[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Government Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ⑤_Policy Toward Japan: Rebuilding Japan-Korea Relations with a Long-Term Perspective of a Century

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute (Professor at Yonsei University), recommends looking ahead to 2030-2050 to rebuild Korea-Japan relations, arguing that both countries need to adopt an approach of resolving common challenges at regional and global levels. He also adds that Korea and Japan must maintain a sense of balance amidst intensifying US-China competition. Finally, he emphasizes that for the new government to rebuild Korea-Japan relations, it must objectively assess Japan's strategic value.

Three Major Policy Tasks for Diplomacy Toward Japan

1. The new government should not repeat the mistakes of the previous administration, which was preoccupied with historical issues such as comfort women and forced labor. Instead, with a long-term perspective of a century, the President should resolve these two major pending issues early in the term. For the comfort women issue, the stance should be to respect past agreements and implement follow-up measures. For the forced labor issue, a declaration that no further monetary demands will be made to Japan is desirable.

2. Korea-Japan relations should not be viewed simply as a matter of bilateral cooperation and competition, but rather as a new concept of building a Korea-US-Japan network that serves as a cornerstone for creating a new order in the Asia-Pacific region. By utilizing frameworks such as the CPTPP, Quad Plus, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Korea should jointly respond with Japan in areas such as trade, advanced technology, climate change, health, and cyber security to restore mutual trust and promote mutual benefit. In terms of security, the trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan should be restored and strengthened, while carefully coordinating with Japan to ensure it does not devolve into military containment of China and remains compatible with the Korea-China cooperation network.

3. To reduce the existing anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments within both countries and restore trust, both nations must overcome exclusive modern nationalism and pursue national strength in accordance with the standards of a new 21st-century civilization oriented towards coexistence. The new government should prepare a new Korea-Japan Partnership Declaration encompassing these points to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan in 2025, during the latter half of its term.

I. Introduction

The most significant foreign policy issue that the next government will inherit from the current administration is the state of Korea-Japan relations. Currently, meaningful dialogue channels between the governments, including summit talks, are blocked. Bilateral trade has significantly decreased, and while people-to-people exchanges, which have been hampered by COVID-19, may take time to recover even after the pandemic situation improves due to visa requirements, it will take time to recover. The paralysis in bilateral relations is rooted in the 'loss of trust' between the governments. Driven by emotional confrontations over historical issues, the two governments have fallen into a vortex of distrust, hesitating to cooperate with each other, undervaluing each other's strategic value, and often treating each other antagonistically.[1]

The Korea-Japan conflict dates back to then-President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and his remarks demanding an apology from the Emperor in 2012. This was followed by confrontations over then-Prime Minister Abe's denial of Japanese colonial aggression and his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, and the dispute over the comfort women settlement and international public diplomacy battles in 2014. Despite the comfort women agreement in December 2015, the conflict deepened, leading to incidents such as the installation of a comfort women statue in Busan, public pledges by presidential candidates in 2017 to break or renegotiate the agreement, the Moon Jae-in administration's review of the comfort women agreement, the dissolution of the 'Reconciliation and Healing Foundation' in 2018, the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, disputes over radar irradiation incidents in the East Sea, retaliatory trade measures in 2019, the termination of GSOMIA, disputes over COVID-19 entry bans in 2020, battles over the UNESCO World Heritage status of Hashima Island, and court rulings on comfort women cases. The vortex of distrust and conflict has not ceased. It can be called 'a lost decade'.

As Korea-Japan relations have become paralyzed, South Korea has incurred significant economic and strategic costs. Since 2011, bilateral trade has decreased by more than 30% over a decade, and Japan's direct investment in South Korea has shrunk to one-fourth of its 2021 level. Meanwhile, the trade dispute that began with mutual export restrictions in 2019 has not yet ended, leading to accumulating economic losses, both tangible and intangible. In the first year of the dispute, exports to Japan decreased by 21.5%, and imports decreased by 9.2%, worsening the trade deficit. This deficit trend has persisted despite economic recovery.[2]In terms of security, the non-functioning of Korea-US-Japan cooperation has weakened coordination with North Korea and negatively impacted Korea-US relations. Furthermore, the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations has hindered South Korea's regional diplomacy. As initiatives such as Japan's 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),' the Quad, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) have emerged as central mechanisms for regional development, security, and trade cooperation, South Korea, by distancing itself from Japan, has experienced a significant reduction in its diplomatic space. This has resulted in the constraint of South Korea's diplomatic avenues and a decline in its overall external negotiation capabilities, underscoring the strategic importance of Japan to South Korea.

[Table 1] Changes in Korea-Japan Trade Volume Over 10 Years (2011-2020)

[Table 2] Changes in Japan's Direct Investment in South Korea Over 10 Years (2011-2020)

International pressure for the improvement of Korea-Japan relations will be amplified by the new international environment that the next government will face. The Biden administration identifies China's challenges as the foremost task in restoring US global leadership and emphasizes solidarity with its allies to counter them. Amidst the rising tide of US-China competition, the US is emphasizing security cooperation between Korea, the US, and Japan, and is strongly urging both Korea and Japan to improve relations, under the premise that historical issues should not undermine its core security interests.

From a more macro perspective, the necessity of Korea-Japan cooperation is self-evident when forecasting the future of US-China competition. China's GDP, which was 40% of US GDP a decade ago, has now risen to 70% and is projected to surpass that of the US by 2030. Around 2030, two superpowers with economic scales of $23-25 trillion will engage in multifaceted competition, including trade, advanced technology, energy, values and norms, currency, and potential military clashes in hotspots.[3]Conversely, by 2030, Japan, with an economy still at $5.5 trillion, and South Korea, even at its maximum growth potential of $2.2 trillion, will remain middle powers with a significant gap from the two superpowers. Without cooperation, securing diplomatic autonomy and pathways amidst the complex US-China competition and confrontation will be difficult. If the current conflict continues, the future for both countries is bleak.

The next government must undertake the rebuilding of Korea-Japan relations amidst the rising tide of US-China competition. Given that the existing approach is insufficient to restore Korea-Japan relations, which have been severely damaged over a long period, the issue of Japan must be addressed with the following new perspectives.

First, the new government must re-examine Korea-Japan relations with a long-term perspective, envisioning Korea's future in 2030 and 2050. It will be difficult for the next administration to move forward if it remains preoccupied with resolving historical issues such as comfort women and forced labor, thereby repeating the mistakes of the previous government. A dual strategy should be adopted: setting a common goal of building a shared future with Japan, fostering exchanges and cooperation to restore diminished mutual trust, and simultaneously pursuing progress in resolving historical issues. Second, diplomacy toward Japan should no longer be viewed solely as a special bilateral relationship, but rather as an approach to resolving common challenges at the regional and global levels. While the economic and strategic importance of the bilateral relationship has indeed diminished due to the relative rise of China, Southeast Asia, and India, and the relative decline of Japan, the new government should seek diplomacy toward Japan from the perspective of building a Korea-US-Japan network that serves as a cornerstone for creating a new order in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, the issue of China lies behind these tasks. When the multilateral order centered on the US leans towards containing China, Korea and Japan must adopt a balanced approach. The new government should engage in close consultation and coordination with Japan to ensure that cooperation within the Korea-US-Japan framework or regional multilateral cooperation ultimately unfolds in a way that embraces and benefits China. Finally, it is difficult for both Korea and Japan to find pathways for future-oriented development from the perspective of exclusive modern nationalism, as is currently the case. The next government should lay the groundwork for Korea to move beyond the emotional conflict structure of Korea-Japan relations by pursuing competition for advancement in line with the standards of a new 21st-century civilization over the long term.

II. New Challenges

One of the greatest foreign policy challenges facing the Moon Jae-in administration, which took office in May 2017, was to halt and improve the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations, which had been exacerbated during the Park Geun-hye administration due to then-President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and remarks demanding an apology from the Emperor in 2012. The Park administration had taken a hardline stance toward Japan, unprecedented since the normalization of diplomatic relations, focusing specifically on the comfort women issue. In particular, the so-called 'one-track diplomacy,' which refused to hold summit talks with Japan unless Japan took forward-looking measures on the comfort women issue, led to a general freeze in bilateral relations. The Moon administration, learning from the Park administration's approach, adopted a 'two-track diplomacy' policy, separating historical issues from security and economic cooperation, to improve relations. The recognition was that the entire bilateral relationship should not be frozen due to conflicts over historical issues.

The problem is that the Moon Jae-in administration effectively hollowed out the 2015 Korea-Japan comfort women agreement, leading to a recurrence of the freeze in bilateral relations, which prompted the Abe administration's one-track diplomacy. The Moon administration declared that the comfort women agreement 'was found to have significant procedural and substantive flaws... and it is hereby announced that the comfort women issue cannot be resolved through this agreement.' As a follow-up measure, it dissolved the 'Reconciliation and Healing Foundation,' a product of the comfort women agreement.[4]When the government responded lukewarmly to the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor in October 2018, the Abe administration, through a meticulously calculated retaliation, abruptly announced export restrictions on three key chemical materials essential to the South Korean economy, catching the South Korean government off guard. Subsequently, the two countries engaged in tit-for-tat trade retaliation and expanded the conflict to security issues, including the termination of GSOMIA, leading to the worst state of relations since the normalization of diplomatic ties. The two-track diplomacy, which had effectively collapsed, has not been restored to this day.

The new challenges emerging amidst the downward spiral of the Moon Jae-in administration's five-year term are as follows: First is the change in Japan's attitude towards historical issues. In the past, Korea-Japan relations were perceived as a special relationship between a colonizer and the colonized, and Japan, as a successful model of modernization, handled historical issues with a sense of superiority over Korea and a degree of moral responsibility as a perpetrator. Therefore, in terms of historical issues, Korea was on the 'offensive' and Japan on the 'defensive.' In contrast, the Abe-Suga governments in Japan reframed the comfort women agreement and forced labor ruling not as historical perception issues, but as issues of bilateral trust violations, such as breaches of international commitments and international law, thereby switching roles. Beyond accusations that Korea constantly harassed and disregarded Japan by moving the 'goalposts' on historical issues, they gained public support by attacking Korea's national character or identity, labeling it as 'a country that does not keep its promises,' 'a country where the rule of law does not apply,' and 'an untrustworthy country.' Prime Minister Abe's choice of the extreme retaliatory measure of trade restrictions in response to the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling was also an exploitation of this shift in public sentiment.

The Japanese government's change in attitude has led to the disregard or neglect of South Korea. Japan is trending towards lowering its strategic value for Northeast Asia and South Korea. The 2014 edition of the Diplomatic Bluebook described South Korea as 'Japan's most important neighbor with whom it shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and basic human rights, as well as interests in maintaining peace and stability,' using phrases like 'sharing values' and 'sharing interests,' and 'most important neighbor.' However, in the 2015 edition, only 'most important neighbor' (最も重要な隣国) remained for South Korea, with the expressions of sharing values and interests deleted. In the 2016 and 2017 editions, the phrase 'most important neighbor with whom strategic interests are shared' was revived, but it disappeared entirely from the 2018 edition onwards. Japanese public opinion also shows a similar trend of government-level disregard and distancing from South Korea. As shown in [Table 3], the proportion of Japanese citizens who consider Korea-Japan relations important decreased steadily from 73% in 2013 to 48.1% in 2020. As long as the Japanese government and public continue their critical and dismissive stance towards South Korea, it is unlikely that the next government can expect a 'sincere apology that touches the hearts of the victims' from Japan on the two major issues of comfort women and forced labor. This foreshadows that a simplistic approach of seeking a resolution through an apology will not work.

[Table 3] Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (2013-2020)

Second, the South Korean government's attitude towards Japan has also changed, leading to a disregard for Japan. The asymmetrical relationship between advanced Japan and developing South Korea, which has existed since the normalization of diplomatic relations, has shifted to an equal footing due to South Korea's economic rise and Japan's stagnation. Now, in terms of GDP per capita based on PPP, Korea and Japan are quite close, and a majority of the Korean public no longer views Japan as a country to learn from. However, this does not mean the public disregards Japan. According to the EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey, over 80% of the public believes that Korea-Japan relations are important. Even in 2020, when public favorability towards Japan plummeted to 12.3% amidst the worst confrontation, the proportion of those who believed Korea-Japan relations were important remained unchanged at 82% ([Table 3], [Table 4]).

Conversely, the Moon administration, judging that Japan was becoming more right-wing under Shinzo Abe, a historical revisionist, treated Japan harshly. This tendency was reinforced by the perception that Japan's status in the Korean economy was no longer important, and that Japan played a minor role, or was even a spoiler, in the Moon administration's top foreign policy priority: improving inter-Korean relations and resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. In this context, the South Korean government effectively abandoned follow-up measures after hollowing out the comfort women agreement and virtually neglected diplomatic responses to the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, provoking a strong and sustained retaliation from the Japanese government that exceeded expectations. In the process of retaliation, the government and political circles used anti-Japan sentiment for domestic political gain, confronting Japan through identity politics without careful consideration of the consequences. The Japanese government, which disregards South Korea, and the South Korean government, which disregards Japan, clashed head-on.

[Table 4] Impression of the Other Country (2013-2020)

Third, the role of the United States in Korea-Japan relations is changing. Historically, the US has emphasized the importance of security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan to counter North Korean threats and has played a diplomatic coordinating role to ensure that unique bilateral issues between Korea and Japan, such as historical conflicts, do not hinder its strategic objectives. The Obama administration, in particular, was actively involved in diplomatic intervention and coordination, arranging Korea-US-Japan summit meetings and emphasizing the two-track approach of both countries to overcome the strained Korea-Japan relations.[5]From the Trump administration to the Biden administration, the US has been requesting cooperation with Japan and South Korea in expanded issue areas beyond the North Korean issue. The joint statements following the Korea-US summit in May 2021 and the US-Japan summit in April 2021 are indicative of this. Both joint statements converge in a very similar structure in terms of content. Both emphasize 'peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait' for military deterrence against China, pursue 'democratic values and human rights' targeting Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and pledge to 'maintain an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific region, opposing all actions that undermine, destabilize, or threaten the rules-based international order.' Furthermore, they emphasize technological cooperation for supply chain resilience in areas such as 5G/6G and semiconductors, mutual cooperation for innovation in emerging technology fields, and joint efforts in infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region. In essence, the underlying code of both statements is trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan. The US is emphasizing cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan not only in security but also in democratic values, human rights, international norms, economy, technology, and infrastructure investment to collectively respond to China's challenges. In this regard, Korea-Japan relations are being called upon to enter a new phase of multilateral cooperation across multiple issue areas.

III. Direction for Reconstruction

The starting point for the new government's reconstruction of Korea-Japan relations lies in objectively assessing Japan's strategic value. Macroeconomically, it is true that Japan's relative size has diminished compared to the past due to the acceleration of US-China strategic competition and the economic rise of China, Southeast Asia, and India. However, the deep interdependence between the economies of Korea and Japan remains unchanged. For example, as South Korea's exports of electrical and electronic products increase, imports of materials, components, and equipment from Japan also increase, and as exports decrease, imports from Japan also decrease. The bilateral trade dispute, which has lasted for two years since July 2019, has paradoxically demonstrated the deepening economic interdependence between the two countries. Although the South Korean government pursued localization (or de-Japanization) of key materials, components, and equipment (so-called 'so-bu-jang') that are heavily dependent on Japan in response to the Japanese government's export restrictions, imports from Japan in 2021 actually increased by 34% compared to the same period of the previous year, and the deficit has expanded for 13 consecutive months. At the center of this are a 55% increase in imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and a 12% increase in imports of fine chemical materials. Conversely, exports of photoresists, hydrogen fluoride, and polyimide, which were precisely targeted by the Japanese government's export restrictions, have exceeded pre-restriction levels. The market is not reacting according to the Japanese government's political intentions. Given the deep interdependence between companies in both countries at the supply chain level for key products, a cooperative economic relationship with Japan is essential.

In terms of security, Japan and South Korea are in the same boat. Amidst the intensifying strategic competition between the US and China as the primary factor shaping the world order, and with the COVID-19 emergency accelerating this trend, South Korea and Japan, as middle powers, feel the need for joint action to protect their security and prosperity from hegemonic competition. To create a platform that controls China's coercive and sometimes predatory actions through a rules-based international order, curbs the US's unilateralism and self-centered tendencies, and expands the space for middle powers, cooperation with Japan is unavoidable. In particular, Japan's strategic value, which exerts leading influence in regional frameworks such as the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),' the Quad, and the CPTPP, must be objectively assessed.

This, in turn, demands a fundamental shift in how we view Korea-Japan relations or Japan itself. In the near future, Japan will no longer be the perpetrator of South Korean economic exploitation, a threat to South Korean security, or a competitor in cultural identity. The era of viewing Korea-Japan relations through an excessive focus on Japan is over. The perceptions of the youth generation (MZ generation) in both Korea and Japan already reflect this trend. According to the EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey, the younger generation, moving beyond resistant nationalism, does not view Japan in a 'good versus evil' dichotomy and shows more favorable attitudes than the older generation. ([Table 5])

[Table 5] Trend of Japan Preference by Age Group in Korea (2019-2020)

The tasks that the new government should pursue over the next five years can be divided into three categories: The first task, historical issues, requires a decisive resolution within the first year of the administration. The second task, multilateral cooperation issues, should be pursued with political momentum during the first half of the term. The third task, considerations related to the policy decision-making system, should be maintained throughout the five-year term.

1. Resolution of Historical Issues

Regarding compensation for comfort women and forced labor victims, the most pressing issue for the next government in its diplomacy toward Japan, the starting point must be the recognition that the past nine years cannot be spent endlessly on this issue, nor can the next five years be wasted. While historical issues are undoubtedly important matters related to the formation of national identity and national pride, they cannot take precedence over the tasks of securing South Korea's security, economic, and strategic interests amidst the rising tide of US-China strategic competition.

In the case of the comfort women issue, the current government, after declaring early in its term that the 2015 comfort women agreement could not be a true resolution from a victim-centered perspective and dissolving the 'Reconciliation and Healing Foundation,' has taken no significant action, leaving the policy direction ambiguous. However, a court ruling in April opened a path for diplomatic negotiation. The solution for the next government is relatively clear: through a political decision by the President, respect the 2015 comfort women agreement as an official accord, and build upon it to implement supplementary measures and follow-up actions.

For the forced labor issue, the options for a solution are already apparent. These include the so-called Moon Hee-sang proposal, which involves a private fund, the option where the South Korean government takes responsibility for victim relief and demands an apology from Japan, and seeking a ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Now that the Central District Court overturned the Supreme Court's 2018 ruling in June, dismissing the damages claim lawsuit, a path for diplomatic negotiation has also opened in this matter.

It is desirable for the next government to resolve the pending issues through a political and strategic decision by the President, declaring that no further monetary demands will be made to Japan. This would demonstrate a willingness to proactively conclude the pending issues and focus on more critical tasks, rather than engaging in a tit-for-tat response to Japan's undignified behavior of adhering to one-track diplomacy. This would also serve as a means of building trust between the two countries. It could also help reduce anti-Japan sentiment and anti-Korea sentiment prevalent in both societies, and mitigate the critical view of apologies in Japan and the high standards for apologies in South Korea.

Follow-up measures should be delegated to the private sector and discussed and resolved over time. The comfort women issue has now moved 'from a sacred cow to the public square' following the Yoon Mi-hyang incident.[6]A private committee should be established to facilitate active private sector discussion and proposal development, focusing on experts, to promote the 'historicization of the comfort women issue' through initiatives such as the installation of memorial facilities and the implementation of educational and healing programs. The forced labor issue should be handled in a similar manner.

It would be advisable for the government to engage in careful consultations with the Japanese government regarding the supplementary measures and implementation methods proposed by the private committee, and ultimately, to plan for these to be included in a second Partnership Declaration with Japan, to be prepared by the latter half of the next government's term, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the normalization of relations in 2025.

For these political decisions to bear fruit between the two countries, efforts are needed to improve mutual trust, reduce anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments, and mitigate the critical view of apologies in Japan and the high standards for apologies in South Korea. Public diplomacy that fosters dialogue at various levels to promote mutual understanding of domestic public opinion in both countries regarding historical issues and to narrow the gap must be systematically pursued. In addition, the next government should, with a long-term perspective, make initial efforts to move away from closed and resistant nationalistic identities and cultivate a composite identity that is inclusive, complex, and capable of coexisting with neighboring countries.

2. Bilateral Cooperation within Multilateralism

A more fundamental task for the new government is to establish trust-building measures to alleviate the near-hostile distrust in relations with Japan. Cooperation opportunities should be created in areas where both sides can achieve 'win-win' outcomes to foster trust and establish friendly relations. Historically, the South Korean government has prioritized policy cooperation with Japan in addressing North Korea issues. In particular, the Moon Jae-in administration vigorously pursued inter-Korean relations improvement with its so-called 'North Korea First Policy,' but found it difficult to identify incentives and momentum for cooperation due to policy differences with Japan on North Korean nuclear solutions. However, there are numerous issues where mutual interests align and joint action is necessary.

The pressure of US-China strategic competition, the greatest diplomatic challenge facing both Korea and Japan, provides an opportunity for building trust between the two countries. As described earlier, cooperation between Korea and Japan in various fields such as trade, production, technology, climate change, health, military affairs, and cyber security falls within the framework of Korea-US-Japan cooperation. Given the nature of these issues, they are not merely bilateral matters but rather issues aimed at regional cooperation and the construction of a regional order, possessing a future-oriented character. At the same time, as the US is planning for collective responses to China's challenges in cooperation with Japan and South Korea, trilateral cooperation also carries the aspect of containing China.

In terms of security, there are areas where Korea and Japan should actively cooperate and areas that require careful coordination. In matters that contribute to strengthening the Korea-US alliance and enhancing deterrence against North Korea, such as GSOMIA and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), and also contribute to regional multilateral security cooperation and trust-building, both countries should actively cooperate. Furthermore, the trilateral cooperation system, including enhancing the credibility of the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence, and joint cooperation in missile defense systems, should be expanded and developed. At the same time, both countries should pursue these efforts in a manner consistent with the goal of building a foundation for peaceful coexistence with North Korea and achieving peaceful unification, without hindering inter-Korean dialogue and relationship improvement.

Meanwhile, Japan has strategic differences with South Korea in that it is participating in military containment of China through its bilateral alliance with the US and the Quad. In response, South Korea must exercise extreme caution to ensure that trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan does not explicitly evolve into a regional alliance for containing China, while making multifaceted efforts to ensure that trilateral cooperation and the Korea-China cooperation network can coexist and be cooperatively linked.

In economic terms, the positions of Korea and Japan converge on China policy. Both countries seek to adhere to the principle of 'separation of economy and politics' with regard to China. That is, while maintaining cooperation with the US on security and norms, such as military security, democracy, and human rights, they aim to maintain and develop economic ties with China. The Japanese government has emphasized a rules-based international order by weakening the containment aspect of its Indo-Pacific strategy and transforming it into an 'Indo-Pacific vision.' Meanwhile, it maintains economic engagement with China, such as its conditional decision to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (2017) and the establishment of the 'Japan-China Third Country Market Cooperation Forum' (2018), exchanging 52 MOUs for joint investment in third countries. This stance aligns with South Korea's national interests, and therefore, both countries should pursue policies aimed at expanding economic cooperation in the region.

In terms of regional cooperation, Korea and Japan must remember that their influence is amplified when they work together. The CPTPP is a good example. The CPTPP is a geoeconomic tool designed to achieve multiple objectives, such as economically pressuring and politically containing China through a high-standard trade agreement, and ultimately encouraging China to reform and transition to an open system. The next government should go beyond negotiating the lifting of export restrictions with Japan and, to restore the liberal, rules-based international order that serves as the foundation for the long-term prosperity and stability of both Korea and Japan, should pursue accession to the CPTPP in cooperation with Japan, as a key mechanism for its expansion and strengthening.

From Japan's perspective, the CPTPP is a monumental achievement of Japanese diplomacy, successfully reconstituted under its leadership despite the US withdrawal. Therefore, the accession of South Korea, a trade advanced country and one of the world's top 10 economies, would provide a significant momentum for expanding and strengthening the CPTPP, which has shrunk in scale due to the US withdrawal. Furthermore, if countries like South Korea and the UK join, it could serve as an incentive for the US to rejoin in the future.

In the case of Korea, negotiations for accession to the CPTPP ultimately carry the significance of Korea-Japan FTA negotiations, as Korea has already concluded bilateral FTAs with nine of the member countries. The biggest obstacles in Korea-Japan negotiations are finished automobiles, certain machinery, and the materials, parts, and equipment (MP) industries. Looking at the bilateral tariff concession schedules between Korea and Japan in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signed last year, sensitive items such as automobiles and machinery were excluded, indicating a low level of liberalization where only 83% of items were subject to tariff reduction and less than half of fishery products were opened. Therefore, future CPTPP negotiations between Korea and Japan will be highly challenging, requiring a significant increase in the level of liberalization. The next administration must make a magnanimous decision, moving beyond a narrow calculation of economic gains and losses between Korea and Japan, and comprehensively considering the overall development of the Korean economy, the improvement of Korea-Japan relations, and the expansion of Korea's international role.

Participation in Quad Plus will also be a significant turning point for Korea-Japan cooperation. Originally, the Quad was developed to counter China, but as non-military cooperation agendas have expanded, the element of countering China has weakened, and the aspect of functional regional cooperation is being emphasized. A recent example is the promotion of Quad Plus through the establishment of working groups in areas such as COVID-19 vaccine distribution, clean energy, and advanced technology at the recent Quad Summit. Since both Korea and Japan are central to global supply chains in the fields of advanced technology and clean energy, Korea's participation is a 'win-win' for both countries. If Korea can participate in issue-specific Quad Plus initiatives and ultimately help transform the Quad's function in a way that also benefits China, this will significantly contribute to improving Korea-Japan relations as well.

3. Domestic Basis for Policy Toward Japan

When pursuing the aforementioned policies toward Japan, the next administration must adhere to a principle of decoupling from domestic politics. Over the past few years, anti-Japanese nationalism has been heightened in Korean society, creating a strong political temptation to exploit it. Political leadership that pursues long-term national interests over temporary political support gained by provoking anti-Japanese sentiment is paramount.

The success or failure of presidential leadership in this regard is related to the institutional condition of decoupling public policy from the Blue House's dominance. When the Blue House leads policy toward Japan, its organizational nature makes it susceptible to political and public opinion influences, as the Blue House is inherently sensitive to popular approval and political support. Consequently, Blue House-led policies are likely to capitalize on or even foster anti-Japanese sentiment. Another drawback of Blue House policy leadership is that it fosters secrecy and weakens accountability. Blue House power relies on the president's personal trust rather than institutional authority, making it inherently arbitrary, closed, and lacking clear lines of responsibility. The secret comfort women agreement under the Park Geun-hye administration is a prime example. High-level secret negotiations between the Blue House Chief of Staff and the Japanese Prime Minister's National Security Advisor, conducted without adequate consultation with domestic stakeholders (victims), ultimately faced public opposition. Finally, the greater the concentration of power in the Blue House, the greater the cost of inaction. A pertinent example is the lack of a responsible response from the South Korean government following the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, after the review of the comfort women agreement and the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation. Future policy toward Japan requires institutional improvements that grant autonomy and negotiation leadership to the ministry in charge of foreign affairs in terms of expertise, while strengthening communication and coordination with relevant ministries. Particularly in historical issues, establishing a civilian committee that includes private experts and civic groups will help alleviate the government's burden by gathering broad opinions, facilitating dialogue, and developing mid- to long-term solutions, while simultaneously enhancing policy legitimacy and negotiation leverage with Japan.

Finally, public diplomacy toward Japan must be pursued actively and systematically. At the public level, cultural and tourism exchanges should be actively supported. The EAI-Genron NPO public opinion poll shows that the more people visit the other country or are familiar with its culture, the more favorable their impression becomes. Support for intellectual exchanges is also important. Efforts should be made to build mutual trust and broaden national understanding and empathy by accumulating experiences in dialogue and joint development of history among private experts. In such spaces, both countries can move beyond a self-centered view of history or a narrow perspective of understanding the other party solely through bilateral relations and issues related to one's own country, and find opportunities to view the other party from various perspectives and build composite identities for co-prosperity. ■

[1] Son Yeol, “The Crisis in Korea-Japan Relations as Seen Through Public Opinion Polls: The Public Wants Change,” EAI Issue Briefing (10/22/2020).

[2] Maeil Business Newspaper, “Trade Deficit with Japan Surges Again, Dependence on Japan Increases.” (8/22/2020).

[3] Ha Young-sun and Son Yeol, “US-China Competition 2050: Widening Conflict and Paths to Compromise,” EAI Special Report (6/12/2021).

[4] “President Moon, Grave Flaws in Comfort Women Agreement... Problem Not Resolved,” Yonhap News (12/28/2017).

[5] Son Yeol, “The Geopolitics of the Comfort Women Agreement: Identity-Security-Economy Nexus and the Park Geun-hye Administration's Diplomacy Toward Japan,” Journal of International Politics, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2018).

[6] Shim Kyu-sun. 2021. *The Comfort Women Movement, From Sacred Ground to Public Square*. Nanam.

■ Author: Son Yeol_ Director of EAI, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Director of the Graduate School of International Studies and Head of the Underwood International College at Yonsei University, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Association of International Studies (2019) and President of the Korean Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Waseda University’s Advanced Research Center, and has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation. He is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Self-Evaluation Committee. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include *Japan and Asia's Contested Order* (2019, with T. J. Pempel), *Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia* (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” *The Pacific Review* (2019), 32, 6, and *South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy* (2017, co-edited).

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung Director of Research, EAI

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