[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Administration Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ⑦_Value and Norm Diplomacy: South Korean Diplomacy Amidst US-China Clash over Human Rights and Democracy

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Kim Heon-jun, Professor at Korea University, argues that while the US has used human rights and democracy as tools to pressure China amidst US-China competition, value/norm diplomacy cannot be understood merely as a tool. He recommends that the new administration consider three characteristics of value/norm diplomacy when formulating foreign policy. The author urges the US to create concrete and effective international norms and laws, adding that South Korea should actively participate in such rule-making processes. He particularly emphasizes the need to explain the importance of the North Korean human rights issue to the international community and present South Korea's potential contributions, considering that the next administration is pursuing a value- and norm-based diplomacy towards North Korea, led by the US.

Three Policy Tasks for Value and Norm Diplomacy

1. The government must establish and consistently pursue universal and international norms and principles that will guide South Korean diplomacy within a broad framework, based on our domestic values and norms such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and a market economy. This relies on the inherent power of principles that are strongly agreed upon by the international community, such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and free trade, making them difficult to deny or challenge.

2. It is necessary to actively and promptly participate in initiatives such as the Summit for Democracy or the Democracy 10 (D10) group, which the US is actively pursuing, to proactively shape our role and enhance our influence. In particular, through the Summit for Democracy, it is crucial to consolidate and consistently pursue all value and norm diplomacy efforts focused on the human rights and democracy of China and North Korea, which may be sensitive to us.

3. Thorough preparation is required for bilateral relations, especially for value and norm diplomacy towards China. Specifically, it is necessary to distinguish between areas pursued at the multilateral level and those at the bilateral level, disperse risks through multilateral activities, and meticulously pursue reciprocity in the bilateral sphere to establish precedents.

I. Introduction

In the context of extreme conflict between US and China over values and norms, what choices will the next administration make and how will it justify them? In international politics, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law have been understood as peripheral elements in traditional views of international politics, belonging to the realm of values and norms. Values were primarily understood as principles pursued by states, and norms as the collective expectations formed by such principles in the international community, though the two terms are often used interchangeably. When value/norm issues rise to the center of international politics, attention has typically focused on their instrumental utility. The perspective is that Trump's emphasis on human rights and democracy diplomacy in the final period of his term was a means to gain an advantage in trade disputes with China and pressure China. While human rights and democracy were indeed used instrumentally during the Trump administration, values and norms cannot be understood solely in this way. Value/norm diplomacy has the following three characteristics, which the next administration should consider when formulating its foreign policy.

First, values and norms possess autonomy, operating with a logic distinct from other domains. While values and norms interact with military, security, economic, and technological spheres, conflicts in these areas do not naturally resolve simply because issues in other domains are settled. Second, values and norms will proceed with close linkage to other domains. The Trump administration saw instances where trade and values/norms became linked, amplifying conflict, and the Biden administration is continuing this policy. Furthermore, since the beginning of his term, Biden has created new linkages between advanced technology and values/norms through essential supply chains. If we broadly consider values and norms within the framework of a rule-based international order, linkages have already been formed with the security domain, such as freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Third, the realm of values and norms is rooted in emotional and affective factors such as public opinion, nationalism, culture, and civilization, possessing potential volatility. Moreover, values and norms strive for consistency at both domestic and international levels, making them resistant to change. The patriotic sentiment in China that emerged in response to COVID-19 and Trump's anti-China offensive, or the anti-China sentiment in the US that persists after Trump, create an environment ripe for triggering value/norm conflicts.

II. Analysis of the Current Situation and Evaluation of the Current Administration

The current administration was in office when the value and norm conflict between the US and China began to intensify. In July 2017, early in its term, the death of Liu Xiaobo and the issue of his wife Liu Xia's departure arose. The US and the EU reaffirmed their existing criticisms of China's human rights record, to which China retorted with claims of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Similar issues arose with cases of detained human rights lawyers such as Xie Yang and Chen Jianfei, and the US and EU jointly urged their release through an unprecedented joint statement. The controversy over human rights and democracy in China, which began with the Hong Kong extradition bill protests in the summer of 2017, escalated in 2018 with issues concerning forced labor and suppression in Xinjiang using advanced technologies like AI, facial recognition, and genetic information, and in 2019 with the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident. The US responded aggressively by enacting the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2019 and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in 2020, with COVID-19 further amplifying the conflict. Issues such as racial discrimination in the US (Black Lives Matter), controversies surrounding the 2020 presidential election and the Capitol riot, and the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law provided opportunities for both sides to raise issues and escalate the conflict.

