[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Government Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ③_China Policy: Rebuilding Korea-China Relations Through Future-Oriented Pragmatic Diplomacy

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Professor Lee Dong-ryul argues that due to the 'three major divergences' that are changing the nature of Korea-China relations—namely, the increasing disparity in national power between the two countries, the divergence in their systems and values, and the divergence in their government and policy cycles—the relationship is at a critical juncture requiring redesign. The author adds that on a bilateral level, there are challenges in creating new engines for economic cooperation and managing the worsening negative sentiment between the two populations, as well as issues in managing the impact of the US-China confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and the resulting escalation of conflict between the two countries. This working paper presents four major tasks for resolving these issues and redesigning Korea-China relations.

Three Major Policy Tasks Regarding China

1. The possibility of renewed conflict with China is very high due to the request from ally the United States for 'China containment' and the rising anti-China sentiment domestically and internationally. The new government must establish a pragmatic, long-term China diplomacy strategy that allows for the rational resolution of conflicts with China without escalation or reproduction, and urgently establish and operationalize communication and consultation mechanisms at various levels with China. In the medium to long term, the government must strengthen its international network power through expansive diplomacy to build Korea's status and position as a middle power, thereby enhancing its independent strategic value in relation to China and preparing for the repercussions of US-China power competition.

2. While acknowledging the reality of China's 'influence and role' in the North Korean (nuclear) issue, the maximum extent of China's role that South Korea can persuade and guide must be objectively analyzed and set, avoiding over- or underestimation. In the long term, as building structural and strategic cooperation consensus and a foundation with China is crucial for preparing for changes in the future landscape of the Korean Peninsula, continuous efforts must be made to accumulate and systematize strategic dialogue and cooperation with China in the diplomatic and security spheres.

3. The core of rebuilding Korea-China relations, which face a transition, lies in establishing an evolved new economic cooperation system and securing national consensus and empathy for coexistence and mutual prosperity. To respond agilely to China's industrial advancement and the rapidly changing international political and economic environment, a close collaboration and role-sharing system among businesses, the government, and academia must be established, and based on this, advanced economic cooperation plans centered on cutting-edge technology and industries must be rapidly and flexibly formulated and pursued. Based on objective mutual understanding and respect for the differences in systems, values, and ideologies between Korea and China, efforts must be made to promote national consensus on the necessity of building a new future-oriented relationship centered on functional cooperation.

I. Introduction

Korea-China relations are at a critical juncture of rebuilding as they approach their 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties. If economic cooperation was the driving force behind the remarkable development of Korea-China relations over the past 29 years, the North Korean (nuclear) issue was a significant motive for cooperation. However, both pillars that have served as the main drivers and motives for the development of bilateral relations—economic cooperation and the North Korean nuclear issue—are at a crossroads of change. Economic cooperation between Korea and China is facing a significant transition due to THAAD, the COVID-19 pandemic, and China's industrial advancement and restructuring. In the North Korean (nuclear) issue, where South Korea has invested considerable effort in its diplomacy toward China, strategic communication and understanding between the two countries are stagnating rather than progressing. It is necessary to face the reality that despite South Korea's expectations and requests over the past 29 years, China's 'role' in the North Korean nuclear issue has not been effectively guided.

Korea and China entered an era of 10 million people-to-people exchanges in 2014, with unprecedented levels of human and cultural interaction. Furthermore, cooperation between the governments was smoother than with any other country during the COVID-19 response.[1]However, an abnormal phenomenon has occurred where mutual perceptions between the citizens of the two countries have actually worsened. US-China relations have rapidly deteriorated through the COVID-19 pandemic, and as expectations and demands for the role of the United States as an ally increase, South Korea faces a complex strategic dilemma. The core tasks of South Korea's China diplomacy now are: first, how to maintain stable relations with China while responding to the overarching trend of 'China containment' led by ally the United States? And second, how to revitalize economic cooperation with China amidst structural changes in Korea-China relations and the evolving international economic environment? In essence, Korea-China relations face the challenges of creating new engines for economic cooperation and managing the worsening negative sentiment between the two populations on a bilateral level. Additionally, a redesign of China's role in the North Korean and nuclear issues is necessary, and complex challenges must be managed, including the impact of US-China confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and the resulting escalation of conflict between the two countries.

II. Challenges Arising from the Widening 'Three Major Divergences' in Korea-China Relations

Despite the dramatic outward development trend, Korea-China relations are facing a critical historical juncture. The reason is that structural factors, specifically the widening 'three major divergences (乖離) or gaps' that are changing the nature of the bilateral relationship, are acting as the primary background. The rebuilding of the next government's China diplomacy must begin with a sober recognition of this reality in bilateral relations.

First, the power gap between Korea and China is rapidly widening. The 29-year history of Korea-China relations has paralleled China's steep rise. As the power gap between the two countries has widened faster than anticipated due to China's rapid ascent, various challenges and tasks have emerged. Particularly, in conjunction with the rapid escalation of US-China competition and confrontation, South Korea's strategic value to China has become a fluid variable dependent on its diplomacy with the US. The common agenda for bilateral consultation is shrinking, and strategic interests are diverging, leading to changes and reductions in the scope and space for cooperation. New drivers for cooperation to replace the declining existing economic cooperation models have not been clearly secured. The widening asymmetry in power also negatively impacts the mutual perceptions of the citizens of both countries.

Second, the divergence between the systems and values of the two countries is widening. Along with the widening power gap, China is strengthening its authoritarian system centered on the Communist Party's one-party rule, while South Korea has seen an elevation of citizen democracy and liberalism following the candlelight protests, leading to an expanded divergence in mutual systems and values. This is widening the gap in mutual perceptions between the citizens of both countries and expanding the space for misunderstanding and distortion. Concurrently, resistance to dependence on and alignment with China is growing in South Korea, while concerns and vigilance about South Korea's alignment with the US are escalating in China, creating a contradictory situation.

Third, the divergence between the governments and policy cycles of the two countries is becoming a structural constraint on bilateral policy cooperation. Due to the characteristics of China's one-party system, policies tend to become more long-term and continuous, whereas South Korea, due to the nature of its single-term presidency, has seen a larger amplitude in policy shifts as it attempts to achieve long-term policy goals within a short period. This results in a misalignment of bilateral policy cooperation and even a lack of trust in policies. Particularly, when long-term policy objectives vulnerable to external factors, such as denuclearization of North Korea, the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and unification, are pursued as core policy agendas by South Korea's single-term government, it has led to mutual strategic distrust and illusory perceptions, and repeated debates over ineffective 'Chinese roles'.

The widening of the 'three major divergences' is occurring in conjunction with structural, long-term changes, namely China's faster-than-expected rise and the resulting escalation of US-China competition. This can have a continuous negative impact on Korea-China relations and pose significant obstacles and constraints for the next South Korean government in conducting its China diplomacy. Therefore, South Korea's China diplomacy must be premised on a sober understanding of these structural constraints, prioritizing the prevention and management of crises and conflicts in the short term, while comprehensively preparing multifaceted structural response measures at a supra-presidential level in the long term.

Korea-China relations are rapidly transforming into a subordinate variable to the international system and environment without sufficient internal consolidation. Therefore, South Korea's China diplomacy must be conceived and conducted with complex strategic considerations that examine various bilateral, Korean Peninsula, East Asian, and global issues and disputes in conjunction. On the bilateral level, there are tasks to resolve the imbalance of 'external prosperity and internal poverty (外華內貧),' establish a management system to prepare for conflicts and crises, and secure new drivers for cooperation through phased, substantive consolidation. On the Korean Peninsula level, the reality of 'sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams (同床異夢)' in strategic terms must be soberly recognized, and various strategic options must be conceived and prepared to manage the repercussions and impacts of exogenous variables. Furthermore, on the East Asian and global levels, expansive diplomacy must be actively pursued to secure Korea's status as a middle power in the long term, thereby creating independent positioning and strategic value that can allow Korea to seek a certain role amidst the vortex of US-China confrontation and competition.

III. Four Major Policy Tasks Regarding China

1. Managing Korea's Conflicts with China and Producing Independent Strategic Value

1) In the short term, minimizing the impact of US-China strategic competition on the Korean Peninsula and strengthening diplomacy for conflict prevention and management with China

The confrontation and conflict between the United States and China, in a broad sense, possess the characteristics of power competition, and are likely to continue to escalate in the future, with the possibility of repercussions reaching the Korean Peninsula increasing. Therefore, preparations for both the short and medium-to-long term must be made. In the short term, awareness is needed regarding situations where South Korea inadvertently creates a dilemma of choice amidst US-China competition. By relying on the roles of major powers to achieve long-term national policy objectives within their term, governments have inadvertently invited the conflict and competition between the US and China onto the Korean Peninsula. For example, the Park Geun-hye administration, in its pursuit of 'unification jackpot,' inadvertently led to the expansion of US-China competition to the Korean Peninsula over the THAAD deployment issue during the process of persuading or pressuring China, which played a behind-the-scenes role in pressuring North Korea. The Moon Jae-in administration, by focusing on inter-Korean and inter-Korean dialogue to achieve the 'Korean Peninsula peace process and denuclearization,' inadvertently stimulated US-China competition for influence surrounding the Korean Peninsula issue as the 'China exclusion theory' emerged and North Korea-China relations were normalized.

While it is clear that unification and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula are critical national tasks for South Korea, it is necessary to learn the lesson that there are practical limitations to resolving them within a single term. Each administration has, in the process of hastily trying to resolve these long-term tasks within its term, ultimately led to dependence on major powers and domestic political conflict. Especially in the current complex situation, where domestic conservative-progressive political confrontation is fierce and US-China conflict is escalating unprecedentedly, the linkage between domestic and foreign politics increases the likelihood of inadvertently inviting US-China competition for influence on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, as US-China competition and confrontation intensify, it is necessary to plan long-term strategies and approach national tasks related to changes in the Korean Peninsula landscape, such as unification and North Korean issues, which have a high potential for expanding into US-China conflict, with caution. Given the complex domestic and international situation where South Korea must seek sophisticated and robust strategic responses, efforts to seek cautious yet flexible strategic responses by fostering domestic collective wisdom and national consensus are more necessary than ever.

The Biden administration is likely to increase its demands on South Korea for its role as an ally, and the ROK-US alliance is likely to be strengthened. In particular, the next government is likely to face an environment where it is difficult to circumvent the ally the United States' request for 'China containment' and the international anti-China sentiment. Therefore, as conflicts due to conflicting interests between Korea and China are likely to recur, it is necessary to form a domestic rapid and complex strategic response team to prevent and manage conflicts from escalating or being reproduced, learning from the THAAD conflict, and to prepare for substantive communication and consultation mechanisms with China.

Furthermore, while South Korea must fulfill its responsibilities and obligations as a US ally, it must send cautious and consistent messages and maintain policy stances to make both the US and China recognize that it has no intention or motive to contain or antagonize China. South Korea must guard against its own tendency to interpret and approach relations with the US and China in a dichotomous manner. South Korea needs to seek complex and flexible strategies that expand areas of cooperation with both countries and manage conflict factors based on national interests in each area of economic, security, and values competition and confrontation between the US and China. For example, efforts must be made to simultaneously strengthen security cooperation with ally the United States while stably maintaining functional economic cooperation with China, and conversely, the policy stance and position must be clearly and consistently maintained to ensure that expanding economic cooperation with China is not interpreted as a weakening of the alliance with the United States.

Moreover, in cases where participation in China containment is unavoidable in areas such as cutting-edge technology, finance, and international norms, it is necessary to minimize the risk of US-China conflict by structuring participation as an advanced country rather than as an ally. In this context, the South Korean government needs to strengthen its cooperation system with the EU while maintaining its policies and positions as a member of the advanced countries' club in areas such as economy, finance, and technology.

Preparations must also be made for situations where competition over values and ideologies between the US and China intensifies, and South Korea must clarify its position. South Korea must fundamentally establish its identity as an advanced country that pursues liberal democracy and a market economy, and clearly communicate domestically and internationally that its foreign policy and foreign relations are based on this identity. However, it is also necessary to clarify that this basic position and policy stance of South Korea are not aimed at targeting or pressuring any particular country, especially China.

In summary, the recovery of relations should begin by having both countries' citizens re-recognize the unique characteristic of Korea-China relations, which, from the stage of establishing diplomatic ties, have developed as pragmatic and functional relations centered on economic cooperation, irrespective of consensus on systems, values, or security. That is, despite differences in systems and ideologies with China, both countries share the experience that the development of economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges over the past 29 years has been in their national interest. Therefore, while sharing the reality that maintaining cooperation and exchange with China is in South Korea's national interest even amidst US-China competition and confrontation, new domestic and international cooperation environments and systems suitable for the new international situation must be prepared to maintain this functional development.

2) In the medium to long term, securing South Korea's identity as an advanced country and its international standing, and producing independent strategic value for China

US-China relations will likely show fluctuations with complex developments of conflict, competition, and cooperation, but in the long term, the aspect of power competition is likely to intensify. Therefore, it is important for the next government to prepare structural response measures at a supra-presidential level in the long term, along with short-term responses to current issues.

In the medium to long term, it is necessary to face the reality that Korea-China relations have become vulnerable and subordinate to US-China relations, and to prepare new strategic designs that can structurally address this. First, areas and agendas for cooperation must be developed that can enable China to perceive South Korea's strategic value and motives for cooperation in a new light, rather than solely in the context of its diplomacy with the US. To secure independent strategic value in its China diplomacy, it is important for South Korea to secure its status as an advanced country with a network and influence in the international community. Through this, China needs to be made aware that South Korea's policies and positions toward China have a significant ripple effect in the international community. In this context, expansive diplomacy that can fundamentally change South Korea's diplomatic landscape, currently biased towards major powers like the US and China, is necessary in the long term.

Currently, US-China strategic competition is the core issue and topic of international affairs, but on the other hand, a new atmosphere of 'every nation for itself' has emerged in the international community through the COVID-19 pandemic. As 'us-vs-them' power competition between the US and China is highly likely to continue in the future, the number of countries experiencing dilemmas by being mobilized in this proxy competition will increase, and a new environment may be created where solidarity among these countries is needed. To prepare for this, it is necessary to proactively diversify South Korea's diplomatic landscape from being centered on major powers to gradually expanding its international network. In short, it is necessary to prepare a long-term strategic design and vision to establish South Korea's status and position as a middle power capable of mediating US-China conflicts based on network power, in preparation for US-China power competition.

2. Redesigning the 'Role of China' in the North Korean (Nuclear) Issue and Preparing Strategic and Security Cooperation Systems with China for Changes in the Future Korean Peninsula Landscape

Korea and China share a basic consensus on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, China, prioritizing its domestic political schedule and situation, fundamentally views the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the denuclearization process, as destabilizing factors that could alter the power balance on the peninsula and therefore remains vigilant. To date, South Korean governments have arbitrarily overestimated or underestimated the 'role of China' in the North Korean nuclear issue, depending on the characteristics of their administration. In contrast, China's policy toward North Korea and its nuclear program has maintained consistency within the basic framework of maintaining the status quo. Therefore, the new government must learn from the policy errors and failures that occurred due to arbitrary interpretations based on the goals and hopes of each administration.

It is necessary to reflect on the policy errors that can result from arbitrary and hopeful assumptions that China's policy toward North Korea and its nuclear program will change according to the situational dynamics of Korea-China and North Korea-China relations. For example, one must guard against the arbitrary judgment that the development of Korea-China relations or the cooling of North Korea-China relations will directly lead to a change in China's policy toward North Korea and its nuclear program as South Korea hopes. Above all, it is necessary to objectively and accurately grasp China's policy stance and factors for change regarding the North Korean and nuclear issues, and based on this, clearly define the scope of the 'role of China' that South Korea can persuade and guide. That is, while acknowledging the reality of China's 'influence and role' in the North Korean (nuclear) issue, the maximum extent of the role that South Korea can persuade and guide must be coolly assessed.

As US-China competition and confrontation intensify, inter-Korean and North Korea-US dialogues are deadlocked, and instability on the Korean Peninsula is escalating due to the worsening economic difficulties in North Korea, the traditional strategic value of North Korea to China is being re-emphasized. North Korea's strategic value as a buffer zone is being re-evaluated, and China's role as a 'backer' is becoming important for North Korea. However, there are limits to the close relationship between North Korea and China as they have different strategic objectives, dreaming different dreams.

North Korea also needs the 'China card' as an alternative to engage the United States. As China's conflict with the US worsens, its motivation to stably manage North Korea as a buffer zone increases, but on the other hand, it wants to avoid further expanding the front of conflict with the US over the North Korean and nuclear issues. Therefore, China is likely to play a minimal role in resolving North Korea's systemic instability and economic difficulties caused by prolonged sanctions and the COVID crisis, and manage the instability of the Korean Peninsula situation. However, considering China's current domestic political schedule and its relations with the US, it is unlikely that China will seek an active and progressive role in resolving the North Korean and nuclear issues.

China still considers the North Korean nuclear issue as an issue to be managed in the long term, and in the process, it will likely maintain and manage minimal relations with North Korea to minimize instability on the Korean Peninsula and ensure its influence is not weakened. While China may express its principled support for denuclearization and a peace regime, it is necessary to recognize the reality that there will inevitably be a gap between its position and South Korea's regarding specific policy directions, priorities, and timelines. Therefore, in the short term, the maximum extent of cooperation that China may pursue with South Korea regarding the North Korean issue is likely to be limited to managing North Korea's systemic instability or provocations.

As North Korea-US and inter-Korean negotiations on denuclearization are deadlocked, China's role is bound to be re-emphasized in the medium to long term. For the denuclearization process to be structured, it must unfold in close connection with measures such as ensuring North Korea's system, and its smooth landing into reform and opening up. In this process, China's role and close cooperation between Korea and China will inevitably become very important. Particularly, as it enters the stage of compensation and self-help for North Korea in the long term, close cooperation between Korea and China will become crucial. To smoothly build a division of roles and a structural cooperation foundation between Korea and China in the future, efforts to consolidate and systematize the stalled strategic and security dialogue and cooperation between the two countries must be undertaken from the present. Through this, a foundation for strengthening communication and trust between the two countries regarding the future landscape of the Korean Peninsula must be laid.

3. Strengthening National Consensus for Seeking Common Ground While Reserving Differences (求同存異) on Systems and Values, and for Coexistence and Mutual Prosperity

Since the THAAD conflict, negative perceptions between the citizens of Korea and China have rapidly expanded, and if these anti-sentiments become prolonged and structural in the future, the rebuilding of bilateral relations could become very difficult, potentially even weakening the motivation for consolidating Korea-China relations and deteriorating into a chronic conflict. As Korea-China relations involve the most diverse and frequent people-to-people exchanges in the world, the possibility of complex conflicts and clashes arising from anti-sentiments is equally high.

Analyzing the trend of public opinion surveys to date, the direct reasons for the worsening public sentiment in both countries stemmed from the THAAD deployment and economic retaliation. However, currently, structural and various circumstantial factors are combining to spread negative perceptions across the board. In particular, anti-China sentiment is rapidly spreading among South Korea's future generations, particularly those in their 20s and 30s.[2]Conversely, in China, there is a parallel phenomenon of anti-Korea sentiment and a significant decrease in interest and expectations regarding South Korea. According to a Chinese public opinion survey released by the Global Times in December 2020, the countries with the greatest influence on China were ranked as the United States (47.5%), Russia (33.8%), the EU (27.7%), ASEAN (14.8%), and Japan (9.5%). South Korea ranked 4.6%, lower than North Korea (5.2%). Among China's neighboring countries, South Korea ranked 7.2%, lower than North Korea, and was positioned 8th out of 9 surveyed countries (regions), just above Mongolia. Considering the characteristics of the Chinese system, these public opinion trends can be said to reflect the government's policy direction to some extent.

Despite the efforts of both governments to improve relations, it is necessary to soberly recognize the reality of worsening mutual perceptions and accurately grasp and understand the causes and background. First, an understanding of the more fundamental and structural reasons influencing the mutual perceptions of the citizens of both countries is needed. A dissonance in mutual perceptions has arisen due to the faster-than-expected widening of the power asymmetry between the two countries. Survey results also indicate that both countries' citizens cite 'lack of respect' as the most representative reason for their negative mutual perceptions. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the national systems and ideologies of the two countries, along with the ROK-US alliance and the special relationship between North Korea and China, are becoming major factors exacerbating negative mutual perceptions.

Notably, despite the recent trend of cooperation between the governments of Korea and China, the perception among the citizens of both countries is expanding that their systems and values are different and difficult to reconcile. When conflicts arise between the citizens of the two countries, anti-sentiment is likely to spread easily. While China is a neighboring country with a long history of exchange with South Korea, it is pursuing a unique system and development path, and has undergone rapid development and change recently. Therefore, continuous internal public diplomacy is needed within South Korea for an objective 'understanding of China'.

China is actively mobilizing nationalism and ideology to ensure regime stability and consolidate its rule, while South Korea is experiencing political over-stimulation in the aftermath of the 'candlelight protests.' China is celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party in 2021, and the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2022, where the long-term rule of General Secretary Xi Jinping will be decided, making it a politically sensitive period. South Korea has already entered a full-fledged election and political season, with fierce generational conflict between progressives and conservatives expected. Especially as the competition between the US and China surrounding the Korean Peninsula intensifies more than ever, and with a presidential election approaching, there is a high risk that the political circles and media will be tempted to mobilize diplomacy for domestic political purposes. It is necessary to be vigilant and aware to avoid the situation where domestic political confrontation extends to diplomatic issues and matters, thereby limiting diplomatic flexibility and strategic maneuverability. For example, a gentleman's agreement may be necessary for complex, fluid, and sensitive diplomatic issues where the other party is involved, refraining from excessively politicizing them during election campaigns.

Therefore, a sober understanding of the political realities facing both South Korea and China is necessary, and a new approach for mutual respect and understanding is required. In short, it is necessary to form a consensus on the need to face and manage the serious reality that negative sentiments between the citizens of Korea and China are interacting and worsening due to structural factors, as observed by the media and opinion leaders of both countries. It is necessary to seek the development of relations from a pragmatic perspective, re-recognizing the 'original intention' that Korea-China relations, from the stage of establishing diplomatic ties, operated based on functional cooperation under the premise of mutually overlooking differences in values and ideologies.

4. Designing a New Future-Oriented Cooperation System with China and Pursuing Pragmatic Relationship Consolidation

Over the past 29 years, Korea-China relations have shown a remarkable quantitative development trend, but the process of consolidating the foundation of the relationship has not been sufficiently pursued. The bilateral relationship has rapidly transitioned into one vulnerable to the international system and environment without a solid foundation. The structural fragility of Korea-China relations lies at the background of the abnormal escalation and reproduction of the THAAD conflict. Although there has been a failure to consolidate the relationship due to the widening asymmetry, efforts to lay the foundation of bilateral relations and achieve substantive consolidation are important from now on to minimize the impact of future exogenous variables.

Korea-China relations have repeatedly fallen into deadlock due to the suspension of strategic dialogue channels that could resolve conflicts. Therefore, multi-layered communication channels for conflict prevention and management must be established and operationalized to break through deadlocks when government-level official dialogue channels are stalled.

Furthermore, a bold and rapid adjustment to the existing cooperation methods with China is necessary, considering the structural changes in the nature of Korea-China relations, China's rapid industrial advancement, and the drastic changes in the international political and economic environment due to US-China strategic competition. As the power asymmetry between the two countries has widened due to China's rapid rise, the agenda of mutual interest has changed, and cooperation agendas beyond the bilateral level have decreased. The main issues that South Korea has cooperated on and discussed with China on a bilateral level are primarily issues such as unification and the North Korean nuclear issue, which lead to dependence on China or inadvertently draw US-China competition to the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, new areas and agendas for bilateral, regional, and global cooperation must be explored beyond these issues. In short, a new design for building a new cooperation system with China suitable for the new domestic and international environment must be actively sought. To this end, it is necessary to establish a domestic comprehensive strategy cooperation and response system with China where practical and concrete collaboration among businesses, academia, and the government can proceed on a regular basis to rapidly and systematically formulate a comprehensive strategy toward China and propose response strategies.

Cooperation with China must be rapidly prepared and pursued from the perspective of managing risks associated with being neighboring countries, beyond the geographical benefits and opportunities enjoyed so far. Underlying the unusual phenomenon of spreading negative sentiment among South Korea's 20s and 30s towards China are concerns about ecological and environmental risks arising from relations with neighboring countries, such as fine dust, environmental pollution, and infectious disease outbreaks. Therefore, based on the experience of cooperation in epidemic prevention with China, efforts must be actively made to strengthen and systematize discussions and cooperation on transboundary issues such as air pollution, climate change, maritime safety, and infectious diseases. Through this, it is necessary to seize the opportunity to resolve mutual conflicts and negative perceptions while expanding areas of cooperation.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, economic cooperation has consistently been the main driver of development in Korea-China relations, and maintaining this cooperative stance remains important. The issue of South Korea's economic dependence on China has re-emerged as a topic due to lockdowns for COVID-19 prevention. Risk management for dependence on the Chinese economy must now move beyond a purely quantitative dimension to seek a qualitative transition towards the future. It has become crucial to rapidly formulate strategies and respond through organic and efficient role-sharing and collaboration between the government and businesses to closely observe the trends of China's rapidly reorganizing industries and markets, particularly in cutting-edge technology and business sectors, and to expand new areas of cooperation and market entry. Furthermore, in the regional sphere, cooperation space through multilateral platforms must be expanded by actively participating in regional multilateral cooperation such as the Korea-China-Japan FTA and RCEP, which China leads or is included in. By expanding economic cooperation with China in these diverse layers and areas, a foundation for building new, pragmatic, and future-oriented relations with China must be laid. ■

[1]The spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs exceptionally praised the Korea-China cooperation in epidemic prevention as demonstrating 'four initiatives (四个率先)'. Specifically, the spokesperson emphasized the cooperative system between the two countries by stating that they led in establishing a cooperation system for epidemic prevention, controlling COVID-19, opening a 'fast track (simplified entry procedures),' and strengthening cooperation for production recovery. “外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会,” (2020.11.30.).https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1836636.shtml(Accessed: December 20, 2020).

[2]A May 2021 Korea Research poll concluded that the 20s and 30s demographic is the core group driving anti-China sentiment. The thermometer score for China among those in their 20s was 15.9 degrees, less than half that of those in their 40s (28.3 degrees) or 50s (30.8 degrees). Those in their 30s also scored lower than the overall average of 26.4 degrees, at 21.8 degrees. Lee O-seong, “Who is the Core Group Hating Everything Chinese?,” *SisaIN*, June 17, 2021.

[3] This was the result of a survey conducted by the Global Times from December 11-17, 2020, among 1,945 adults aged 18-69 in 16 major Chinese cities including Beijing and Shanghai. “Chinese rational on China-US ties: GT poll,” (December 26, 2020).https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1211038.shtml(Accessed: December 30, 2020).

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryulDirector of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongdeok Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University, served as the President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, and is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and ethnic minority issues. His recent research includes “China's Strategy and Role in Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process,” “Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s,” “Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of the Xi Jinping Administration's 'Maritime Power' Initiative,” “Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea,” and *China's Territorial Disputes* (co-authored).

■ Management and Editing: Baek Jin-kyung EAI Research Director

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr