[EAI Working Paper] 2022 Conditions for Presidential Success Series: ⑦ Respect the National Assembly from the Perspective of Cooperation

1. Envision a Cooperative Relationship Between the National Assembly and the President

When discussing the relationship between the President and the National Assembly in Korea, it is commonly referred to or written as the 'President-National Assembly relationship.' However, this chapter uses the term 'National Assembly-President relationship.' The reason for deviating from common practice is to emphasize that in a democratic system based on the rule of law, the National Assembly, responsible for legislation, holds greater institutional significance than the President, who is responsible for execution. There was a time when the National Assembly functioned as a 'rubber-stamp assembly,' meaning it passively approved policies requested by the President, merely adding a veneer of legitimacy through legislation. The expression 'President-National Assembly relationship' was natural during that period. However, since democratization, our National Assembly has steadily enhanced its independent status as a legislative body (Son Byung-kwon et al. 2020; Ham Sung-deuk 2017; Park and Wilding 2016). Today, if a bill does not pass the National Assembly, the President faces significant hurdles. In other words, in the interaction between the President and the National Assembly, the emphasis has shifted from the President to the National Assembly, making the 'National Assembly-President relationship' the more appropriate term for the current era.

Therefore, for the deepening and advancement of our democracy, what kind of relationship between the National Assembly and the President is desirable? To conclude, a National Assembly-President relationship based on 'cooperation' must be established. In reality, few concepts in Korean politics are as important yet as hollow as 'cooperation.' In a society marked by increasing confrontation and conflict, everyone speaks of the importance of cooperation, but no one practices it. In 'Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire,' there is a line: 'We must choose between what is right and what is easy.' This phrase contrasts 'right' with 'easy,' implying that what is right is difficult and what is easy is wrong. Cooperation, where the President consults and decides with both ruling and opposition parties, is 'right' in the sense that it integrates diverse and conflicting interests into policy-making for the common good, but it is by no means 'easy.' Conversely, exploiting, fostering, and amplifying the inherent conflicts of interest in a democracy to gain and exercise power is 'wrong' but relatively 'easy.' Since democratization, our politics has predominantly chosen the 'easy' path over the 'right' one.

The call for a National Assembly-President relationship based on cooperation is a demand to pursue the difficult but right path. It is a request for politics that pioneers, develops, and expands policy areas where both ruling and opposition parties can find common ground and reach consensus, and that builds a political culture of cooperation rather than confrontation and conflict. This demand focuses not on 'what to achieve' but on 'how to achieve it.' Therefore, it is process-oriented rather than results-oriented. However, the process is a far more fundamental determinant of the outcome. Just as a factory with a flawed manufacturing process cannot produce a quality product, a government with a flawed policy-making process cannot produce sound policies.

Viewed in this light, two conditions must be met for a President to succeed. First, the President must soberly recognize the significant shift in the National Assembly's status as a legislative body in the current era. The National Assembly is no longer a subordinate entity that blindly follows presidential commands as it did during the authoritarian past. The President must adopt an attitude of acknowledging and respecting the National Assembly as an equal partner in state governance. Second, the President must understand that a sound policy-making process is a prerequisite for achieving sound policy outcomes. The President must foster a political culture of cooperation, eschewing adversarial and zero-sum relationships between ruling and opposition parties, thereby establishing a policy-making process that harmonizes competing partisan interests into the common good. These two conditions are things no president has achieved since democratization. Perhaps they were unwilling to do so, as they were all branded as 'imperial presidents' who preferred to reign rather than rule. Only when a president emerges who sheds the 'imperial' label and cultivates a 'cooperative' National Assembly-President relationship, ruling rather than reigning, will we have the opportunity to witness a president evaluated as the first successful one since democratization.

How, then, can a cooperative National Assembly-President relationship be formed? This author focuses not on the institutional aspects but on the 'mindset' a President must cultivate to achieve this. This is because people are considered more important than institutions. This does not imply that institutions are unnecessary. Institutions provide a framework that reduces uncertainty by fostering stable interactions among actors within them (North 1990). The problem is that even well-intentioned institutions are highly susceptible to misuse if the people operating them lack the 'mindset' necessary for democracy (Tocqueville 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).[1] As long as the partisan and adversarial mindsets of our politicians remain unchanged, no matter how excellent the institutions, our politics will struggle to escape the vicious cycle of confrontation and conflict.

To foster a cooperative National Assembly-President relationship, the President must internalize and practice four principles: First, policy does not exist without politics. Second, mobilizing the public yields more harm than good. Third, consensus-based governance is preferable to majority rule. Fourth, the negotiation process with the opposition party is better conducted with a degree of opacity. Of course, for a cooperative National Assembly-President relationship to materialize, not only the President but also the National Assembly, particularly the opposition party, must change their attitudes. However, the impetus for change must originate with the President. It is more feasible for one President to change than for all 300 National Assembly members to do so. A single presidential transformation can serve as a crucial cornerstone in altering the landscape of Korean democracy, currently fraught with conflict. It can lay the foundation for advancing Korean politics from confrontation and antagonism toward cooperation and integration, marking a path toward advancement. South Korea has successfully achieved industrialization and democratization. Now, it must embark on the path of advancement. Taking the first step onto this path will undoubtedly be recorded as a historic achievement.

2. No Policy Without Politics

Most Korean presidents are former members of the National Assembly, yet upon election, they seem to forget the Assembly. Presidents often view the legislature not as a co-equal branch in a system of checks and balances, but as a subordinate entity that must serve the President's agenda.

This sentiment was echoed by former National Assembly Speaker Kim Hyeong-o (re-quoted in Ham Sung-deuk 2017, p. 235). As previously noted, since democratization, the National Assembly has transformed from a rubber-stamp body obeying presidential directives into a genuine legislative institution. The unfortunate reality is that despite these historical shifts, most presidents since democratization have maintained the mindset that they are the 'master' and the National Assembly is merely a 'servant.' This perception of the President as a commander of the National Assembly has led to the disappearance of politics, and the absence of politics has resulted in policy failures.

The President can no longer command the National Assembly. Since democratization, the National Assembly's authority as a legislative body has significantly increased. For instance, the National Assembly Advancement Act, implemented from the 19th National Assembly, makes it extremely difficult for any bill to pass without the consensus of the opposition parties, who hold approximately two-fifths of the seats. Consider the 20th National Assembly, dubbed the 'Vegetable Assembly.' At that time, the opposition party, lacking a majority, effectively acted as a veto power, repeatedly delaying or blocking the legislative enactment of the President's policy agenda. It is not only the opposition party; even the ruling party has increasingly challenged the President. Notable examples include the opposition within the ruling party during President Roh Moo-hyun's administration regarding the Korea-US FTA, and during President Lee Myung-bak's administration concerning the relocation of government offices to Sejong City.

These changes in the political environment signify that the President's political acumen has become more crucial than ever before. This includes the ability to build trust-based relationships between ruling and opposition parties and to achieve conflict resolution and integration through negotiation and persuasion. However, the President, acting as a commander, lacks the political will or effort to engage in direct dialogue and persuasion with lawmakers from both sides to foster harmonious inter-party relations within the National Assembly. Furthermore, the National Assembly, where confrontation and conflict between ruling and opposition parties are normalized, cannot escape legislative gridlock on its own. This situation ultimately leads to the stagnation and failure of the President's policy agenda.

President Park Geun-hye stated the following regarding the failure to process economic revitalization and labor reform bills in the National Assembly:

(Our National Assembly) only pays lip service, claiming the public suffers while failing to do its job. I consider this hypocrisy... For the National Assembly to obstruct economic progress for other reasons is dereliction of duty and a challenge to the public (re-quoted in Ham Sung-deuk 2017, p. 160).

These words shift all responsibility to the National Assembly. However, President Park herself never engaged in dialogue with the leaders or officials of the opposition party to ensure these bills passed. Similarly, President Lee Myung-bak lamented, 'The Grand Canal project evolved beyond economic and environmental issues into a political one. In our political environment, policy still cannot overcome politics' (Lee Myung-bak 2015). However, the situation where policy cannot overcome politics is not unique to Korea. In any democratic system, policy cannot be achieved without politics (Binder and Lee 2015).

To realize the policies they desire, presidents absolutely need the cooperation of both ruling and opposition parties in the National Assembly. To gain this cooperation, they must engage in 'politics' that builds trust-based relationships between the parties and fosters a legislative and political culture based on dialogue and compromise rather than confrontation and conflict. To build mutual trust, the President needs to continuously meet with lawmakers from both sides. Formal meetings are important, but informal meetings are even more so. Only when individuals can candidly share their innermost thoughts during informal gatherings can they broaden their understanding of each other as dialogue partners. This expanded understanding can then serve as efficient fuel to drive compromise and consensus.

Furthermore, the President must possess the patience to embrace, rather than hastily resolve, the tensions arising from inter-party conflicts within the National Assembly. The President's patience is crucial in two respects. First, attempts to hastily break the deadlock in inter-party negotiations often exacerbate the conflict. For example, when the Speaker of the National Assembly exercises the right of direct submission to quickly break legislative gridlock on a presidential policy agenda, inter-party conflict in the legislature invariably intensifies (Jeon Jin-young 2011). Second, new and innovative policy ideas that integrate conflicts often emerge when tensions between the parties have sufficiently matured. In other words, the President must patiently strive to prevent the conflict and tension between the parties from escalating into a catastrophic situation where they view each other as enemies, while simultaneously fostering an environment where new creative seeds can sprout amidst such tension.

Another point to keep in mind when building trust-based politics between ruling and opposition parties is to avoid approaching politics from a perspective of good versus evil (Kim Young-soo 2019). When politics is judged based on right and wrong, it often solidifies into an adversarial relationship where 'I am right, and the other side is wrong,' thus necessitating the defeat of the opponent. In such circumstances, cooperation based on dialogue and compromise between ruling and opposition parties becomes impossible. President Roh Moo-hyun likely spent more time meeting and conversing with National Assembly members from both ruling and opposition parties than any other president (Kim Byung-joon 2012). Yet, his relationship with the opposition party was extremely poor. During the political funding investigation early in his term, he referred to the opposition Grand National Party as a 'cart-carrying party' and stated, 'If the scale of my illegal funds exceeds one-tenth of the Grand National Party's, I will take responsibility,' effectively demonizing the party. This initial adversarial relationship led the Grand National Party to consistently ignore and reject President Roh's policy agenda throughout his term (Yoon Yeo-joon 2011).

Politics is an arena where clear distinctions between good and evil are not always possible. Depending on the context and situation, yesterday's good may become today's evil. In the realm of politics, it is possible for both conflicting positions to be simultaneously right or wrong. Politics transcends good and evil. Forcing a good-versus-evil framework onto politics only creates unnecessary conflict and confrontation, making problem resolution more difficult. In a democracy, politics should not be about who is right or wrong, but about how to reconcile and compromise conflicting interests—that is, how to solve problems.

3. Mobilizing the Public Yields More Harm Than Good

Since democratization, successive presidents in South Korea have neglected politics with the National Assembly while actively engaging in politics with the public (Kim Hyuk 2016). Instead of resolving legislative gridlock through direct communication with ruling and opposition parties, they have opted for a strategy of mobilizing the public to pressure the National Assembly and achieve desired outcomes. However, this politics of public mobilization yields more harm than good.

Firstly, it is extremely difficult to shift public opinion in the direction desired by the President. Not only in Korea but also in the United States, presidents have employed the strategy of 'going public' to sway public opinion in their favor. However, numerous studies indicate that these presidential attempts often end in failure rather than success (Edwards III 2004, 2015). Given the difficulty of altering public opinion itself to align with presidential preferences, it is inevitably challenging for presidents to exert legislative influence over the National Assembly by mobilizing the public.[2] Furthermore, the President's 'going public' strategy carries the risk of lowering their approval ratings. Presidents who mobilize the public to pressure the National Assembly often provoke strong backlash from the opposition parties. The criticism and condemnation from the opposition, triggered by the President's actions, provide the public with clearer information about what is wrong, potentially leading to a backlash that diminishes public support for the President (Christenson and Kriner 2017).

However, a more serious issue than these is that presidential mobilization of the public significantly increases the likelihood of exacerbating conflict among citizens and dividing the community (Park Sang-hoon 2018; Edwards III 2015). The public is composed of various groups with differing opinions and interests. Therefore, a president cannot mobilize the entire public as a target. The public mobilized by the president is typically their support base. When these supporters actively respond to the president's appeals, it inevitably provokes opposition from those who do not support the president, prompting them to act. Conflict and animosity arise between those who support the president and those who do not, leading to societal division. In a representative democracy, societal disagreements, conflicts, and clashes should be addressed in the public sphere where representatives of the people gather – the National Assembly. If the president's mobilized supporters and their opposition directly clash in society without any objective mediator, their conflict will escalate to a level akin to warfare, reminiscent of Hobbes's state of nature before the emergence of the state.

Another point worth mentioning regarding public mobilization is the rise of 'fandom politics,' which intensified after President Moon Jae-in's tenure. 'Fandom' is a portmanteau of 'fanatic' and 'domain,' generally referring to a group of fans who passionately adore a particular individual or field. In Korea, fandom culture began to take shape in earnest in the 1990s with a few idol groups, and this fandom culture has now evolved into fandom politics centered around President Moon Jae-in as the 'fan object.' While it cannot be definitively stated that fandom politics was intentionally mobilized by President Moon, it appears he at least tolerated it. During the 2017 Democratic Party primaries, when President Moon was criticized for his supporters unfairly slandering other candidates, he responded by calling it 'seasoning that makes the primaries more exciting.' Furthermore, even after becoming president, despite various issues raised concerning 'Moon fans,' President Moon made no statement. This effectively signifies his acknowledgment of the existence and activities of 'Moon fans.'

However, fandom politics is detrimental to our democracy. Firstly, fandom, by professing unconditional love for the 'fan object,' is inherently uncritical and exclusive. The uncritical nature of fandom politics is starkly evident in the phrase 'Our Moon, do whatever you want.' Regardless of whether the president's policies succeed or fail, 'Moon fans' blindly cheer and support them. Secondly, the exclusive nature of fandom politics means that criticism of President Moon is absolutely not tolerated, even if it is constructive. Those who criticize President Moon are immediately branded as enemies and become targets of attack. Another problem with fandom politics is that while the 'Moon fans' themselves remain unseen, the targets of their criticism and attacks are explicitly identified through 'coordinate targeting,' and these attacks are widely disseminated through social media. As Park Sang-hoon (2018) argues, 'It is a force that clearly exists, but its beginning and end lie in transferring private hatred and animosity towards someone and then disengaging.' In such a situation, public debate to bridge differences and disagreements becomes impossible. All that remains is a community divided into 'us versus them.'

The fundamental problem with the politics of public mobilization and fandom politics is that they divide the public and incite conflict among citizens. The public should not be driven into a 'trap of anger.' Societal problems should not be borne directly by the public but should be addressed in the public sphere of the National Assembly. Regarding this, Park Sang-hoon (2018, p. 226) stated: 'I wish the President would act like an orchestra conductor. Just as a conductor looks at the musicians, not the audience, to create harmony, the President should not declare they will face the public and only look at them, but should turn towards the cabinet, political parties, and the legislature.'

4. Consensus-Based Governance Over Majority Rule

The collective decision-making methods of the National Assembly can be broadly categorized into majority rule and consensus-based governance (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Majority rule is a system where policy decisions are made swiftly according to the preferences of the majority. While it incurs low transaction costs due to decisions aligning with majority desires, it carries a significant risk of excluding minority opinions.[3] Conversely, consensus-based governance is based on the premise that diverse groups' opinions and interests must be reflected in the decision-making process. Achieving collective outcomes that various groups can agree upon requires the difficult task of coordinating their interests. Consequently, transaction costs are high, and the legislative process is inherently slow. However, because it accommodates not only the preferences of the majority but also those of the minority, compliance costs are reduced.

Since democratization, the legislative procedures of our National Assembly have primarily evolved in a direction that strengthens consensus-based governance. Immediately after democratization, the overall operation of the National Assembly, including the agenda and the introduction of bills, was determined through consultations between the Speaker and the floor leaders of parliamentary negotiation groups. Furthermore, the practice of allocating committee chairmanships not solely to the majority party but also to other parties based on their seat share became established. Moreover, the National Assembly Advancement Act, implemented from the 19th National Assembly, further enhanced the consensus-based characteristics of our National Assembly by strengthening the veto power of minority parties.

Given that the National Assembly's collective decision-making process is strongly imbued with consensus-based characteristics, a culture of cooperation that incorporates minority party opinions into policy decisions should have taken root. However, since democratization, presidents have acted contrary to these consensus-based institutions, attempting to push through their policy agendas using the power of the majority. In cases of divided government resulting from general elections, they have resorted to abnormal methods such as mergers or poaching lawmakers to artificially create a unified government. Once a unified government was formed, instead of incorporating opposition party views into the policy-making process, they have sought to push the President's will through the majority's power via the Speaker's right of direct submission. This behavior by presidents has provoked strong opposition from the opposition parties, leading to routine parliamentary paralysis. The contradiction between the National Assembly's consensus-based decision-making system and the President's pursuit of majority-rule politics has inevitably plunged our politics into continuous conflict and chaos.

However, the implementation of the National Assembly Advancement Act has shifted the National Assembly's decision-making process almost entirely towards consensus. With the requirement of 180 seats, rather than a simple majority, to push through legislation by majority power, the utility of abnormal methods like mergers or poaching lawmakers has diminished. Furthermore, the Speaker's right of direct submission can now only be exercised under conditions such as a national emergency or agreement among floor leaders, making it difficult to pass bills from standing committees through sheer majority power. Under these circumstances, one might expect presidents to make political efforts to persuade the opposition; however, presidents acting as commanders have merely criticized the gridlocked National Assembly without undertaking significant efforts. Ultimately, for a president committed to majority-rule politics to achieve anything, a miracle was needed: a ruling party loyal to the president securing approximately 180 seats to neutralize the obstruction of minority parties.

Such a miracle occurred in the 21st general election. The ruling Democratic Party of Korea secured nearly 180 seats. Moreover, the Democratic Party broke the long-standing convention since democratization of allocating committee chairmanships based on the proportion of seats held by each party, and monopolized all committee chairmanships. The opposition party had no institutional means to prevent the unilateral actions of President Moon Jae-in and the ruling party, and with 'Moon fans' not tolerating criticism of the President, dissenting voices within the ruling party also disappeared. An ideal environment was created where the President's policy agenda could be enacted into law without significant obstruction, and indeed, the President's policy agenda was passed one by one through the National Assembly.

However, this situation significantly increased the compliance costs for minority segments of the population. Generally, the greater the divergence in values and interests among members of a community, the higher the compliance costs (Moon Woo-jin 2013). South Korea is a country with very high levels of political and economic conflict, as well as ideological division. Therefore, the cost borne by citizens who oppose the President and the ruling party to comply with policies enacted by them is inevitably substantial. Increased compliance costs accumulate dissatisfaction and fuel a desire for regime change at all costs. When this desire meets the opposing aspiration to defend the current regime, societal conflict escalates dramatically. Despite increased legislative productivity achieved through majority power, the outcome has been the division of the community rather than its integration.

Ultimately, the National Assembly-President relationship must be formed on the premise of consensus-based governance rather than majority rule. In other words, a National Assembly-President relationship based on cooperation must be established. There are two reasons for this. First, due to the National Assembly Advancement Act, the National Assembly's collective decision-making process has fully transitioned to a consensus-based approach. Legislative enactment of presidential policy agendas is practically impossible without the help of the opposition party. The situation where the ruling party holds nearly 180 seats, as in the 21st National Assembly, neutralizing the obstruction of minority parties, is extremely exceptional. Therefore, the President's political efforts to achieve consensus with the opposition party and reflect it in policy-making are absolutely essential.[4] Second, even if legislation based on majority rule is possible due to the emergence of a supermajority ruling party exceeding 180 seats, there is a risk that the overall societal conflict level will increase by raising the compliance costs for minority citizens. Instead of relying solely on the power of the majority, efforts are needed to enhance the political legitimacy of policies by appropriately reflecting the opinions of the minority opposition party, thereby fostering community integration.

5. Negotiations with the Opposition Party Are Sometimes Better Conducted with Opacity

We are currently in an era of political polarization where refusing dialogue with opposing sides is common. Therefore, even getting the opposition party to sit at the negotiation table is by no means easy. The President's political efforts to gain the trust of the opposition are essential for this to be possible. However, let us assume a situation where the President and the ruling and opposition parties in the National Assembly have agreed to discuss a specific policy issue and have come to the negotiation table.

How should negotiations proceed to maximize the likelihood of reaching an agreement that both the President and the opposition party can endorse? While various methods can be considered, given the reality of high political conflict in society, with citizens deeply divided along regional, partisan, and ideological lines, conducting the negotiation process itself in private may prove beneficial (Binder and Lee 2015; Mansbridge 2015).

Transparency is considered a core value of democracy. It is difficult to associate democratic principles with secret meetings held behind closed doors by politicians. Legislative processes in the National Assembly are also generally conducted openly, unless they involve critical matters related to national security. Why, then, is it suggested that negotiations with the opposition party be conducted privately? Because, in an era of political polarization, transparency in the negotiation process hinders successful negotiation.[5] Firstly, when negotiations on important policy matters are conducted openly, it becomes difficult for the negotiating lawmakers to freely negotiate without deviating from their party's and ideology's lines. Open negotiation processes inevitably attract significant public attention. Lawmakers participating in negotiations are aware that many people, especially those with strong ideological and partisan leanings, are observing the process. They also know that if they violate partisan or ideological principles to reach a compromise, they could face severe criticism from their supporters. This is not conducive to re-election. If compromising principles for the sake of compromise does not benefit re-election, lawmakers are more likely to choose to emphasize their distinctiveness and refuse compromise, thereby increasing the likelihood of negotiation failure.

Furthermore, a transparent negotiation process makes it difficult to find solutions for consensus. Negotiation is a process of give and take. It is a process of receiving something the other party values more in exchange for conceding something one does not want. However, finding agreement between negotiating parties on what to give and what to receive is not easy. It requires a lengthy process of back-and-forth between the negotiating parties. Now, suppose that during the negotiation, what the opposition party has conceded to the President or the ruling party is revealed by the media. Immediately, criticism from opposition supporters will pour in, accusing them of violating principles or engaging in collusion. Such pressure from supporters is likely to cause the opposition party to withdraw its concessions. This means the difficult negotiation process must begin anew from the start.

Ultimately, conducting negotiations privately increases the likelihood of reaching an agreement in two ways: it liberates lawmakers from the compulsion to adhere strictly to party and ideological principles, and it provides time to freely consider and discuss terms of compromise away from external pressures. Therefore, when engaging in negotiations with the opposition party on important policy agendas, the President should explore avenues for conducting them as privately as possible. Furthermore, the President needs to exercise leadership to ensure that all participants in the negotiations maintain confidentiality throughout the deliberation process until a final agreement is reached.

However, after the negotiations are concluded, the results must be transparently disclosed to the public (Mansbridge 2015). It is crucial to explain and persuade the public in detail about the reasons for the negotiations, what concessions were made by each party, how the costs associated with the agreement will be covered and utilized, and how this compromise contributes to the overall well-being of the Republic of Korea. While sacrificing transparency in the negotiation process to achieve inter-party consensus, it is essential to ensure transparency in the outcome to secure democratic legitimacy for the agreement with the public.

6. To Be a Successful President, Discuss Cooperatively with the National Assembly

In summary, two conditions are necessary for a President to succeed in cooperating with the National Assembly, particularly the opposition party. First, the President must soberly recognize the significant shift in the National Assembly's status as a legislative body, which has dramatically increased compared to the past. The era when the President was the lead actor and the National Assembly a minor supporting role has ended. If one wishes to succeed, one must humble oneself and elevate and respect the National Assembly. One must not be an authoritarian clinging to the past or to undemocratic principles. Second, the President must understand that a sound policy-making process is a prerequisite for achieving sound policy outcomes. A sound policy-making process means decisions made by consensus between ruling and opposition parties. The President must foster relationships based on trust between the parties and create a policy-making process based on dialogue and compromise rather than conflict and confrontation. Ultimately, the condition for presidential success hinges on the ability to establish a 'cooperative' National Assembly-President relationship.

To build a cooperative National Assembly-President relationship, the President must cultivate and practice four mindsets. First, policy does not exist without politics. Since democratization, presidents have rarely made concerted political efforts to secure the National Assembly's cooperation. This absence of politics has led to policy failures. The President must build trust by meeting with numerous lawmakers from both ruling and opposition parties. Only when such trust is established can their policy agendas be legislated. Furthermore, the President must patiently prevent inter-party tensions and conflicts from escalating into a catastrophic situation where they view each other as enemies, and foster a political environment where new creative ideas can emerge amidst such tensions and conflicts. The President must also strictly avoid judging politics from a good-versus-evil perspective. Approaching politics with a standard of right and wrong only exacerbates and amplifies inter-party conflict, making cooperation impossible. It is important to recognize that politics transcends good and evil.

Second, it is essential to internalize that mobilizing the public yields more harm than good. The reason presidents mobilize the public is to pressure the National Assembly and thereby secure legislative influence for their desired outcomes. However, this strategy is more often unsuccessful than successful. Moreover, the politics of mobilization and fandom politics have only served to sow discord among citizens and divide our community. Instead of mobilizing the public and inciting direct conflict among them, it is crucial to address societal issues within the public sphere of the National Assembly.

Third, consensus-based governance is preferable to majority rule. The National Assembly's collective decision-making process is based on consensus-based governance. However, since democratization, presidents have acted contrary to this system, pushing for majority-rule politics. The contradiction between the National Assembly's decision-making system and the President's actions has led to routine inter-party conflict and parliamentary paralysis. The President needs to respect the National Assembly's consensus-based decision-making process and foster a political culture of cooperation.

Finally, the President needs to recognize that conducting negotiations privately increases the likelihood of reaching agreements between ruling and opposition parties. In Korea, where political polarization is severe, conducting negotiations privately liberates lawmakers from the compulsion to adhere to party and ideological principles and provides time to freely consider and discuss terms of compromise away from external pressures, thereby increasing the possibility of reaching an agreement. However, transparency in the outcome of negotiations must be ensured by actively explaining and persuading the public about the results.

Ultimately, to become a successful president, one must adopt an attitude of consulting and deciding with the National Assembly. Do you wish to become a great president who will be remembered in history like King Sejong? Remember that one of the most frequently appearing words in the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty (Sejong Sillok) is 'yeoui' (與議), meaning 'to consult together.' ■

References

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[1] Regarding this point, it is worth contemplating the following words from Yoo Jin-ryong, who served as the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism during the presidency of Park Geun-hye: 'Only one person needs to change. The president undermined institutional governance. As society has progressed, our nation's governance has also achieved institutional advancement. However, governance is not solely composed of institutions. The people who operate the institutions must be diverse, trust each other, and accept each other's differences.' (Quoted from Ham, Sung-deuk 2017, p. 28)

[2] An exceptional case where a president can secure legislative influence over Congress by mobilizing the public occurs when the public already has a very high preference for a particular policy, yet Congress refuses to legislate on it (Canes-Wrone 2001). There are almost no cases where a president has succeeded in legislation by mobilizing the public when public preference for a particular policy was not high.

[3] This increases the cost of compliance. Transaction costs refer to the costs incurred in reaching a collective decision, and compliance costs are the costs that must be paid by a group that must follow a collective decision against its will (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).

[4] This issue could become even more critical if the opposition candidate wins the 20th presidential election in 2022. The next president will have to face a supermajority opposition party, holding nearly 180 seats, for about two years. To gain their support, the president's political efforts to create a trust-based inter-party relationship must be actively pursued. On the other hand, forming a coalition government with the opposition party can be considered an alternative. While coalition governments are generally known to be possible primarily in parliamentary systems, they occur very frequently in presidential systems as well, and coalition governments with a majority opposition party in divided government situations are known to yield better policy outcomes than those without (Hong, Jae-woo et al. 2012).

[5] The reasons why transparency makes negotiation processes between parties difficult are summarized by drawing on the discussion in Binder and Lee (2015).

■ Author: Choi, Jun-young_ Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Inha University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida State University. He has served as President of the Korean Political Science Association and President of the Association for American Political Studies, among other roles. His main research areas include legislatures, elections, and American politics. His major publications include “Win Without Fighting, But Don't Fight: The Dual Attributes of Korean Voters Towards Representative Democracy” *Korean Political Science Review* (2019, co-authored), “Testing legislative shirking in a new setting: the case of lame duck sessions in the Korean National Assembly” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (2019, co-authored), “Conflict and Gridlock in Korean Representative Democracy: Whose Responsibility and What to Do?” *Korean Political Science Review* (2018), and “Cognitive and partisan mobilization in new democracies: The case of South Korea” *Party Politics* (2017, co-authored).

■ Managed and Edited by: Jeon, Ju-hyun_ EAI Research Fellow

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