[EAI Working Paper] 2022 Presidential Success Conditions Series: ④ Innovate the Foreign Affairs and Security Command Tower

1. Foreign Affairs and Security: The President's Absolute Authority Determining the Nation's Future

By its very nature, the lives of Koreans are significantly influenced by external factors. The reality of division, a geopolitical location surrounded by great powers, and an export-dependent economic structure mean that Korea is exposed to the waves of international politics and the global economy without a breakwater. Consequently, it is known that foreign relations tasks, which the president must personally handle after taking office, account for 40-50% of their total duties. Therefore, for the president to understand the major foreign affairs and security issues that arise constantly and to set a strategic direction amidst a flood of reports, considerable learning and training must be undertaken before inauguration.

The problem lies in the fact that foreign policy issues, despite their importance, do not become major campaign issues during the presidential election process, including the party primaries. In fact, most countries hold elections based on domestic issues. Even the United States, which manages global affairs, has rarely held 'diplomatic elections' that determine the outcome of an election. In the context of South Korean presidential elections, the vetting of candidates' qualifications and knowledge regarding foreign policy is extremely superficial compared to domestic politics, economic policies, and welfare issues such as housing and social services. With the exception of Presidents Syngman Rhee and Kim Dae-jung, who contemplated foreign affairs for a long time, it is no exaggeration to say that in most cases, presidents who were virtually ignorant of foreign affairs were elected and began learning from that point onward to make major policy decisions. It is akin to becoming the CEO of an industry in which one has never worked. The 2022 presidential election, which will elect the 20th president, is no exception. Most candidates have not directly dealt with foreign affairs or expressed foreign policy perceptions and strategic directions that reflect deep consideration. However, in a reality where Korea is overwhelmingly influenced by international issues, managing foreign affairs and security issues and making policy decisions are directly linked to the success or failure of the president's five-year term. In this regard, the candidate's ability to manage foreign policy issues is a core condition for success, if not a condition for election.

The five-year term of the 20th president is expected to be more challenging than any previous term due to international upheaval. Globally, cooperation and conflict among major powers in responding to and preparing for the post-COVID-19 pandemic are unfolding, and in the Asia-Pacific region, the power competition between the United States and China is expected to intensify. Relations between South Korea and Japan are unlikely to find an easy breakthrough, and the Korean Peninsula faces the daunting task of simultaneously resolving North Korea's complete denuclearization and guaranteeing its right to survival and development (Ha Young-sun, 2021).

To overcome the external challenges facing Korea over the next five years and create an opportunity for leap forward, the 20th president must possess a balanced combination of three leadership virtues: policy, communication, and execution. As external conditions become increasingly difficult, the president must first have sound policies and strategies, then possess the communication skills to gauge public reaction, shape public opinion, and gain parliamentary consent for policies, and finally, establish a command tower that effectively utilizes the knowledge and assets of the government's foreign affairs and security agencies to implement policies. Failure to balance these three virtues will likely lead to failure in the presidency.

To become a successful foreign policy president, specific tasks must be addressed simultaneously. First, the president must accurately perceive Korea's international situation and understand foreign policy issues with long-term vision and broad perspective, and consequently set policy priorities. Second, the president must refrain from foreign policy that appeals to self-centered nationalism and exclusive nationalism, and avoid the temptation of 'politicizing foreign policy.' Third, foreign policy decision-making authority concentrated in the Blue House and the president must be decentralized and delegated to the cabinet and relevant ministries to establish a horizontal decision-making system. Fourth, the policy integration and coordination functions of the National Security Council (NSC) must be strengthened. Fifth, the Presidential Transition Committee must faithfully fulfill its inherent role of evaluating the capabilities of foreign affairs and security departments and conducting policy reviews to enhance the new government's execution capabilities, and secure a broad talent pool to place individuals in appropriate positions.

2. Four Major Challenges Awaiting the 20th President

The 20th president faces numerous challenges, including the North Korean nuclear and missile issue, changes in the ROK-US alliance, strained ROK-Japan relations, China's coercive diplomacy, international cooperation on COVID-19, the climate change crisis, and economic security threats. Behind these foreign policy issues lie four major trends: intensifying US-China strategic competition, increasing complexity of foreign affairs, the wave of reglobalization, and the advancement of polarization and populism. The 20th president and government face the challenge of adjusting existing foreign policy concepts and strategies in line with these macro trends.

Intensifying US-China Strategic Competition

The strategic competition between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region is the most significant variable determining the future of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century. The United States, which has led the world order since World War II, is entering a period of relative decline, while China, a rapidly rising new power, is poised to match the US in GDP size by 2030. Furthermore, by 2050, it is projected to achieve parity with the US in military spending (Ha Young-sun, Son Yeol 2021). However, even looking ahead three decades, the US is likely to continue playing a central role in shaping the world order. China dreams of building a socialist great power that surpasses the US, but it still lacks the physical power, legitimacy, and appeal to lead the world order in place of the US. Therefore, the US-China relationship, characterized by intense competition, cooperation, and conflict, is emerging as a key variable that will determine Korea's security and prosperity. North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, the ROK-US alliance, and ROK-Japan and ROK-China relations will all be influenced by the dynamics of US-China competition. It is time to forecast the future of US-China relations with a long-term perspective and reorder the priorities of individual strategies within that context. However, current discussions and policies on this matter have not significantly moved beyond 19th-century-level balance of power diplomacy and remain confined to rhetoric of 'strategic ambiguity'.

Increasing Complexity of Foreign Policy Issues

The US-China relationship, which will dominate the direction of the world order in the 21st century, will involve intense competition, cooperation, and conflict across military, trade, technology, finance, energy, environmental (climate change, health), and normative arenas. The problem is that competition, cooperation, and conflict do not unfold in isolation but are interconnected across multiple arenas, thereby increasing the difficulty of policy choices. For example, in the international economic order, phenomena such as the 'weaponization of trade' or the 'weaponization of economic interdependence' are frequently occurring due to the strategic competition between the US and China (Farrell and Newman 2019). A prime example is the competition to reshape supply chains between the US and China, which is a foreign policy issue involving interconnected production, trade, technology, and security. Despite the increasing multifacetedness and complexity of foreign policy issues, existing policies remain at the level of piecemeal responses based on departmental silos, leading to policy delays or repetitive temporary measures.

Reglobalization Trend Following the COVID-19 Crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a severe blow to the entire economy, particularly affecting self-employed individuals and small business owners domestically. It is also evident that overcoming this crisis is a central issue in domestic politics. However, COVID-19 does not stop there. Externally, the global spread of COVID-19 and the issue of vaccine supply not only confirm the contradictions and flaws of neoliberal globalization but also clearly demonstrate the dangers of anti-globalization. Ultimately, the global overcoming of the COVID-19 pandemic can only be achieved through international cooperation, multilateralism, and global governance. In this context, the necessity of a new architecture for readjusting and reconstructing existing globalization, namely reglobalization, is rapidly emerging (Bishop and Payne 2021). The US and China have already begun competing to lead this new self-centered reglobalization order. Korea, with vital interests at stake in the changes to the global order, both economically and security-wise, must actively participate in building an inclusive order that reflects the interests of great powers, middle powers, and weaker nations.

The Challenge of Polarization and Populism

The fourth challenge that will influence the foreign policy actions of the 20th president is the 'polarization and populism' spreading primarily in advanced industrial nations. As a political ideology, populism is emerging as a backlash against neoliberal globalization, particularly in the UK and the US. That is, as economic inequality deepens and social cohesion weakens due to the liberalization of trade, capital, and human movement, there is a surging tide of anti-establishment politicians seeking to amplify the voices of the masses that have been overshadowed by established elite politics, as seen in Brexit and Trumpism (Eichengreen 2018). Amidst a strong belief that national security and prosperity cannot be secured through external openness, international cooperation, and international institutions, intense self-centered nationalism and economic nationalism are gaining traction.

These global changes pose significant challenges for South Korea, which seeks to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula through international cooperation and achieve prosperity via an outward-oriented economic system. Domestically, South Korea is also experiencing a rise in populism rooted in self-centered nationalism and exclusive ethnic nationalism. The deepening political polarization, exacerbated by declining economic growth rates, widening income inequality, economic recession, and the COVID-19 crisis, has led to heightened partisan confrontation. This often results in political paralysis due to entrenched divisions on major issues. Concurrently, the temptation of populist policy prescriptions is growing stronger. Externally, the reality of difficulty in deriving bipartisan policies on key diplomatic matters amidst partisan divisions driven by group interests, coupled with the increasing allure of appealing to self-centered nationalism and seeking popularity from a short-term benefit perspective, is evident.

3. Five Key Tasks for Success as a Foreign Policy President

To be remembered in history as a president successful in foreign policy, the 20th president, facing four major domestic and international challenges, needs leadership that balances and harmonizes capabilities in policy, communication, and execution. To achieve this, the following five tasks must be addressed:

First, Read the Grand Trends of the World Order with Long-Term Vision

The next president does not need to have specific views and solutions for individual policy issues such as the North Korean nuclear solution, the ROK-US alliance, or the THAAD issue. These are the responsibilities of the relevant ministers. The president must read the grand trends of international political changes with a long-term vision and accurately perceive Korea's situation. Assuming office with a vague belief that things can be done without a certain level of knowledge of international affairs and deep consideration of reality can lead to facing difficulties from multifaceted upheavals.

The 20th president must approach the five-year foreign policy vision of their term with a long-term perspective, looking towards the Asia-Pacific order of 2030, and even 2050. As mentioned earlier, US-China strategic competition in the Asia-Pacific region is the most significant variable determining the future of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century. The specifics of foreign policy—namely, inter-Korean relations, ROK-US relations, ROK-China relations, ROK-Japan relations, Indo-Pacific regional policy, human rights diplomacy, trade diplomacy, and development cooperation diplomacy—will inevitably vary depending on the dynamics of US-China relations.

The next president must accurately forecast the trend of US-China strategic competition, and then, within a broad framework, set priorities among individual policies and establish a basic direction. During their five-year term, while aligning with the US Biden administration to restore and strengthen the ROK-US-Japan cooperation network, efforts must be made to maximize the expansion of ROK-China cooperation. Regarding relations with Japan, as the power asymmetry in terms of economic and military strength is steadily improving, a new relationship based on an equal power dynamic should be sought with a long-term perspective.

The North Korean issue remains the top priority in Korean foreign policy, but we must move beyond North Korea-centrism. Previous administrations have always placed the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue at the center of their foreign affairs and security pledges. Examples include the Lee Myung-bak administration's 'Denuclearization, Opening 3000,' the Park Geun-hye administration's 'Trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula,' and the Moon Jae-in administration's 'Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula.' Consequently, diplomatic efforts were poured into resolving the North Korean nuclear issue or improving inter-Korean relations. However, it is difficult to pursue foreign policies that adapt to changing times with such traditional concepts of diplomacy. Today, our citizens perceive multifaceted and complex threats beyond mere military threats, including economic, technological, health, climate change, and cyber threats. According to the 2019 EAI Survey on Foreign Policy Perceptions, the top threat facing Korea was 'trade/technology friction among neighboring countries,' ranking higher than 'North Korea's nuclear program/instability in inter-Korean relations.'

The president must establish policy priorities and build an appropriate command tower after acquiring a long-term and comprehensive, multifaceted perspective on international issues.

Second, Beware of Politicizing Foreign Policy

The president's communication skills are a crucial element in policy implementation. The ability to gauge public reaction to policies and gain parliamentary consent is an important virtue for a foreign policy president. The president can also achieve national unity through communication on foreign affairs and security issues and gain the political support necessary for leadership. The problem lies in the tendency to place excessive emphasis on communication over policy itself, dedicating more time to message management, events, overseas trips, and public engagement.

In a presidential system characterized by immense power, often referred to as 'imperial presidency,' individuals who were part of the presidential campaign team are often appointed to key positions. Beyond the 'election campaign,' they become engrossed in an 'eternal campaign' to maintain the president's popularity even after taking office. As they gain control over foreign policy, issues arise such as the 'eventification' of policy, domestic political considerations in policy implementation, and policy formulation based on short-term perspectives.

Emphasis on communication is evident in both conservative and progressive governments. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that each new presidential team, upon taking office every five years, launches with new slogans and policies. They invariably emphasize differentiation from the previous administration and set unrealistic goals. For instance, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, despite its complex history spanning nearly 30 years, presidential candidates often package it as solvable within their five-year term.

These slogans, concepts, and policies are invariably created by the presidential campaign teams. Generally, campaign teams prepare only for election victory, so foreign policy pledges tend to be formulated to help secure votes rather than considering national interests, thereby making the candidate stand out and be highlighted. The Lee Myung-bak administration's 'Denuclearization, Opening 3000,' the Park Geun-hye administration's 'Trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula,' and the Moon Jae-in administration's 'Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula' were, in reality, no more than declarative concepts rather than sophisticated solutions. Similarly, in terms of Northeast Asian cooperation policies, the Roh Moo-hyun administration's 'Northeast Asian Cooperation Policy,' the Lee Myung-bak administration's 'Three Major Silk Road Cooperation Initiatives for Resource Diplomacy,' the Park Geun-hye administration's 'Eurasia Initiative,' and the Moon Jae-in administration's 'New Northern Policy' were presented as declarative concepts for promotional purposes rather than yielding substantial results, with only the names changing.

These policies tend to be relatively underdeveloped due to their hasty creation by the campaign's foreign affairs and security teams over a short period. In politically advanced countries like the United States, private think tanks consistently produce policy alternatives. Therefore, campaign teams recruit personnel from these think tanks and select policies for adoption. In contrast, South Korea has a weak tradition of utilizing private think tanks, resulting in campaign experts, primarily composed of pro-government scholars and former officials, hastily creating slogans and policies. This situation increases the likelihood of producing half-baked policies, the consequences of which are then fully borne by the new government's policy implementation.

Let's consider a few examples. The Moon Jae-in administration's core state agenda and foreign policy strategy, the 'Northeast Asia Plus Responsible Community,' inherited the concept of the 'Northeast Asian Community' from the preceding Roh Moo-hyun administration, adding 'Plus' to expand the geographical scope and 'Responsible' to emphasize a sense of community. The issue is that this concept, in terms of content, was not significantly different from the Park Geun-hye administration's 'Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative,' differing only in name. Ultimately, it remained rhetoric and was abandoned. This was due to the campaign's insufficient time for policy production during the candlelight protests and impeachment proceedings, leading to the presentation of underdeveloped strategies. Before pursuing this strategy, the Moon administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have dedicated considerable time and effort to conceptualization and theoretical development to differentiate it from previous government policies. Similarly, the Park Geun-hye administration launched with 'Trust Diplomacy' as its guiding concept for foreign policy, but the concept of 'Trust Diplomacy' was not clearly defined by the presidential campaign or the transition team, leading to the absurd situation of needing to define the concept before its implementation.

A particular point the president must be mindful of is handling foreign policy issues intertwined with nationalist sentiment. Korean nationalism has a strong exclusive character, based on intense resistance to the pressure and domination of past great powers. While this can have a positive function in boosting national pride and mobilizing national capabilities to catch up with developed countries, it has also severely undermined diplomatic autonomy and hindered pragmatic approaches. In relations with Japan or North Korea, presidents are easily tempted to stimulate nationalism to persuade the public or gain support for their policies (Wi Sung-rak, 2020). When such communication strategies become politicized and cause internal conflict, they not only lead to diplomatic difficulties but also seriously impact the president's power and authority in the long run.

Third, Decentralize Blue House Authority

The core of presidential success ultimately lies in execution capability. If what needs to happen does not happen, the president will inevitably face harsh criticism. While one can escape difficult moments by creating plausible narratives, becoming a successful president solely through communication strategies is impossible. Execution capability depends on how the president utilizes the given government apparatus—that is, how the Blue House is organized, how the foreign affairs and security ministers are utilized, and how the president's time is allocated.

Let's first examine the role of the Blue House. In the past, presidential diplomatic activities were limited to overseas visits. However, in the 21st century, the president participates in various summit meetings representing the nation. This includes regional summits such as APEC, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, and ROK-China-Japan Summit, as well as global forums like the G7, G20, and the UN. These occasions also provide opportunities for frequent bilateral summits with major countries. Therefore, the increasing role of the Blue House in diplomacy is a trend of the times.

As the number of foreign affairs and security personnel in the Blue House increases and its policy functions expand, the Blue House secretariat/advisors create a certain distance between the president and cabinet ministers. The trend of the Blue House formulating major policies and ministries merely executing them is strengthening. Currently, the Blue House's National Security Office, as the command tower for foreign affairs and security policy, goes beyond coordinating policies among ministries to leading major policy decisions. It even engages directly in negotiations with foreign countries on key issues. During the Park Geun-hye administration, the Blue House Chief of Staff led secret negotiations with Japan, resulting in the comfort women agreement, and during the Moon Jae-in administration, the Second Deputy Director of the Blue House National Security Office negotiated with China, leading to the so-called 'Three Principles for THAAD.' In both cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the primary ministry for diplomacy, was effectively excluded from the negotiations. While it is understandable for the Blue House to handle negotiations with North Korea, which cannot be considered diplomatic relations, direct negotiations with countries like Japan or China are controversial.

As the Blue House increasingly takes the lead in foreign affairs and security policy, with administrative ministries limited to execution, the government's execution capability weakens. In fact, the most important signal in the president's decision-making comes from government ministries. Nevertheless, if the president distances themselves from the government ministries they manage and relies on the Blue House, significant obstacles arise in interpreting the signals received.

Second, policy responsibility is diminished in a Blue House-led system. The authority of the Blue House is inherently arbitrary, closed, and lacks clear accountability, as it depends on the president's personal trust rather than institutional legitimacy. It is easy to obscure accountability, as work instructions can be given not only through documents but also via a single phone call. Therefore, it is contrary to the principles of responsible politics and democratic diplomacy. Furthermore, when work is concentrated in the Blue House, it leads to an overload of work, resulting in a focus on short-term responses or missing appropriate response times.

The Blue House-led system also negatively impacts the organizational structure of the primary foreign affairs and security ministries. The campaign's foreign affairs and security team not only produces slogans, strategic concepts, and sectoral policy pledges for the new government but also, through the transition team, takes positions in key ministries and the Blue House after the new government's inauguration to lead policy decisions. This tendency is not unique to South Korea; it is a common phenomenon in presidential systems, exemplified by the United States. It is natural for presidents to appoint familiar individuals from their campaign teams to key positions in the Blue House or the cabinet and prefer to work with them.

The real problem lies in the tendency for key tasks to be driven through networks of campaign alumni formed within the Blue House and various ministries. In other words, informal networks drive policy. It goes without saying that such practices cause significant problems at the organizational level. As seen in the 2017 ROK-China agreement on THAAD or the 2019 trade dispute with Japan, the responsible minister is bypassed in the policy decision-making process, becoming a figurehead, and the accountability for that policy is significantly weakened. Furthermore, it can create a vicious cycle of conflict within the Blue House between 'appointed officials' (campaign insiders) and 'career officials' (non-campaign outsiders). This phenomenon is not temporary but tends to strengthen across multiple administrations.

The president must reorganize the system by entrusting major foreign policy decision-making and negotiation authority to the relevant ministries, allowing the Blue House to focus on its inherent secretarial functions, and serve as a control tower for policy coordination among ministries. The president should also instruct the creation of an appropriate organizational chart for the Blue House. It should be kept in mind that the reduction and delegation of Blue House authority can only be achieved through the president's will, as presidential campaign teams tend to favor a larger Blue House.

Fourth, Strengthen the NSC's Policy Oversight and Coordination Functions

The National Security Council (NSC) is the supreme command for national security, composed of the president and relevant ministers. The president must re-establish the NSC as the preeminent policy coordination body for foreign policy, both in name and reality, and expand its membership to include economic ministers/experts to ensure a government-wide approach. As described earlier, modern foreign policy issues are complex, with military, economic, technological, energy, climate change, health, and normative arenas interconnected. The current government has struggled to respond to cross-cutting foreign policy issues such as 5G and Huawei, semiconductor supply chain restructuring, and Japan's export restrictions, as economic, security, and political issues are intertwined, making responses difficult. The next president will face such dilemmas more frequently and intensely. For example, the Quad, with which Korea will cooperate in the future, is a security consultative body, but it is expanding its areas of cooperation around four issues: vaccine cooperation for COVID-19, climate change, maritime security, and technology. The Quad is a security cooperation framework among the US, Japan, Australia, and India, which began as an 'informal' consultative body in 2004 to jointly respond to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. Since its revival during President Trump's visit to Asia in November 2017, it has rapidly become formalized, with foreign ministerial meetings in April 2019 and summit meetings in March 2021.

Therefore, a whole-of-government approach involving not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also ministries related to economy, science and technology, and health is essential for Quad cooperation, and the function of coordinating and adjusting these efforts is extremely important.

The next president must be keenly aware of the deep-seated problem of sectionalism within the Korean bureaucracy and pay extraordinary attention to reorganizing the policy decision-making system to enable the pooling and coordination of ministerial efforts. The president must strengthen policy coordination functions by regularly attending NSC standing committee meetings. Furthermore, in addition to the existing ministerial-level standing committee, the activation of vice-ministerial working-level coordination meetings and the establishment of director-general-level working-level coordination meetings are necessary to ensure smooth policy consultation and coordination at three levels. To prevent such an organizational system from being dictated by sectionalism, the president's strong will must be conveyed.

A crucial actor in the integrated coordination system of foreign policy is the National Intelligence Service (NIS). The NIS is an agency responsible for collecting, analyzing, and evaluating national security-related information. Particularly in the unique context of division, it holds a high status due to its near-monopoly on collecting information on North Korea and its non-public contact channels. The NIS not only provides information but also engages in policy and even diplomatic negotiations through its direct reporting channel to the president. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine greater problems arising if policy recommendations become politicized. It is difficult to rectify the NIS's policy interventions as long as the president considers North Korean relations as the central focus of foreign policy. The president must consider the negative aspects of information monopoly by a specific agency and, referencing examples from advanced countries, order the establishment of a system that ensures checks and balances on information collection and analysis within the government and facilitates the smooth flow of information.

Fifth, Instruct the Presidential Transition Committee to Faithfully Fulfill Its Mandate

For the successful execution of presidential duties, it is primarily essential for the president to have a clear understanding of the organizational capabilities and limitations of the foreign affairs and security departments within the government. The president must understand what each department does and how well it performs its tasks to be able to combine and allocate authority among organizations. In this regard, the president must properly manage the Presidential Transition Committee during the president-elect period.

Originally, the transition team's core mission is to understand the government's organizational structure, functions, and budget, and to prepare for setting the new government's policy direction. While it has been more than 20 years since it began in earnest with the Kim Young-sam administration, the transition team today often fails to adhere to its original mission. In a single five-year presidential term, the president-elect's transition team tends to act like an occupying force, focusing on differentiating itself from the previous government. Instead of policy 인수 (takeover) and planning, they often engage in policy decision-making and even implementation.

To establish a new foreign policy decision-making system and strategy, a rigorous evaluation of the organizational capabilities and limitations of existing government agencies and a thorough policy review are essential. It is crucial to precisely analyze the achievements and failures of policies over the past five or ten years, assess the feasibility of campaign pledges, and plan and present realistic and concrete policy directions and alternatives. In the United States, the transition team is dedicated to policy takeover and evaluation, and for specific policies, evaluation may continue even after the president takes office. The Biden administration's North Korea policy review, which began in January 2021, was released in May, and for China policy, a critical foreign policy issue, the Department of Defense's policy review was released in June, while the review of China trade policy is still ongoing. In contrast, South Korea's past transition teams have not conducted proper policy evaluations. As a result, the concepts of key slogans and visions remain undefined, leading to the late expenditure of time and energy on these tasks after the new government takes office.

The president-elect must ensure that campaign pledges are rigorously evaluated, revised, and supplemented through the transition team, so that implementation can begin as soon as the government takes office. Especially for core policies, it is essential to broadly utilize not only campaign experts and relevant officials but also private experts for multifaceted verification even after the government is inaugurated. Furthermore, once alternatives are developed, consultations with relevant countries can secure the legitimacy and efficiency of policy implementation.

4. The President's Role in Safeguarding South Korea's Survival and Prosperity

The president, who safeguards the survival and prosperity of the Republic of Korea, is a performer on the front lines of the international stage. To deliver a successful performance on a stage that is constantly changing and increasing in complexity, the president must possess a balanced combination of policies, communication, and execution capabilities that maximize national interests. First, the new government's policy pledges for its five-year term must be carefully selected through thorough policy reviews by the transition committee and the new government in its early stages. Second, the legitimacy of policies must be enhanced through maximum communication and consultation with the National Assembly within the framework of bipartisan cooperation. Third, along with this, the Blue House-led approach must be abandoned, and an innovative foreign affairs and security system must be established that ensures appropriate role distribution and coordination among the performers involved in foreign affairs and security. Above all, the selection of supporting actors to back the president's performance is crucial. The president must mobilize a broad talent pool, irrespective of ideology or personal networks, and appoint individuals to their appropriate positions. ■

References

Wi Sung-rak. 2020. *A Proposal for Upgrading Korean Diplomacy*. 21st Century Books.

Ha Young-sun. 2021.10. '2021 EAI New Government Foreign Policy Proposal ①: Rebuilding Cooperative Diplomacy for the New Government.' *EAI Working Paper*.http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20751&board=kor_workingpaper&keyword_option=&keyword=&more=

Ha, Young-sun and Son, Yeol. 2021.7. "US-China Competition 2050: Phased Expansion and Search for Compromise." EAI Special Report.http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20612&board=kor_special &keyword_option=&keyword=&more=

Bishop, Matthew Louis and Anthony Payne eds. 2021. Reglobalization (London: Routledge).

Eichengreen, Barry. 2018. The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era (NY: Oxford).

Farrell, Henry and Abraham Newman. 2019 "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion," International Security 44(1).

■ Author:Son, Yeol_ Director of EAI, Professor at Yonsei University School of International Studies. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Director of Yonsei University School of International Studies, Dean of Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), and a Visiting Scholar at the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Waseda University Institute for Advanced Study. He has served as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation. He was also a specialist member of the Committee for Northeast Asian Cooperation. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), "South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking" (The Pacific Review 2019(32):6), Choices for Korea After the Crisis: Global Financial Crisis, Order Transformation, and Korea's Economic Diplomacy (2020), and The Global Appeal of BTS (2020, co-edited).

■ Management and Editing: Jeon, Ju-hyun _ EAI Research Fellow

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