During this period, the value and norm diplomacy issues related to our government were (1) the Hong Kong extradition bill protests and the National Security Law controversy, and (2) the Xinjiang detention camps and human rights abuses. Beyond these, although less directly linked to US-China conflict, there were also (3) the issue of compensation for forced labor victims and the ruling on comfort women between South Korea and Japan, (4) controversies surrounding North Korean human rights and the ban on leaflet dissemination to North Korea, and (5) the situation in Myanmar, which began with a coup in February 2021 and led to the massacre of innocent civilians. The latter three issues were also significant matters for the government's value/norm diplomacy and indirectly influenced the US-China conflict issues. Evaluating the current administration's policies on these five issues, it is difficult to give high marks, except for the response to the situation in Myanmar. The government has implemented swift, firm, and effective policies regarding the situation in Myanmar. The government issued four very strong statements, and the President and Prime Minister also expressed their views via social media. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs met twice with the ambassador to Myanmar and students from Myanmar, and the Minister of Justice personally met with Myanmar nationals residing in South Korea. The government also took effective measures such as suspending new exchanges and cooperation in defense and public security, refusing to export military goods and strictly reviewing the export of strategic industrial materials, re-examining development cooperation excluding humanitarian projects, and providing special humanitarian stay for Myanmar nationals.

Conversely, regarding the issues of Hong Kong and Xinjiang, which are at the core of US-China relations, the government maintained its cautious, prudent, and principled policy stance. Until the passage of the National Security Law, the government's stance on the issue was a principled statement of "closely monitoring the situation with great interest." Immediately after the passage of the National Security Law, it expressed concern that "the government respects the contents of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, and it is important for Hong Kong to continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy under 'one country, two systems' and maintain stability and development in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong." Mentioning 'high degree of autonomy,' which had not been mentioned before, was clearly a new and more proactive expression of intent. However, the government balanced this by mentioning the Basic Law of Hong Kong alongside the Sino-British Joint Declaration and by mentioning 'stability and development,' which China advocates, as values for Hong Kong to pursue. Furthermore, it refrained from further intervention by not participating in the joint statement regarding the Hong Kong National Security Law issued by 27 countries, including the UK, Canada, and Japan, at the UN Human Rights Council, citing "consideration of all aspects." Moreover, regarding Xinjiang and Uyghurs, the government has not made any statement beyond the meaningless remark of "closely monitoring the situation." Instead, the passive response to China's announcement after the 2019 South Korea-China summit that "South Korea views the Hong Kong and Xinjiang issues as China's internal affairs" as a "statement indicating that President Xi Jinping's explanation was well-received" leaves much to be desired.

While such a cautious approach may be desirable for maintaining the status quo when international affairs are stable, in the current rapidly changing landscape of values- and norms-based diplomacy, it risks losing the initiative in foreign policy or failing to interpret and set the meaning of policies proactively, leading to an awkward situation where they are left to the arbitrary interpretations of other countries. The "China threat theory" that is being raised and amplified within domestic and US political circles is an example of this. Although the National Security Office, foreign policy advisory bodies, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have repeatedly explained that this is a misconception and that South Korea operates its alliance with the US and its strategic cooperative partnership with China, they have not been able to sufficiently persuade domestic and international public opinion. This is particularly undesirable given that, since the advent of the Biden administration, Secretary of State Blinken has explicitly stated that the US will jointly respond with like-minded states to human rights and democracy issues in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. There were numerous ways to indirectly or circumventially attempt values- and norms-based diplomacy, and it is regrettable that the opportunity to test the waters regarding China's human rights and democracy in line with our identity at the early stage of US-China conflict was missed.

Beyond a principled response to the threatening attitudes and aggressive actions of Chinese students during the Hong Kong extradition bill incident, actively demanding clarification after China's unilateral announcements regarding Hong Kong and Xinjiang immediately following the 2019 South Korea-China summit, more actively protesting the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson's response of "President Moon Jae-in's remarks" on related issues, and expressing concern about the potential harm to South Koreans residing in Hong Kong that the Hong Kong National Security Law could cause – these were all legitimate points of contention and opportunities to indirectly but clearly express our position on China's human rights and democracy issues. The situation in Myanmar's foreign policy also presented an opportunity to clearly highlight the differences between our position and China's. Through a statement by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 3rd, China identified "improper intervention by the UN Security Council" and "incitement by external forces" as factors to be avoided in resolving the Myanmar crisis. This is an outdated logic of sovereignty that is clearly different from what South Korea aims for in terms of democracy and human rights, and it is an excessively conservative interpretation that disregards the international consensus that has made significant progress on non-interference in sovereignty. Clearly revealing these differences in South Korea's foreign policy toward Myanmar is also a way of indirectly but clearly pursuing values- and norms-based diplomacy with China that we could have attempted.

From the perspective of values- and norms-based diplomacy, the controversies surrounding compensation for victims of forced mobilization and the Japanese military comfort women rulings, as well as North Korean human rights and the law prohibiting the distribution of leaflets to North Korea, are also regrettable. In both issues, the discussion focused on the relationship with the target parties, Japan and North Korea, and failed to address the fundamental core of the issues: universal values, human rights, and democracy. Firstly, while there may be various solutions in South Korea-Japan relations, the rulings on compensation for victims of forced mobilization and comfort women are not fundamentally about policy toward Japan. Human rights, judicial independence, and victim redress have been discussed domestically in various contexts as South Korea's democracy has developed, and the rulings on forced mobilization and comfort women fall within that context. The discussion was only directed at Japan because it was the power that made the decisions at the time of the incidents; similar demands were made towards the United States for events that occurred during the US military rule period, such as the Jeju April 3rd Incident or the Yeosu Rebellion, or during the Korean War, such as No Gun Ri. Demands for truth-finding, punishment of perpetrators, and compensation are distinct from anti-Japan or anti-US sentiment, being victim-centered discussions. Therefore, the lack of proactive efforts to explain this externally and preemptively block conflict at the initial stage of the issues is regrettable. Furthermore, when Japan responded to universal human rights issues as a bilateral matter, it remains questionable whether our government should have responded in the same bilateral manner and fallen into a quagmire. Although the issue of comfort women is recently being referred to as a "sexual violence in conflict" in multilateral diplomacy, such as at the Human Rights Council, emphasizing universal values, it is a belated effort.

North Korean human rights are no different. The biggest obstacle to South Korea's values- and norms-based diplomacy is undoubtedly North Korean human rights. This is an issue that constantly arises whenever human rights issues in Hong Kong, Myanmar, or China surface and require South Korea's active response. Throughout its term, the current administration has been embroiled in numerous controversies regarding co-sponsoring UN North Korean Human Rights Resolutions, launching the North Korean Human Rights Foundation, appointing a North Korean Human Rights Ambassador, supporting organizations related to North Korean human rights, enacting the law prohibiting leaflet distribution to North Korea, and holding US Congressional hearings. The very fact that there have been so many controversies is evidence that the current government's North Korean human rights policy has not proceeded smoothly, demonstrating that policies have been pursued without regard for principles and precedents. Since the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean Human Rights in 2014 and the enactment of the North Korean Human Rights Law in 2016, one thing is certain: North Korea has not presented clear evidence of human rights improvements to the international community. Therefore, the government should have consistently pursued the main provisions of the North Korean Human Rights Law, considering universal human rights and respecting the bipartisan agreement of 2016. This should have been pursued separately from inter-Korean exchanges and summits to maintain the broader framework of values- and norms-based diplomacy. If the intention was to tone down human rights discussions in bilateral diplomacy to consider North-South negotiations, then consistent engagement on the issue in multilateral diplomacy, such as at the UN, should have been maintained. If a certain degree of consistency and principle had been maintained, it is judged that US Congressional hearings on South Korea's North Korean human rights policy would not have been held as they have been.

The May 2021 summit between South Korea and the United States yielded achievements but also left homework undone. In terms of values-based and norms-based diplomacy, it is assessed that more homework remains than achievements made. First, examining the achievements, it was reaffirmed that South Korea and the United States share fundamental principles regarding values and norms. The joint statement's expression, "sharing a vision for a region where democratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law prevail domestically and internationally," clearly illustrates this. This was also evident in the awarding of the Purple Heart to Korean War veterans and agreements on cooperation in supply chains, advanced technologies, health, and vaccines based on shared values. However, these achievements simultaneously presented difficult tasks. While specific references to China's democracy or human rights issues, such as Hong Kong and Xinjiang, were omitted unlike in the U.S.-Japan summit joint statement, the South Korea-U.S. leaders mentioned the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea in the context of maintaining a "rules-based international order" and expressed their commitment to "promoting human rights and the rule of law domestically and internationally" in the same context. More notably, the phrase "promoting human rights, the rule of law, and democracy domestically and internationally" is repeated three times within the relatively brief joint statement. Additionally, it included a commitment to "cooperate to improve the human rights situation in North Korea." Considering the current administration's stance, this is judged to be a strong directive from the United States, and it appears to be a strategic move not merely for the summit but with the long-term U.S.-China confrontation in mind. Fragments of this approach were fully evident at the G7 summit, where South Korea was invited along with South Africa, India, and Australia.

The direction of U.S. diplomacy in terms of values and norms is well-expressed in the G7 summit's joint statement and the "Open Societies Statement" involving the four invited countries. This is similar to the content presented in the joint statement of the EU-G7 Foreign and Development Ministers' Meeting in May and clearly shows the core of the democracy versus authoritarianism framework envisioned by the United States and the EU. A Blue House official explained that "there are absolutely no contents targeting specific countries," but this is an unnecessary comment, as demonstrated by the remarks of Ambassador Xing Haiming immediately after the summit, which, while not mentioning China by name, were clearly "aimed at China." Similarly, the statement regarding the Taiwan Strait, issued immediately after the summit, was described as being included at a "general and principled level." The issue is that as of June 2021, the U.S. plan is in the planning stage rather than the finalization stage, and thus, more will gradually be demanded. First, the U.S. will take concrete and strong actions at the G20 summit, the UN, and the Summit for Democracy. In this regard, South Korea cannot distance itself from U.S. values-based and norms-based diplomacy simply by stating that the word "China" is absent or that the level is general. It must establish clear principles and strategies for values-based and norms-based diplomacy. The next administration will require a diplomatic strategy that differentiates itself from the current one in this regard.

III. Policy Recommendations for the Next Administration: Principles and Detailed Strategies

The international political landscape that the next administration will face will be characterized by a dual dynamic: intensifying U.S.-China conflict on one hand, and the revival attempt of U.S. leadership in the liberal international order on the other. This U.S.-China-centric international relations structure overlaps with the regional order centered on bilateral diplomacy, such as inter-Korean relations, South Korea-Japan relations, South Korea-China relations, and South Korea-U.S. relations. Furthermore, it interacts with and is influenced by domestic situations such as conflicts between conservatives and progressives, ruling and opposition parties, generations, genders, and social classes. Lastly, the successes and failures of past administrations, including the current one, will inevitably influence the foreign policy of the next government. The realm of values and norms, like all other domains, requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses domestic, regional, and international levels spatially, and past, present, and future temporally. Therefore, the next administration should pursue detailed strategies for values-based and norms-based diplomacy based on the following principles.

1. Principle: Consistent pursuit of universal values and norms based on our unique values and norms.

Like any other country in the world, South Korea cannot escape the influence of the two great powers, the U.S. and China. In this context, diplomacy based on international norms and principles, i.e., legitimacy and justification, will become a significant source of strength for us. Of course, agile strategies and temporary accommodations may be required depending on specific issues and situations, such as North Korea policy and diplomacy with China. However, based on our domestic values and norms, including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy, which we have achieved so far, the government must establish universal and international norms and principles that will guide South Korean diplomacy broadly and pursue them consistently. The best approach is to rely on the inherent power of principles that are strongly agreed upon by the international community, such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and free trade, which cannot be easily negated or challenged. Of course, there are many areas that have recently become problematic and require new agreements, such as election interference and manipulation of information presented in the Open Societies Statement. Since these issues require time to reach an agreement, they can be addressed gradually based on the overarching principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Values and norms such as human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and free trade are derived from domestic values and norms and are closely linked to our identity, making it difficult for the U.S. or China to easily challenge them. Therefore, as long as we consistently maintain our domestic politics and foreign policy, this is a principle that will not cause significant difficulties. The problem arises when we reveal loopholes of double standards or selective application domestically and internationally, as in the case of North Korean human rights. If we show a tendency to easily and lightly disregard principles for practical gains when principles and practical interests conflict, we will be easily exposed to diplomatic pressure, such as recent hearings held by the U.S. Congress. While the government's role is important regarding principles, social consensus and understanding are also crucial. In areas where public opinion is divided, such as the THAAD deployment, the government is vulnerable to foreign pressure. Therefore, the next administration should at least achieve consensus among political parties, diplomatic circles, the media, and academia in setting foreign policy principles that concern the nation's fate, and at least focus on political efforts and message management to maintain them during its term or appear to do so externally.

Diplomacy that consistently relies on principles may be difficult at first, but it becomes easier over time as precedents are established and records are accumulated in similar cases. Such principles will become a strong backing that can protect our positions and interests in future specific matters. This is not merely a means to internationally respond to authoritarian states like China or Russia. The U.S., as demonstrated by the Trump administration, can disregard international organizations or agreements at any time and is highly likely to retreat unilaterally from the realm of values and norms based on its interests. Although the Biden administration has so far implemented policies in a desirable direction regarding values and principles, such as swift mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, lifting individual sanctions on ICC prosecutors, publicly revealing the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia, and supporting the waiver of intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines, it continues to pursue policies that are concerning, such as unilateral trade practices that disregard international norms and the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body. Therefore, there is a view within the U.S. that it is important to first resolve domestic issues in the realm of values and norms or overcome international weaknesses before exerting global leadership. Our value and norm-based foreign policy principles should be partially based on these rational voices within the U.S. to check not only China but also the U.S.

2. Detailed Strategies

1) Summit for Democracy or Democracy 10 (D10)

It is important to maintain a consistent and impartial voice, at least in matters of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, urging compliance with international standards. The recent joint statement by EU-G7 foreign and development ministers strongly pressured China by specifically mentioning human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet and proposing measures to address them. Although the proposals for solutions and the mention of Tibet were omitted, the G7 summit's joint communiqué maintained a similar tone. The G7 foreign and development ministers' statement also pressured North Korea, prioritizing human rights issues over nuclear and missile development, and addressing human rights abuses in political prison camps and the issue of abductees. The G7 summit's communiqué maintained a similar tone. This served as the first trial run for the Summit for Democracy envisioned by the U.S. or the D10 alliance, and as expected, the joint communiqué contained very specific and extensive proposals regarding international politics as a whole. The Summit for Democracy is something the current administration is positively considering, and we have already made significant progress through two invitations to G7 meetings and participation in the Open Society Statement. Therefore, it can be considered the most important multilateral platform for values and norms that the next administration should actively utilize in the future. Based on our past actions, formal participation in the Summit for Democracy is natural and expected to proceed in that direction.

The next administration needs to utilize the Summit for Democracy more actively to its advantage. There are three approaches. First, regarding participation in the Summit for Democracy, there is no need to hesitate or show hesitation considering our democratic identity and the maturity of our human rights. Recently, we have been criticized for hesitation, looking for cues, and timing of stance declarations in our participation in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the THAAD deployment. Therefore, it is necessary to pre-determine positions on such matters and make swift decisions when proposals are received. Among various areas, this task is relatively easier in the realm of values and norms, specifically the Summit for Democracy. Instead, showing hesitation in this area or preemptively or unnecessarily showing consideration for China or North Korea is prone to causing misunderstandings domestically and internationally. Furthermore, actively expressing expectations and engaging in the Summit for Democracy will buy us time for participation in the Quad Plus, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the Economic Prosperity Network, and the Clean Network, which we may be sensitive about and hesitate to join.

Second, through the Summit for Democracy, it is necessary to focus and consistently pursue all value and norm diplomacy concerning the human rights and democracy of China and North Korea, which may be sensitive to us, if possible. Value and norm diplomacy conducted on a multilateral platform places less burden on individual countries than bilateral diplomacy, and as long as there are no specific advancements in the matter, consistent diplomacy can be maintained through this platform, securing some room for maneuver in bilateral diplomacy. China has not shown the strong rebuttals and harsh retaliation in multilateral relations that are seen in bilateral relations regarding value and norm offensives such as human rights and democracy. Of course, it has recently implemented retaliatory sanctions against the EU's sanctions on Hong Kong democracy and Xinjiang human rights abuses and is preparing legislation to support this, but it has not yet sanctioned specific countries in response to G7 joint statements or Human Rights Council resolutions. In light of these points, there is no reason for us to defensively excuse that these multilateral statements are not targeting specific countries, as was the case with the Open Society Statement. Rather, it is necessary to clarify, as stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson recently, that these multilateral statements are an extension of the values and principles that we believe in domestically.

Third, as suggested by the Open Society Statement, there are many agendas to be addressed in future Summits for Democracy. This is because international laws and norms have not been established in many areas where the U.S. confronts China in terms of values and norms. We can actively contribute in this regard. Value and norm diplomacy can be broadly categorized into offense (anti-China) and defense (pro-democracy). Criticism and urging regarding issues sensitive to China, such as Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet, can be considered offensive, but this is not the core of value and norm diplomacy. At the Summit for Democracy, South Korea should leave the offensive aspects to other countries and focus on discovering, preempting, and proposing agenda items for the promotion of democracy from a defensive standpoint. In particular, South Korea has unique experiences due to its geopolitical location relative to China and needs to leverage them. First, in terms of the rules-based international order, there are issues with the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ), which China intrudes upon without notice, and maritime boundary lines in the West Sea. Additionally, there are issues such as hostage diplomacy, cyberattacks, information manipulation, influence operations, and internet public opinion manipulation by those called "Wumao Party" (五毛党). In particular, South Korea is well-positioned to prove the effects of China's combative nationalism or cultural supremacy. Representative examples include the Northeast Project (동북공정) in 2004 and recent controversies surrounding Yun Dong-ju, Hanbok, and Kimchi. The violence by Chinese nationals in South Korea on university campuses during the 2008 Olympic torch relay and in relation to the 2019 Hong Kong protests are also side effects of rising authoritarian China that democratic nations should jointly address.

2) Bilateral Values-Based and Norms-Based Diplomacy

Thorough preparation is necessary for bilateral relations, particularly for value- and norm-based diplomacy toward China. First, by reflecting on China's foreign policy, a "tit-for-tat" strategy that is principled and matches the level and magnitude of the situation must be devised. A return to basic measures is required, such as appointing ambassadors who match the situation, treating Chinese diplomatic envoys appropriately, establishing equitable communication channels, and observing correct protocol. Those who advocate for the "China appeasement theory" recently point out that South Korea, beyond mere caution, fails to respond even to China's humiliating actions. During the THAAD deployment, China imposed economic retaliation, and in 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a Reuters interview, disparaged South Korea by implying it was a subordinate of the United States, quoting the idiom "Xiang Zhuang dances with a sword, but the intent is to kill Pei Gong" (項莊舞劍 意在沛公). Subsequently, Xi Jinping intentionally committed diplomatic impropriety by receiving special envoys from two successive presidents and seating them in the main seats on two occasions. Just before attending the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Wang Yi made the audacious demand in a phone call with his South Korean counterpart to "grasp right and wrong" (握是非曲直) and "not be led astray" (不被带偏节奏). Xi Jinping's speech at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party recently clearly stated that China will proactively confront criticism or attacks concerning what it claims are its core interests in the future.

This is not solely an issue for us. China's diplomacy in the realm of values and norms is often unsophisticated and rough. Australia's experience, for instance, includes economic retaliation after demanding an investigation into the origins of COVID-19. Beyond punitive measures, which fall within the scope of legitimate trade regulations, the Chinese Embassy presented "Fourteen Grievances" to humiliate Australia. The recent "Wolf Warrior diplomacy" during the COVID-19 pandemic, aimed at promoting China, has exposed problems in various aspects. Wang Yi's visits to Europe and Asia to garner support for the Hong Kong National Security Law did not yield positive results either. The vaccine diplomacy employed in countries maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan, such as Paraguay, and in Eastern Europe and Asia, has not been entirely successful. To engage with China on equal footing in the bilateral sphere of values and norms, we must explore China's methods and discourse and conduct diplomacy that counters them. The discourse used to reject the 2016 South China Sea ruling, and the response logic to the criticism from Japan, Australia, and the United States regarding China's unilateral declaration of its Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ) in 2013, are resources that South Korea can turn back on China. Fortunately, on a practical level, thorough tit-for-tat responses against China in maritime areas such as the West Sea are already occurring. It is necessary to consolidate these measures and at least establish principles for bilateral diplomacy in the domain of values and norms.

Even if active and consistent engagement in bilateral diplomacy is difficult due to its sensitivity or economic interests, it is necessary to maintain a connection in value- and norm-based diplomacy through multilateral channels, 1.5-track, or two-track approaches. Of course, the most effective method is to participate in multilateral platforms such as the Summit for Democracy and to continuously raise issues collectively. Considering the current international political climate, it is crucial to avoid being caught between the U.S. and China as much as possible. We experienced the difficulties of being caught in the sharp confrontation between the U.S. and China during the THAAD deployment, and Canada and Australia are currently facing similar challenges. The U.S.-China relationship, as a global order, affects many countries similarly. South Korea, being geographically close to China and highly dependent on its economy, is even more affected, and as long as the division persists and adversarial relations with North Korea continue, China's significance will not diminish. Consequently, China's overbearing attitude is likely to persist. China will not relinquish the asymmetric Sino-Korean relationship it has enjoyed nor the advantageous position it has secured. In this situation, South Korea must maximally utilize multilateralism when value- and norm-related conflicts arise in bilateral relations. Multilateralism within the liberal international order is the only means to buffer the power politics of the U.S.-China conflict.

The issues we have experienced and will continue to experience are unlikely to be ours alone. Intentional intrusions into air defense identification zones can be responded to jointly with Japan and Taiwan. The encroachment of Chinese vessels in the West Sea maritime boundary is a common problem faced by countries bordering China, including India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, involving the erosion of ambiguous border areas and attempts to create disputes. The ambiguous retaliatory actions, crossing lines between civilian and governmental spheres, which we have experienced, can be addressed in coordination with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Canada, Sweden, and Norway. If the issue is too sensitive for the government to lead, due to difficulties in raising it multilaterally, it is a second-best option for the National Assembly/political parties, the judiciary, corporations, civil society organizations, and public opinion to take the lead, with the government providing support and cover. Particularly at a time when the U.S. and China are presenting various visions to gain dominance, bold decisions are required, rather than the overly cautious and conservative approach of the current administration. The joint statement of 14 countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, issued on March 31st, expressing concern based on our expertise regarding the WHO's report on the origins of COVID-19, appears to be a good start.

IV. Conclusion

As evidenced by our recent invitation to the G7 Summit and participation in the communiqué on open societies, the expectations of G7 countries, excluding Japan, towards South Korea have become clearer than before. However, South Korea's standing on the multilateral stage drastically shrinks when returning to the bilateral stage of Sino-Korean relations, or to the Northeast Asian stage where the U.S. and Europe are distant and China and Japan coexist. This is the effect of power dynamics in international politics, emphasizing relative national strength rather than absolute strength. The greatest power for a relative non-great power to counter this is inevitably diplomacy based on law and principles concerning values and norms. The Biden administration's emphasis on values and norms alongside advanced technology, economy, and military affairs presents an opportunity for the next government. The next four years will likely be the only chance to rectify the tilted playing field in the realm of values and norms in Sino-Korean diplomacy, and this can be pursued with the expectation of U.S. foreign policy. Naturally, this hinges on the premise that the Biden administration maintains its current stance, which is admittedly uncertain due to the difficulties of value- and norm-based diplomacy and the Biden administration's principle of "diplomacy for the middle class." However, setting aside the vulnerabilities of U.S. foreign policy that are beyond our control, we must do what we can. Within the broad framework of the two strategies mentioned above, the following two points can be considered.

First, it is necessary to demand that the United States create specific and effective international norms or international laws in various areas of value and normative diplomacy and actively participate in the rule-making process. Issues such as China's digital authoritarianism, influence operations abroad, hostage diplomacy, and gray zone offensives using non-state actors are difficult to address without clear laws and norms. In this regard, active participation in multilateralism to establish standards is essential. Second, there is the issue of North Korean human rights. Policymakers in the Biden administration are well aware that a uniform anti-China front is neither feasible nor effective. In a 2019 op-ed, National Security Advisor Sullivan and China Strategy Chief Campbell stated that it is better policy to "engage states on their own terms." Considering this, the issue of North Korean human rights is a factor that South Korea can address and contribute to the United States' global strategy. From the perspective of values and norms, North Korea exhibits serious human rights violations, a dictatorial regime, hostage diplomacy, religious oppression, disregard for international law, cyber terrorism, and hacking, all of which are issues that the United States points out regarding China. The next administration needs to explain the importance of North Korea in diplomacy that prioritizes U.S. values and norms and to present and confirm South Korea's potential contributions in this area.

■ Author: Kim Heon-jun_Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in International Relations and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota. He has served as Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow at Griffith University, Australia, and as Visiting Assistant Professor at St. Olaf College, USA. His related works include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea, Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific, and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding.”

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung EAI Director of Research

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr