[EAI Working Paper] 2022 Conditions for Presidential Success Series: ② Dismantle the Blue House Government

1. The Blue House: The First Milestone from Election Victory to Success

The presidential election, held every five years, offers voters hope for new change. This hope stems from the expectation that under new leadership, unresolved issues or conflicts will be resolved, and progress toward a better society will be achieved. Candidates participating in the election also present various pledges to meet these voter expectations.

However, public satisfaction with presidents upon completing their five-year terms has consistently been rather low. They are more often evaluated as 'failed' presidents than as successful ones.

The difficulty in being evaluated as a 'successful president' is likely due to the inherent limitations of what can realistically be resolved or pursued within the short five-year term. Furthermore, elected presidents present pledges aimed at garnering the maximum number of votes during the election campaign, but in the process of governance, it is practically difficult to satisfy all those voters with policy execution, leading to widespread disappointment (Mueller 1970; Moon Woo-jin 2012).

Despite these inherent limitations and problems, the low evaluation of presidents is closely related to the fact that recent presidents have failed to exercise appropriate leadership for successful governance or effective policy implementation. For instance, one of the most frequent criticisms leveled against the recent governing style of Korean presidents is the so-called 'Blue House Government' (Park Sang-hoon 2018). The term 'Blue House Government' emerged in close connection with the excessive concentration of power in the Blue House and the president's over-reliance on it. The Presidential Secretariat, commonly referred to as the 'Blue House,' is, by definition, an agency that assists the president. However, in reality, it has taken center stage in governance and intervened in state affairs. The adjective 'imperial' attached to 'president' is related to the blocking, checking, and suppression of opposition and criticism through so-called 'power institutions.' Above all, however, it is because the Blue House has led overall state affairs, weakening the autonomy of various agencies and concentrating power in the hands of the president and the Blue House.

However, the Blue House Government does not contribute to the president's successful performance. The concentration of power in the Blue House increases the opacity of policy decisions while inevitably lowering the professionalism of their execution. Moreover, the resulting concentration of power around the president hinders free communication and the expression of opinions, ultimately reducing public acceptance of policies. The assessment of a failed presidency largely includes the problems arising from this concentration of power in the Blue House. In this regard, while the concentration of power in the Blue House was raised as an issue during the Park Geun-hye administration, it did not change significantly after the Moon Jae-in administration took office; rather, this tendency intensified during President Moon Jae-in's term. The Blue House Government is a very significant factor in 'presidential failure'.

To become a successful president, the role of the Blue House in the presidential governing process must change. This paper will point out the problems of Blue House-centric governance and discuss the conditions for becoming a successful president by overcoming them.

2. The Blue House Government Limits the Resources Available to the President

The president is provided with various resources for governance. To be a successful president, it is crucial to effectively deploy and lead these diverse resources to function organically. First and foremost, the president is the head of the executive branch under the separation of powers. Bureaucrats in the executive branch possess expertise in their respective fields, have institutionalized and accumulated experience, and hold significant related information. The bureaucracy is a crucial institutional resource that the president can utilize. On the other hand, while the bureaucracy is responsible for providing public services, it also has its own interests, such as expanding budgets and personnel (Niskanen 1971; Dunleavy 1991). Managing and leading them to prevent them from falling into bureaucracy, departmentalism, or inertia is a critical condition for a successful presidency.

Another resource the president possesses is the ruling party. Since the Kim Dae-jung administration, the practice of the president directly and overtly controlling and influencing the ruling party as its leader has disappeared. However, as evidenced by the failure of the 'party-government separation' experiment during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, establishing the relationship between the president and the ruling party is extremely important. The president's major policies or pledges must go through legislative processes in the National Assembly to be realized. Cooperation with the ruling party is crucial in the process of handling budgets and major legislation. Since the Park Chung-hee administration, party-government consultations have been significant in the policy-making process (Ga Sang-jun, Ahn Soon-chul 2012; Kwon Chan-ho 2007). Furthermore, the ruling party plays an important role in tracking public opinion, responding to it, and managing relations with the opposition party.

In addition to the bureaucracy and the ruling party, the Presidential Secretariat is also one of the president's key resources. That is, the Presidential Secretariat is one of the resources available to the president. For a president to be successful, harmony and cooperation among these three institutional resources are essential. The emergence of the term 'Blue House Government,' however, suggests that the balance among them has been disrupted. Due to its functional nature, the Presidential Secretariat inevitably has more frequent and closer contact with the president on a daily basis. However, if the president becomes overly reliant on the secretariat, various problems are bound to arise. The Blue House organization itself is inherently more closed-off than other agencies, and if the president empowers this organization, it will inevitably overshadow other agencies. This disrupts the balance among the three key governing resources of the president.

Of course, the expansion of the Presidential Secretariat is not unique to Korea. In the United States, the size of the White House staff has steadily increased since President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Burke 2000). In Korea, the size of the secretariat significantly increased during Park Chung-hee's rule, and this trend has continued even after democratization (Kim Jeong-hae 2013). However, the problem in Korean politics is not simply an increase in size but a significant increase in its influence after democratization (Kang Won-taek 2018: 53-54).

One reason for this is the single five-year term. Within the short span of five years, the president desires to achieve visible and concrete results, leading to the inclination to directly oversee and manage major policies through the close aides in the Blue House, rather than relying on the bureaucratic organizations of the executive branch.

Another factor is distrust in the bureaucracy. In past authoritarian regimes, state power overwhelmed civil society and political opposition, so checks and criticisms of state actions were not properly implemented. Consequently, the bureaucracy could efficiently carry out the demands of those in power. However, after democratization, demands for transparency and accountability in the executive branch's policy-making and implementation have increased, and the monitoring and criticism functions of the media, civic groups, and the opposition party have also been strengthened. Furthermore, with changes in administration, bureaucrats are sometimes held responsible for policy issues from previous governments, leading to a passive stance among bureaucrats on politically sensitive matters.

Another related issue with the bureaucracy is the potential for conflicts of interest or disputes among bureaucratic organizations. When there are differing interests or positions among ministries responsible for distinct policy implementation functions, considerable time is required for coordination, and in some cases, policy implementation itself may be frustrated. For these reasons, presidents may opt to manage and pursue policies directly through the Blue House Secretariat rather than relying on the executive bureaucracy.

Another reason for the emergence of the Blue House Government is related to 'camp politics.' In recent years, presidential elections have increasingly centered around candidate-specific election camps rather than political parties. This is also related to the introduction of primary election systems for selecting presidential candidates within parties. During the intra-party primaries, key party figures and supporters, including incumbent National Assembly members, divide and compete around the presidential candidate, resulting in the party being unable to collectively support the candidate selected through the primaries. The presidential candidate of a party, selected through primaries, tends to rely on the election camp composed of 'my people' who supported them from the primaries during the general election campaign. The problem is that individuals associated with these camps are often appointed to key positions after the party takes power. The president tends to appoint camp associates who supported them from the candidacy stage to important positions in the secretariat and to lead policies through them.

However, a governing style that relies heavily on the secretariat among the president's various resources is bound to create numerous problems. It sidelines or places the cabinet and the ruling party in passive positions in major policy-making processes and, moreover, leads to the concentration of power in the president and the issue of an 'imperial president.' This, in turn, leads the Presidential Secretariat to function as a superior body, effectively above the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, by leveraging the strengthened power and authority of the president. Therefore, to become a successful president, efforts are needed to reduce excessive reliance on the Presidential Secretariat and achieve an appropriate balance among the president's governing resources, including the executive branch and the ruling party.

3. Utilize the Blue House as a Staff Organization, Not an Executive Body

Important issues were discussed at the meetings of relevant ministers and party-government consultations chaired by the president. The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning, relevant ministers, the chairman of the ruling party's policy committee, and relevant National Assembly standing committee chairmen attended. The Chief Secretary and relevant Senior Secretaries attended these meetings but did not speak. This was to prevent the Presidential Secretariat from interfering in the work of the executive branch. The only time I spoke at such a meeting was during a party-government consultation on the introduction of value-added tax on June 13, 1977.[10]

The State Council should be central, meaning it must be utilized as a forum for substantive discussion of state affairs. During Park Geun-hye's presidency, the State Council was busy merely recording the president's directives. It is important for the president to 'preside' over meetings rather than engaging in one-sided communication based on 'talking points' prepared by the secretariat.

