[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Administration Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ⑥_Indo-Pacific Policy

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Park Jae-jeok, professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, forecasts the Indo-Pacific regional strategic environment that the new administration will face and, to propose policies accordingly, explains the U.S. Indo-Pacific policy that has been inherited and developed from the Obama administration through the Trump administration to the Biden administration, while also examining the Moon Jae-in administration's policy responses. Furthermore, the author states that amidst escalating geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China, the approach of some European countries to the Indo-Pacific region will noticeably increase over the next five years. In this context, the new administration should consider South Korea's appropriate position not between the U.S. and China, but within the security networks led by the U.S. and China, he adds.

Three Major Policy Tasks for the Indo-Pacific

1. The new administration must restore security cooperation between South Korea and Japan, and among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, not only as a response to the North Korean nuclear issue but also to establish South Korea's position within the U.S.-led security network in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan's influence is rapidly increasing within the U.S.-led security network, which is central to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, making it urgent to enhance our standing.

2. As Quad Plus is expected to be pursued in various issue areas within the Indo-Pacific region, the new administration should actively participate in Quad Plus initiatives that align with South Korea's national interests. However, decisions on participation in Quad Plus initiatives that expand military exercises led by Quad countries and those aimed at declaring regional norms should be made cautiously.

3. The new administration must actively pursue bilateral and multilateral cooperation with regional countries. By pursuing various multilateral cooperation initiatives with major middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region such as Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, South Korea should secure its standing and autonomy within the U.S.-led security network. Furthermore, it should actively participate in indigenous (mini-lateral) cooperation initiatives emerging from ASEAN for Mekong River cooperation, anti-piracy efforts, and maritime information sharing.

I. Introduction: The Evolution of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Biden administration is inheriting and developing the U.S. Indo-Pacific (hereafter, IP) strategy, which was actively pursued by the Trump administration following the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy. Then-President Trump, who took office in January 2017, officially declared the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy' (FOIP) as the U.S. regional strategy during his five-nation Asian tour in November 2017, despite his 'new isolationism' stance. Subsequently, the U.S. has been concretizing its IP strategy through various reports, including the Department of Defense's IP Report in June 2019 and the Department of State's IP Report in November 2019, as well as various legislative bills enacted by the U.S. Congress. Notably, the 'Quad' (Quad Security Dialogue), a security cooperation alliance of four countries—the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India—which emerged in 2007 but collapsed within a year due to Australia and Japan's withdrawal, was revived during then-President Trump's November 2017 Asian tour. At that time, a meeting of director-level officials from the four countries was held on the sidelines of the ASEAN-related summit in the Philippines, and subsequently, Quad meetings were held eight times during the Trump administration. Among these, the September 2019 meeting was the first foreign ministerial meeting attended by foreign ministers accompanying their respective heads of state at the UN General Assembly, and in October 2020, the foreign ministers of the four countries held an in-person meeting despite the global spread of COVID-19. Following the inauguration of the Biden administration, the Quad held director-level working-level meetings and a third foreign ministerial meeting virtually, and in March 2021, the heads of state of the four countries met virtually.

The Indo-Pacific is a rather constructed regional space connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Even within the concept of the Asia-Pacific region, India was positioned as one of the 'ASEAN+6' countries, with India participating in the 'East Asia Summit' (EAS). However, as India's strategic importance in countering China has grown, a strategic space concept that emphasizes India has become necessary. Indeed, since the Obama administration, the U.S. has been strengthening its security network in the Indo-Pacific space and enhancing its security cooperation with India.

Under its Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. has also rapidly advanced bilateral and trilateral security cooperation with Japan and Australia, establishing Japan, Australia, and India as key countries in Northeast Asia, the South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, meticulously weaving a security net across the Indo-Pacific region. Together with Japan, the U.S. is emphasizing 'freedom of navigation and overflight' and the 'rule of law' to establish 'alliance or security mutuality' that permeates the U.S.-led security network. This provides the rationale for various bilateral and mini-lateral military exercises conducted by the U.S., its allies, and security cooperation partners in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. However, as the number and scale of such military exercises increase, it is also assessed that the U.S.-led security network is being strengthened to target China, which is in territorial disputes with numerous regional countries.

Meanwhile, one of the shortcomings of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is the lack of economic cooperation mechanisms to counter China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI). While the U.S., its allies, and security cooperation partners have been increasing infrastructure investments in the region, these are far from sufficient compared to China's investment scale, and mechanisms for coordinating national policies have also been absent. Simply persuading countries lacking infrastructure not to accept China's infrastructure investment with the logic of a 'debt trap' is not feasible. Therefore, the U.S., India, Australia, and Japan have been striving to demonstrate to regional countries that China is not the only option and that alternative capital is available. For instance, the U.S. has assigned functions to coordinate infrastructure investments among member countries within trilateral cooperation frameworks or the Quad led by the U.S. Representative examples include the 'Trilateral Infrastructure Fund' in the Indo-Pacific established by the U.S., Japan, and Australia in 2018, and the 'Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group' and 'Trilateral Infrastructure Forum' established by the U.S., Japan, and India in 2018. Furthermore, the U.S., Japan, and Australia established the 'Blue Dot Network' in November 2019 to promote infrastructure investment through public-private partnerships (PPP). At the Quad level, officials from the four countries have expressed their intention to create a consultative body whenever they meet officially (or in Track 1.5 meetings involving officials from the four countries). At the G7 Summit held in London in June 2021, the leaders agreed to pursue a large-scale infrastructure plan named 'Build Back Better World' (B3W).

China recognizes the widespread criticism that BRI projects can lead to fiscal crises in recipient countries and, in May 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Finance drafted guidelines for sustainable development with the finance ministries of 30 countries. Chinese leaders consistently emphasize 'high-quality and high-standard infrastructure projects' and are pursuing cooperation in third-country markets with some European countries, Japan, and the U.S.

As the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is manifesting as strengthening the U.S.-led security network in the security domain, infrastructure investment in the economy, and emphasis on regional mini-lateral and multilateral diplomacy, the U.S. is demanding our participation in its IP strategy. Below, we examine how the Moon Jae-in administration has responded to the U.S.'s demand for participation in its IP strategy. Subsequently, we will forecast the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region that the new administration will face and present policy tasks for the new administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.

II. The Moon Jae-in Administration's Response to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Moon Jae-in administration initially maintained a negative stance towards participating in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. In the joint declaration issued after the summit between then-President Trump and President Moon Jae-in during Trump's visit to Korea in November 2017, the following sentence was included: 'President Trump emphasized that the ROK-U.S. alliance is a linchpin for security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.' However, when asked by a reporter whether this sentence implied our participation in the U.S. IP strategy, then-Economic Advisor Kim Hyun-chul stated, 'We do not need to be incorporated into it.' Amidst this negative stance, the Moon Jae-in administration, while in principle supporting the U.S. IP strategy's core principles of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP), the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes, has refrained from participating in multilateral military exercises for FOIP to avoid unnecessary entanglement in the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China.

As the U.S. concretized its IP strategy in 2018 and 2019, it made more active demands for our participation. The Moon Jae-in administration responded by seeking common ground between its own regional policy, the New Southern Policy, and the IP strategy, rather than direct participation. Although the U.S. IP strategy was launched with a focus on security, it began to incorporate geo-economic elements to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. The Moon administration's New Southern Policy, in turn, opened avenues for engagement by deciding to strengthen peace-related projects, which had shown limited progress among its main policy goals of 'People, Prosperity, and Peace' (3Ps). As mentioned in the 'Fact Sheets' distributed by the foreign ministries of both countries after consultations in November 2019 and November 2020, infrastructure investment, maritime security, cybersecurity, marine environmental protection, and energy security emerged as key connecting points.

Among these, infrastructure investment aligns with the 'Prosperity' aspect of the 3Ps pursued by our New Southern Policy and is practically beneficial to South Korea's economic interests. However, given that our investment scale is smaller compared not only to China but also to the U.S. and Australia, with whom we have explored joint investments, it is difficult to pursue substantial cooperative projects with these countries. Furthermore, the fragmentation between grant aid executed by the 'Korea International Cooperation Agency' (KOICA) and ODA provided by institutions like the Export-Import Bank of Korea has made it challenging to achieve large-scale investments. Nevertheless, the Moon Jae-in administration recognizes the importance of regional infrastructure investment, as evidenced by the establishment of the 'Korea Overseas Infrastructure & Urban Development Support Corporation' (KIND) in June 2018. We are pursuing cooperation with the U.S. in areas such as energy development in the South Pacific and exploring cooperation methods for infrastructure investment with Australia through initiatives like the 'Korea-Australia ASEAN Policy Dialogue'.

As we explore joint infrastructure investments with countries like the U.S. and Australia, the space has expanded for us to participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative while preventing the U.S. from misinterpreting our involvement as leaning towards China. President Moon Jae-in had already expressed his intention to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative during his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in December 2017. At the 16th Korea-China Economic Ministers' Meeting held virtually on October 19, 2020, both countries agreed to continue efforts for cooperation between the New Northern and New Southern Policies and the Belt and Road Initiative, and to explore joint ventures in third-country markets.

In terms of maritime security, it is noteworthy that we have contributed to enhancing the maritime capabilities of regional countries. Key recipient countries have included Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, to which we have transferred various military equipment such as decommissioned warships, fighter jets, and vehicles. For example, the Pohang-class patrol vessel PCC-757 'Gimcheon', which was operated by the ROK Navy from 1986 to 2017, was donated to Vietnam in 2017, followed by the PCC-758 'Yeosu' in 2018. In 2019, the ROK donated the PCC-761 'Chungju' to the Philippines for $100, on the condition that the Philippines would spend $4 million on its refurbishment and name it after Army Captain Conrado Yap, who died during the Korean War. This vessel is currently one of the most powerful warships in the Philippine Navy's inventory and the only combat ship equipped with anti-ship missiles. Meanwhile, as a byproduct of contributing to maritime capability building, we have also secured economic benefits through the export of defense industry products such as warships and aircraft to countries like the Philippines and Indonesia. The sale of two 'Jose Rizal-class' frigates (2,800 tons) by Hyundai Heavy Industries to the Philippines in 2020 is not unrelated to the donation of the 'Chungju'.

However, while contributing to the maritime capability building of regional countries, the South Korean government has maintained a cautious stance towards collaboration with Quad countries like the U.S. The U.S., Japan, Australia, and India have also individually taken the lead in providing equipment to enhance the maritime capabilities of key countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, bilateral and trilateral cooperation among these Quad countries has been increasing recently. The stated rationale for the four countries' contributions to maritime capability building in the region is to respond to non-traditional security agendas, but the interoperability and trust accumulated in non-traditional security areas can transfer to cooperation in traditional security areas. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the Quad countries' contributions to maritime security, whether intended or not, have a hedging aspect against China's assertive maritime policies. As regional countries enhance their maritime security capabilities through the contributions of Quad countries, they can more effectively respond to China's 'Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.' This counteracts China's 'Grey Zone strategy' and ultimately leads to controlling China's maritime activities. From the perspective of not unnecessarily provoking China, the Moon Jae-in administration, despite agreeing to find common ground between the New Southern Policy and the U.S. IP strategy on maritime security issues, has not engaged in substantive cooperative projects.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is actively pursuing 'Quad Plus,' which expands the scope of the Quad, a core element of its IP strategy, but the Moon Jae-in administration was negative towards participation. For example, since March 2020, virtual consultations at the vice-ministerial/director-general level for COVID-19 response have been held among the four Quad countries, Vietnam, and New Zealand. In August 2020, then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun specifically referred to these consultations as 'Quad Plus.' However, the Moon Jae-in administration maintained that these consultations were part of various international meetings South Korea had organized for COVID-19 response and were a seven-country meeting unrelated to Quad Plus. Thus, the Moon Jae-in administration withheld participation in 'Quad Plus' due to concerns about being perceived as joining an anti-China front. The U.S. did not request South Korea's participation in Quad Plus, and South Korea continued its policy of not participating in exclusive consultative bodies that exclude certain countries. However, at the Quad Summit held in March 2021, the leaders of the four countries agreed to establish 'working groups' focused on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change response, and advanced technologies. As the Quad countries presented a direction towards building Quad Plus centered on various non-traditional security and economic issues, the Moon Jae-in administration began to adopt a more flexible stance towards participating in Quad Plus. The joint statement issued after the ROK-U.S. summit held in Washington in May 2021 included the sentence, 'The Republic of Korea and the United States recognize the importance of open, transparent, and inclusive regional multilateralism, including through the Quad.'

III. The Indo-Pacific Regional Strategic Environment the New Administration Will Face

The Indo-Pacific regional strategic environment that the new administration will face is likely to be characterized by a more 'adversarial regional order' than at present. The Biden administration, which has inherited the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, has consistently rallied forces under the banner of democracy and human rights since taking office. By around May 2022, when the new administration is inaugurated, Quad Plus is expected to be operational across various functional areas. The U.S. will likely exert strong pressure on China in areas such as advanced technology, supply chain diversification, energy, environment, and fair trade, demanding that Indo-Pacific countries take its side.

Conversely, China, having conducted effective vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021, will likely expand its political and economic influence by providing large-scale financial support under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative to Indo-Pacific countries urgently needing funds for post-COVID-19 economic recovery starting in 2022. Furthermore, with the confidence that China's GDP will soon surpass that of the U.S., China will become more assertive on key security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly concerning territorial disputes related to what China claims as its 'core interests.' In terms of maritime security, as security cooperation between regional countries and Quad countries rapidly increases and the quality and quantity of contributions from Quad countries to ASEAN nations improve, China will also fully engage in enhancing the maritime capabilities of regional countries. Although the current quality and quantity of Chinese contributions are low, China possesses large-scale shipbuilding capacity and numerous decommissioned vessels, raising questions about when it will actively engage in such contributions. As Quad countries strengthen maritime cooperation with regional countries, China will also gradually increase its contributions to regional maritime security, leading to intensified geopolitical competition between Quad countries and China in the maritime cooperation domain. Consequently, regional countries concerned about being forced to choose between the two will hope that Quad cooperation unfolds openly without excluding China. In this strategic environment, pro-U.S. and pro-China countries in the Indo-Pacific region will become more distinct in their alignments. However, countries like South Korea, which have reserved choices that excessively lean towards one side between the U.S. and China, will face a more difficult situation.

Amidst the escalating geopolitical and geo-economic competition between the United States and China, the Indo-Pacific approach of some European nations is expected to significantly increase over the next five years of the new administration. While Quad countries, in whole or in part, are conducting numerous joint military exercises in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and around Japanese territory, the frequency and intensity of these exercises are projected to rise further. Notably, in addition to regional players, extra-regional countries such as France and the United Kingdom are enhancing security cooperation with Quad members. With France, the Netherlands, and Germany having already released their own Indo-Pacific strategies, the EU is scheduled to publish its Indo-Pacific report in the latter half of 2021. The UK, which emphasized the importance of the Indo-Pacific region by dedicating an independent chapter to it in its 'Integrated Review' of defense, security, development, and foreign policy published in March 2021, will soon release its own Indo-Pacific strategy report. France dispatched a nuclear submarine to the Indo-Pacific in the latter half of 2020, and the UK plans to deploy an aircraft carrier strike group to the Asian region in the latter half of 2021. Germany is also set to deploy a frigate to the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca between August 2021 and February 2022. From this perspective, at least from a security standpoint, the competitive dynamic between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific could evolve into a competition between China and a US-led security network, or between China and the 'West.' Consequently, the new administration will face a strategic environment where it must consider its appropriate 'positioning' not so much between China and the United States, but between China and the US-led security networks across many issue areas.

Another burden factor that the new administration will face is Japan's clear positioning as a central pillar of the US-led security network. Japan has enhanced security cooperation with Australia to the level of a quasi-alliance and is rapidly advancing security cooperation with the UK and France. If Japan's status is strengthened within the US-led security network and it functions as a hub for Northeast Asia, South Korea's relative standing will diminish. Furthermore, if Japan takes the lead in forming regional multilateral security cooperation, as seen with the Quad, South Korea's position in regional multilateral security cooperation will also be outranked by Japan.

IV. Policy Recommendations for the New Administration

1. Securing a Position within the US-led Indo-Pacific Security Network

The United States has consistently focused on strengthening its security network by linking its alliances and security partnerships since the Obama administration, through the Trump administration, and into the Biden administration. As mentioned earlier, after the launch of the Biden administration, the US has successfully regrouped forces, including major European countries, by centering its network around democracy and human rights. However, once the initial consolidation is largely complete, starting from 2022, the US will likely require an operational mechanism to bind this vast security network together.

Judging from various reports recently published by the US administration and bills proposed by the US Congress, it appears highly probable that the US will propose missile defense and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, along with intelligence provision, as operational mechanisms that permeate its security network. In the case of Missile Defense (MD), Japan and Australia are already actively participating in the establishment of a US-led missile defense system. If the US-led linkage of missile defense among the US, Japan, and Australia gains momentum and further extends to cooperation with India and South Korea, it would effectively signify the laying of the foundation for a US-led MD system in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, as previously noted, the US, along with other Quad countries, has contributed to enhancing 'Marine Capacity Building' and 'Maritime Domain Awareness' in the Indo-Pacific by donating used aircraft, ships, etc., to key regional countries and providing training programs for their military, coast guard, and customs personnel. Recently, the quality of donations has expanded to include ISR assets such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and surveillance radars. The reason for the focus on ISR equipment and intelligence provision is that many regional countries lack the financial capacity to invest astronomical sums in purchasing cutting-edge equipment to counter China's assertive maritime activities or to secure cybersecurity capabilities. The US and other Quad countries are providing ISR equipment and intelligence to key regional nations and are further promoting space cooperation, including with satellites, with regional countries. The ultimate goal is to draw key Southeast Asian countries into a US-led security network. Therefore, Quad countries are expected to broaden their contributions by establishing early warning systems, maritime patrol and reconnaissance systems, and aerial reconnaissance systems for regional countries.

Given that the US-led security network will be broadly linked through missile defense and the provision of ISR assets and intelligence sharing, the new administration may face demands to participate in the US-led MD. Since 'non-participation in US-led MD' is one of the 'three NOs' policy promised to China by the current administration, it will be difficult for the new administration to declare participation in MD. Nevertheless, security cooperation with Japan should be restored to activate military intelligence sharing for US-Japan missile defense cooperation at a working level.

If the next administration fails to restore the deteriorating security relationship with Japan, and thus US-Japan security cooperation remains stagnant, South Korea's standing within the US-led security network will decline. This relative decline will be particularly evident as Japan strengthens its alliance with the US and rapidly advances security cooperation with Australia, India, the UK, and France, emerging as a regional hub. Given that the two countries are still unable to overcome historical grievances, trilateral missile defense cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan to jointly respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats could provide a justification for restoring the security relationship between South Korea and Japan.

If the next administration fails to secure a certain level of status and influence within the US-led security network by restoring the South Korea-Japan relationship and US-Japan security cooperation, the Northeast Asian security situation is likely to develop unfavorably for South Korea. Japan conducted army military exercises on its territory in May 2021 with France, the US, and Australia. In this vein, Japan could plan large-scale military exercises in Northeast Asia with the US, inviting countries with which it has agreed to 'Reciprocal Access Agreements,' such as Australia, and those increasing their security activities in the Indo-Pacific region, like France and the UK. In such a scenario, if South Korea lacks a certain status within the US-led security network, it will not have the leverage to persuade relevant countries to ensure that such military exercises do not develop unfavorably for its strategic interests.

Therefore, the new administration needs to approach the restoration of South Korea-Japan and US-Japan security cooperation not just as a response to the North Korean nuclear issue, but also from the perspective of establishing a certain status within the US-led Indo-Pacific security network. If it is difficult to abruptly restore security relations with Japan in 2022, South Korea should establish its position within the US-led security network by strengthening security cooperation with Australia, India, and key Southeast Asian countries. In particular, if US-Japan security cooperation remains stagnant for an extended period, strengthening trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Australia, and among South Korea, the US, and India, could be considered as alternatives.

2. Cautious Participation in the Controversial Quad Plus in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Quad countries are pursuing the expansion of the Quad's scope, i.e., Quad Plus. Currently, Quad Plus is being discussed across various issue areas. The Quad Plus initiatives in (1) health and vaccine supply, (2) climate change response and green energy development, and (3) advanced technology and cybersecurity, discussed by the four Quad leaders at the March 2021 Quad Summit, are expected to be pursued within 2021. Furthermore, Quad Plus initiatives in (4) infrastructure investment and (5) maritime security, which have been discussed at nearly every Quad meeting held more than ten times since the US Trump administration officially announced its Indo-Pacific strategy in November 2017, as well as Quad Plus for (6) supply chain diversification, in which the US has a strong interest, are also expected to be actively pursued within the year.

Judging from the results of recent South Korea-US presidential summits, it appears highly likely that the current administration will participate in a significant number of the aforementioned Quad Plus initiatives before its term expires. Quad Plus initiatives related to COVID-19 vaccines, infrastructure investment, and maritime security have the justification of responding to non-traditional security issues. For Quad Plus related to climate change response, participation carries less burden, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has agreed to participate in relevant international conferences hosted by the US. Regarding Quad Plus related to advanced technology, since Quad countries hold a technological advantage over China, South Korea should participate without concern for China's reactions, for its own economic benefit. Furthermore, Quad Plus initiatives for infrastructure investment and supply chain diversification are directly linked to our economic interests, and participation in Quad Plus for maritime capacity building creates a favorable environment for our defense exports. In particular, with regard to Indo-Pacific infrastructure investment, as South Korea is a technologically advanced country in the Indo-Pacific along with the US, Australia, Japan, and India, it can jointly bid or procure financing for infrastructure projects that require advanced technology or have significant security implications. Therefore, it is highly probable that South Korea will participate in multilateral cooperation for infrastructure investment coordination and cooperation, going beyond bilateral cooperation with the US, similar to how the US, Japan, and Australia, and the US, Japan, and India are coordinating their individual policies by forming trilateral funds, working groups, and forums for infrastructure development. If the current administration has not yet participated in any of the six Quad Plus initiatives mentioned above before its term ends, the new administration should promptly participate.

On the other hand, the current administration is likely to leave the decision on participating in controversial Quad Plus initiatives to the new administration. A prime example is the expansion of participating countries in military exercises hosted by all or some of the Quad countries. While the likelihood of the new administration deciding to participate in the 'Malabar' exercise is extremely low, Malabar exercise, which began as an annual military exercise between the US and India in 1992, became a trilateral military exercise with Japan's annual participation from 2015, and with Australia's participation in 2020, it has become a symbolic military exercise of the Quad, thus carrying a very high burden of participation. However, beyond the Malabar exercise, the new administration will have to consider whether to continue participating in multilateral exercises hosted by some Quad countries, such as Talisman Saber, Cope North, Pitch Black, and Pacific Vanguard.

For instance, in the 'Talisman Saber' military exercise, held biennially by the US and Australia, countries like New Zealand and Japan currently participate on a small scale. In the 2021 exercise, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands region in the Indian Ocean, in addition to the Oceania region, was considered as a training area, and India's participation was discussed; however, due to the worsening COVID-19 situation in India, its participation became uncertain. Before Quad Plus gained significant attention, we had planned to send a battalion-sized unit to the 2021 'Talisman Saber' exercise, but due to COVID-19, this plan was changed to participate with a reduced scale. If we had dispatched a battalion-sized unit, it was anticipated that domestic and international media would extensively report on South Korea's participation in Quad military exercises.

However, if the spread of COVID-19 subsides with vaccine distribution, military exercises hosted by some or all Quad countries, including Talisman Saber, Cope North, Pitch Black, and Pacific Vanguard, will be conducted on a large scale. The new administration will have to consider whether to participate in such exercises and, if so, at what scale. An opportunity factor in participating in military exercises hosted by Quad countries is the possibility of tactical and technical integration into the US's Indo-Pacific deterrence strategy. As the US military pursues 'Dynamic Force Employment' (DFE) and 'Agile Combat Employment' (ACE) and develops military strategic concepts such as 'Joint All-Domain Command and Control' (JADC2), and conceives new deterrence strategies based on these, non-participation in Quad-led military exercises would prevent the accumulation of cooperative habits and experience.

Therefore, the new administration must participate, at a minimum, in military exercises conducted by Quad countries. Such military exercises are essential for us to acquire intelligence sharing and interoperability of advanced weapons. For example, South Korea, which operates the P-3C Orion for maritime reconnaissance, has signed a contract to purchase the upgraded P-8A. Therefore, joint anti-submarine warfare exercises with the US, Australia, and India, which operate the P-8A, after its introduction in 2022, will be of great help to South Korea in operating the P-8A in the future.

Another Quad Plus initiative that the new administration will need to consider is the Quad Plus for norm declaration. Some regional scholars are proposing the establishment of an 'Indo-Pacific Charter' by Quad countries, similar to the 'Atlantic Charter' signed by the UK and the US in 1941, to proclaim universal principles such as freedom of navigation and the rule of law. If the negotiations for a 'Code of Conduct' (CoC) in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN, which China has set as a target for conclusion, are not completed by 2021, discussions on an 'Indo-Pacific Charter' could rapidly gain prominence. Furthermore, Quad countries may take the lead in adopting regional value and norm declarations on issues such as China's coercive rule in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region, and the coup in Myanmar. This is particularly likely given that the Biden administration in the US emphasizes democratic and human rights values as core elements of its foreign policy.

The opportunity factor in participating in Quad Plus for value and norm declaration would be the strengthening of South Korea's status as a middle power in the region. Having achieved both economic growth and democratization in a short period, South Korea's positive international image would be tarnished if it does not join in value and norm declarations. Moreover, by accumulating a record of active participation in Quad Plus for value and norm declarations, South Korea can project an image of making decisions based on norms and principles rather than strategic considerations in the choice between the US and China. However, on the other hand, there are also burdens associated with participating in Quad Plus for value and norm declaration. First, given that the 'Atlantic Charter' signed by the US and the UK in 1941 became the foundation for the UN's establishment after the war, the adoption of an 'Indo-Pacific Charter' is likely to be perceived as preparatory work for the establishment of a collective security system like NATO. Consequently, China will strongly condemn countries that sign such a charter. Furthermore, as many Southeast Asian countries have authoritarian government systems, they are concerned that the US and other Quad countries may project values such as good governance, transparency, and democracy onto their ASEAN policies. China also reacts very sensitively to issues related to Hong Kong and Xinjiang from the perspective of defending state sovereignty.

Although the US is emphasizing democracy and human rights to rally forces after the launch of the Biden administration, cooperation with ASEAN is crucial for implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy. Therefore, the possibility of the US relaxing its standards on democracy and human rights in its relations with Southeast Asian countries cannot be ruled out. Consequently, the new administration should participate in Quad Plus to establish universal principles and norms, as a middle power in the region, without being overly concerned about China's reactions. However, it needs to be cautious about leading such initiatives or participating preemptively before other countries.

3. Promoting Indo-Pacific (mini/multi-lateral cooperation with regional countries such as Indonesia and Australia

The new administration must promote multilateral cooperation with regional countries. Currently, many instances of multilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region are formed among countries that constitute the US-led security network. However, it is noteworthy that while Quad countries India, Australia, and Japan are enhancing security cooperation with regional countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea, and these security cooperations are being promoted to strengthen the US-led network, there is also a growing trend of multilateral cooperation led by regional countries as a byproduct. Examples of multilateral security cooperation that do not involve the US include strategic dialogues held at the vice-ministerial level by Japan, Australia, and India since 2015. Another example is the Australia-India-Indonesia strategic dialogue, which originated within the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in November 2017. In the maritime security domain, various trilateral cooperations and informal multilateral cooperations are in operation, such as those involving Japan-Vietnam-Philippines, Australia-Indonesia-India, India-Japan-Vietnam, and France-Australia-India.

If multilateral alliances formed by key middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, secure a position within the US-led security network while also gaining autonomy, they can deter the US-led security network from functioning excessively as a tool for US-China confrontation. Furthermore, if these alliances are linked with indigenous multilateral cooperation emerging from ASEAN for Mekong River cooperation, anti-piracy efforts, and maritime information sharing, they will serve as a cornerstone for fostering multilateral security cooperation that is more independent of US-China strategic competition.

From this perspective, the new administration needs to actively pursue bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with regional countries. While the current administration focused on enhancing economic cooperation with Vietnam, the new administration should maintain this focus while promoting bilateral security cooperation with Australia and Indonesia, and actively pursue trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia (KIA). Since the launch of the New Southern Policy in 2017, the current administration has emphasized cooperation with ASEAN countries and India, but excluded Australia from its key focus countries. This was viewed with surprise in Australia, given the steady progress in bilateral relations, including the initiation of biennial 2+2 ministerial meetings in 2013. When President Moon Jae-in mentioned in his opening remarks at the summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in November 2018 that 'Australia is a cooperation partner in the New Southern Policy pursued by the South Korean government,' and during the 2+2 ministerial meeting in December 2019, both countries agreed to find points of convergence in their regional policies, this was in consideration of Australia's sense of exclusion. The new administration needs to include Australia, a key country in the US's Indo-Pacific strategy, as a major target country for the New Southern Policy. This is because Australia's security and economic cooperation with ASEAN countries and India are increasing, and Australia's importance in discussions on Southeast Asian security is growing.

The new administration should actively pursue the reactivation of the KIA framework while developing bilateral relations between South Korea and Australia. Given Indonesia's economic rise and its status as a leading nation in ASEAN, along with the economic and military capabilities of Australia and South Korea, KIA has significant potential to emerge as a key security and economic consultative body in the region. Although the current Moon Jae-in administration showed some interest in KIA cooperation, it did not develop into concrete policies.

The new administration should drive practical KIA cooperation through defense industry and energy security. The foundation for defense industry cooperation is already established, with 'Korea Aerospace Industries' (KAI) exporting supersonic trainers T-50 to Indonesia and Hanwha exporting K9 self-propelled howitzers to Australia. The liquefied natural gas (LNG) and hydrogen energy sectors can also promote trilateral cooperation. South Korea, which has strengths in hydrogen utilization areas such as hydrogen cars and fuel cells, and Australia, which has potential in areas of hydrogen production such as renewable energy and gas, are in negotiations to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation projects. Hyundai Engineering was awarded a contract in September 2020 for the expansion project of the Hydrocracking Unit at the Balikpapan Refinery in Indonesia. Ultimately, based on trilateral cooperation in functional areas such as defense industry and energy, a security strategy dialogue at the KIA level should be initiated to foster common ground on regional security issues.

Furthermore, the new administration should promote multilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and India in advanced technology and cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific region. As the international order becomes increasingly uncertain due to intensifying technological competition and the rise of new security threats, the US-China technological hegemony competition surrounding advanced technologies such as 5G/6G, artificial intelligence, autonomous driving systems, and hypersonic equipment is intensifying, and its ripple effects are expected to be clearly manifested in international security. If the confrontation between the US and China in the advanced technology sector escalates, regional countries like South Korea will frequently face demands to halt purchases of Chinese advanced products, as seen in the Huawei incident. As not only the US and China but also Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea are leading in advanced technology and cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific region, the new administration should seek to form a bloc by allying with other technology middle powers. Given the uncertainty that emerging security issues based on cutting-edge technology will bring to the regional security environment, if countries like South Korea do not preemptively lead multilateral cooperation in emerging security domains and establish norms, principles, and organizations, they will ultimately be forced to choose between the US and China. Therefore, the new administration should leverage its middle-power diplomacy capabilities to ensure that regional countries preemptively drive multilateral cooperation in various emerging security domains, maintain a certain level of influence, and create alternative norms, rules, and institutions independent of the US-China-centric framework. ■

■ Author: Park Jae-jeokProfessor, Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Australian National University. He has served as a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security and a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. His research areas include U.S.-led security networks in the Indo-Pacific region, regional security order, mini-lateral security cooperation, the U.S.-Australia alliance, and Australian security policy. His recent publications include 'Current Status and Contributions of 'Quad' Countries to 'Maritime Domain Awareness' in the Indo-Pacific Region: Issues and Prospects' (2020), 'South Korea's Public Diplomacy toward the U.S.: Goals, Actors, Targets, and Directions' (2019), (2020), and (2018).

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyungHead of Research Office, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr