curbed the spread of the virus based on strict quarantine policies and citizen cooperation, raise the need to analyze the effectiveness of a "strong state" in a new context. Just as a "strong state" was important for latecomer countries to overcome structural constraints and subordinate market failures and various political and social interests to the goal of economic development, perhaps the role of the state, which can enforce quarantine policies on society by restricting citizens' freedom to some extent, is important for the safety of a community in crisis. In particular, China's success in controlling the epidemic, having declared the end of COVID-19 early on, could serve as a case study demonstrating the relative effectiveness of authoritarianism in responding to national crises. If state capacity is defined, as in Chalmers Johnson's developmental state theory, as the ability of the state to unilaterally impose its objectives and will on social actors without being hindered by various societal interests, then the Chinese case appears to be a success story of a state with strong control capable of enforcing epidemic prevention policies for the benefit of the community on all members of society, achieving the objectives of safety and stability.

However, this paper demonstrates, based on domestic and international Chinese sources, that the Chinese authoritarian regime actually failed in the initial containment of COVID-19 by analyzing in detail the Chinese government's response during the crucial first two months after the outbreak. The process by which China's central and local governments ignored warning signs and delayed active responses during the initial phase, which determined the speed and scope of COVID-19's spread, while focusing on information control, shows how a "strong state" with significant autonomy from society can cause immense social sacrifices under the paramount goal of political stability in a critical crisis. Behind the Wuhan lockdown, which appeared to be a decisive intervention for active epidemic prevention, were the local governments that had been busy suppressing the number of confirmed cases and controlling information leaks for nearly two months, and the central government that emphasized social stability, denied the risks of the virus, and focused on information blockade. The immense mobilization and coercive power over society was utilized for information control rather than for a swift and effective response to the epidemic, resulting in enormous loss of life, human rights abuses, and immense social costs. China is by no means exempt from the question of whether a state and political system that fails to effectively protect its citizens and provide adequate support when the lives of the majority are threatened can maintain legitimacy.

Nevertheless, the vulnerabilities revealed by the liberal democratic system under the COVID-19 crisis and the questions about the role and capacity of the state arising from those vulnerabilities remain valid. If a strong state is not the answer, what kind of state capacity can address the political challenges exposed by the COVID-19 era? Why did the existing "advanced" liberal democratic states reveal such limitations in responding to the critical crisis of COVID-19, and what did their past accolades overlook? Does liberal democracy, based on the supreme value of individual freedom, ultimately give rise to selfish individuals and an unequal and divided society?

The yearning for a "competent" state capable of reaching social consensus, effectively mobilizing necessary resources, and protecting citizens' health and lives in crisis situations, coupled with disappointment in existing political systems that have repeatedly failed even when the survival of community members is threatened, could accelerate a global crisis of democracy after COVID-19. In particular, the failures experienced by "advanced" liberal democratic systems serve as a reminder of the role of community and the state, which have been relatively overlooked by liberal democracy, which has developed based on markets and individuals, and that trust in fellow citizens and commitment to the community are also important for the growth of democracy. The shock that COVID-19 brought to existing political systems, by starkly exposing the vulnerabilities of liberal democracy, paradoxically provides an opportunity to formally initiate fundamental reflection and discussion and to elevate the effectiveness and legitimacy of democracy by one level.■

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[1] WHO, Coronavirus Dashboard, https://covid19.who.int/(Accessed November 1, 2021).

[2] As of October 25, 2021, examining the cumulative confirmed cases and total deaths in the United States and Western European countries, the United States had 45,107,253 and 730,306 cases respectively, the UK had 8,773,678 and 139,533, and France had 6,904,501 and 115,092. Germany, known to have suffered relatively less damage, had 4,472,730 cases and 95,117 deaths. In contrast, South Korea had 354,355 cases and 2,788 deaths, Taiwan had 16,380 cases and 847 deaths, Japan had 1,717,104 cases and 18,207 deaths, and China had 125,565 cases and 5,695 deaths. Although there are disparities in the figures among East Asian countries, there is no doubt that the damage suffered is far less compared to the United States and European countries. WHO, Coronavirus Dashboard; Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En(Accessed October 26, 2021).

[3] Examples discussing the relationship between COVID-19 response outcomes and regime types, such as democracy or authoritarianism, include the following: Brookings 2020; Burkle 2020; Carnegie 2020; Cassan and Steenvoort 2021; Fukuyama 2020; The Washington Post 2020.

[4] By the early 1990s, the World Bank, representing the neoliberal perspective, also acknowledged the positive role of state intervention. Noting the 'East Asian economic miracle' characterized by rapid and relatively equitable economic growth, the World Bank identified 'selective government intervention' as one of its primary causes, analyzing that for certain countries, 'government intervention enabled higher and more equitable development than would have been possible without intervention' (World Bank 1993, 17).

[5] For representative related works, please refer to the following: Amsden 1989; Chang 1994; Deyo 1987; Evans 1995; Fields 1995; Haggard 1990, 2018; Johnson 1982; Moon and Prasad 1994; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999;

[6] For discussions on this topic, please refer to the following: Appelbaum 1992, 18-19; Dahrendorf 1968, 219.

[7] Consequently, discussions on state capacity were subsequently expanded to research emphasizing the interrelationship and connectivity between society and the state (Evans 1995; Moon and Prasad 1994; Okimoto 1989).

[8] This chapter extensively quotes from Jeong Ju-yeon and Shin Eun-bi (2022). For more detailed information, please refer to this paper.

[9] WHO, China: Coronavirus Dashboard. https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/cn.

[10] Although there are claims that cases occurred as early as November 17, 2019, it is generally accepted that the first COVID-19 case in Wuhan occurred on December 1 (BBC 2020a; Epidemiology Team 2020; South China Morning Post 2020b). The Wuhan Municipal Government claims the first case occurred on December 8.

[11] WHO, China: Coronavirus Dashboard.

[12] WHO, Coronavirus Dashboard.

[13] Lest we forget, Covid-19 Timeline, https://covid19.forget.eu.org/en.html.

[14] WHO, Covid-19-China.

[15] CNN, China’s truthtellers,

■ Author: Jeong Ju-yeon_Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University and served as a Postdoctoral Fellow at Columbia University and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, Canada. Her research focuses on political economy, particularly the relationship between state and market, using China as a primary case study in comparative politics. Recent publications and edited volumes include “Changing Frames: China's Media Strategy for Environmental Protests” (2021), Is Protest Effective in China: The Xiamen Environmental Protest and the Role of the Urban Middle Class (co-authored, 2019), From Market to State: Adaptation and Evolution of Chinese Socialism (2018), China's Economic Model: Meaning and Limitations of the New Market Economy Presented by China (2017), and The Rise of China and Domestic Political Vulnerabilities (edited, 2016).

■ Managed and Edited by: Yoon Ha-eun_EAI Research Fellow

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