President Park Chung-hee conducted meetings efficiently. He held important meetings about four times a week. Before each meeting, President Park would read the relevant agenda items and familiarize himself with their content. After hearing the explanation from the responsible minister, President Park would ask for the opinions of the attendees. While attendees presented their views, President Park would take notes. Once the attendees finished speaking, President Park would again ask for the responsible minister's opinion. In this process, solutions to problems were usually found. What is important here is that the meetings were not conducted as free-for-all discussions. President Park would call on attendees one by one to speak. Therefore, the meetings did not devolve into chaos but were conducted in an orderly manner. Conclusions could typically be reached within about two hours of the meeting.[11]

The President Should Have Ample Time for Reflection and Meet Diverse Individuals

The president bears the responsibility of understanding the trends of the times and formulating a vision and strategy for the nation's future. While extensive learning occurs during the election campaign to prepare pledges, the environment and circumstances encountered after taking office are often insufficient. Furthermore, during governance, the president may develop a sense of the direction of societal change and future goals. For these presidential perceptions to translate into a grand vision for national development, ample time for reflection is essential. Additionally, the president should not be 'confined' to the Blue House but should interact with individuals from various fields. Being confined to the Blue House can limit the president's perception of reality and judgment of the situation. In fact, President Moon Jae-in's pledge of a 'Gwanghwamun Government' during his campaign was likely due to this very reason.

On the 24th, Moon Jae-in, the presidential candidate for the Democratic Party of Korea, pledged to move the presidential office from the Blue House to the Gwanghwamun Government Complex, stating, 'I will end the era of unjust and uncommunicative presidents and become a president who communicates with the people among the people.' At a press conference held at the party's headquarters in Yeouido, Seoul, candidate Moon added, 'I will be a president who can stop by Namdaemun Market on the way home from work for a drink with citizens, a president of the common people like a friend or neighbor,' and declared, 'We will return the Blue House to the citizens as a space for rest.'[12]

President Moon Jae-in viewed the Blue House Government as 'unjust and uncommunicative,' but the Gwanghwamun Government was not realized. This was due to reasons such as the difficulty of moving the presidential office to Gwanghwamun for security, traffic, and administrative purposes. However, perhaps the significance of the 'Gwanghwamun Government' lies in its implication. It can be seen as an expression of the will not to confine the president's channels of information and communication solely to the Blue House Secretariat. To be a successful president, it is crucial to have time for self-reflection and to engage with diverse individuals outside the Blue House.

4. Presidential Success Depends on Utilizing the Executive Branch

Every election cycle, upon the inauguration of a new president, there are hopes for a successful presidency. However, contrary to the public's wishes, evaluations of presidents after their terms are often negative. While there are various reasons for this, excessive expectations regarding the power and influence of the presidency also play a part.

President-elects and their close aides tend to believe they can do anything once they gain power. However, the president's influence and term are very limited. To be a successful president, one must be able to appropriately utilize the various institutional resources granted. Yet, recently, presidents have shown a tendency to rely excessively on the secretariat. This 'Blue House Government'-centric governing style, while appearing efficient and convenient in the short term, is not suitable for generating effective policy outcomes. This chapter has discussed the conditions for a successful presidency in relation to the Presidential Secretariat.

The key points discussed here are as follows:

First, the size and role of the Blue House must be reduced. In fact, the Blue House organization has continuously expanded since the Park Chung-hee era. Even during the Moon Jae-in administration, the Blue House again increased in size and budget compared to before. Now, the role of the Blue House must be reduced. 'A working Blue House' is a flawed concept. Only the president's core agenda should be handled by the Blue House; all other responsibilities should be delegated to the relevant departments.

Second, the State Council should be revitalized over the Blue House. The practice of the presidential secretariat effectively directing cabinet ministers must cease; the autonomy of each administrative agency should be strengthened, and the State Council should be revitalized. If it is deemed unnecessary for all State Council members to convene, consideration can be given to revitalizing smaller State Council meetings involving only relevant ministers. A possible approach is to divide them into meetings such as the Foreign Affairs and National Security Ministers' Meeting and economic-related meetings, with the president directly attending and presiding. Major policy discussions should take place in the State Council, which is constitutionally mandated to discuss state affairs, rather than in meetings with Blue House aides.

Third, Blue House-centric governance can result in the president being 'trapped' by the personnel composition within the Blue House. President Moon Jae-in's pledge of a 'Gwanghwamun Government' during the election campaign was likely due to the recognition of this problem. In particular, since the Blue House is easily staffed by individuals from election camps or based on personal relationships with the president, its composition tends to be homogeneous. Consequently, discussions on diverse opinions and competing policy alternatives become difficult.

Fourth, it is desirable to limit the role of the Senior Secretary for Personnel Affairs and abolish the position of Senior Secretary for Policy. The standing committee system of the National Security Office should be abolished, and the National Security Council should be reorganized to play a more substantive role.

In summary, for a president to be successful, it is necessary to relinquish the concentrated power held by the Blue House, revert to its original role of planning and coordination, and instead pursue decentralized governance that enhances the autonomy of each institution. ■

References

Ga Sang-jun, Ahn Soon-chul. 2012. “Problems and Institutional Alternatives of Party-Government Consultation After Democratization.” *Journal of Korean Politics*. 21(2), 87-112.

Kang Won-taek. 2018. *Korean Politics*. Revised ed. Parkyoungsa. Kim Jeong-ryeom. 1997. *Ah, Park Chung-hee*. JoongAng M&B.

Kwon Chan-ho. 2007. “A Study on the Factors Influencing Party-Government Cooperation: Focusing on the Analysis of the Party-Government Cooperation System by Administration.” *Korean Public Administration Review*. 21(4), 279-302.

Moon Woo-jin. 2012. “The Law of Inevitable Decline in Presidential Approval Ratings: Who Changes Support for the President and Why?” *Korean Political Science Review*. 46(1), 175-201.

Park Sang-hoon. 2018. *The Blue House Government: Thinking About 'What is a Democratic Government'*. Humanitas. Baek Chang-jae. 2018. “Resources and Leadership of the U.S. President.” *National Strategy*. 24(4), 135-173.

Burke, John. 2000. *Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dunleavy, P. 1991. *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science*. New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

Mueller, John. 1970. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” *American Political Science Review* 64(1), 18-34.

Niskanen, W. A. 1971. *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

[1] “2,000 Positions Appointed by the President… Campaign Loyalists Await Phone Calls.” *JoongAng Ilbo* 2017.7.18.https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/21765735#home

[2] Kim Yong-ho. “The Wrong Practice of 'Camp Politics' by Presidential Candidates.” *JoongAng Ilbo* 2021.8.12.

[3] “Blue House Administrative Officer, What Kind of Position Is It… Working-Level Control Tower… Criticized as a 'Parachute Landing' in Affiliated Organizations After Retirement.” *Monthly Chosun* 2014.12.http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=201412100016

[4] From Gwanghwamun - Gil Jin-gyun. “The Secretariat of Personnel Affairs Became a Dinosaur… Responsibility Minister in Name Only.” *The Dong-a Ilbo* 2019.1.16.

[5]"The Blue House Decides Up to Director-General Level... Can a Minister Without Personnel Authority Issue an Order?" "Maeil Business Newspaper" 2019. 6. 13. https://www.mk.co.kr/news/economy/view/2019/06/411735/

[6] Kim Jeong-ryeom. "Advice from the Longest-Serving Presidential Chief of Staff - Conditions for a Successful President: President Park Chung-hee Did Not Approve Many Documents. The President Must Have Ample Time for Contemplation." "Monthly Chosun" 2008. 1. http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=200801100014

[7] Jang Ha-sung and Kim Dong-yeon. "'Income-Led Growth' Clash... Is the Control Tower 'Jang & Kim' or 'Kim & Jang'?" "Sunday JoongAng" 2018. 8.11. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/22877564#home

[8]"Political Affairs by the Chief of Staff, Policy by the Policy Chief... Dispersal of Power in the Blue House Secretariat." "Chosun Ilbo" 2017. 5. 12. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/05/12/2017051200211.html

[9]"Korean Peninsula Situation in Flux, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Out of Sight." "JoongAng Ilbo" 2018. 3. 12. https://w zww.joongang.co.kr/article/22434190#home

[10] Kim Jeong-ryeom. "Advice from the Longest-Serving Presidential Chief of Staff - Conditions for a Successful President: President Park Chung-hee Did Not Approve Many Documents. The President Must Have Ample Time for Contemplation." "Monthly Chosun" 2008. 1. http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=200801100014

[11] Ibid. Kim Jeong-ryeom.

[12]"Moon Jae-in: 'I Will Move the Blue House Office and Open the Era of the 'Gwanghwamun President'." "News1" 2017. 4. 24. https://www.news1.kr/articles/?2975947

■ Author: Kang Won-taek_ Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the London School of Economics (LSE). He has served as President of the Korean Political Science Association and the Korean Association of Party Studies. His main research areas include Korean politics, parliament, elections, and political parties. His major works include "Decisive Moments in Korean Politics" (2019), "Writing Social Science" (2019), "Korean Politics" (2019), "Democracy Made by Citizens" (2018, co-authored), "Evaluation of 30 Years of Democratization in the Republic of Korea" (2017, co-authored), and "Presidential System, Cabinet System, and Semi-Presidential System" (2016).

■ Editor: Jun Ju-hyun _ EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr