[EAI Working Paper] 2022 Presidential Success Conditions Series: ⑥ Establish a Bridgehead for Stable State Administration

1. Communication and Cooperation Among Party, Government, and Presidential Office: The Starting Point for Presidential Leadership

Experts point to various qualities and circumstances as factors for successful presidential leadership. Many scholars view presidential leadership as a function of qualities such as the ability to present a vision, organizational skills, communication skills, and political acumen. Greenstein (2004) notes the importance of a leader's ability as a communicator to the public and their emotional intelligence (EQ), even if a hierarchy of qualities for successful presidents cannot be established. When various leadership virtues are harmonized, a president can achieve high performance in successfully administering state affairs. The success of a political leader depends on their ability to coordinate diverse interests through negotiation and compromise within a given environment to reach consensus and, furthermore, to achieve national unity. In this light, legislative and policy support to realize the president's grand vision is absolutely necessary to evaluate the success or failure of a president. The most crucial area where such political power is manifested is likely the relationship between the ruling party and the government, or the party and the presidential office. This will form the cornerstone for establishing a smooth relationship between the executive and legislative branches. In other words, it is no exaggeration to say that the starting point for the president's stable state administration capability (governability) and leadership is a successful party-government relationship.

Just as political parties act as lubricants to ensure close cooperation between the National Assembly and the administration, in a presidential system, political parties, especially the ruling party, play a role in naturally mitigating competition between the executive and legislative branches in a state with separation of powers. In a unified government, where the ruling party holds a majority in the legislature, the government secures a large number of supportive forces within the parliament. Although party discipline may not be as strong as in a parliamentary system, harmonious state administration and cooperation are possible when the president and the ruling party's lawmakers share a high degree of unity and cohesion. However, in a divided government, where the ruling party does not hold a majority, processing legislative agendas in the National Assembly becomes difficult. This is especially true if the president-elect lacks experience in 'Yeouido politics,' making it necessary to secure a support base by fostering a sense of unity with ruling party lawmakers. To form a smooth relationship between the president and the legislature through party cohesion, attention must also be paid to the characteristics of the government system, as party-government operations differ significantly between presidential and parliamentary systems. Korea, in particular, has adopted a presidential system with parliamentary characteristics, so utilizing these features in party-government relations could be an alternative. In a parliamentary system, legislators can be threatened with exclusion from the cabinet if they do not cooperate with the leadership. However, in a presidential system, it is based on dual legitimacy, where both the president and National Assembly members derive their legitimacy from the people. Therefore, theoretically, it is difficult to expect the same level of cohesion as in a parliamentary system, and it is impossible for the president to control the legislature to the same extent that a prime minister controls the parliament in a parliamentary system. In Korea, parliamentary characteristics are incorporated, allowing legislators to serve as cabinet ministers. Therefore, it is important to note that this differs from a pure presidential system.

It is important to note that the political power, as a quality for presidential success, is largely exercised through a smooth party-government relationship. This chapter will review the characteristics and problems of party-government relations in South Korea since democratization and offer several suggestions for establishing a desirable party-government relationship for the newly elected 20th president and his administration.

2. Party-Government Relations Drifting Apart Since Democratization

Basis for Party-Government Cooperation

Party-government cooperation is explicitly defined as 'policy consultation work between the executive branch and political parties' in Prime Minister's Office Directive No. 703. In the past, it focused on the relationship between the executive branch and the ruling party, but today it encompasses relations with both the ruling and opposition parties. Tracing the origins of party-government cooperation, the first official record is from the 100th Party Affairs Meeting of the Democratic Republican Party on December 19, 1963, which decided to hold regular joint meetings of party executives and cabinet members, attended by the president, starting in 1964. On April 8, 1965, President Park Chung-hee issued a 'Memorandum of Instructions on Improving Organic Cooperation Between Political Parties and the Government,' which was approved at the cabinet meeting on April 20, establishing the institutional basis for party-government cooperation. The theoretical basis for party-government cooperation in Korea is found in the accountability that the ruling party and the executive branch hold to the public in national policy decisions. In other words, it is to gain public support by actively accepting public demands and criticisms and efficiently implementing policies. Since democratization, the regulatory basis for the party-government cooperation system can be summarized as follows in Table 1. The role of connecting the ruling party and the executive branch was assigned to the Office of the Minister without Portfolio after the Fifth Republic, but this was abolished, and the Office of the Prime Minister was established to oversee party-government cooperation. However, since the launch of the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Office of the Prime Minister has been responsible for overseeing party-government cooperation.

The party-government consultation system of the Moon Jae-in administration is institutionalized by Prime Minister's Office Directive No. 703 (revised on December 14, 2017), and it has not significantly changed from the system during the Park Geun-hye administration. Specifically, the Prime Minister oversees and coordinates the party-government consultation work of the executive branch (Article 3). The scope of party-government consultation includes bills, presidential decrees, prime ministerial decrees, ministerial ordinances, budget proposals, or plans for implementing national tasks that have a significant impact on people's lives or the national economy (Article 4, Paragraph 1). A high-level party-government consultation meeting is held, and the Prime Minister, in consultation with the leader of the ruling party, is to convene meetings on a monthly basis in principle. In addition, departmental party-government consultation meetings are established between each ministry, department, agency, and committee and the ruling party's policy committee (Article 8) to consult and coordinate policies. These meetings are co-chaired by the head of the respective institution and the chairperson of the policy committee and are to be held every two months in principle.

<Table 1> Changes in Regulatory Basis for Party-Government Cooperation System

While institutionalized formal party-government cooperation is central, various types of informal party-government consultation channels can also exist. When using formal channels, in-depth discussions can be difficult due to the large number of participants and the burden of media exposure, and practical work productivity cannot be enhanced. Therefore, informal consultation channels are often utilized. Irregular party-government meetings presided over by the president or personnel exchanges between the party and the government can also be considered forms of party-government consultation in a broad sense. If a stalemate or irreconcilable differences arise between the party and the government, the president may directly intervene to mediate. Furthermore, for sensitive agendas such as critical issues or controversial national policies, inviting leaders from both the ruling and opposition parties to explain and seek their agreement could be an alternative to resolving political deadlock.

Party-Government Relations Environment

To examine the environment for presidential party-government consultation, an analysis of the domestic and international political situation is necessary. Subsequently, as conditions for exercising political leadership, one must examine whether there is a divided government, focusing on the party system and the distribution of seats in the legislature, and whether the relationship between the legislature and the president is one of compromise. The following Table 2 analyzes the leadership environment, including the political situations of successive presidents since democratization in 1987.

The legislative process in the National Assembly is crucial for implementing policies. Therefore, to examine the leadership environment, the party system and the parliamentary standing of the National Assembly, i.e., whether it is a divided or unified government, are important. In a divided government, where the ruling party is in the minority, it is essential to actively engage in dialogue with the opposition party with a spirit of integration and cooperation. In the past, attempts were made to artificially reorganize the political landscape in the early stages of a government to secure a stable majority, but these were met with strong resistance from the opposition parties. Attempts to distort the will of the people and undermine representative democracy to convert a divided government into a unified government, for the purpose of maintaining the president's absolute power, have often occurred. The artificial mergers of parties, recruitment of independent lawmakers, poaching of lawmakers from opposing parties, and lending of lawmakers during the presidencies of Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung are representative examples. The resulting political deadlock due to the confrontation between the president's party and the opposition parties darkened the path of Korean democracy. Therefore, it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the limiting factors of one's leadership at the beginning of one's term and then find ways to exercise leadership in the legislative process. In particular, reformist-populist leadership, which bypasses the party and the legislature to appeal directly to the public, as attempted during President Roh Moo-hyun's tenure, cannot avoid deadlock between the president and the National Assembly. Unified governments at the beginning of a term were only seen in the Kim Young-sam, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye administrations, which were formed after the three-party merger. Therefore, it was difficult for other presidents to secure the necessary parliamentary standing to exercise leadership.

Even in a unified government, where the ruling party holds a majority, there are many instances where the ruling party's unilateral actions, based on its majority, have faced fierce resistance from the minority opposition parties. The administrations of Roh Tae-woo, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in all began with a minority ruling party. While the Roh Tae-woo and Roh Moo-hyun administrations started as divided governments and fostered a cooperative relationship between the president and the National Assembly, the Kim Dae-jung and Moon Jae-in administrations developed confrontational relationships. Even when the president has strong power within the party, unilateral state administration led by the Blue House can provoke significant resistance. This leads to monopolization of personnel appointments and policies, and arrogance, despotism, and autocracy ultimately result in alienation of public sentiment. Consequently, this has led to election defeats for the ruling party. When a party has strong internal power, a lack of ability to compromise and poor political skills can lead to a decline in presidential approval ratings. Failed presidents have generally ignored formal political institutions and processes such as parties, legislatures, and the media, focusing solely on their support groups or factions and adopting a highly autocratic style of state administration. In Korea as well, the consistent style of state administration by authoritarian presidents has been characterized by arrogance, despotism, and autocracy. The judgment of the president's arrogance and despotism in various elections, which serve as mid-term evaluations, is a testament to this. Poor political skills are similar to a lack of compromise ability, meaning a particular president lacks the ability to mobilize public support to implement their political agenda. Failing to reflect the voices of parties that mediate with grassroots voters results in weak policy responsiveness and significant repercussions from policy failures.

The internal party power of presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung was very strong at the beginning of their terms. The political influence of the 'three Kims' was at its peak, and their influence over party nominations was immense. However, after the decline of the 'three Kims' politics, President Roh Moo-hyun declared a separation between the party and the government, maintaining a distance from the party, amidst the trend of intra-party democracy. While leadership environments cannot be uniformly categorized, it is evident that leadership has been exercised flexibly depending on various intra-party power dynamics, the distribution of seats in the National Assembly, the party system, and the president's individual personality.

Party-Government Consultation System

The main party-government meetings stipulated in the current Prime Minister's Office Directive are the High-Level Party-Government Consultation Meeting (Article 7), Departmental Party-Government Consultation Meetings (Article 8), and Working-Level Policy Consultation Meetings (Article 5) (see Table 3). If there is no ruling party, the Party Policy Consultation Meeting (Article 7-2) can play a role. In addition to these regular meetings, irregular meetings are held between the president and the leadership of the ruling party to coordinate current issues.

Although there are some differences depending on the administration, officially, the High-Level Party-Government Consultation Meeting and the Working-Level Party-Government Consultation Meeting are central. In addition to formal meetings, policy coordination meetings are held by the ruling party's policy committee, with participation from relevant ministries, to adjust opinions. However, the existing meetings are not very effective as channels for substantive consultation for ex-ante coordination. Furthermore, policy consultation meetings with opposition parties are virtually nonexistent. During President Roh Moo-hyun's administration, regulations were put in place to establish a Party Policy Consultation Meeting in the absence of a ruling party, but it has not functioned properly since then.

<Table 2> Changes in Party-Government Relations Environment Since Democratization

Types of Party-Government Conflict

Conflicts among the party, government, and presidential office can be broadly categorized into political, policy, and personnel conflicts. First, political conflicts often arise in the process of power competition between the party and the presidential office. President Lee Myung-bak experienced conflict with Representative Park Geun-hye during the primary election within the party. After his election, as he became involved in the party's nomination of public office candidates, this escalated into a party-presidential office conflict. In the 2008 general election, the so-called 'nomination massacre' of the pro-Park Geun-hye faction by the pro-Lee Myung-bak faction occurred, and the surviving pro-Park faction, in the Sejong City political crisis of 2010, rejected the Lee Myung-bak administration's revised Sejong City plan, leading to President Lee Myung-bak's lame duck status. In the 2012 general election, the pro-Park faction extensively cut off the pro-Lee faction, continuing the factional conflict. This, in turn, led to the nomination controversy in the 2016 general election and ultimately served as a precursor to conservative division and impeachment. Therefore, while the party-government separation during President Roh Moo-hyun's tenure was problematic, attempts to artificially seize control within the party also exacerbated party-government relations, acting against intra-party democracy. It is important to note that such conflicts between the party and the presidential office have led to the mutual destruction of the entire political sphere. It can be seen that when attempts are made to seize control between the party and the presidential office in a situation where the president's power within the party is weak, it leads to numerous subsequent conflicts and ultimately results in the loss of the party's electoral competitiveness and the president's control over state affairs.

These political conflicts were also prominent in the Kim Dae-jung administration, which formed a coalition government. The Kim Dae-jung administration was plagued by conflicts over politically sensitive issues such as constitutional amendment for a cabinet system, the merger of the National Congress for New Politics and the United Liberal Democrats, and electoral system reform. During this period, close consultation between the coalition parties and between the party and the government was crucial for smoothly resolving these conflicts. Nevertheless, in the Kim Dae-jung administration, the National Congress for New Politics and the United Liberal Democrats held separate party-government consultations, requiring administrative officials to attend consultation meetings for both parties. Furthermore, while both parties jointly participated in high-level party-government meetings chaired by the Prime Minister, they held separate ministry-level party-government consultations to promote detailed implementation. Consequently, in the early stages, the policy confusion arising from the persistent disharmony between the party and the government was attributed to the ruling coalition's lack of experience. However, as policy confusion continued, it was ultimately pointed out that the government's lack of preparation, the absence of substantive party-government consultations, and the inadequate policy coordination between relevant ministries and the ruling party were the causes (Ga, Ahn 2012).

Second, policy conflicts can be identified. The implementation of presidential campaign pledges and the position of the political party that must contest elections often conflict. The Lee Myung-bak administration's 'Four Major Rivers Project' was a pledge that starkly revealed the difference in perspectives between development and environmental protection. During the presidential election campaign, President Lee Myung-bak pushed for the 'Four Major Rivers Project' despite opposition from political circles and civic groups, citing reasons such as reducing logistics costs, securing water resources, and developing tourism, investing over 22 trillion won. This project divided public opinion and ultimately led to the politicization of policy issues. Such forceful policy implementation escalated into intra-party conflict, and numerous problems were revealed through the Board of Audit and Inspection audit conducted after President Park Geun-hye's election. Policies pushed forward without consensus between the party and the government, or between the ruling and opposition parties, continue to be debated today.

Immediately after its election, the Moon Jae-in administration announced a nuclear phase-out policy. This was declared solely on the grounds of it being a campaign pledge, without consultation among the party and government, or even with experts. It even involved halting the construction of Shin-Kori 5 and 6 and Shin-Hanul 3 and 4, which were already 30% and 15% complete, respectively. Ultimately, facing fierce opposition from the nuclear industry, political circles, and the media, the government established a public deliberation committee to decide whether to resume the construction of Shin-Kori 5 and 6. After deliberation by the public deliberation committee, the construction was eventually resumed, causing considerable confusion. It is unreasonable to claim a mandate from the people after election based solely on campaign pledges, without democratic processes and procedures in place during the formulation of presidential election pledges.

<Table 3> Major Party-Government Meetings

The backlash from the executive branch against unilateral policy initiatives by the Blue House or the party is also not uncommon. An example is the Ministry of Economy and Finance's resistance to the party and presidential office's promotion of income-led growth policies, stating, 'National finances are not an inexhaustible spring.' The party and presidential office raising their voices to criticize the inertia of executive ministries or demand reform is also an example of party-government disharmony. The Moon Jae-in administration's housing policies, nuclear energy policies, and conflicts during the nomination and confirmation process for public office candidates led to demands from the party for party-led state administration after the Seoul and Busan mayoral by-elections in 2021. During the Kim Young-sam administration, informal channels, rather than formal party-government consultation lines, tended to plan and coordinate policies, frequently causing consternation for the party, presidential office, and executive branch.

Third, personnel conflicts can be mentioned. Many presidents have held the belief that the core of reform begins with 'personnel cleansing.' President Kim Young-sam equated 'Sajoong' (personnel reform) with reform itself. That is, he perceived reform as the non-mainstream faction, which had been on the periphery of past power, purging the mainstream vested interests. (Kim Hyung-jun, 2007). In this process of personnel cleansing, resistance forces to reform emerged, and society became divided into reformist and anti-reformist camps, leading to animosity and confrontation. If changing only people, without altering flawed practices and the framework of politics, is considered reform, it inevitably creates a confrontational structure between the party's mainstream and non-mainstream factions, or between pro-X and anti-X groups, thereby weakening party cohesion. Ultimately, pursuing reform through such personnel cleansing results in 'personalized reform' rather than 'institutionalized reform.'

Furthermore, for reform to succeed, the reformist forces must unite, often leading to a situation of taking sides. President Moon Jae-in's personnel appointments were faithful to the principle of selecting individuals who shared his 'philosophy of state administration.' However, in reality, criticism of 'pro-Moon' code appointments followed. As evidenced by the near-national division over the appointment of former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, controversies over the professionalism and morality of key cabinet appointments have been incessant. Consequently, appointments were pushed through without opposition party consent in parliamentary confirmation hearings in over 30 cases. While the personnel confirmation hearing itself is problematic, the unilateral exercise of appointment power by the appointing authority should not be taken for granted (Shin Eun-byul et al., 2021). In particular, for appointments requiring parliamentary confirmation, pre-consultation with the party leadership and through party-government consultations, followed by the appointment process, could reduce party backlash and turmoil during confirmation hearings.

Moreover, if personnel are reshuffled after being held accountable for policy failures or political responsibility, and then reappointed to key positions, it can be quite awkward for the party that must contest elections. In the Moon Jae-in administration, the Chief of Staff for Policy, who was effectively dismissed due to side effects of the minimum wage, was appointed as the Ambassador to China, or the Senior Economic Secretary, who was replaced due to deteriorating economic indicators, was immediately appointed as the Chairperson of a Special Committee within the Presidential Committee for Policy Planning. This phenomenon was also common in the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, drawing strong backlash not only from the opposition but also from within the ruling party. In the Lee Myung-bak administration, the Chief of Staff resigned taking responsibility for the mad cow disease incident but was reinstated as the Ambassador to China, and in the Park Geun-hye administration, the Chief of the National Security Office, who was dismissed due to the Sewol ferry disaster, was appointed as the Ambassador to China, drawing criticism for 'revolving door' appointments.

3. What are the Directions for Establishing a Desirable Party-Government Relationship?

Establish a Party-Government Relations Model that Harmonizes Autonomy and Interdependence

Party-government cooperation is meaningful in that it ensures the accountability of the ruling party and the executive branch to the public in national policy decisions (Kwon Chan-ho, 1999). It is also important in harmonizing the efficiency of government policies with the representativeness of political parties to the public (Choi Hang-soon, 2007). Therefore, it is necessary to avoid mechanical demands for party-government separation or excessive demands for party-government unity and to create a governance model suitable for the new circumstances. Party-government governance suitable for Korea's political reality must be effectively established to enhance the efficiency of the Blue House's state administration, the representativeness of political parties to the public, and the democracy and efficiency of the executive branch. This requires establishing a party-presidential office and party-government relations model that considers environmental factors such as the party system, the parliamentary standing of the ruling party in divided or unified governments, and the president's position within the party.

The core lies in seeking a balance between the autonomy and interdependence of political parties and the government (Lim Sung-hak, 2015). While maintaining autonomy, close interdependence should be fostered to maximize synergistic effects, enabling the president's policy achievements and the party's electoral success to be well harmonized. First, these two dimensions, autonomy and interdependence, can be judged by the level of relationship between the party and the government. Overemphasis on autonomy carries a high risk of mutual destruction. Until the Kim Dae-jung administration, the president concurrently served as the leader of the ruling party, and the head of the presidential secretariat and ministers of political affairs acted as messengers between the party and the presidential office, focusing on ensuring party-government unity. However, starting with President Roh Moo-hyun's tenure, the call for party-government separation led to disharmony due to differing objectives (presidential office: emphasis on achievements; party: emphasis on elections), resulting in the failure of both the party and the presidential office to achieve their intended outcomes. Ultimately, President Roh Moo-hyun himself acknowledged the limitations of his advocacy for party-government separation, stating, 'The center of politics is the political party, and the government is born from the party. Party-government separation must be reconsidered' (June 2007).

The area where party autonomy should be respected is the nomination process for public office candidates. Historically, political conflicts between the party and the presidential office have primarily occurred in the nomination of public office candidates. Considering this, it is important to allow parties to autonomously decide candidates according to the principles and standards they set. This, of course, is premised on the democratization of the party's nomination process for public office. As 'fandom politics' (politics where people only like specific individuals) becomes active today, if the presidential candidate's fandom begins to interfere in the selection of party leadership or candidates for public office, the autonomy between the party and the presidential office is undermined. These groups exert significant influence in the party's nomination process for public office and in the process of public opinion gathering for major policy decisions in state administration. By participating as dues-paying regular members in the party's nomination of public office candidates or in elections for party chapter chairpersons, they exert overwhelming influence in the primaries for presidential candidates, gubernatorial candidates, mayoral candidates, and National Assembly candidates. Because their support is unconditional and blind, it carries a highly exclusive nature. Therefore, if these groups interfere in the party's nomination process for public office, political conflicts between the party and the presidential office are unavoidable, regardless of the president's intentions.

Next, attention should be paid to interdependence in policy decision-making. In a fused-power parliamentary system, the executive and legislative branches share a strong sense of identity and jointly manage state affairs. However, in a presidential system, in addition to the principle of separation of powers, they have different electoral constituencies. Therefore, they can have different views or objectives regarding policies. Due to these characteristics, distributional conflicts occur more frequently in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2000). While legislators in a parliamentary system share a common interest in maintaining the governing coalition, legislators in a presidential system are more likely to conflict with the president, who considers the nation as a whole, because they must represent the interests of their constituencies and act in a constituency-centered manner. The cause of this phenomenon can be attributed to the institutional characteristics of the presidential system, which allow voters to make different choices in presidential and parliamentary elections. That is, voters vote in presidential elections considering the president's role in national policy, but they choose legislators by considering more regional issues. Therefore, legislators are highly sensitive to the preferences of their constituents and, due to different election cycles, demand closer consultation with the party when the president pursues policy agendas.

Therefore, the president-elect needs to establish a cooperative governance model that harmonizes autonomy and interdependence, and it is important to build consensus within the party on this matter. For those without experience in 'Yeouido politics,' differences between the party and the presidential office, and between the party and the government, should be understood as natural and unavoidable to some extent. However, while guarding against excessive confusion and conflict that could lead to mutual destruction between the party and the presidential office, or between the party and the government, the optimal solution for coexistence must be sought. To this end, detailed plans should be developed, such as broadly recognizing the party's autonomy in the nomination process for party officials and public office candidates, and strengthening interdependence between the party and ministries through the appointment of party members to government positions.

Actively Utilize Personnel Exchanges and Working-Level Policy Consultation Meetings

The current party-government relations, centered on the High-Level Party-Government Consultation Meeting, are largely retrospective and often limited to a formal monthly meeting. It is important to clearly convey the party and presidential office's policy agenda to the government and to develop reasonable implementation plans in consultation with the government. Simply forcing the government ministries to blindly implement policies that have been discussed by the party and the presidential office can lead to backlash or induce inertia among public officials. To prevent such problems, it would be useful to actively utilize working-level policy consultation meetings between the chairperson of the party's policy committee and the heads of relevant ministries to conduct prior consultations at the policy formulation stage, as stipulated in the party-government consultation regulations.

Furthermore, it is necessary to seek a new model for party-government relations by actively utilizing personnel exchanges between the party and the government. Although not a direct method of policy consultation between the party and the government, the system of personnel exchange between the party and the government can be utilized as a foundation for party-government cooperation. Although our constitution and laws adopt a presidential system, it has many elements of a parliamentary system. The appointment of personnel from the president's affiliated party to public office is an element of the parliamentary system aimed at achieving party-government unity and serves as the basis for party-government cooperation. In particular, given the increasing difficulty of passing confirmation hearings for high-ranking public officials, including ministers, lawmakers who have accumulated expertise in parliamentary standing committees are increasingly being appointed to cabinet positions in the executive branch. This serves as a channel for party-government cooperation and a means of conveying the intentions of the party and the president to the executive branch, thereby enhancing accountability in state administration. Those with experience as chairpersons of parliamentary standing committees or who have served two terms in the same standing committee can accumulate sufficient expertise. If individuals with such experience are appointed as ministers in the executive branch, positive effects can be expected not only in terms of policy expertise but also in their ability to lead ministries.

When party members are appointed to the cabinet, communication and policy coordination between the party and the government can be easily facilitated. From the party's perspective, it can pursue policies that are not detached from public sentiment and can greatly assist in reflecting the policy demands of lawmakers in government proposals. From the government's perspective, it can directly receive assistance from ministers in legislating policies formulated by ministries. In particular, from the party's perspective, it can provide mid-level party members with opportunities to gain practical administrative experience, thereby broadly securing a pool of talented individuals with state administration experience for the party as a whole. This process can also greatly contribute to enhancing the party's future capacity to govern.

In addition, personnel deployment can be planned in a direction that strengthens party-government-presidential office cooperation. During the initial cabinet formation, 'team harmony' can be applied as a key criterion through the reorganization of the pro-government coalition to create synergistic effects of cooperation. Specifically, careful personnel selection is needed, considering team harmony and synergy in the composition of the political affairs line (Senior Political Secretary - Party Floor Leader or Party Leader), the foreign affairs and security line (Minister of Foreign Affairs - Minister of Unification - Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security), the economic line (Minister of Economy and Finance - Senior Economic Secretary - Chairperson of the Policy Committee), and the public relations line (Government Information Agency - Blue House Spokesperson - Party Spokesperson). In particular, given that political conflicts account for a high proportion of party-government-presidential office conflicts and have significant ripple effects, it is necessary to appoint individuals capable of facilitating smooth communication between the party leader and the president as Chief of Staff or Senior Political Secretary and grant them appropriate authority. This is especially important for presidents without experience in 'Yeouido politics,' as it is crucial for them to understand the intentions of the party leader and serve as a communication channel between the president and the party leader. In a situation of minority ruling party, the ability to establish smooth relations with the opposition party is also required.

Establish a Systematic Management Plan for Pledges from the Transition Committee Stage

It is necessary to enhance the efficiency of opinion coordination and implementation when formulating policies. First, it is important to establish a system for implementing presidential pledges and develop implementation plans. Pledges presented by candidates or parties during the presidential election campaign must be consolidated at the transition committee stage to develop implementation plans.

A crucial consideration for the president-elect in setting the state administration vision is consistency with the pledges announced during the presidential election campaign. The president-elect should strive to ensure that their state administration vision and government composition thoroughly reflect campaign pledges, as the evaluation of their state administration achievements after their five-year term will depend on the results of pledge implementation. When setting the state administration vision, including pledges, it is important to consider that a five-year term is very short. Taking this into account, one must consider what to select and focus on. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the public's reaction to the pledges presented during the presidential election. Pledges such as President Lee Myung-bak's Four Major Rivers Development Project or President Moon Jae-in's issue of decommissioning the first nuclear power plant have caused significant public conflict. Therefore, it would be wise to incorporate pledges that cause public conflict after gathering public opinion or undergoing a public deliberation process at the transition committee stage and making some revisions. For example, the Four Major Rivers Project could have been expanded based on the reaction after a pilot implementation, such as on the Yeongsan River.

Next, the pledges should be classified by sector, and the legislative and revision needs required for the implementation of each pledge should be identified. Then, the budget required for pledge implementation should be estimated, and potential inter-ministerial disagreements or social conflict factors during pledge implementation should be assessed. The positions of the opposition parties regarding the pledges should also be organized, and finally, the priority for pledge implementation should be determined. Pledges presented to voters by candidates and parties should be systematically organized in a format similar to that in Table 4 to enable the establishment of a pledge implementation plan and to serve as a checklist for future implementation monitoring. Tasks that embody the state administration philosophy or pressing public livelihood issues should be closely coordinated between the party and the government within six months of taking office to ensure legislative support.

After the transition committee has organized the responsible departments and implementation systems, plans for legislative and budgetary support should be pursued in consultation with government ministries and the party's policy committee. Differentiated approaches are needed depending on the policy issue. Generally, foreign policy issues involve less conflict between the two institutions than domestic issues because foreign policy issues concern the nation as a whole and are therefore less distributive. In contrast, when national agenda issues overlap with distributive issues, they are classified as the most conflict-ridden. That is, foreign and security policy is a governance type where the party's dependence on the government is high, but its autonomy is low. Conversely, for political issues such as environmental problems, the party's autonomy increases, and the government's dependence on the party also increases. If autonomy and interdependence in party-government relations are assumed according to policy, and cooperation and checks and balances are carried out accordingly, a more efficient and democratic party-government governance can be formed.

<Table 4> Review of Pledge Implementation Plan

It is also necessary to consider whether the control tower for pledge implementation should be located in the Prime Minister's Office or the Blue House Policy Coordination Office. While the monitoring of the president's pledge implementation should be conducted by the Blue House Situation Room or the Policy Coordination Office, the coordination of inter-ministerial disagreements, adjustment of social conflicts, and further coordination of party-government disagreements should be overseen by the Prime Minister's Office. Additionally, it is important for the party, government, and presidential office to coordinate major bills in advance and classify them as agreed submissions, coordinated submissions, or notified submissions. Agreed proposals should be processed with priority, while coordinated proposals should be processed after undergoing a democratic party consensus-building process, such as holding a general meeting of party members.

Strengthen Communication Among Party, Government, and Presidential Office to Maintain Message Unity

Strengthening communication among the party, government, and presidential office and maintaining unified message management are crucial. Message management is a critical task for maintaining policy consistency and preventing confusion regarding national issues. Unified message management enhances government credibility. Therefore, communication among the party, government, and presidential office is particularly necessary on political and policy issues. We have seen cases where disagreements or mistakes among the party, government, and presidential office during crisis response, such as during infectious disease outbreaks, have caused significant confusion. The ruling party's floor leader and the Blue House chief of staff engaged in a verbal dispute over the president's remarks and intentions (National Assembly Steering Committee, February 24, 2021), and key Blue House aides have made conflicting statements. Statements from ministry ministers and presidential aides have also diverged. As the Blue House, government, and ruling party flounder, the public has no way of knowing the president's true intentions. Some argue that the failure of presidential message management has led to discord among the party, government, and presidential office and has contributed to 'lame duck' controversies at the end of the term.

It is necessary to maintain constant communication channels among the Blue House Senior Political Secretary or Spokesperson, the party's Floor Leader and Spokesperson, and the Prime Minister's Office's Chief of Staff to strengthen communication. The need for prior coordination through working-level policy consultation meetings is also highlighted in this context, to prevent discrepancies between the party, government, and presidential office on major issues or policy matters. In the event of a disaster, a situation room should be established or irregular working-level party-government meetings should be activated to prevent confusion in the response process for the public. A unified voice from within the Blue House regarding the president's messages should also be promptly communicated to the party and the government.

In addition, intra-party communication must be strengthened to manage potential discrepancies arising from a lack of communication within the party. With the strengthening of lawmakers' autonomy due to democratization within parties today, diverse voices can emerge. However, it is also evident that there are frequent instances where different opinions are expressed due to a lack of understanding of major intra-party issues or contentious points. Considering these circumstances, intra-party communication is more important than ever.

4. Recover Party-Government Relations for Presidential Success: The Two-Person, Three-Legged Race

It must be remembered that the outcome of state administration is a two-person, three-legged race between the party and the government. Furthermore, the political affairs function must be reinforced and institutionalized within this framework. Factors that weaken presidential leadership, such as political conflicts, policy conflicts, and personnel conflicts, arise from party-government relations. Therefore, a cooperative governance model that harmonizes autonomy and interdependence must be established as a condition for presidential success. The less experience a president has in 'Yeouido politics,' the more crucial it is to develop strategies for maintaining smooth party-government relations.

The party-government consultation system must be established from the transition committee stage. After conducting the election centered around the campaign team, the transition committee often includes individuals from the presidential election campaign team who are seeking career advancement after the administration takes office. If these individuals excessively participate in the formation and operation of the transition committee, the party may be marginalized, and the administration may launch without the party's voice being reflected in the overall plan for state administration. Sharing policy priorities and concrete implementation plans for fulfilling the pledges made by the president-elect is essential to ensure momentum in the National Assembly after the term begins.

Actively utilize personnel exchanges between the party and the government, and proactively engage in prior policy coordination through working-level policy consultation meetings. Given the difficulty of passing confirmation hearings for high-ranking public officials, including ministers, appointing lawmakers who have accumulated expertise in parliamentary standing committees to cabinet positions in the executive branch can serve as a channel for party-government cooperation and convey the state administration philosophy of the party and the president to the executive branch, thereby enhancing accountability in state administration.

Strengthen communication among the party, government, and presidential office to maintain message unity. Message management is crucial for maintaining policy consistency and preventing confusion regarding national issues. ■

References

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■ Author: Lee Hyun-chul_ Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Konkuk University. He has served as Director of the Office of External Affairs and Director of the Institute for Civic Politics at Konkuk University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Konkuk University. He has served as President of the Korean Association of Party Studies and Vice President of the Korean Political Science Association. He has also served as a consultant for the National Assembly Innovation Advisory Committee and the Special Committee for Constitutional Amendment. His main research areas include parliament, political parties, elections, and Korean politics. His major publications include *The Theory of Asian Community* (2021, co-authored), *Korean Political Process in the Era of Globalization* (2016), *The 21st General Election and the Evolution of Korean Democracy* (2021, co-authored), “Population Aging and Korean Society,”(2021), “Older Voters’ Policy Preferences in the Korean General Elections,”(2021), “Changes in and Continuity of Regionalism in South Korea,”(2020), “Silver Generation’s Counter-movement in the Information Age,”(2018).

■ Responsible Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun _ EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr