[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI Recommendations for the New Administration's Foreign Policy Series ⑤_Policy toward Japan: Rebuilding Japan-Korea Relations with a Long-Term Perspective of a Century

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Son Yeol, Director of the East Asia Institute (Professor at Yonsei University), recommends looking ahead to 2030-50 to rebuild Korea-Japan relations, arguing that the two countries need to address common challenges at regional and global levels. He also adds that Korea and Japan must not lose their balance amidst the intensifying US-China competition. Finally, he emphasizes that for the new administration to rebuild Korea-Japan relations, it must objectively assess Japan's strategic value.

Three Major Policy Tasks for Diplomacy toward Japan

1. The new administration should not repeat the past mistakes of the previous government, which became bogged down in historical issues such as comfort women and forced labor, but should resolve the two major pending issues early in its term with the president's decision-making, based on a long-term perspective of a century. In the case of the comfort women issue, it is desirable to respect the past agreement and implement follow-up measures. In the case of the forced labor issue, it is desirable to declare that no further monetary demands will be made of Japan.

2. Korea-Japan relations should not be viewed merely as a matter of cooperation and competition between the two countries, but with a new perspective of building a Korea-US-Japan network that serves as a cornerstone for creating a new order in the Asia-Pacific region. By utilizing frameworks such as the CPTPP, Quad Plus, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, cooperation in trade, advanced technology, climate change, health, and cyber security with Japan should be pursued to restore mutual trust and promote mutual benefit. In terms of security, the trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan should be restored and strengthened, while carefully coordinating with Japan to ensure it does not devolve into military containment of China and is compatible with the Korea-China cooperation network.

3. To reduce the prevailing anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiments within both countries and restore trust, the two nations must overcome exclusive modern nationalism and seek national strength in line with the standards of a 21st-century civilization oriented towards coexistence. The new administration needs to prepare a new Korea-Japan Partnership Declaration embodying these ideas, to be announced in the latter half of its term, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan in 2025.

I. Introduction

One of the diplomatic issues that the next government will inherit as a negative legacy from the current administration is the Korea-Japan relationship. Currently, meaningful dialogue channels between the governments, including summit talks, are blocked between Korea and Japan. Bilateral trade has significantly decreased, and even if the exchange of people, currently hindered by COVID-19, recovers after the pandemic situation improves, it will take time to return to visa-free status. The primary factor behind this de facto paralysis of bilateral relations is the 'loss of trust' between the governments. Driven by emotional confrontations over historical issues, the two governments have fallen into a vortex of distrust, hesitating to cooperate with each other, undervaluing each other's strategic value, and often treating each other antagonistically.[1]

The Korea-Japan conflict dates back to President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and his remarks demanding an apology from the Emperor in 2012. This was followed by confrontations over Prime Minister Abe's remarks denying Japan's colonial rule and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, and then the dispute over the comfort women settlement and international public diplomacy in 2014. After the comfort women agreement in December 2015, the conflict intensified, leading to various incidents such as the controversy over the installation of a statue of a girl in Busan, the 2017 presidential candidates' pledges to break or renegotiate the agreement, the Moon Jae-in administration's review of the comfort women agreement, the dissolution of the ' 화해·치유재단 (Reconciliation and Healing Foundation)' in 2018, the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, the dispute over radar irradiation incidents in the East Sea, reciprocal trade retaliation in 2019, the termination of GSOMIA, disputes over entry bans due to COVID-19 in 2020, controversies over the UNESCO registration of the Hashima Island industrial heritage, and court rulings on the comfort women issue. The vortex of distrust and conflict has not ceased, and it can be called 'a lost decade'.

As Korea-Japan relations have been paralyzed, South Korea has incurred considerable economic and strategic costs. From 2011 to 2021, bilateral trade volume decreased by more than 30%, and Japan's direct investment in South Korea has shrunk to one-fourth of its level in 2011. Meanwhile, the trade dispute that began with reciprocal export restrictions in 2019 has not yet ended, accumulating economic losses, both tangible and intangible. In the first year of the dispute, exports to Japan decreased by 21.5% and imports decreased by 9.2%, worsening the trade deficit, and this deficit trend has persisted despite the economic recovery.[2] In terms of security, the paralysis of Korea-US-Japan cooperation has weakened coordination on North Korea and negatively affected Korea-US relations. Furthermore, the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations has hindered South Korea's regional diplomacy. As initiatives led by Japan, such as the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),' the Quad, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), have emerged as central mechanisms for regional development, security, and trade cooperation, South Korea, by distancing itself from Japan and hesitating to participate, has seen its space for regional diplomatic activities significantly shrink. This has resulted in a restriction of South Korea's diplomatic pathways and a decline in its overall external negotiating power. This, in turn, can be seen as proof of how strategically important Japan is to South Korea.

[Table 1] Changes in Korea-Japan Trade Volume over 10 Years (2011-2020)

[Table 2] Changes in Japan's Direct Investment in South Korea over 10 Years (2011-2020)

International pressure for the improvement of Korea-Japan relations will be amplified by the new international environment that the new administration will face. The Biden administration, viewing the challenge posed by China as the primary task for restoring US global leadership, emphasizes solidarity with its allies to counter it. Amidst the rising tide of US-China competition, the US is emphasizing security cooperation between Korea, the US, and Japan, and is strongly urging Korea and Japan to improve relations, under the premise that historical issues should not undermine its core security interests.

From a more macro perspective, the necessity of Korea-Japan cooperation becomes self-evident when looking at the future of US-China competition. China's GDP, which was 40% of US GDP a decade ago, has now risen to 70% and is expected to surpass it by 2030. Around 2030, two superpowers with an economic scale of $23-25 trillion will engage in multifaceted competition across trade, advanced technology, energy, values and norms, currency, and potentially military conflicts in hotspots.[3] In contrast, by 2030, Japan, with a GDP of $5.5 trillion, and South Korea, even with maximum growth, will remain mid-tier powers significantly behind the two superpowers. Without mutual cooperation, it will be difficult to secure diplomatic autonomy and pathways amidst the complex competition and confrontation between the US and China. If the current conflict persists, the future for both countries will be bleak.

The next administration must embark on rebuilding Korea-Japan relations amidst the rising tide of US-China competition. Given that the deep-seated damage to Korea-Japan relations, accumulated over a long period, cannot be easily repaired with existing approaches, the Japan issue must be addressed with the following new perspectives.

First, the new administration must re-examine Korea-Japan relations with a long-term perspective, envisioning Korea's future in 2030 and 2050. It is difficult for the next government to move forward if it gets bogged down in resolving historical issues like comfort women and forced labor, repeating the mistakes of the previous government. A dual strategy is needed: set a common goal of building a shared future with Japan, foster exchange and cooperation to restore fallen mutual trust, and pursue progress in resolving historical pending issues. Second, Japan policy should no longer be approached as a special bilateral relationship, but as an effort to address common challenges at the regional and global levels. While it is true that the economic and strategic importance of bilateral Korea-Japan relations has diminished due to the relative rise of China, Southeast Asia, and India, and the relative decline of Japan, the new administration must seek Japan policy from the perspective of building a Korea-US-Japan network that serves as a cornerstone for creating a new order in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, behind these tasks lies the issue of China. When the multilateral order centered on the US leans towards containing China, both South Korea and Japan must adopt a balanced approach. The new administration must engage in close consultation and coordination with Japan to ensure that Korea-US-Japan cooperation or regional multilateral cooperation ultimately unfolds in a way that is inclusive of China and beneficial to it. Finally, it is difficult for both Korea and Japan to find pathways for future-oriented development from the current perspective of exclusive modern nationalism. The next administration should lay the groundwork for South Korea to compete for advancement in line with the standards of a new 21st-century civilization, thereby overcoming the emotional conflict structure in Korea-Japan relations in the long term.

II. New Challenges

One of the primary diplomatic challenges facing the Moon Jae-in administration, which took office in May 2017, was to prevent and improve the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations, which had been exacerbated during the four years of the Park Geun-hye administration, triggered by President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and his remarks demanding an apology from the Emperor in 2012. The Park administration focused intently on the comfort women issue, pursuing an unprecedentedly hardline policy toward Japan since the normalization of diplomatic relations. In particular, the so-called 'one-track diplomacy,' which stipulated that no summit talks would be held unless Japan took forward-looking measures on the comfort women issue, led to a general freeze in bilateral relations. The Moon administration, learning from the Park administration's experience, adopted a 'two-track diplomacy' approach, separating historical issues from security and economic cooperation matters, and sought to improve relations. The perception was that it was necessary to avoid a situation where bilateral relations would freeze due to conflicts over historical issues.

The problem is that the Moon Jae-in administration effectively nullified the 2015 Korea-Japan comfort women agreement, which led to a recurrence of the diplomatic freeze, triggering the Abe administration's one-track diplomacy.[4] The Moon administration declared that the comfort women agreement was confirmed to have 'significant procedural and substantive flaws... and that the comfort women issue cannot be resolved by this agreement,' and subsequently dissolved the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, which was established as a follow-up measure to the agreement. Soon after, the Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in October 2018 was met with a lukewarm response, prompting the Abe administration to preemptively declare export restrictions on three key materials for semiconductors, the lifeline of the Korean economy, as a carefully calculated retaliatory measure. Subsequently, the two countries engaged in reciprocal trade retaliation and expanded the scope of confrontation to security issues, including the termination of GSOMIA, leading to the worst state of relations since the normalization of diplomatic ties. The two-track diplomacy, which had effectively gone bankrupt, has not yet been restored.

The new challenges that have emerged amidst the downward spiral of the Moon Jae-in administration's five years are as follows: First is the change in Japan's attitude towards historical issues. In the past, Korea-Japan relations were perceived as a special relationship between a colonizer and the colonized, and Japan, as a model student of modernization, handled historical issues with a sense of superiority over Korea and a certain degree of moral responsibility as a perpetrator. Therefore, in terms of historical issues, Korea was on the 'offense' and Japan on the 'defense.' Conversely, the Abe-Suga governments in Japan reframed the comfort women agreement and forced labor ruling not as historical perception issues, but as issues of bilateral trust, such as violations of international commitments and international law by South Korea, thus switching the roles. Beyond accusing South Korea of constantly bothering and ignoring Japan by 'moving the goalposts' on historical issues, they gained public support by attacking South Korea's national character or identity, labeling it as 'a country that does not keep its promises,' 'a country where the rule of law does not apply,' and 'an untrustworthy country.' Prime Minister Abe's choice of an extreme retaliatory measure like trade sanctions in response to the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling was also an attempt to capitalize on this shift in public sentiment.

The change in the Japanese government's attitude has led to the disregard or belittling of South Korea. Japan is trending towards downgrading the strategic value of Northeast Asia and South Korea. The 2014 edition of the Diplomatic Bluebook described South Korea as 'the most important neighbor for Japan, sharing basic values such as freedom, democracy, and fundamental human rights, as well as interests such as ensuring peace and stability,' using expressions like 'sharing values' and 'sharing interests,' and 'the most important neighbor.' However, in the 2015 edition, only 'the most important neighbor' remained for South Korea, with expressions of sharing values and interests deleted. In the 2016 and 2017 editions, the expression 'a most important neighbor sharing strategic interests' was revived, but it disappeared entirely from 2018 onwards. Japanese public opinion also shows a similar trend of government-level disregard and distancing from South Korea. As shown in [Table 3], the proportion of Japanese citizens who consider the importance of Korea-Japan relations to be high was 73% in 2013, but has steadily declined since then, reaching 48.1% in 2020. As long as the trend of criticism and disregard towards South Korea by the Japanese government and public continues, it will be difficult for the next administration to expect a 'sincere apology that touches the hearts of the victims' from Japan on the two major pending issues of comfort women and forced labor. This foreshadows that a simplistic approach of expecting a genuine apology and resolving the issues in one fell swoop will not work.

[Table 3] Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (2013-2020)

Second, the attitude of the South Korean government towards Japan has also changed, leading to a disregard for Japan. The asymmetric relationship of advanced Japan and developing South Korea since the normalization of diplomatic relations has shifted to a more equal footing due to South Korea's economic rise and Japan's stagnation. Now, South Korea's per capita GDP based on PPP is quite close to Japan's, and the majority of South Koreans no longer view Japan as a model to learn from. However, this does not mean that the public disregards Japan. According to the EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey, over 80% of the public believes that Korea-Japan relations are important. Even in 2020, when the favorability of the South Korean public towards Japan plummeted to 12.3% amid the worst confrontation, the proportion of people who considered Korea-Japan relations important remained high at 82% ([Table 3], [Table 4]).

Conversely, the Moon Jae-in administration, judging that Japan was becoming more right-wing under Shinzo Abe, a historical revisionist, treated Japan harshly. This tendency was reinforced by the perception that Japan's position in the South Korean economy was no longer important, and also by the perception that Japan's strategic role in improving inter-Korean relations and resolving the North Korean nuclear issue—the Moon administration's top diplomatic priority—was not significant and rather acted as a spoiler. In this context, after nullifying the comfort women agreement, the South Korean government delayed follow-up measures and effectively neglected diplomatic responses to the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, thus provoking strong and sustained retaliation from the Japanese government that exceeded expectations. During the process of retaliation, the government and political circles used anti-Japanese sentiment for domestic political purposes, countering Japan through identity politics without adequately considering the consequences. The South Korean government, which disregarded Japan, and the Japanese government, which disregarded South Korea, clashed head-on.

[Table 4] Impression of the Other Country (2013-2020)

Third, the role of the United States in Korea-Japan relations is changing. In the past, the US emphasized the importance of Korea-US-Japan security cooperation in countering the threat from North Korea and played a diplomatic coordinating role to ensure that inherent bilateral issues between Korea and Japan, such as historical conflicts, did not hinder its strategic objectives. The Obama administration, in particular, was actively involved in diplomatic interventions and coordination, such as arranging Korea-US-Japan summit talks and emphasizing the two-track approach of both countries to overcome the strained Korea-Japan relations.[5] With the transition from the Trump administration to the Biden administration, the US is requesting cooperation with Japan and South Korea on issues that extend beyond the North Korean problem. The joint statements following the Korea-US summit in May 2021 and the Japan-US summit in April 2021 are illustrative in this regard. Both joint statements converge on a very similar structure in terms of content. Both emphasize 'peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait' for military deterrence against China, pursue 'democratic values and human rights' targeting Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and pledge to 'uphold an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific region, opposing all actions that undermine, destabilize, or threaten the rules-based international order.' Furthermore, they emphasize technological cooperation to enhance the resilience of supply chains in areas such as 5G/6G and semiconductors, mutual cooperation for innovation in emerging technology fields, and joint efforts for infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region. The unspoken code of both statements is essentially trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan. The US is emphasizing cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan not only in security but also in democratic values, human rights, international norms, economy, technology, and infrastructure investment to collectively respond to China's challenges. In this sense, Korea-Japan relations are being called upon to enter a new phase of multilateral cooperation across multiple issue areas.

III. Direction for Reconstruction

The starting point for the new administration's reconstruction of Korea-Japan relations is to objectively assess Japan's strategic value. Macroeconomically, it is true that Japan's relative size has diminished compared to the past, with the acceleration of strategic competition between the US and China and the economic rise of China, Southeast Asia, and India. However, the deepened interdependence between the economies of South Korea and Japan remains unchanged. For example, the more South Korea's exports of electrical and electronic products increase, the more it imports materials, components, and equipment from Japan, and conversely, the more exports decrease, the more imports from Japan also decrease. The trade dispute between the two countries, which has lasted for two years since July 2019, paradoxically demonstrated the intensified economic interdependence between them. Although the South Korean government promoted localization (or de-Japanization) of key materials, components, and equipment (소부장), which are heavily dependent on Japan, in response to the Japanese government's export restrictions, imports from Japan in 2021 actually increased by 34% compared to the same period of the previous year, and the deficit has been widening for 13 consecutive months. At the center of this are a 55% increase in imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and a 12% increase in imports of precision chemical materials. Conversely, exports of photolithography chemicals, hydrogen fluoride, and polyimide, which were precisely targeted by the Japanese government's export restrictions, have exceeded pre-regulation levels. The market is not reacting according to the Japanese government's political intentions. Given the deep interdependence between companies in both countries within the supply chain of key products, a cooperative economic relationship with Japan is essential.

In terms of security, Japan and South Korea are in the same boat. Amidst the intensifying strategic competition between the US and China as the primary factor shaping the world order, and with the COVID-19 pandemic accelerating this trend, South Korea and Japan, as mid-tier powers, feel the need to jointly respond to protect their security and prosperity from great power competition. To control China's coercive and sometimes predatory actions through a rules-based international order, to curb the trend of unilateralism and self-centeredness by the US, and to create a space for mid-tier powers to operate, cooperation with Japan is inevitable. In particular, Japan's strategic value in actively exerting influence in regional frameworks such as the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),' the Quad, and the CPTPP must be objectively assessed.

This calls for a fundamental shift in how we view Korea-Japan relations or Japan. In the near future, Japan will no longer be the perpetrator of South Korean economic plundering, a threat to South Korean security, or a competitor for cultural identity. The era of viewing Korea-Japan relations through an excessive focus on Japan is over. The perceptions of the youth generation (MZ generation) in both Korea and Japan already reflect this trend. According to the EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey, the younger generation, moving beyond resistant nationalism, does not view Japan in a black-and-white 'good versus evil' dichotomy and shows more favorability than the older generation ([Table 5]).

[Table 5] Trend of Preference for Japan by Age Group in South Korea (2019-2020)

The tasks that the new administration must pursue over the next five years can be divided into three categories: First, historical pending issues are tasks that require a decisive resolution in the first year of the administration. Second, multilateral cooperation issues (multilateral and regional cooperation) are tasks that should be pursued by leveraging political momentum in the first half of the term. Third, considerations regarding the policy decision-making system are tasks that must be maintained throughout the five-year term.

1. Resolution of Historical Pending Issues

Regarding compensation for victims of comfort women and forced labor, the most pressing issue in diplomacy toward Japan facing the next administration, the premise must be that we cannot afford to waste another five years, as we have already spent the last nine years on this issue day and night. While historical issues are undoubtedly important matters related to the formation of national identity and national pride, they cannot take precedence over the task of securing South Korea's security, economic, and strategic interests amidst the rising tide of US-China strategic competition.

In the case of the comfort women issue, the current administration, after declaring early in its term that the 2015 comfort women agreement could not be a true resolution from a victim-centered perspective and dissolving the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, has taken no significant action, leaving the policy direction ambiguous. However, a court ruling in April has opened avenues for diplomatic negotiation. The solution for the next administration is relatively clear: it is to resolve the two major pending issues early in the term with the president's political decision-making, respecting the 2015 comfort women agreement as an official accord and building upon it to implement supplementary measures and follow-up actions.

In the case of forced labor, the options for resolution are already evident. They are narrowed down to approaches such as the Moon Hee-sang proposal, which involves a private fund, the approach where the South Korean government takes responsibility for victim relief and demands an apology from Japan, and seeking judgment from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Now that the Seoul Central District Court overturned the Supreme Court's 2018 ruling in June and dismissed the lawsuit for damages, diplomatic negotiation pathways have opened up for this issue as well.

It is desirable for the next administration to resolve the pending issues with a political and strategic decision by the president, declaring that no further monetary demands will be made of Japan. Instead of retaliating against Japan's undignified behavior of adhering to one-track diplomacy, it should demonstrate its will to proactively conclude the pending issues and focus on more crucial tasks. This also serves as a means of building trust between the two countries. It can help lower the anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiments prevalent in both societies and mitigate the critical views on apologies in Japan and the high standards for apologies in South Korea.

It would be best to leave the follow-up measures to the private sector and discuss and resolve them over time. Following the Yoon Mi-hyang incident, the comfort women issue has moved 'from a sanctuary to the public square.'[6] A private committee should be established to facilitate active private sector discussion and alternative development, promoting the 'historicization of the comfort women issue' through initiatives such as installing memorial facilities and implementing educational and healing programs. The forced labor issue should also be handled in a similar manner.

It would be advisable for the government to engage in careful consultations with the Japanese government regarding the supplementary measures and implementation methods proposed by the private committee, and ultimately, to plan for these to be included in a second Partnership Declaration with Japan, to be formulated in the latter half of the next administration's term, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the normalization of relations in 2025.

For these political decisions to bear fruit between the two countries, efforts are needed to improve mutual trust, reduce anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiments, and mitigate critical views on apologies in Japan and high standards for apologies in South Korea. Public diplomacy that promotes dialogue at various levels to foster mutual understanding of public opinion in both countries regarding historical pending issues and to narrow the gap must be systematically pursued. In addition, the next administration should, with a long-term perspective, make initial efforts to move away from a closed and resistant nationalistic identity and foster a complex identity that is inclusive, multifaceted, and capable of coexistence with neighboring countries.

2. Bilateral Cooperation within Multilateralism

A more fundamental task for the new administration is to establish trust-building measures to mitigate the near-hostile distrust in Korea-Japan relations. Cooperation should be initiated in areas where both sides can achieve 'win-win' outcomes to foster trust and build friendly relations. Historically, the South Korean government has prioritized policy cooperation with Japan on North Korea issues. In particular, the Moon Jae-in administration vigorously pursued inter-Korean relations improvement with its so-called 'North Korea First Policy,' but found it difficult to find incentives and momentum for cooperation due to policy differences with Japan on the North Korean nuclear issue. However, there are numerous areas where mutual interests align and joint responses are necessary.

The pressure of US-China strategic competition, the greatest diplomatic challenge facing both South Korea and Japan, provides an opportunity for building trust between the two countries. As described above, cooperation between South Korea and Japan in various fields such as trade, production, technology, climate change, health, military affairs, and cyber security falls within the framework of Korea-US-Japan cooperation. By its nature, this is not an issue of bilateral Korea-Japan relations but an issue aimed at regional cooperation and building a regional order, possessing a future-oriented character. At the same time, as the US is planning for collective responses to China's challenges through cooperation with Japan and South Korea, trilateral cooperation also carries the aspect of containing China.

In terms of security, there are areas where Korea and Japan should actively cooperate and areas that require careful coordination. In areas such as GSOMIA and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which contribute to strengthening the Korea-US alliance and enhancing deterrence against North Korea, and also contribute to regional multilateral security cooperation and trust-building, both countries should actively cooperate. Furthermore, the trilateral cooperation system, including enhancing the reliability of nuclear umbrellas and extended deterrence, and joint cooperation in missile defense systems, should be expanded and developed. At the same time, both countries should pursue cooperation in a way that aligns with efforts to build a foundation for peaceful coexistence with North Korea and achieve peaceful reunification, without hindering inter-Korean dialogue and relationship improvement.

Meanwhile, Japan has strategic differences with South Korea, as it participates in military containment of China through bilateral alliances with the US and the Quad. In response, South Korea must exercise extreme caution to ensure that trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan does not explicitly evolve into a regional alliance for containing China, while making multifaceted efforts to ensure that trilateral cooperation and the Korea-China cooperation network can coexist and be cooperatively linked.

In economic terms, the positions of South Korea and Japan converge on policy towards China. Both countries aim to uphold the principle of 'separation of economy and politics' with regard to China. That is, while maintaining cooperation with the US on security and norms such as military security, democracy, and human rights, they seek to maintain and develop economic ties with China. The Japanese government, by shifting its 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' to an 'Indo-Pacific Vision' and weakening its China containment elements, emphasizes a rules-based international order, while maintaining economic engagement with China, such as the conditional decision to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (2017) and the establishment of the 'Japan-China Third Country Market Cooperation Forum' (2018), exchanging 52 Memoranda of Understanding for joint investment in third countries. These positions align with South Korea's national interests, and therefore, both countries should pursue policies to broaden the scope of economic cooperation at the regional level.

At the level of regional cooperation, South Korea and Japan must remember that their influence is amplified when they work together. The CPTPP is a prime example. The CPTPP is a geo-economic tool aimed at multiple objectives, such as economically pressuring and politically containing China through a high-level trade agreement, and in the long term, encouraging China to reform and transition to an open system. The next administration should go beyond negotiations on lifting export restrictions with Japan and, to restore the liberal, rules-based international order that forms the basis for the long-term prosperity and stability of both Korea and Japan, should push for the expansion and strengthening of the CPTPP in cooperation with Japan.

From Japan's perspective, the CPTPP is a pinnacle of Japanese diplomacy, successfully reconstituted under its leadership despite the US withdrawal. Therefore, the accession of South Korea, a trade advanced country and a top 10 global economy, will provide a significant momentum for expanding and strengthening the CPTPP, which has shrunk in scale due to the US withdrawal. Furthermore, if South Korea and the UK, among others, join, it could serve as an incentive for the US to rejoin in the future.

В случае с Южной Кореей переговоры о вступлении в CPTPP фактически означают переговоры о заключении корейско-японского соглашения о свободной торговле (FTA). Это связано с тем, что Южная Корея уже имеет двусторонние соглашения о свободной торговле с девятью странами-членами. Основными препятствиями на пути корейско-японских переговоров являются автомобильная промышленность, некоторые виды машиностроения, а также промышленность, связанная с материалами, комплектующими и оборудованием. Если взглянуть на двусторонние тарифные уступки между двумя странами в рамках Всестороннего регионального экономического партнерства (RCEP), заключенного в прошлом году, то можно увидеть, что уровень либерализации был низким: автомобильная и машиностроительная отрасли были исключены как чувствительные товары, а количество товаров с пониженными тарифами составило 83%, при этом открытие рынка морепродуктов не достигло и половины. Поэтому будущие переговоры между Южной Кореей и Японией в рамках CPTPP будут сложными переговорами, направленными на существенное повышение уровня либерализации. Следующая администрация должна принять дальновидное решение, выходящее за рамки узкого расчета экономических выгод и потерь между двумя странами, и всесторонне учитывать общее развитие корейской экономики, улучшение корейско-японских отношений и расширение международной роли Южной Кореи.

Участие в формате Quad Plus также станет важным поворотным моментом в корейско-японском сотрудничестве. Изначально Quad развивался как инструмент сдерживания Китая, но по мере расширения повестки дня невоенного сотрудничества, сдерживающий фактор в отношении Китая ослабевает, а акцент смещается на функциональное региональное сотрудничество. В качестве недавнего примера можно привести продвижение Quad Plus путем создания рабочих групп по распределению вакцин против COVID-19, чистой энергетике и передовым технологиям на саммите Quad. Поскольку Южная Корея и Япония занимают ключевые позиции в глобальных цепочках поставок в области передовых технологий и чистой энергетики, участие Южной Кореи является беспроигрышным вариантом для обеих стран. Если Южная Корея сможет участвовать в Quad Plus по отдельным вопросам и тем самым способствовать трансформации функций Quad таким образом, чтобы это в конечном итоге приносило пользу Китаю, это также внесет значительный вклад в улучшение корейско-японских отношений.

3. Внутренняя основа политики в отношении Японии

При реализации вышеуказанной политики в отношении Японии следующая администрация должна соблюдать принцип определенного отделения от внутренней политики. Поскольку в последние несколько лет в корейском обществе наблюдался рост анти-японского национализма, существует сильное политическое искушение подстрекать к нему. Политическое лидерство, которое стремится к долгосрочным национальным интересам, а не к временной политической поддержке, полученной путем разжигания анти-японских настроений, имеет первостепенное значение.

Успех или неудача такого президентского лидерства связаны с институциональным условием, заключающимся в отказе от централизованного управления государственной политикой со стороны Голубого дома. Когда Голубой дом доминирует в политике в отношении Японии, он неизбежно подвержен влиянию политики и общественного мнения из-за характера организации. Голубой дом — это организация, которая по своей природе чувствительна к популярности президента и его политической поддержке. Следовательно, политика, возглавляемая Голубым домом, имеет высокую вероятность использования или разжигания анти-японских настроений. Другим недостатком политики, возглавляемой Голубым домом, является поощрение секретности и ослабление ответственности за объяснения. Поскольку власть Голубого дома зависит от личного доверия президента, а не от институциональных основ, она по своей природе произвольна, закрыта и имеет неясную ответственность. Тайные переговоры по вопросу «женщин для утешения» во время правления Пак Кын Хе являются типичным примером. Высокопоставленные секретные переговоры между главой администрации президента и секретарем по национальной безопасности канцелярии премьер-министра Японии, проведенные без достаточных консультаций с отечественными заинтересованными сторонами (пострадавшими), в конечном итоге столкнулись с общественным противодействием. Наконец, чем больше власть концентрируется в Голубом доме, тем выше издержки бездействия. В качестве недавнего примера можно привести отсутствие ответной реакции со стороны правительства Южной Кореи после рассмотрения соглашения по «женщинам для утешения» и роспуска фонда «Примирение и исцеление», а также после решения Верховного суда о принудительном труде. В будущем политика в отношении Японии должна предусматривать предоставление автономии и ведущей роли в переговорах профильному министерству иностранных дел с точки зрения профессионализма, при одновременном усилении институциональных гарантий для улучшения коммуникации и координации с соответствующими министерствами. В частности, по историческим вопросам необходимо создать гражданский комитет, охватывающий частных экспертов и гражданские организации, для сбора широких мнений, проведения диалога и разработки среднесрочных и долгосрочных решений. Это позволит снизить нагрузку на правительство и одновременно обеспечить легитимность политики и переговорную силу в отношении Японии.

Наконец, необходимо активно и систематически проводить общественную дипломатию в отношении Японии. На уровне широкой общественности следует активно поддерживать культурные обмены и туристические обмены. Опросы общественного мнения EAI-Genron NPO показывают, что чем больше люди посещают страну-партнера или знакомы с ее культурой, тем лучшее впечатление они о ней составляют. Поддержка обменов на уровне интеллектуалов также важна. Необходимо приложить целенаправленные усилия для построения взаимного доверия путем накопления опыта совместной разработки истории и диалога между частными экспертами, а также для расширения взаимопонимания и сочувствия среди населения. В таких пространствах обе страны смогут выйти за рамки узкого взгляда, который рассматривает историю чрезмерно эгоцентрично или понимает партнера только через призму двусторонних отношений и собственных интересов, и найти возможность для взаимного развития, рассматривая партнера с различных точек зрения и формируя комплексную идентичность. ■

[1] Сон Ёль, «Корейско-японские отношения в кризисе по данным опросов общественного мнения: народ хочет перемен», EAI Issue Briefing (22.10.2020).

[2] Maeil Business Newspaper, «Дефицит в торговле с Японией снова резко вырос, зависимость от Японии увеличилась» (22.08.2020).

[3] Ха Ён Сон, Сон Ёль, «Конкуренция между США и Китаем до 2050 года: расширение конфликта и пути к компромиссу», EAI Special Report (12.06.2021).

[4] «Президент Мун Чжэ Ин: соглашение по «женщинам для утешения» имеет серьезные недостатки... проблема не решена», Yonhap News (28.12.2017).

[5] Сон Ёль, «Международная политика соглашения по «женщинам для утешения»: связь идентичности, безопасности и экономики и внешняя политика правительства Пак Кын Хе», Международные отношения, том 58, № 2 (2018).

[6] Сим Гю Сон. 2021. «Движение «женщин для утешения»: от святыни к площади». Нанам.

■ Автор: Сон Ёль — Директор EAI, профессор Graduate School of International Studies Университета Ёнсе. Доктор философии по политологии Чикагского университета. Работал директором Graduate School of International Studies и деканом Underwood International College, директором Исследовательского центра устойчивого развития, директором Института международных исследований Университета Ёнсе, а также приглашенным профессором Токийского университета, приглашенным исследователем в Университете Северной Каролины (Чапел-Хилл) и Калифорнийском университете (Беркли). Был председателем Корейской ассоциации международных отношений (2019) и Корейской ассоциации современных японских исследований (2012). Являлся старшим научным сотрудником Фулбрайта, Макартура, Фонда Японии и Института передовых исследований Университета Васэда, а также членом консультативных советов Министерства иностранных дел, Корейского института дипломатического обучения, Фонда истории Северо-Восточной Азии, Корейского фонда международного обмена, и экспертом Комитета по делам Северо-Восточной Азии. В настоящее время является членом комитета по самооценке Министерства иностранных дел. Области специализации: японская внешняя политика, международная политическая экономия, международные отношения в Восточной Азии, общественная дипломатия. Среди недавних публикаций: Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, в соавторстве с Т. Дж. Пемпелем), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, в соавторстве с Яном Мелиссеном), «South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking», The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, «Сдерживающая внешняя политика Южной Кореи» (2017, в соавторстве).

■ Ответственный за выпуск и редактирование: Пэк Чжин Гён — Руководитель исследовательской группы EAI

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