[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Government Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ④_North Korea Policy: A New Vision for North Korea's Denuclearization and 21st Century Survival and Prosperity

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Professor Kim Byung-yeon of Seoul National University and Chairman Ha Young-sun of the East Asia Institute (Professor Emeritus of Seoul National University) emphasize that the success or failure of North Korea's denuclearization will likely be determined within the term of the next government, and that volatility surrounding North Korea and the Korean Peninsula will increase. The authors offer recommendations for North Korea's nuclear and North Korea policy that the new government should pursue in this environment. They argue that a new vision for North Korea's denuclearization, which comprehensively pursues a "four-pronged strategy" (sanctions, deterrence, engagement, self-reliance), and a new vision for North Korea's survival and prosperity must be established. They also add that institutional improvements are needed to implement the new North Korea policy.

Three Major Policy Tasks Toward China

1. Establish a new vision for North Korea's denuclearization that comprehensively pursues sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and self-reliant change. In particular, relevant parties, including South Korea and the United States, must concurrently pursue measures for North Korea's regime security, sanctions relief, and economic development in accordance with North Korea's denuclearization steps.

2. A new vision for North Korea's survival and prosperity in the 21st century must be presented, contingent upon complete denuclearization. Specifically, South Korea should support North Korea's technological development, cultivate its high-caliber human resources, and facilitate its accession to international financial institutions. Furthermore, it should aid the North Korean economy's leap forward by providing South Korean infrastructure, both tangible and intangible, to North Korea. A future-oriented North Korea policy should be pursued with consideration for the division of labor and integration of the South and North Korean economies, including the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

3. To efficiently implement the new North Korea policy, a standing network organization at the level of ministers and working-level officials from relevant ministries should be operated to strengthen inter-agency communication and coordination. Simultaneously, the National Security Council should be institutionally supplemented to enable the comprehensive pursuit of the new North Korea policy.

I. Introduction

North Korea's denuclearization and the formation of desirable inter-Korean relations will be among the highest priorities of the new government's foreign policy. The North Korean issue is inseparably linked to South Korea's identity and the history of the Korean people, and it is connected to almost all areas, including security, politics, society, diplomacy, and economics. In particular, the intangible and tangible costs South Korea would incur if North Korea's denuclearization fails would be immense.

Volatility surrounding North Korea and the Korean Peninsula is expected to be significantly higher during the term of the new government than before. First, the success or failure of denuclearization is likely to be determined. If North Korea becomes a de facto nuclear-armed state, it may pursue a more hardline policy toward South Korea than before. Conversely, it might adopt a more flexible policy toward South Korea for economic development. Alternatively, it might attempt to strengthen domestic cohesion by emphasizing self-reliance despite sanctions and the COVID-19 crisis, potentially leading to a crisis for the regime. Furthermore, the deepening US-China conflict is expected to complicate the North Korean issue. If the US and China approach the North Korean issue from different strategic standpoints, denuclearization and inter-Korean relations will face greater difficulties. As the US-China conflict expands beyond military and diplomatic arenas to encompass technology, corporations, economics, and health, the ripple effects of the North Korean issue could extend to South Korea's security, alliances, diplomacy, and economy.

The purpose of this paper is to propose North Korea's nuclear and North Korea policies that the new government should implement. This paper first examines the policy environment the new government will face and then evaluates the Moon Jae-in administration's North Korea nuclear and North Korea policies. It then reviews the effectiveness of North Korea's self-reliance economic policy and discusses the impact of US-China and China-North Korea relations on the North Korean economy. Subsequently, it introduces policies the new government should avoid and then proposes a new vision for North Korea policy to promote North Korea's denuclearization and survival and prosperity.

II. New Policy Environment

The new government's North Korea nuclear and North Korea policies in 2022 should be pursued with attention to two particularly new changes. First, the rapid changes in the international environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. As demonstrated by the Alaska talks in April, the US and China are engaged in competition, conflict, and cooperation not only in traditional diplomatic and security arenas but also in six complex arenas: economics, technology, culture, and ecology. The US-China conflict, in particular, has expanded from trade to cutting-edge technologies. The Biden administration is pursuing the establishment of a global supply chain that excludes China in advanced technologies such as semiconductors and the space industry. Simultaneously, a confrontation of norms is unfolding, pressuring China under the banner of democracy, human rights, and freedom. The world order has thus transformed into a structure where diplomacy, security, economics, technology, and norms are interconnected. The South Korea-US summit held in May also confirmed these changes by addressing not only North Korea and security-related issues but also technology, science, the environment, and democracy.

North Korea is facing a severe economic crisis. Sanctions against North Korea are judged to have dealt a significant blow to the North Korean economy between 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, in 2020, economic activity further contracted due to trade blockades and restrictions on market activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and this situation continues to persist. Chairman Kim Jong-un himself acknowledged the economic crisis at the cell secretaries' meeting in early April, mentioning the "arduous march." In particular, with a significant decrease in exports and foreign currency earnings, the foreign currency reserves available to the North Korean government may be depleted within the next few years. Moreover, the economic hardship could lead to accumulated discontent among the North Korean populace, as well as among officials and the power elite, posing a serious political burden to the North Korean regime. If the North Korean regime attempts to forcibly or semi-forcibly absorb private sector foreign currency to prevent the depletion of government foreign currency reserves, public discontent could arise.

The future course of denuclearization will depend not only on North Korea's internal situation and policies but also on US-China relations. If US-China relations continue to be confrontational, North Korea's strategic value from China's perspective will increase. That is, China is likely to use the North Korean issue to pressure the US or as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the US. This could lead to increased Chinese support for North Korea, thereby enhancing North Korea's bargaining power with the US. Conversely, if US-China relations broadly improve or if the US and China cooperate on the North Korean nuclear issue, China will likely take a more active role in sanctions. As a result, North Korea's economic situation will worsen, but the possibility of denuclearization will increase.

As described above, the policy environment facing the next government is complex and multi-layered, with North Korea's choices, internal changes, and US-China relations intricately intertwined. Furthermore, due to the dynamics caused by tensions within North Korea and the US-China conflict, the current situation is unlikely to persist throughout the term of the next government. Therefore, the next government needs to anticipate various situations arising from the combination of these factors and prepare effective and comprehensive countermeasures for each scenario.

III. Evaluation of the Moon Jae-in Administration's North Korea Policy

The Moon Jae-in administration, which took office in the first half of 2017, had to address the immediate challenge of North Korea's denuclearization. However, the policy space was limited. Above all, strong UN sanctions against North Korea and unilateral US sanctions were operating as means of denuclearization. In this environment, the Moon Jae-in administration, believing that the virtuous cycle of South Korea-US relations and inter-Korean relations would contribute to peace on the Korean Peninsula, first sought to improve inter-Korean relations. As a result, three inter-Korean summits and two US-North Korea summits were held. However, it failed to achieve tangible results in North Korea's denuclearization. Moreover, contrary to the Moon Jae-in administration's expectations, North Korea has clearly stated its possession of nuclear weapons in its constitution and at the 8th Party Congress, while continuously advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities.

The Moon Jae-in administration underestimated North Korea's determination to possess nuclear weapons. However, the special envoys of the Moon Jae-in administration interpreted Chairman Kim Jong-un's statement during their visit to Pyongyang in March 2018 – "If the military threat to North Korea is resolved and North Korea's regime security is guaranteed, there is no reason to possess nuclear weapons" – with excessive optimism. Chairman Kim Jong-un intended to discuss partial denuclearization, such as a freeze on nuclear activities, in exchange for sanctions relief and regime security, but he did not make a strategic decision for complete denuclearization of its nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless, US President Donald Trump, lacking a deep understanding of North Korea, immediately decided to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un after meeting with the South Korean envoys. This turn of events, while contributing to controlling North Korean provocations and creating a temporary atmosphere of peace, was detrimental to substantive progress in denuclearization. This is because China, concerned about the rapid improvement of US-North Korea relations, eased sanctions. If sanctions had been maintained at the level implemented in the latter half of 2017, they could have driven denuclearization, but the inter-Korean and US-North Korea negotiations proceeded too quickly, and the policymakers in South Korea and the US failed to understand the resulting dynamics of closer China-North Korea ties and sanctions relief.

The Moon Jae-in administration believed that the key to denuclearization was the improvement of inter-Korean relations and focused on this objective. Without in-depth consideration of the complexities and dynamics of international relations, and the means and effects of denuclearization, some even argued that sanctions, the core means of denuclearization, should be eased first to persuade North Korea. It is undeniable that this led to cracks in South Korea-US cooperation and amplified internal divisions within South Korea. Furthermore, the deterioration of relations with Japan, with whom close cooperation is essential for North Korea's denuclearization, and the excessive expectation that China's cooperation could be obtained on the North Korean issue, acted as factors that diminished the effectiveness of the Moon Jae-in administration's policies.

IV. Evaluation of North Korea's Self-Reliance Efforts

As sanctions against North Korea intensified, North Korea began to emphasize self-reliance. In particular, after the collapse of the Hanoi summit, the self-reliance policy was fully implemented. However, self-reliance efforts are difficult to succeed. Above all, the North Korean economy has transformed into a structure heavily dependent on external factors. Marketization and foreign trade were the primary reasons for the recovery of the North Korean economy from the "arduous march" in the mid-to-late 1990s. Specifically, through trade with foreign countries, North Korean enterprises could import necessary raw materials, machinery, parts, and oil. They could also earn foreign currency by exporting minerals, clothing, and seafood, and by dispatching workers to Russia, China, and the Middle East. Reflecting this, North Korea's trade dependence reached 52% in 2014, only 8 percentage points lower than the global average trade dependence of 60% in the same year. If illicit trade between North Korea and China is included, it is no exaggeration to say that North Korea's trade dependence before the sanctions was higher than the global average.

Increased trade had positive ripple effects on industry and market activities. The supply chain disruptions, a chronic problem of the centrally planned economy, were somewhat mitigated, leading to increased industrial production and enhanced production activities of export-oriented companies. Furthermore, the import of consumer goods led to an increase in market supply within North Korea. Simultaneously, the inflow of income from trade and foreign currency earnings into the domestic economy increased market demand. This led to increased market transactions and a rise in household income in North Korea. Thus, the possibility of economic self-reliance without trade, which was the driving force behind North Korea's economic recovery, is slim.

North Korea's self-reliance efforts can be interpreted as pressure on the US to open denuclearization negotiations early. The intention is to gain leverage in denuclearization negotiations by signaling that the North Korean economy can withstand sanctions and the COVID-19 crisis. Furthermore, in these negotiations, North Korea may intend to be recognized as a de facto nuclear-armed state while simultaneously seeking to have existing sanctions lifted in exchange for abandoning some of its nuclear capabilities.

V. US-China and China-North Korea Relations and the North Korean Economy

There is a view that the North Korean economy will recover once the COVID-19 pandemic ends and exchanges between North Korea and China resume. In this perspective, self-reliance is merely an expression of the will to endure until that time. This possibility will depend not only on the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic but also on US-China relations. If US-China relations worsen significantly from their current state, China may try to use North Korea to pressure the US. The rationale is that China will increase its support for North Korea, helping its economy to partially recover, and if the North Korean regime continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities with this support, the US will cooperate with China to resolve the North Korean issue. However, this strategy could backfire. Instead of seeking China's cooperation, the US may impose secondary boycotts on Chinese companies or institutions. This would not only restrict China's support for North Korea, at least partially, but also further worsen US-China relations. Therefore, unless US-China relations have irrevocably deteriorated, the likelihood of China's sanctions violations and support for North Korea increasing significantly after the COVID-19 pandemic ends is not high.

Even if the situation returns to that of 2019, just before the COVID-19 pandemic, it would be difficult for the North Korean economy to normalize. For economic growth, imports of capital equipment, parts, and energy must proceed smoothly, but this is constrained by sanctions. Even if imports are possible, trade deficits are inevitable because sanctions make exports and foreign currency earnings difficult. While this deficit can be temporarily covered by mobilizing existing foreign currency reserves, the economic crisis will become apparent once these reserves are depleted. Thus, North Korea's economic problems are structural. In this sense, "sanctions have caged the North Korean economy."

The results of the US review of North Korea policy are also assessed as being based on this realistic assessment. According to White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, the Biden administration's North Korea policy is summarized as a "calibrated pragmatic approach." The Biden administration has adopted a pragmatic approach that uses a freeze on nuclear activities as an intermediate stepping stone toward complete denuclearization to promptly halt the continuous advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. However, the US is emphasizing a thoroughly calibrated approach that allows for thorough verification of North Korea's sincerity in complete denuclearization at each stage, rather than accepting North Korea's new calculation of confidence-building, nuclear freeze, and complete denuclearization as is. Therefore, positioning the Biden administration's policy between the Obama administration's "strategic patience" and the Trump administration's early "grand bargain" is a reasonable and unavoidable decision. However, the Biden administration's North Korea policy, whose full text has not been released, must address two difficult tasks. First, even if a nuclear freeze is set as the primary negotiation agenda as an intermediate step toward complete denuclearization, the differing parallel approaches of the US, China, North Korea, and South Korea must be unified. Second, to move beyond a nuclear freeze to complete denuclearization, effective confidence-building must be established between both sides regarding the sincerity of complete denuclearization and complete regime security.

VI. Pitfalls to Avoid for the New Government

The new government must understand the complexity of the North Korean issue. While the policy environment is multi-layered and complex, if the North Korea policy is single-layered and simplistic, as was the case with the Moon Jae-in administration, its effectiveness will drastically decrease, and policy costs will skyrocket. In other words, the new government must abandon the naive idea that a single "golden bullet" can solve all problems. A prime example of this simplistic, single-layered thinking is the principle of national self-determination. If, based on this principle, improving inter-Korean relations and maintaining friendly relations with North Korea become the most important policy objectives, North Korea's denuclearization will become even more difficult. Not only will the effectiveness of sanctions be reduced due to the breakdown of cooperation, but there will be no adequate means to prevent North Korea from exploiting South Korea's policies. Furthermore, it will negatively impact the South Korea-US alliance, undermining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula, and could adversely affect the technological development and competitiveness of South Korean companies, as well as the macroeconomy, in an international environment of escalating US-China confrontation.

The argument for South Korea's nuclear armament should also be avoided. From the narrow perspective of expanding diplomatic means or nuclear deterrence, the argument for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons in response to North Korea's nuclear program may arise. However, a comprehensive feasibility study would reveal that South Korea's nuclear armament is highly likely to cause fatal damage to national interests. Just as North Korea's nuclear weapons, developed for survival, paradoxically threaten their own survival, South Korea's development of nuclear weapons is likely to follow a similar path. As experienced in the 1970s, South Korea's development of nuclear weapons will inevitably face economic, technological, and security sanctions. Simultaneously, it will have negative ripple effects, leading to nuclear armament not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in Northeast Asia. In particular, the argument for nuclear armament undermines the legitimacy of sanctions against North Korea, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the sanctions currently in place. Therefore, South Korea's response to the advancement of North Korea's tactical nuclear capabilities should not be nuclear armament, but rather a comprehensive alternative that includes strengthening deterrence through conventional weapons and sharing US nuclear extended deterrence until a peaceful, non-nuclear regime is established on the Korean Peninsula.

Inter-Korean economic cooperation is not a panacea either. Both conservative and progressive governments have recognized economic cooperation as the most important leverage to influence North Korea. However, for economic cooperation to yield the intended results, at least one of the following two conditions must be met. First, North Korea's willingness to reform and open up. If the North Korean regime does not wish to reform and open up, the economic cooperation they desire will be limited to projects such as tourism, which generates foreign currency income or contributes to industrial development without affecting regime change. However, this type of economic cooperation could rather reduce the possibility of North Korea's denuclearization or reform and opening. Second, economic cooperation must be meticulously designed and implemented. Not all economic cooperation benefits the South Korean economy, and some cooperation hinders desirable changes in North Korea. Therefore, rather than treating all economic cooperation uniformly, individual projects should be pursued after a thorough assessment of their respective advantages and disadvantages, contributing to North Korea's economic development and denuclearization. Economic cooperation that fails to meet these conditions, while having significance as a pillar of North Korea policy, is unlikely to yield significant results.

VII. A New Vision for North Korea's Denuclearization

Some argue that North Korea's denuclearization is impossible and that South Korea should accept this as a fait accompli and seek countermeasures. However, this is a hasty judgment. North Korea, due to its economic difficulties, cannot sustain a "status quo" policy for long. This means that North Korea will likely have to choose between coming to the denuclearization negotiations or attempting to change the situation through strong provocations. Therefore, the opportunity for North Korea's denuclearization still remains open. Accordingly, the new government's vision for North Korea's denuclearization should focus on the following four points.

First, as an effective and peaceful means for North Korea's denuclearization, economic sanctions are critically important, and thus, active participation in international cooperation on sanctions against North Korea is essential.[1]Other than presenting North Korea with a plan that maximizes the opportunity costs of nuclear development and possession through sanctions, while simultaneously maximizing the expected benefits of abandoning nuclear weapons, it is currently difficult to find any other peaceful method. To this end, denuclearization should be approached from the perspective of "sanctions utility" rather than "sanctions futility" or "sanctions omnipotence." First, the argument of "sanctions futility" is factually incorrect. North Korea itself acknowledges the impact of sanctions, and there is abundant empirical evidence to support this. As a specific example, at the Hanoi summit, North Korea sought an exchange of significant sanctions relief for partial denuclearization. This suggests that as the effectiveness of sanctions increases, the achievable level of denuclearization also rises. However, it is also necessary to recognize that achieving denuclearization solely through sanctions is difficult. Therefore, while enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, realism is needed regarding the level of denuclearization achievable through sanctions alone. Simultaneously, humanitarian aid for vulnerable populations in North Korea facing critical situations can reduce the unintended side effects of sanctions and is desirable from a human rights perspective.

Second, acknowledge China's role in denuclearization and seek ways to engage China together with the United States. First, the US should develop plans to cooperate with China on North Korea's denuclearization as part of its strategy toward China. Specifically, common ground should be sought between China's "dual-track parallel" approach to denuclearization and the US's "phased denuclearization after nuclear declaration and inspection" approach. To this end, South Korea and the US should consider optimal measures that increase the possibility of initiating denuclearization while reducing the probability of mid-course failure. For example, if North Korea agrees to the definition and roadmap for complete denuclearization and demonstrates sincerity, a plan could be considered where the US and China implement parallel actions in stages, and nuclear declaration, verification, and inspection are conducted at appropriate stages, not just at the entry point of denuclearization. Furthermore, measures to alleviate China's concerns regarding North Korea after denuclearization can be incorporated into a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea needs to create various spaces for cooperation with China. Examples include attempts at multilateral communities like the Northeast Asia public health and quarantine community, and the construction of Northeast Asian infrastructure connecting China's three northeastern provinces and multilateral economic cooperation for this purpose. Consideration should also be given to establishing a two-track or 1.5-track four-party or six-party consultative body for North Korea's economic development projects, with China's participation.

Third, a roadmap for North Korea's denuclearization should be developed together with the United States. This roadmap should include specific details of engagement sequenced with sanctions and phased according to the stages of denuclearization. Furthermore, engagement policies should be broadly divided into establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and supporting economic development, with detailed policy menus for each. Then, in conjunction with sanctions relief or easing, phased measures for establishing a peace regime and support for North Korea's economic development should be proposed to North Korea as a package. This will help build trust between the US and North Korea, and between South Korea and North Korea. Regarding sanctions relief, measures such as lifting the most recently adopted sanctions first, lifting sanctions sector by sector, or creating new projects for relief could be considered. The US and South Korea need to design the specific sequence and content of sanctions relief and engagement to contribute to North Korea's permanent denuclearization. If the method and sequence of sanctions relief, and the content of engagement, are flawed, the momentum for further denuclearization could be lost, necessitating professional and meticulous review.

Fourth, a plan for the survival and prosperity of a completely denuclearized North Korea is needed. To this end, a development strategy aimed at division of labor, mutual benefit, and integration of South and North Korean economies must be established. This must include enhancing North Korea's human capital, including nurturing high-level talent, upgrading technology, providing South Korea's tangible and intangible infrastructure, and facilitating North Korea's accession to international financial institutions.

Fifth, while efforts for sanctions, deterrence, and engagement are essential for North Korea's denuclearization, ultimately, it is crucial to help North Korea establish its own new vision for survival and prosperity in the 21st century, rather than remaining at its current 19th-century level, from a perspective of co-evolution. Above all, information access for North Korea is essential for this. For North Korea to become a new protagonist in the 21st-century Asia-Pacific order, information access is indispensable for accurately calculating its core national interests in the 21st century. Information access encompasses building statistics, acquiring knowledge, and developing capabilities in North Korea. Therefore, methods should be sought to ensure that South Korea's North Korea policy contributes to North Korea's information access. To this end, consideration should also be given to supporting the education of North Korean officials and experts and academic exchanges with other countries.

VIII. A New Vision for the Survival and Prosperity of a Denuclearized North Korea

The new government's North Korea policy requires a new vision for North Korea's denuclearization, along with a new vision for North Korea's survival and prosperity. The best-case scenario for this new vision is one where North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons and missiles and transitions to a market economy. The worst-case scenario is one where it rejects both denuclearization and regime transition. A third scenario involves pursuing one of these two options. And while less likely, a scenario of sudden change in the North Korean regime can also be considered. Policies must be prepared to address these various possibilities.

In the best-case scenario, along with North Korea's denuclearization, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will be established, and normal diplomatic relations between North Korea and the US are likely to be established. In this case, the core of engagement policy will be economic development in North Korea and the creation of synergy between South and North Korean economies. To this end, South Korea needs to provide various technical support for economic development, engage in nurturing North Korea's human capital, and strive to assist North Korea's accession to international financial institutions. Furthermore, by providing South Korea's tangible and intangible infrastructure to North Korea, it will contribute to North Korea's economic jump-start, and a future-oriented North Korea policy should be established with an eye toward the division of labor and integration of South and North Korean economies, including the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Contingency plans for the worst-case scenario must be prepared simultaneously with the best-case scenario. In this case, South Korea's security vulnerabilities will be significantly highlighted, making a policy focused on securing military deterrence unavoidable. However, even in this situation, various deterrence options should be considered, and the impact of these options on South Korean companies and the economy, as well as politics, society, future inter-Korean relations, and South Korea-China relations, must be comprehensively assessed. In other words, a general balance approach that considers South Korea's present and future, as well as the ripple effects on international relations, should be adopted, rather than a partial balance approach confined to the military sector. Furthermore, it is worth noting that appropriate economic engagement can promote the marketization prevalent in North Korea today.

In the third scenario, a combination of deterrence and engagement is necessary. If North Korea transitions to a market economy without denuclearization, the utility of nuclear weapons will decline over time. In this case, the new government must design policies to accelerate North Korea's economic development within the market economy track, along with strengthening South Korea's military deterrence. Conversely, if North Korea has denuclearized but still attempts to maintain socialism, measures to support economic change from the bottom up through inter-Korean economic cooperation can be explored. Simultaneously, practical engagement policies to improve North Korea's human rights situation should be pursued.

While the possibility of a sudden change in North Korea is low in the short term, its potential explosiveness is very high. In particular, if a sudden change occurs in North Korea amidst worsening US-China conflict, it is difficult to predict how this situation will unfold and how far its impact will extend. However, as the possibility of such an event cannot be entirely ruled out, preparations are necessary. Looking at the experiences of German reunification and regime transitions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the shock of unprepared reunification and regime transition was immense.

IX. Institutional Improvements for a New North Korea Policy

The new government's new vision for North Korea policy requires analytical and imaginative capabilities that extend beyond inter-Korean relations to encompass US-China relations, more than ever before. It is also unfolding across a complex stage involving diplomacy, security, economics, technology, culture, and ecology. Therefore, the new government must improve the governance of its North Korea policy. Strengthening inter-agency communication and coordination on North Korea's nuclear program and North Korea policy, as well as reforming related institutions, is paramount. The National Security Council (NSC) needs institutional supplementation to comprehensively pursue the new North Korea policy. Furthermore, a standing network organization of ministers and working-level officials from relevant ministries is crucial for efficiently implementing this new vision for North Korea. ■

[1]One discussant asked about the difference between this approach and the "denuclearization, openness, 3000" policy of the Lee Myung-bak administration. The differences are as follows. First, it is an unavoidable choice due to changed circumstances. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, North Korea's nuclear possession was not yet a fait accompli, so a different approach could have been taken. However, now that North Korea is a de facto nuclear state, there is no better alternative (Kim Byung-yeon, 2020). Second, the probability of success for sanctions and pressure has increased. It was nearly impossible to drive North Korea's denuclearization through sanctions and pressure solely by South Korea, as in the "denuclearization, openness, 3000" policy. However, currently, sanctions are being implemented within the framework of international cooperation through UN sanctions against North Korea, creating an environment where this approach can work.

■ Author: Kim Byung-yeonProfessor of Economics, Seoul National University. Ph.D. in Economics from Oxford University. He has held positions as a professor at the University of Essex, UK, and Sogang University, and has received awards such as the National Academy of Sciences Award of Korea (2018), Seoul National University Research Award (2018), The Nier Foundation Research Award (2019), the Korean Economic Association Cheongram Award (2005), and the T.S. Ashton Prize from the Economic History Society, UK. His representative works include Unveiling the North Korean Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

■ Author: Ha Young-sunChairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus of Seoul National University. He obtained a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington, USA, and has served as a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, a visiting fellow at the Princeton University Center for International Studies, a visiting fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden, Director of the Seoul National University Institute of International Affairs, Director of the Institute of American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research on a New Era of Korea-Japan Relations, member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and member of the Senior Advisory Group for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparatory Committee. He is currently Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited volumes include "The Global Politics of Love: War and Peace," "A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity," "The Competition to Build the Asia-Pacific Order between the US and China," and "The International Politics of Four Tributaries: An Analysis of Joseon Tongsinsa and Yeonhaengrok Records from the 16th to 19th Centuries." He also wrote the "Ha Young-sun Column" for the Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo for seven years.

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung Head of Research Division, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr