[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Administration Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ②_US Policy: Tasks for the New Administration for a Comprehensive ROK-US Alliance

[Note from the editor]

In this working paper, Professor Jeon Jae-seong explains that the new administration, launched in 2022, will forge an alliance relationship with the US administration of Joe Biden in a broader range of fields. In this context, the author emphasizes the importance of clarifying, when designing future ROK-US relations, what meaning Biden's diplomatic grand strategy holds within the long-term historical flow, whether it is sustainable, and what strategic factors South Korea can leverage. The paper outlines the tasks facing the next administration: clarifying South Korea's position on regional and global governance aligned with its values, presenting a sophisticated and forward-looking stance on national interest separate from values in the US-China strategic competition, and pursuing concrete measures for ROK-US technological cooperation from a pragmatic perspective, along with the task of ROK-US cooperation for North Korea's denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Three Major Policy Tasks Towards the United States

1. Amidst the US-China strategic competition, the new administration must clearly establish its own system of values and interests and conduct diplomacy with both the US and China. While it is true that the ROK and the US share many common values, principles, and interests regarding the future of the international order, South Korea must clarify its own unique values and principles pursued through societal consensus. Efforts should be made to promote cooperation in areas of US-China collaboration, maintain the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula in areas of confrontation, and ensure competition is based on principles.

2. The new administration should actively participate in the solidarity of democracies and pursue issue-based participation in the Quad, ultimately aiming for full membership. It must emphasize the premise that the Quad should become an organization that aligns with South Korea's regional vision and does not exclude any specific country, such as China. Simultaneously, concrete benefits must be secured through cooperation with the US and the Quad.

3. The new administration must maintain broad and close cooperation between the ROK and the US to promote US-North Korea cooperation for North Korea's denuclearization, as well as for North Korea's future economic development and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. It is crucial to maintain a high priority for Korean Peninsula issues in US foreign policy and strive to ensure that the process of North Korea's denuclearization becomes an area of US-China cooperation.

I. Introduction

The next South Korean government, set to emerge in 2022, will engage in a relationship with the US administration of Joe Biden across a broad spectrum. Over the course of a nearly 70-year alliance, both the ROK and the US have achieved many successes and endured trials. Amidst rapidly changing international relations, a new vision must be created for the ROK and the US to continue as allies sharing values and interests in the future. While the ROK-US summit in May 2021 addressed a wide range of shared issues, providing a strong framework for future cooperation, the new South Korean administration will face many choices regarding how to translate the principles of agreement into concrete policies. The direction of ROK-US cooperation is crucial, not only for short-term issues but also as partners in shaping the future international order in Asia and globally. Amidst the Biden administration's deepening comprehensive competition with China, the relationship between US strategy towards China, its Indo-Pacific strategy, and South Korea's regional strategy will be a critical issue directly linked to South Korea's medium- and long-term destiny.

II. The Biden Administration's Grand Diplomatic Strategy and Changes in the ROK-US Relations Environment

A major factor in the changes in South Korea's diplomatic environment in 2021 was the change in the US administration. From its inception, the Biden administration rapidly reviewed key strategies, including those concerning China, supply chains, and North Korea's nuclear program, while also addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and economic issues. It then engaged in active diplomacy through summits with Quad countries, South Korea, and Japan, as well as with the G7 and NATO countries.

The significance of the changes in the Biden administration's first year lies not only in the transition from President Donald Trump to President Biden but also in the shift in the overall direction of US grand diplomatic strategy. President Trump believed that US interests would be best served by a fundamental change in the existing liberal international order and by a unilateral diplomatic strategy rather than multilateralism. However, the Biden administration is pursuing a rapid policy shift, premised on the restoration of the liberal international order based on multilateralism and alliances as indispensable for maintaining and improving US hegemony.

Considering the changes in the first year, the Biden administration's diplomatic strategy from 2022 onwards is likely to evolve from setting basic directions to implementing more concrete and pragmatic policies. The speed of this implementation will largely depend on the availability of resources and domestic consensus to support these policies. Notably, the Biden administration's policies of competition and containment towards China have garnered bipartisan consensus despite extreme political polarization in the US, suggesting they will persist for a considerable period.

The direction of the Biden administration's foreign policy needs to be examined from the perspective of its medium- to long-term hegemonic strategy. While it is true that the nature of the unipolar world order, where the US was the sole superpower, is weakening due to shifts in the balance of power among major nations, the US itself is confident in its ability and willingness to provide global public goods, and many countries also place their hopes on US hegemonic leadership. The grand diplomatic strategy pursued by the Biden administration will be a significant variable in South Korea's diplomatic environment for the coming years. It poses considerable challenges not only to bilateral ROK-US relations but also to the US's Indo-Pacific strategy and its global strategy.

The Biden administration prioritizes resolving the COVID-19 crisis and restoring economic strength, the foundation of US hegemony, particularly by rebuilding the middle class. However, it is also pursuing long-term strategies to solidify its hegemonic foundations. Over the 30-year unipolar period since 1991, the US has experienced three major crises – 9/11, economic crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic – leading to numerous missteps in maintaining effective hegemony and providing leadership suited to a changing era. It has faced attacks from non-Western countries challenging the unipolar order, terrorist groups, and other adversaries. Furthermore, the neoliberal globalization that underpinned its hegemony has inflicted significant economic damage on the US and its capitalist allies. Unilateral US diplomacy hindered effective multilateral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, ultimately making the US itself the hardest-hit nation.

In its first year, the Biden administration has pursued a strategy of solidifying global leadership alliances with key partners such as Asian allies like South Korea and Japan, as well as the EU and G7. In an era where maintaining hegemony alone is no longer feasible, the US aims to establish sustainable leadership alliances based on values and norms, seeking to secure leadership and advantage in new arenas such as climate change, pandemics, and new technologies.

Concurrently with the US pursuit of improved hegemonic leadership based on multilateralism, alliances, and norms of human rights and democracy, its core strategy is the containment of China. The Biden administration views China as a long-term and formidable strategic competitor, shifting the paradigm from cooperation to competition. Although the Biden administration has articulated a three-pronged strategy towards China—cooperation, competition, and confrontation—competition is increasingly dominating. While cooperation is unavoidable on existential issues for both the US and China, such as preserving the global environment and preventing pandemics, as well as non-proliferation, it is clear that US-China relations will be defined by competitive coexistence. Since neither the US nor China desires competition to escalate into catastrophe or confrontation, a catastrophic phase like military conflict is unlikely in the short term, but intense competition will unfold across various sectors.

As long as the US endeavors to establish hegemonic alliances centered on human rights, democracy, and the liberal international economic order, China is inevitably defined as a force challenging the existing order in multiple domains. Particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has promoted authoritarian models as alternatives to the US, provided public health goods, expanded its economic influence, and engaged in territorial disputes, thereby asserting its power while also drawing criticism from many countries. China's territorial disputes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and with India have strained relations with Japan, India, and Southeast Asian nations. Issues concerning human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have also created tensions with European countries and the democratic international community. Over the past two to three years, marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden administration has seized the opportunity to form anti-China alliances in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, laying the groundwork for a long-term strategy of containing China.

The weakening of US hegemony and US-China competition are closely linked issues. The US has revealed weaknesses in manufacturing competitiveness, supply chain dependencies in critical sectors such as healthcare and semiconductors, and partial vulnerabilities in emerging technologies. Under the unipolar system, the US operated its economy based on market efficiency principles. However, it is increasingly striving to strengthen its competitiveness relative to China and other nations and to build sustainable supply chains. Strategic competition with China provides an effective stimulus and environment for strengthening US national power. Although the US has faced debates about hegemonic decline on several occasions, it has maintained its hegemony to date, and it seeks to leverage the current US-China competition as an opportunity to enhance its own power. This involves attracting support from allies for rebuilding the US economy, increasing the competitiveness of US industries under government intervention, maintaining financial hegemony, and preserving and strengthening leadership in emerging technologies.

This US diplomatic strategy will likely continue throughout the 2020s, characterized by strengthened US national power, enhanced alliances and partnerships, and reinforced global solidarity based on democracy, leading to a more visible outcome in the strategic competition with China. Many countries are cooperating with or aligning with the US's 'Build Back Better' strategy to advance their own interests. The US is expanding its 'Build Back Better' strategy into a 'Build Back Better World' (B3W) initiative for global governance. It intends to invest substantial funds in areas such as supporting infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region with allies, strengthening military cooperation networks, jointly developing new technologies, and cooperating on global issues like health and the environment. This initiative will provide incentives for participating countries. In June 2021, both the Democratic and Republican parties in the US passed the Strategic Competition Act with bipartisan consensus, approving a government economic strengthening plan amounting to $200 billion.

The success of the Biden administration's competitiveness enhancement strategy will determine whether it can build domestic consensus to maintain global engagement. If the Biden administration successfully navigates the COVID-19 crisis and revitalizes the middle class, leading to a successful first term, it will create a predictable diplomatic environment for South Korea. However, if the recovery of the US economy falters and diplomatic successes in countering China's challenges are not achieved, the Biden administration's standing could weaken again. Nevertheless, the support the Biden administration garnered in 2021 from allies, partners, and the international community has resonated domestically, potentially conveying the message that global engagement is more beneficial to the US than isolationist unilateralism.

When South Korea designs its ROK-US relations starting in 2022, it is crucial to clearly understand the meaning of the Biden administration's grand diplomatic strategy within the long-term historical flow, its sustainability, and the strategic factors that South Korea can leverage.

III. South Korea's National Interest in ROK-US Relations

South Korea's next administration must first clarify its objectives for swiftly concluding the COVID-19 pandemic, revitalizing the economy, and securing medium- to long-term diplomatic interests. From a national strategy perspective, the objectives of foreign policy strategy include, first, a clear endorsement and emphasis on the liberal international order. South Korea has achieved economic growth, democracy, and the status of a cultural power within the US-led liberal economic order. In the evolving international order of the 21st century, international politics is significantly shaped not only by the distribution of power but also by the distribution of identity and norms. The influence of great power politics in international affairs has diminished, while the voices and power of middle powers and the Third World have grown. The influence of international institutions, organizations, and non-state actors has also increased, and normative power, distinct from physical force, has become increasingly significant.

South Korea is not only a beneficiary of the liberal international order but also a builder and maintainer of it. In a situation where both the US and China claim to lead the multilateral order, the future leadership of the liberal, multilateral international order will not solely rest with great powers. South Korea must strive not only to realize its short-term national interests but also to envision an international order favorable to itself and exert institutional, structural, and normative power to achieve it.

South Korea can achieve continuous economic development through active foreign economic activities within an open international economic order based on multilateral norms. Therefore, there are significant shared interests with the multilateral, liberal international economic order pursued by the US. If the ideology of the liberal international order pursued by the US inherently carries the implications of great power ideology and hegemony, then the liberal order envisioned by South Korea is one that connects great powers and smaller nations, representing a different perspective from the standpoint of middle powers. It is important to establish a division of roles and a complementary relationship between the ROK and the US in promoting appropriate values and norms.

Second, the other pillar of the liberal international order is the prevention of war and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and South Korea must clarify this objective. Through various diplomatic activities in 2021, the US advocated for maintaining the military status quo, peaceful conflict resolution, enhancing crisis stability, and strengthening strategic communication. For South Korea, which has close interests in conflict-prone regions in Asia such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, maintaining the military status quo and achieving peaceful conflict resolution are paramount. By maintaining and developing the ROK-US alliance, South Korea has a significant national interest in ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula and promoting military and security stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Third, establishing South Korea's fundamental position amidst the vortex of US-China strategic competition is crucial. South Korea faces a dilemma within the US-China strategic alignment. The ROK-US alliance is indispensable for peace and coexistence between the two Koreas, while a strategic cooperative relationship with China is also important for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and for economic interdependence. Maintaining a dual strategic cooperative relationship with both the US and China is not an easy task, a dilemma shared by many countries in Asia. The Biden administration has repeatedly expressed understanding of the dilemmas faced by Asian countries and emphasized flexibility depending on the situation. Finding the optimal formula for the US and Asian countries, considering the specific circumstances of each issue and country, will be important.

It is becoming increasingly clear that forcing either the US or China into a strategic choice, even at great sacrifice, will be counterproductive. When Asian countries lean towards one side in US-China relations on an issue-by-issue basis, the great power imposing penalties and sanctions is met with criticism and opposition from other countries. If both the US and China pursue strategies of coercion based on power, an organized backlash from Asian countries will intensify, potentially leading both powers to shift towards a competition of inclusion and values. South Korea must pursue a strategy for ROK-China relations that considers both national interests and values, promoting cooperation between the US and China rather than simple strategic choices, and clarifying South Korea's position.

Fourth, a comprehensive and all-encompassing strategy towards North Korea, going beyond mere denuclearization, is necessary. Given North Korea's increasingly sophisticated nuclear capabilities, the core of the strategy towards North Korea must involve strong military deterrence, economic sanctions for denuclearization, and enhanced engagement to encourage North Korea's transformation into a normal state.

In this process, North Korea-US negotiations are a key element. South Korea has experienced that its diplomatic standing is secured when it can cooperate with North Korea and the US and guide their strategic direction. The next administration must strive to find a breakthrough for denuclearization amidst deterrence towards North Korea, and seek a path towards peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula through long-term support for North Korea's regime stability and development. The ROK-US alliance is essential in this process, and a roadmap for denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime must be developed.

Fifth, for South Korea's long-term development, it is crucial to create opportunities for national power enhancement in areas such as new technologies, while also strengthening its position as a norm-setting state in new challenges like climate change and pandemics. Amidst intensifying competition in Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies, South Korea must develop into a leader in new technologies, and cooperation with the US can provide significant benefits in this process.

At the ROK-US summit in May 2021, both countries pledged cooperation in new technologies and vaccine technology. Such cooperation, along with cooperation in other areas, must be sustained. UN Secretary-General António Guterres identifies climate and digital fields as the most crucial areas for the future. South Korea is partially taking a leading role in norm-setting and actual policy development in these two areas. ROK-US cooperation needs to continue in these fields, thereby enhancing South Korea's development opportunities.

IV. US-China Strategic Competition and the ROK-US Alliance

As partners in a military alliance, US military and security strategy towards China will emerge as a crucial pillar of ROK-US relations. In the past, South Korea has redefined its vision for the medium- to long-term future of the alliance whenever the strategic environment surrounding it changed. Now, as the US renews its military leadership and intensifies strategic competition with revisionist powers like China and Russia, it is time for South Korea to present a comprehensive vision for the ROK-US strategic alliance that serves its national interests. A comprehensive vision for ROK-US relations was presented at the ROK-US summit in 2021; therefore, a vision for the ROK-US military alliance needs to be conceptualized starting in 2022.

The core objectives of US military strategy are effective military deterrence against China and maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. First, the US is pursuing the independent strengthening of its military capabilities against China. Since late 2020, it has announced the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and is seeking ways to effectively contain China through sustained budget increases. To counter China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, the US is conceptualizing multi-domain operations encompassing land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, and is on the verge of establishing a Multi-Domain Task Force. Given that the US Indo-Pacific strategy aims to prevent changes to the status quo by China through military force, military competition between the US and China is expected to continue for a considerable period.

Second, the US is actively pursuing the strengthening and upgrading of relationships with its allies worldwide. The Quad was already revitalized during the Trump administration, and the Biden administration has continued to strengthen solidarity through summits. Beyond the four Quad countries, the Biden administration is encouraging various forms of participation from Asian allies and partner countries through working groups. While efforts will initially focus on strengthening cooperation among the four countries, concrete measures for expanding participation are likely to be developed. Ahead of the ROK-US summit in May 2021, the US made efforts to reduce South Korea's burden of participation by defining the Quad as an open, flexible, and issue-based forum. Since the Moon Jae-in administration also felt burdened by participating in the Quad as a means of containing China, it sought to diversify forms of cooperation by accepting Quad agendas centered on practical collaboration.

Through the G7 summit and NATO summit in June 2021, the US deepened cooperation with Europe, broadened the agenda of cooperation, and intensified pressure on China. While mentioning the possibility of cooperation with China, it criticized China's attempts to alter the status quo and specifically addressed human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. NATO countries, judging that China poses a multifaceted threat and systemic competition, decided to announce a new strategic concept at their 2022 summit. The fact that NATO is developing a strategic concept that refers to China-driven systemic competition for the first time in its history foreshadows containment of China across Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

Third, the US emphasizes the importance of connectivity among its allies. In this context, it repeatedly mentions the importance of ROK-Japan cooperation. The US is well aware of the difficulties in bilateral issues between South Korea and Japan and avoids taking sides, but it can be expected to actively attempt mediation. Regardless of bilateral issues between South Korea and Japan, US demands for ROK-Japan cooperation on Indo-Pacific security issues will continue. Among the various conflict zones in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea are likely to be common concerns for the ROK, the US, and Japan.

In their respective summits in 2021, the ROK and the US, and the US and Japan, explicitly stated their emphasis on freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce in the South China Sea, as well as stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait. While Japan is certain to militarily intervene in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait to defend the East China Sea, South Korea holds a different position. Nevertheless, South Korea can include a clause in the ROK-US joint statement implying that it can take diplomatic opposition and concrete responses if China uses force against Taiwan, thereby presenting a diplomatic deterrent effect against China's alteration of the status quo in Taiwan. The US will seek effective security cooperation not only between the US and its allies but also among allies by envisioning diverse roles for its allies in conflict zones within the Indo-Pacific region.

South Korea's next administration will face the task of coordinating its specific policies with the Indo-Pacific strategies agreed upon at the 2021 ROK-US summit. If the fundamental principles of the summit are not preserved due to a change in government in South Korea, or if they are not developed into concrete policies, mistrust between the new South Korean government and the US could deepen.

The two countries declared at the 2021 summit that the ROK-US relationship is "beyond the Korean Peninsula, grounded in our shared values and based on our respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific region." Therefore, the specific Indo-Pacific strategy that South Korea's next government will establish becomes a crucial factor. As both countries "commit to upholding a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, opposing all threats to the rules-based international order and undermining or weakening it," South Korea's more concrete strategic objectives are needed.

In his speech at the State Department on February 4, 2021, President Biden mentioned plans for the redeployment of US forces stationed overseas. Even during the Trump administration, the 2018 National Defense Strategy indicated a plan to disperse overseas forces concentrated in Northeast Asia to effectively contain China. While the containment of China has not yet developed into a concrete strategy within the framework of the ROK-US alliance, changes are likely to occur at the policy level, including changes in US strategic concepts, forms of cooperation with allies for multi-domain operations, the establishment of cooperative frameworks among allies, the development of new weapons for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and the redeployment of overseas forces.

V. The Next Administration's Strategy Towards the US

The policy tasks facing South Korea's next administration include the following: First, clearly defining its position on regional and global governance aligned with the values it pursues. After the Trump administration, the US abandoned its previous liberal leadership, and the Biden administration has made significant efforts to restore it. As a result of the Biden administration's efforts in its first year, many allies and partner countries are responding positively, and a democracy alliance is likely to be launched within 2021. South Korea should actively participate in the democracy alliance and pursue issue-based participation in the Quad, ultimately aiming for full membership. When the Quad was launched in 2004 following the Sumatra earthquake in Indonesia, China also participated and contributed to disaster relief. South Korea must emphasize the premise that the Quad should align with its regional vision and not exclude any specific country like China, while also securing concrete benefits through cooperation with the Quad.

China, leveraging its immense economic power, attempted to counter the Trump administration's containment efforts while simultaneously trying to fill the power vacuum created by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it ultimately faced considerable opposition. China failed to demonstrate its potential as an alternative to the US in regional and global governance through territorial disputes with neighboring countries, its 'wolf warrior' diplomacy and expansionist policies globally, and its human rights abuses. China is expected to present a new diplomatic strategy in response to the Biden administration's strategy towards China and its Indo-Pacific strategy. It will be difficult to counter the US and its allies with existing paradigms such as a 'new type of international relations,' 'community of shared future for mankind,' or 'Chinese Dream.'

South Korea needs to maintain strategic cooperative relations with both the US and China, prevent the destructive consequences of great power politics, represent the positions of middle powers, and clearly articulate the values and norms of international politics it independently upholds, such as peaceful conflict resolution and the maintenance of the liberal international order. Since defining South Korea's identity and values should stem from its own autonomous perspective rather than from changes in international politics like US-China relations, an independent value-based diplomacy is necessary. By conducting diplomacy based on values derived from societal consensus as a democratic nation, South Korea can maintain an unwavering stance amidst the architectural competition between the US and China.

Second, it is necessary to present a sophisticated and forward-looking stance on national interest, separate from values, amidst the US-China strategic competition. The ROK and the US share common values regarding the future of the international order, and thus should strive to strengthen the overall ROK-US alliance. Looking at more specific issue areas, the Biden administration has proposed climate change and the environment, health and pandemics, and nuclear non-proliferation as areas for cooperation, while territorial issues in the Indo-Pacific region will be areas of conflict and confrontation. The intermediate area of competition encompasses a wide range of fields, including economy, culture/norms, and technology.

South Korea needs to make efforts to foster more cooperative relations in areas of US-China cooperation, requiring ROK-US cooperation. While pursuing cooperation with the US in climate and health fields, South Korea can also emphasize cooperation between China and South Korea, as well as cooperation between the US and China. In areas of conflict and confrontation, South Korea must find ways to support the maintenance of the status quo without direct military intervention. South Korea is already playing a significant role in maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula at considerable cost, and the US is aware of this contribution. As the Korean Peninsula is a region where the US and China could clash and confront each other, South Korea's military role in deterring North Korea and preventing China from attempting to alter the status quo on the peninsula can be seen as contributing a pillar to the Indo-Pacific strategy. In the South China Sea and regarding cross-strait relations, South Korea can make diplomatic efforts to oppose changes to the status quo and maintain a transparent, open, and inclusive regional order.

The area of competitive issues between the US and China is the most challenging. South Korea must adopt an issue-specific strategy to maximize its national interests in areas where US and Chinese interests sharply conflict. In cases of undue economic sanctions from China when acting in accordance with the norms and principles of each area, a path of joint response through cooperation between the ROK and the US, or among allies, should be sought.

Third, with the Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies increasingly shaping future international politics, the US-China competitive landscape offers an advantageous situation for South Korea. The US policy of containing China leads to active support for its allies, so South Korea should leverage the competitive environment to enhance its national power. At the 2021 ROK-US summit, both countries agreed to cooperate in areas such as climate, global health, eco-friendly EV batteries, strategic raw materials, pharmaceuticals, emerging technologies including 5G and 6G, supply chain resilience, migration and development, and people-to-people exchanges. They also agreed to establish a comprehensive ROK-US Global Vaccine Partnership, including focus areas such as science and technology cooperation, and the global expansion of production and related materials. Promising future areas of cooperation also include clean energy fields such as next-generation batteries, hydrogen energy, and carbon capture and storage (CCS), as well as emerging technology fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), Open-RAN technology, quantum technology, and biotechnology. Partnerships in private space exploration, science, and aviation research were also agreed upon.

The direction of these agreements from 2021 will be determined by the future development of strategic cooperation between the ROK and the US. The more aligned the strategic frameworks of the ROK and the US are, the more the US will strengthen technological cooperation with South Korea, and mutual trust in technological cooperation will be built. Furthermore, cooperation on regulatory platforms for future technologies is also important, thus South Korea needs to pursue concrete measures for ROK-US cooperation from a pragmatic perspective.

Fourth, the task of ROK-US cooperation for North Korea's denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration, in consultation with the South Korean government, has inherited the Singapore Declaration and incorporated aspects of the Trump administration's North Korea policy, thereby ensuring continuity between administrations. If South Korea's next administration deviates significantly from the Moon Jae-in administration's nuclear and North Korea policies, the Biden administration's North Korea policy could face considerable confusion. South Korea's next administration needs to effectively build upon the achievements and consensus of the Biden-Moon Jae-in administrations' North Korea policies.

Given the confirmed importance of North Korea-US talks in the process of North Korea's denuclearization, South Korea must be able to demonstrate to North Korea that it can mediate North Korea-US relations within a comprehensive cooperative relationship with the US. Furthermore, it must accurately grasp the direction of US policy towards North Korea, draw out North Korea's cooperation, and strive to harmonize inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation with North Korea-US reconciliation.■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-seong_Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung EAI 연구실장

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr