[EAI Working Paper] 2022 Presidential Success Conditions Series: ⑩ Discard 'Self-Righteousness,' the President's Greatest Enemy

1. Why the President Elected Amidst Blessings Faces an Uncertain Post-Presidency

The presidential election, held every five years, is the most highly-rated political event, drawing the attention of the entire nation, not just the candidates and their parties. All past presidents began their terms with the support of the majority of the public. However, most ended their terms dismally. Former presidents left behind considerable achievements during their terms. President Roh Tae-woo's accomplishments in leading Northern Diplomacy and the simultaneous UN admission of North and South Korea are commendable. President Kim Young-sam is evaluated as having laid crucial groundwork in the early stages of democratization by driving reforms such as eradicating the military secret society 'Hana-hoe' and implementing the real-name financial system. President Kim Dae-jung is credited with overcoming the IMF economic crisis and improving inter-Korean relations. President Roh Moo-hyun is recognized for leading the effort to shed authoritarianism. President Lee Myung-bak's contributions to globalization, including hosting the G20 Seoul Summit and concluding the Korea-US FTA, are noteworthy, and even President Park Geun-hye, the first president in Korean political history to be impeached, has some recognized achievements, such as concluding the Korea-China FTA. However, despite these achievements, there is a general sentiment that none are recognized as 'successful presidents.' For instance, President Roh Moo-hyun, who topped 'favorite president' polls among young people, had to face a tragic end due to scandals involving his close associates after leaving office. In addition to Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who faced difficulties due to family or associate scandals after their terms, it is undeniable that it is difficult to assess them as successful presidents, especially when the presidents themselves received prison sentences and served time. Consequently, among voters aged 60 and above who have experienced the terms of all presidents, former President Park Chung-hee still receives the highest evaluation. It is an paradox of Korean democracy that presidents directly elected after democratization are evaluated less favorably than former President Park Chung-hee, the 'dictator' they strived to dismantle.

2. Presidential Approval Ratings and Governing Capacity

How should a president govern to be evaluated as successful? Many experts focus on public relations and media strategies. Modern politics has long since shifted from the era of 'boss politics' to the era of 'media politics.' In the past era of boss politics, represented by the 'Three Kims,' the 'bosses' of each party exerted unrivaled influence within their parties. Their influence, particularly in the nomination process, was almost absolute. Given the nature of the regionalist parties at the time, nomination often meant election. Therefore, for politicians of the respective parties, their intra-party network was their most crucial political asset, providing a basis for party leadership to exercise absolute authority over all affiliated National Assembly members and party officials. Thus, this boss politics can be seen as a mechanism that enabled strong party politics.

Conversely, in today's environment where such powerful party 'bosses' have all disappeared, the slogan 'Going Public' (Kernell, 2007) has taken their place. Currently, there are no party bosses with the presence of the 'Three Kims' of the past. Furthermore, voters' fundamental perception of the political sphere is highly negative. Consequently, established politicians with close ties to party leadership become targets of negative stereotypes. For these reasons, each party dedicates significant effort to recruiting talented individuals to discover new candidates who can appeal to voters during elections. Additionally, they sometimes publicly state a principle of not re-nominating a certain number of incumbent National Assembly members. As anti-establishment sentiment intensifies, party politics inevitably weakens. Consequently, the influence of party leadership has also diminished. Therefore, maintaining close relationships with party leadership no longer guarantees nomination, and it has become an era where all potential election candidates strive to appeal directly to the public to be perceived as competitive candidates.

In this process, media and press play the most crucial role. Ordinary voters rarely acquire information about politics through direct experience; they mostly gain it through indirect experience via media and press. Therefore, media and press inevitably exert immense influence. Moreover, the most important qualification for receiving party nomination in major elections is 'name recognition.' Voter preferences are often easily determined by simple cognitive signals. Consequently, name recognition alone can provide a significant advantage in elections. Thus, building public name recognition through regular appearances on current affairs programs on cable TV has become an important path to entering politics. Furthermore, the number of potential election candidates increasing their name recognition by appealing directly to voters through channels like social media is also on the rise. What does this fundamental change in the political environment imply for presidential governance? The president must also thoroughly understand the grammar of 'Going Public' and implement strategies accordingly. First, for the president to pursue policies, the relationship with the National Assembly is crucial. If it takes a long time to pass or if bills related to the president's policies are rejected in the National Assembly, it becomes fundamentally impossible for the president to pursue achievements that will be remembered in history, and they are inevitably reduced to a 'lame duck' president. This is why a situation where the ruling party holds an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly is much more advantageous for stable governance.

The problem is that, unlike in the past boss politics era, unconditional 'loyalty' is no longer guaranteed even from ruling party members. Many lawmakers may not follow the president's desired legislation if it could harm their public image or provoke strong backlash from their constituents. Personally, since the president is not a 'boss' from the ruling party like former Presidents Kim Young-sam or Kim Dae-jung, their influence over ruling party lawmakers is inherently conditional. While carrots like cabinet appointments can be offered, the pool of potential beneficiaries is limited, making it impossible to control most lawmakers solely through this logic. Similarly, neither party leadership nor the president, who cannot guarantee nominations, has significant means to compel individual lawmakers to comply with such demands. On the other hand, due to increasingly severe political conflicts, the president's reliance on the ruling party has become much higher than in the past. In other words, smooth governance is impossible without the full support of ruling party lawmakers.

In the changed political environment, the only method to control not only the opposition but also ruling party lawmakers is the 'Going Public' strategy. The 'Going Public' strategy means that the president maintains high approval ratings, thereby fostering a belief among both ruling and opposition parties that opposing their policies will incur significant political costs, and inducing 'loyalty' based on this 'threat' or 'pressure.' Therefore, unlike the previous boss politics, in the era of the 'Going Public' strategy, the most important thing for the president is to maintain high approval ratings and use these high ratings as the driving force for smooth governance. In other words, high approval ratings are the president's most crucial political asset.

Of course, media relations can be very important for managing approval ratings. That is, if favorable media coverage can be induced through active policy promotion, it would help maintain approval ratings. Ultimately, this becomes the driving force for smooth governance and the pursuit of core policy tasks. The logic of the 'Going Public' strategy can also be applied to media relations. That is, maintaining approval ratings itself significantly attracts favorable media coverage. Media outlets, too, may find it politically and economically burdensome to excessively criticize a president who enjoys the support of the majority of the public, as it could lead to a decline in subscriptions or viewership. For instance, when former President Park Geun-hye's approval ratings plummeted due to the 'tablet PC' incident, conservative media outlets simultaneously ran critical articles about her. During periods of high presidential approval ratings, public opinion campaigns against specific media outlets intensify. In such cases, advertisers also find it difficult to provide advertising or sponsorships. In other words, media coverage is also likely to be influenced by approval ratings.

3. Why Do Presidential Approval Ratings Decline?

The problem is that all presidents' approval ratings tend to decline continuously, except for a very brief period at the beginning of their term, the so-called 'honeymoon period.' This 'law of declining approval ratings' is a very consistent phenomenon in political science, common not only to Korean but also to most US presidents. As a result, the loss of governing capacity is repeatedly observed. There were expectations that President Moon Jae-in would be different. This was because he started with very high approval ratings during the impeachment crisis of former President Park Geun-hye. However, President Moon's approval ratings, which reached up to 80% in some early surveys, were no exception to this law. His approval ratings, which once fell below 30%, have stagnated in the mid-to-high 30s towards the end of his term. This represents a decline of nearly half from the peak. Of course, this is still higher than the approval ratings of most previous presidents at the same point in their terms. However, the prevailing interpretation is that this is due to the significantly intensified political polarization compared to the past.

Indeed, looking at the estimated approval ratings of past US presidents by the American data journalism site 'FiveThirty Eight,' out of 13 presidents since World War II, 10 presidents, excluding Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and Bill Clinton, showed a decline in approval ratings. In Korea, according to the quarterly presidential approval rating trends provided by Gallup Korea, all presidents since democratization in 1987 have experienced this decline in approval ratings. Of course, with the recent extreme political polarization, the intensification of animosity towards the opposing camp and the strong operation of factional logic have led to a phenomenon where presidential approval ratings stagnate between 40% and 50%. President Moon's approval ratings are a prime example, and in the US, President Trump's approval ratings remained almost unchanged around 40% throughout his term. However, President Moon's approval ratings have also fallen by nearly half from their peak of nearly 80%.

Many have been interested in the causes of this decline in approval ratings. What is the problem? The most plausible explanation is the 'Coalition of Minorities' hypothesis. This theory suggests that whenever a president pursues new policies, new groups of voters oppose those policies, and as various policies are pursued during the term, the opposing factions accumulate and coalesce, leading to a decline in presidential approval ratings. Paradoxically, from this perspective, a decline in approval ratings is inevitable unless the president pursues no policies at all. Furthermore, the more reformist policies are pursued for the current situation, the faster opposing factions may form.

To become a successful president who leaves a historical legacy, it is essential to create an environment where core policy tasks can be boldly pursued by maximizing the control over the speed of decline in presidential approval ratings, even if it is impossible to completely reverse the trend. So, what factors accelerate the decline in presidential approval ratings?

There are various internal and external factors. First, the most representative external factors are economic crises or disasters. Many overseas studies have shown that presidential approval ratings are affected by the improvement or deterioration of the economic situation (Gronke and Newman, 2003). There are few studies on whether these results still hold true in Korea. However, the sharp decline in President Kim Young-sam's approval ratings due to the foreign exchange crisis during his administration can be cited as a representative example. Conversely, President Kim Dae-jung is widely interpreted to have maintained high approval ratings as the economic situation improved due to his successful management of the foreign exchange crisis in the early part of his term. Furthermore, failures in economic policies, such as the real estate policies during the Moon Jae-in administration, are also expected to affect presidential approval ratings. In addition, major accidents like the sinking of the MV Sewol during President Park Geun-hye's term or the Sampoong Department Store collapse during President Kim Young-sam's term could also accelerate the decline in presidential approval ratings.

So, what can the president themselves do? The most significant factor accelerating approval rating decline caused by the president themselves can be seen as the president's 'self-righteousness.' Given the landscape of Korean voters, it is nearly impossible for any president to be elected by a wide margin. In fact, in the 2017 presidential election held amidst an impeachment crisis, President Moon Jae-in's vote share was only 41.1%. Even if we include the votes for Sim Sang-jung, considering the strength of reform-minded voters, the total vote share was around 47.3%. This means that more than half of the total voters did not support President Moon Jae-in. Nevertheless, due to the winner-take-all nature of our presidential system, all power is concentrated in the president after the election. We have frequently witnessed presidents engaging in 'self-righteous' governance, especially in the early part of their terms, intoxicated by their election victory. Considering the reality of our political landscape where more than half of the voters do not support the president, a very rapid decline in approval ratings can occur, leading to a weakening of governing capacity.

In what forms does this 'self-righteousness' manifest? First, the president's intoxication with power can lead to unilateral policy initiatives. That is, if unilateral legislation is repeatedly pursued on issues where public opinion is severely divided, the speed of approval rating decline can accelerate. A representative example during the Park Geun-hye administration is the pursuit of state-authored history textbooks despite strong public opposition. Conversely, a similar example during the Moon Jae-in administration could be the pursuit of 'nuclear phase-out.' With public opinion divided almost equally on nuclear phase-out, the construction of Shin Kori 5 and 6 was abruptly halted early in the term. However, the public deliberation results eventually favored 'resuming construction,' leading to the resumption of work and significant political damage. At the time, there was also considerable criticism that the government had evaded responsibility by shifting the decision-making to public deliberation. Another common 'self-righteous' mistake is attempting to interfere in elections or exercise nomination rights. During the 2016 general election, the conflict between President Park Geun-hye and the Saenuri Party leadership reached its peak, leading to a farce where Kim Moo-sung, the then-leader of the Saenuri Party, took 'sealing wax' and went to Busan. In conclusion, many presidents have brought about a decline in approval ratings and lost governing capacity due to self-righteous actions driven by intoxication with power in the early part of their terms.

This paper analyzed the approval ratings of Presidents Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in to examine which issues accelerated the decline in their approval ratings. First, as these were the most recent presidents, the political environment and voter landscape during their terms are similar to those of the next president, making the implications most significant. Furthermore, one was a conservative president and the other a progressive president, representing both camps. In this analysis, we collected all presidential approval rating surveys registered on the website of the Central Election Survey Deliberation Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'CESDC') since April 2015, when CESDC mandated the registration of political and election surveys, adjusted for biases of each survey agency, and estimated the presidential approval ratings. April 2015 corresponds to the midpoint of former President Park Geun-hye's term. Therefore, there is a clear limitation that the impact of events and accidents that occurred before this period cannot be considered. The number of approval rating surveys included for the two presidents was 288 and 970, respectively.

By applying the Bayesian methodology proposed by Simon Jackman (Jackman, S. 2005) to these approval rating data, we obtained estimated presidential approval ratings adjusted for the house effect of each survey agency. We then performed Change Point Analysis (Killick, Eckley, Jonathan, and Ewans, 2010) on these estimated approval ratings to identify statistically significant 'change points' in each president's approval ratings. Change points can be understood as the points where the average change before and after is greatest. By examining these change points, we inferred the factors that had the greatest impact on the changes in the approval ratings of both presidents.

4. Turning Points in Former President Park Geun-hye's Approval Ratings

After April 2015, former President Park's approval ratings underwent several turning points, declining to the low teens by October 2016 and subsequently leading to impeachment (see Figure 1). That is, during this period, approval ratings declined by nearly 40 percentage points, from about 50% to the low teens.

So, what triggered the decline in former President Park's approval ratings? Was the downfall of former President Park solely due to the Choi Soon-sil scandal, triggered by the so-called 'tablet PC' incident? Or were there other precursor symptoms? If so, what were they? The decline in approval ratings can ultimately be seen as a loss of former President Park's governing capacity. Therefore, identifying the time points that served as major turning points for the decline in approval ratings would be meaningful.

Looking at the trend of former President Park's approval ratings, there were three turning points corresponding to the 'Choi Soon-sil Gate' triggered by the 'tablet PC' reporting in the latter half of her term (October 11, 20, and 30, 2016).[1] The existence of three turning points within the single month of October 2016 demonstrates how rapidly former President Park's approval ratings declined. Subsequently, her approval ratings hovered in the low to mid-10% range. This period corresponds to the very end of former President Park's term (see Figure 2).

So, were there no precursor symptoms before the tablet PC incident? Excluding the tablet PC incident, there were two turning points: March 15, 2016, and April 11, 2016. This period, preceding the general election, can be characterized as the 'nomination dispute' period. After the Sewol ferry disaster, approval ratings, while not high, had maintained a certain stability, but then plummeted during the nomination dispute period.

This nomination dispute period can be broadly divided into two phases. First, the initial significant turning point (mid-March 2016) corresponds to the outbreak of the nomination dispute due to the controversy over the so-called 'kill list' in late February, and the peak of the conflict with party leader Kim Moo-sung's 'sealing wax incident' on March 23. It was found that former President Park's approval ratings showed the greatest difference before and after March 15, which falls roughly in the middle of these two events. After this point, her approval ratings, which had been in the mid-40% range, dropped below 40% and entered a lull.

Examining the background of this situation, it can be seen that internal party conflict erupted as the ruling party leadership and lawmakers opposed the Blue House's attempt to exercise nomination rights in the general election. This illustrates that even former President Park, despite her father's historical legacy and her past efforts to save the Grand National Party, did not wield significant influence within the ruling party, especially given her not-so-high approval ratings.

Notably, before the legal basis for using 'safe numbers' in opinion polls was established, survey agencies could not secure lists of mobile phone numbers by district. Consequently, most predictions released during the election period indicated a landslide victory for the Saenuri Party, with 150-160 seats. This can be seen as continuously sending incorrect signals to the president. As a result, the president's unchecked, almost reckless, intervention in nominations was not halted. The common interpretation is that former President Park attempted to exercise nomination rights by creating a 'kill list' to ensure the entry of individuals highly loyal to her into the National Assembly for smooth governance in the latter half of her term. And it was due to the disharmony originating from the Blue House surrounding these nominations that former President Park's approval ratings sharply declined. Therefore, this can be seen as a disaster caused by the president's 'self-righteousness'.

The greater problem is that the controversy surrounding these nominations led to defeat in the general election. Contrary to the predictions of a landslide victory in the 2016 general election, the Democratic Party emerged as the majority party. It appears that many Saenuri Party supporters, lacking motivation to vote due to the nomination controversy, did not place significant importance on voting, assuming the predicted landslide victory would occur. Consequently, responsibility was placed on the president immediately after the general election, leading to a second turning point (April 13) with a steeper decline than that in mid-March. According to the approval rating estimates in this analysis, former President Park's approval ratings, which had remained around 40%, dropped by nearly 10 percentage points to around 30% within just two weeks after the general election. This can be interpreted as many supporters withdrawing their support out of disappointment with the nomination controversy and the subsequent election defeat caused by the president's 'self-righteousness.' This period can be considered the second phase of the nomination dispute (see Figure 2). Ultimately, former President Park, who never recovered the 40% mark after the general election, embarked on the path to downfall about six months later due to the tablet PC incident. Some analyses suggest that the decline in former President Park's influence was the cause of the tablet PC incident itself. At the very least, it is clear that the Saenuri Party lawmakers, who harbored resentment due to former President Park's self-righteous actions during the general election, did not actively defend her during the impeachment process.

In summary, during the period covered by the analysis, excluding the tablet PC incident, the nomination dispute had the most decisive impact on the decline of former President Park Geun-hye's approval ratings. Ultimately, former President Park attempted to exert excessive influence during the 2016 general election nomination process, which caused considerable controversy and directly led to the decline in her approval ratings. Following the defeat in the general election, there was a rapid further decline in approval ratings, after which she entered the impeachment process due to the tablet PC incident without ever recovering the 40% mark. Therefore, the direct cause of the decline in former President Park's approval ratings was 'self-righteousness,' represented by the undue exercise of nomination rights.

5. Turning Points in President Moon Jae-in's Approval Ratings

Similar to the analysis of former President Park Geun-hye's approval ratings, we collected 974 presidential approval rating surveys registered with the CESDC from the beginning of President Moon Jae-in's term until April 1, 2021. After adjusting for the unique tendencies of each survey agency over time, we estimated presidential approval ratings and applied the Change Point Analysis technique.

Based on the approval rating trends, President Moon's term until April 1, 2021, could be broadly divided into approximately seven periods. The first three months from the beginning of his term until the first week of July 2017 were the 'honeymoon' period, during which he maintained 'surreal' approval ratings of around 80%. While this is a period that all presidents experience, considering that the initial approval ratings of former presidents ranged from about 42% (Park Geun-hye) to 71% (Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung), President Moon began with an exceptionally high approval rating. There could be various reasons, but the most plausible interpretation is the extremely low participation of conservative voters in opinion polls due to the stigma associated with conservatism following the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye. In reality, given the landscape of Korean voters, it is considered impossible for President Moon, who received about 41.1% of the vote in the presidential election, to achieve approval ratings close to 80%. Regardless of the reason, President Moon can be considered the president of the Republic of Korea who began his term with the highest approval ratings in history.

After the 'honeymoon' period, President Moon's approval ratings entered a phase of decline, similar to other presidents. This was the period when 'eroding segments' began to emerge as the administration's personnel appointments and basic policy directions were introduced. This can be seen as the 'first decline period' and lasted from approximately the first week of July 2017 to the first week of April 2018. During this period, President Moon faced controversy over 'ideological appointments,' as he appointed many individuals aligned with civic groups, activists, and specific 'lines' to key Blue House posts and government ministries, contrary to his promise to be 'the president of all citizens.' The 'ideological appointments' controversy can ultimately be seen as a form of 'self-righteousness' mentioned in the case of former President Park Geun-hye and is a phenomenon observed in many presidents.

Following this first decline period, President Moon's approval ratings experienced a 'first rebound period' starting from the first week of April 2018. The most significant reasons for this first rebound period can be analyzed as two factors. First, the two inter-Korean summits held around that time raised expectations for improved inter-Korean relations. However, the most important reason is considered to be the 'rally effect' resulting from the overwhelming victory in the June 13 local elections. At that time, in the metropolitan mayoral and gubernatorial elections, the Democratic Party, the Liberty Korea Party, and independents received results of 14, 2, and 1 respectively, leading to a rapid increase in the Democratic Party's approval ratings. It appears that these two external factors brought about a fortunate rebound after the second decline period.

This 'first rebound period' was short-lived. Starting from the third week of June 2018, shortly after the local election victory, the 'second decline period' began. Despite several adjustment periods, by the first week of December of the same year, the approval rating fell below 50% for the first time. This occurred within just a year and a half of his term, highlighting the transience of approval ratings, especially considering the peak of nearly 80%. This signifies that President Moon's support base had shrunk to a hard-core base. This second decline period was the period of the most significant drop in President Moon's approval ratings, falling by as much as 30 percentage points from the peak of the 'first rebound period' (79.4% in the first week of May). This illustrates the dramatic shift in public sentiment within just two weeks of the landslide victory in the June 13 local elections. This period can be seen as the time when the core of the Moon administration's '100 national tasks,' announced by the National Policy Advisory Committee at the start of the administration, such as 'rooting out deep-rooted evils,' were introduced. Ironically, while the president was pursuing policies related to 'rooting out deep-rooted evils,' which he considered 'reform,' President Moon's approval ratings also declined concurrently. This outcome can be interpreted as the Moon administration, intoxicated by the victory in the local elections, pursuing self-righteous policies focused on its support base, similar to the first decline period, and failing to sustain the momentum from the June 13 local election victory.

Following the second decline period, a 'stable period' of sorts lasted for about a year and a half, from the first week of December 2018 to the second week of March 2020. During this period, President Moon's core support base showed steadfast support despite various adverse factors. Notably, even amidst the controversies triggered by the nomination of Cho Kuk as Minister of Justice, the lowest point of approval ratings was around 43% (third week of September 2019), fluctuating between the 40% and low 50% range. This can be interpreted as the result of strong support holding firm despite the administration's insistence on the controversial appointment of Cho Kuk as Minister of Justice. This phenomenon is also observed in the approval ratings of US President Trump. That is, in the highly polarized US political landscape, President Trump's approval ratings started relatively low but remained consistently around the low 40% range throughout his term without further decline, showing a similar trend.

Subsequently, President Moon had an opportunity for a 'second rebound.' During the early stages of the global pandemic caused by COVID-19, approval ratings surged due to relatively successful epidemic control measures and the distribution of disaster relief funds. Riding this momentum, the ruling party achieved a landslide victory in the April 2020 general election, temporarily regaining approval ratings in the 60% range. The weakness of the opposition party also contributed to the rebound in President Moon's approval ratings. Regaining 60% approval ratings in the latter half of his term is considered highly unusual.

The Moon administration's 'second rebound period' did not last long either. Starting from the fourth week of June 2020, a 'third decline period' began, marked by a significant drop in approval ratings. This period saw the conflict between Minister of Justice Choo Mi-ae and Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-yeol over prosecutorial reform escalate, leading to a rapid decline in approval ratings. As the conflict between Minister Choo, who took office after Cho Kuk stepped down, and the prosecution reached its peak, even prosecutors with pro-government leanings publicly opposed Minister Choo. From this point onwards, President Moon's approval ratings began to decline, even falling below the 30% mark at times. This third decline period can also be interpreted as a result of 'self-righteousness,' represented by Minister Choo Mi-ae.

Although the data used in this analysis only includes up to April 2021, the 'LH incident,' which occurred amidst a barrage of regulations targeting 'real estate corruption,' appears to have triggered a new decline period. A sharp decline is noticeable in the final part of this analysis. The persistent real estate policies of Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Kim Hyun-mi seem to have become another 'turning point' for the decline in approval ratings. However, with the upcoming presidential election, both camps are consolidating their positions, and President Moon's approval ratings are currently fluctuating in the mid-to-high 30% range.

In summary, President Moon's approval ratings started at around 70-80% and, despite several periods of decline and rebound, ultimately converged to the mid-to-high 30% range, failing to escape the 'law of declining approval ratings' like other presidents. The issues that triggered the decline in President Moon's approval ratings included the appointment of individuals who could be classified as 'ideological appointments' in the early part of his term, leading to a rather sharp decline in approval ratings after the 'honeymoon period.' Subsequently, there was a period of rapid increase around the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, fueled by a mood of reconciliation with North Korea and an overwhelming victory in the local elections. Interestingly, the decline in approval ratings began rapidly after the landslide victory in the local elections. This was a period when the administration, confident from the local election victory, was deeply engrossed in 'rooting out deep-rooted evils.' That is, while pursuing policies related to 'rooting out deep-rooted evils' against past administrations, President Moon's approval ratings also declined concurrently. Finally, although President Moon's approval ratings did not drop further despite various suspicions surrounding the appointment of Cho Kuk as Minister of Justice, they turned downwards due to the controversies that arose during Minister of Justice Choo Mi-ae's 'prosecutorial reform.' Subsequently, the decline continued due to Minister Kim Hyun-mi's stubborn real estate policies. In other words, Minister Choo Mi-ae's prosecutorial reform and Minister Kim Hyun-mi's real estate policies appear to have driven the decline in approval ratings. In summary, policies appealing to the 'hardcore base' such as 'ideological appointments,' 'rooting out deep-rooted evils,' 'prosecutorial reform,' and 'real estate'—examples of 'self-righteousness'—served as triggers for the decline in approval ratings.

6. Discard Self-Righteousness and Exercise Leadership for Unification

Despite leaving behind various achievements, many former presidents have not received favorable historical evaluations. This is because they failed to leave a positive legacy. To create achievements worthy of being remembered as a historical legacy, it is necessary to be able to stably pursue core policies that can achieve the national goals set by the president and the historical tasks assigned to that administration. How is this possible?

In a political environment where party bosses have all disappeared, the 'Going Public' strategy has long been the basic grammar for relationships among political elites. In a situation where there are no party bosses with the presence of the 'Three Kims' of the past, all National Assembly members and politicians must appeal to the public independently, and the control of party leadership has significantly decreased compared to the past. To pursue policies through such a National Assembly, the president must also pressure lawmakers based on public support. Maintaining approval ratings is therefore crucial. Ultimately, most presidents fail to create achievements that will be remembered as a historical legacy because they lose governing capacity due to declining approval ratings, making it difficult to pursue bold and successful policies.

In this process, media and press play the most crucial role. This is because ordinary voters receive almost all their political information through media and press. On the other hand, media outlets, facing more difficult economic conditions than in the past, are more sensitive to public reactions. Therefore, the tone of media coverage cannot be free from the influence of presidential approval ratings. It becomes very burdensome, both politically and economically, for the media to offer sharp criticism to a president who is 'popular.' Past presidents have consistently fallen victim to the 'law of declining approval ratings,' except for the 'honeymoon period' at the beginning of their terms. This is a common phenomenon observed not only in Korea but also among most US presidents. Most scholars explain this phenomenon with the 'Coalition of Minorities' hypothesis. This view suggests that as the president pursues new policies, new groups of voters oppose them, leading to a decline in presidential approval ratings.

What kind of attitude from the president accelerates this phenomenon? It can be described as the president's 'self-righteousness.' Due to the nature of the presidential system in Korea, presidents are often prone to the illusion that they are permitted to do whatever they pursue during their term. They forget, or make the mistake of antagonizing, the nearly half of the electorate who do not support them.

This paper analyzed all presidential approval rating surveys registered with the CESDC for former Presidents Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in to identify the turning points in their approval ratings. The results indicate that for both presidents, acts or policies driven by self-righteousness accelerated the decline in their approval ratings.

In the case of former President Park, her self-righteous act of interfering in nominations in 2016 and the subsequent shock of losing the general election triggered a sharp decline in approval ratings. Ultimately, as a consequence, the tablet PC incident occurred, leading her down the path to impeachment. Although President Moon had several opportunities for a rebound in approval ratings, the appointment of 'ideologically aligned' individuals in the early part of his term, the 'rooting out of deep-rooted evils,' the conflict between Minister of Justice Choo Mi-ae and the prosecution, and the real estate policies of Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Kim Hyun-mi emerged as turning points that accelerated the decline in approval ratings. These were representative cases of self-righteous governance among the Moon administration's policies. As a result, President Moon, who started with the highest approval ratings in history, could not escape the 'law of declining approval ratings.' While there are no 'what ifs' in history, if he had pursued 'national unification' rather than 'self-righteousness' during the two 'rebound periods' represented by the local elections in 2018 and the general election in 2020, he might have been able to break the 'law of declining approval ratings.' The president's greatest enemy is, indeed, the president's own 'self-righteousness.' ■

References

Jackman, S. 2005. “Pooling the Polls over an Election Campaign.” Australian Journal of Political Science 40 (4). 499-517.

Gronke, P., and B. Newman. 2003. “FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A Field Essay on Presidential Approval.” Political Research Quarterly 56: 501-512.

Kernell, S. 2007. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Killick R, Eckley IA, Jonathan P, Ewans K 2010. “Detection of Changes in the Characteristics of Oceanographic Time-Series using Statistical Change Point Analysis.” Ocean Engineering. 37(13), 1120–1126.

[1]First, it is possible to predict that the Sewol ferry disaster would have significantly impacted former President Park's approval ratings. However, this analysis only includes survey data registered with the Yeo-shim-wi, so data for this period is not available.

■ Author: Han Kyu-sup_Professor of Media and Information, Seoul National University. He earned a Ph.D. in Media Studies from Stanford University and has served as the Associate Dean of the Humanities and Social Sciences Division at the Seoul National University Institute for Big Data, Vice President for Cooperation at Seoul National University, and Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). His primary research area is political communication. Recent publications include “Economic and Cultural Drivers of Support for Immigrants” (2019), “Korean Political Trends as Seen Through Big Data” (2016, co-authored), and “The Influence of “Social Viewing” on Televised Debate Viewers’ Political Judgment.”

■ Contact and Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr