[EAI Working Paper] 2022 EAI New Administration's Foreign Policy Recommendations Series ②_Policy Toward the U.S.: Tasks for the New Administration for a Comprehensive ROK-U.S. Alliance

[Editor's Note]

In this working paper, Professor Chun Jae-sung explains that the new administration, launching in 2022, will forge an alliance with the U.S. administration of Joe Biden in a broader range of fields. In this context, the author emphasizes the importance of clarifying, when designing future ROK-U.S. relations, what meaning Biden administration's foreign policy grand strategy holds within the long-term historical flow, whether it is sustainable, and what strategic factors Korea can leverage. The author outlines the policy tasks facing the next administration: a clear stance on regional and global governance aligned with Korea's values, a sophisticated and future-oriented expression of national interest independent of values in the U.S.-China strategic competition, and the pursuit of concrete measures for ROK-U.S. technological cooperation from a pragmatic perspective, along with the task of ROK-U.S. cooperation for North Korea's denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Three Major Policy Tasks Toward the U.S.

1. The new administration must clearly establish its own system of values and interests amidst the U.S.-China strategic competition and conduct diplomacy toward both countries. While it is true that the ROK and the U.S. share a significant portion of their values, principles, and interests regarding the future of the international order, South Korea must clarify its own unique values and principles pursued through societal consensus. Efforts should be made to promote cooperation in areas of U.S.-China collaboration, maintain the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula in areas of confrontation, and ensure competition is based on principles.

2. The new administration must actively participate in the community of democracies, pursue issue-based participation in the Quad to the greatest extent possible, and ultimately aim for full membership. It must emphasize the premise that the Quad should align with Korea's regional vision and not exclude any specific country, such as China. Simultaneously, concrete benefits must be secured through cooperation with the U.S. and the Quad.

3. The new administration must maintain broad and close cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. to promote U.S.-North Korea cooperation for North Korea's denuclearization, as well as for North Korea's future economic development and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. It is crucial to keep the Korean Peninsula issue high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda and strive to ensure that the process of North Korean denuclearization is integrated into areas of U.S.-China cooperation.

I. Introduction

South Korea's next government, set to emerge in 2022, will engage in a relationship with the U.S. administration of Joe Biden across a wide spectrum of areas. Over the course of nearly 70 years of alliance, the ROK and the U.S. have achieved many successes and endured trials. Amidst rapidly changing international relations, a new vision must be created for the ROK and the U.S. to remain allies sharing values and interests in the future. While the ROK-U.S. summit in May 2021 addressed a broad range of shared issues, providing significant direction for future cooperation, the new South Korean administration will face numerous choices regarding how to translate the principles of agreement into concrete policies. The direction of ROK-U.S. cooperation is crucial, not only for short-term issues but also as partners in shaping the future international order in Asia and globally. Amidst the deepening trend of comprehensive competition between the U.S. and China, the relationship between the U.S.'s grand strategy for China, its Indo-Pacific strategy, and South Korea's regional strategy will be a critical issue directly linked to South Korea's medium- and long-term destiny.

II. The Biden Administration's Foreign Policy Grand Strategy and Changes in the ROK-U.S. Relations Environment

A major factor in the changes in South Korea's foreign policy environment in 2021 was the change in the U.S. administration. From its inception, the Biden administration rapidly reviewed key strategies, including those concerning China, supply chains, and North Korea's nuclear program, in addition to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and economic issues. It then actively engaged in diplomacy through summits with Quad countries, South Korea, and Japan, as well as with the G7 and NATO countries.

The changes in the Biden administration's first year are significant not only because of the transition from President Donald Trump to President Biden but also because of a shift in the overall direction of U.S. foreign policy grand strategy. President Trump believed that U.S. interests would be advanced through unilateral diplomacy rather than fundamental changes to the existing liberal international order and multilateralism. However, the Biden administration is pursuing a rapid shift in policy, premised on the restoration of the liberal international order based on multilateralism and alliances as indispensable for maintaining and improving U.S. hegemony.

Considering the changes in the first year, the Biden administration's foreign strategy from 2022 onwards is expected to move beyond setting basic directions to becoming more concrete and pragmatic. It has a high potential to progress rapidly depending on the extent to which financial resources and domestic consensus are built to support these policies. Notably, the Biden administration's policies of competition and containment toward China have garnered bipartisan consensus despite extreme political polarization in the U.S., suggesting they will persist for a considerable period.

The direction of the Biden administration's foreign policy needs to be examined from the perspective of its medium- and long-term hegemonic strategy. It is true that the nature of the unipolar system, where the U.S. was the sole global superpower, is weakening in the balance of power among major countries. However, the U.S. itself is confident in its ability and willingness to provide global public goods, and many countries also place their hopes on U.S. hegemonic leadership. The grand strategy pursued by the Biden administration will be a significant variable in South Korea's foreign policy environment for the coming years, posing major challenges not only to bilateral ROK-U.S. relations but also to the U.S.'s regional strategy in the Indo-Pacific and its global strategy.

The Biden administration prioritizes resolving the COVID-19 crisis and restoring economic power, the foundation of U.S. hegemony, particularly rebuilding the middle class. However, it is also pursuing long-term strategies to solidify its hegemonic foundation. Over the past 30 years since 1991, during the unipolar era, the U.S. has experienced three major crises—9/11, economic crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic—leading to numerous trial-and-error attempts in maintaining effective hegemony and providing leadership suited to a changing era. It has faced attacks from various adversaries, including non-Western countries opposing the unipolar system and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the neoliberal globalization that formed the basis of its hegemony has inflicted significant economic damage on the U.S. and its capitalist allies. U.S. unilateral diplomacy hindered effective multilateral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, ultimately making the U.S. itself the greatest victim.

In its first year, the Biden administration has pursued a strategy of solidifying global leadership alliances with key partners, including Asian allies like South Korea and Japan, as well as the EU and G7. In an era where maintaining hegemony alone is impossible, the U.S. aims to build sustainable leadership alliances based on values and norms and secure leadership and advantage in new frontiers such as climate and environment, pandemics, and new technologies.

While the U.S. seeks to improve its hegemonic leadership based on multilateralism, alliances, and norms of human rights and democracy, its core strategy is to contain China. The Biden administration views China as a long-term and formidable strategic competitor and is shifting the paradigm from cooperation to competition. Although the Biden administration has articulated three main lines of strategy toward China—cooperation, competition, and confrontation—competition is increasingly dominating. While cooperation is unavoidable on existential issues for both the U.S. and China, such as global environmental preservation and pandemic prevention, and nuclear non-proliferation, it is clear that U.S.-China relations will be defined by competitive coexistence. Since neither the U.S. nor China desires competition to devolve into catastrophe and confrontation, catastrophic scenarios like military conflict are unlikely in the short term, but intense competition will unfold across various sectors.

As long as the U.S. establishes its hegemonic alliance based on human rights, democracy, and the liberal international economic order, China will inevitably be defined as a force challenging the existing order in various areas. Particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic, China has demonstrated its power through policies such as promoting an authoritarian model as an alternative to the U.S., providing global health public goods, expanding its economic influence, and engaging in territorial disputes. Simultaneously, it has become a target of criticism from many countries. China's territorial disputes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and with India have strained relations with Japan, India, and Southeast Asian countries. Tensions have also arisen with European countries and the democratic international community over issues such as human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Over the past two to three years, marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden administration has seized the opportunity to form anti-China alliances in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, laying the groundwork for a long-term strategy to contain China.

The weakening of U.S. hegemony and U.S.-China competition are closely linked issues. The U.S. has revealed weaknesses such as declining manufacturing competitiveness, reliance on vulnerable supply chains in critical sectors like healthcare and semiconductors, and partial vulnerabilities in emerging technologies. Under the unipolar system, the U.S. managed its economy based on market efficiency logic. However, it is now striving to strengthen its competitiveness, which has lagged behind China and many other countries, and build sustainable supply chains. Strategic competition with China provides an effective stimulus and environment for strengthening U.S. national power. Although the U.S. has faced debates about hegemonic decline multiple times, it has maintained its hegemony to date, and the current U.S.-China competition is also being pursued as an opportunity to enhance U.S. hegemony. The U.S. is seeking to attract the support of allies to rebuild its economy, enhance the competitiveness of U.S. industries with government intervention, and maintain and strengthen its financial hegemony and leadership in emerging technologies.

This U.S. foreign strategy will continue through the 2020s with strengthened U.S. national power, enhanced alliances and partnerships, and reinforced global solidarity based on democracy. The outcome of the strategic competition with China will become increasingly visible thereafter. Many countries are cooperating with or riding the wave of the U.S.'s 'Build Back Better' strategy to enhance their own national interests. The U.S. is expanding its 'Build Back Better' strategy to 'Build Back Better World' (B3W). It plans to invest substantial funds in areas such as supporting infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region with allies, strengthening military cooperation networks, jointly developing new technologies, and cooperating on global issues like health and the environment, which will provide incentives for participating countries. In June 2021, both the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. passed the Strategic Competition Act with bipartisan consensus, approving $200 billion in government funding for economic strengthening.

Whether the Biden administration's strategy for strengthening competitiveness will succeed will determine whether the U.S. can build domestic consensus to maintain global engagement and involvement. If the Biden administration successfully resolves the COVID-19 crisis and revitalizes the middle class, leading to a successful first term, it will create a predictable foreign policy environment for South Korea. However, if the U.S. economy fails to recover and its diplomatic efforts to counter China's challenges are unsuccessful, the Biden administration's position could weaken again. Nevertheless, the support the Biden administration garnered from allies, partners, and the international community in 2021 has resonated widely within the U.S. and may convey the message that global engagement is more beneficial to the U.S. than isolationist unilateralism.

When South Korea designs its ROK-U.S. relations from 2022 onwards, it is crucial to clearly understand the meaning and sustainability of the Biden administration's foreign policy grand strategy within the long-term historical flow, and to identify strategic factors that South Korea can leverage.

III. South Korea's National Interests in ROK-U.S. Relations

South Korea's next administration must first clarify its objectives: rapidly concluding the COVID-19 crisis, revitalizing the economy, and securing medium- and long-term foreign policy interests. From a national strategy perspective, the objectives of foreign policy can be considered as follows: First, a clear endorsement and emphasis on the liberal international order. South Korea has achieved economic growth, democracy, and the status of a cultural power within the U.S.-led liberal economic order. The international political landscape has significantly changed in the 21st century, being defined not only by the distribution of power but also by the distribution of identity and norms. The influence of major power politics in international politics has diminished, while the voices and power of middle powers and the Third World have grown. The voices of international institutions, organizations, and non-state actors have also increased, and normative power, distinct from physical force, has gained significant influence.

South Korea is not only a beneficiary of the liberal international order but also a builder and maintainer of it. As both the U.S. and China claim leadership in the multilateral order, the future leadership of the liberal, multilateral international order will not solely rest with major powers. South Korea must go beyond realizing short-term national interests and strive to envision an international order favorable to itself and exert institutional, structural, and normative power to realize it.

South Korea can achieve continuous economic development through active foreign economic activities within an open international economic order based on multilateral norms. Therefore, there is a significant overlap of interests with the multilateral, liberal international economic order pursued by the U.S. If the ideology of the liberal international order pursued by the U.S. inherently carries the implications of a major power and hegemony, the liberal order envisioned by South Korea is one with a different perspective, representing the interests of middle powers connecting major and minor powers. It is important to establish a division of roles and a complementary relationship between the ROK and the U.S. in promoting appropriate values and norms.

Second, the prevention of war and peaceful resolution of conflicts are another pillar of the liberal international order, and South Korea must clarify these objectives. Through various diplomatic activities in 2021, the U.S. has advocated for maintaining the military status quo, peaceful conflict resolution, enhancing crisis stability, and strengthening strategic communication. For South Korea, which has close interests in conflict-prone regions in Asia such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, maintaining the military status quo and achieving peaceful conflict resolution are paramount. By maintaining and developing the ROK-U.S. alliance, South Korea has a significant national interest in ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula and promoting military and security stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Third, establishing South Korea's fundamental stance amidst the vortex of U.S.-China strategic competition is crucial. South Korea faces a dilemma within the U.S.-China strategic alignment. The ROK-U.S. alliance is indispensable for peace and coexistence between the two Koreas, and a strategic cooperative relationship with China is also important for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and for economic interdependence. Maintaining a dual-sided strategic cooperative relationship with both the U.S. and China is not an easy task, a dilemma shared by many countries in Asia. The Biden administration has repeatedly expressed understanding of the dilemmas faced by Asian countries and emphasized flexibility depending on the situation. Finding the optimal formula for the U.S. and Asian countries, considering specific circumstances for each issue and country, will be important.

It is becoming increasingly clear that forcing a strategic choice upon either the U.S. or China, even at the cost of significant sacrifice, will be counterproductive. When Asian countries lean towards one side between the U.S. and China on specific issues, the major power that punishes and sanctions them becomes the target of criticism and opposition from other countries. If both the U.S. and China pursue strategies of coercion based on power, an organized backlash from Asian countries will intensify, potentially leading them to shift towards a competition of inclusion and values. South Korea should pursue a strategy for U.S.-China relations that considers both national interests and values, promotes cooperation between the U.S. and China rather than simple strategic choices, and clarifies South Korea's position.

Fourth, a comprehensive and holistic strategy toward North Korea, going beyond mere denuclearization, is necessary. Given the increasing sophistication of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, the core of the strategy toward North Korea must involve strong military deterrence, economic sanctions for denuclearization, and enhanced engagement to encourage North Korea's transformation into a normal state.

In this process, U.S.-North Korea negotiations are a key element. South Korea has experienced that its diplomatic standing is secured when it can cooperate with North Korea and the U.S. and guide their strategic direction. The next administration must strive to find a clue for denuclearization amidst deterrence toward North Korea, and seek a path toward peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula through the long-term development and security of North Korea's regime. The ROK-U.S. alliance is essential in this process, and a roadmap for denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime must be prepared.

Fifth, for South Korea's long-term development, it is crucial to create opportunities for national power growth in areas such as new technologies, while simultaneously strengthening its position as a norm-setting state in new challenges like climate and pandemics. Amidst increasingly fierce competition in fourth industrial revolution technologies, South Korea must develop into a leader in new technologies, and cooperation with the U.S. can provide significant benefits in this process.

At the ROK-U.S. summit in May 2021, both countries pledged cooperation in new technology fields and vaccine technology. Such cooperation, along with cooperation in other areas, must be sustained. UN Secretary-General António Guterres identifies climate and environment and digital fields as the most important areas for the future. South Korea is partially playing a leading role in norm-setting and actual policy development in both areas. Cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. also needs to continue in these two fields, which can enhance South Korea's development opportunities.

IV. U.S.-China Strategic Competition and the ROK-U.S. Alliance

As partners in a military alliance, U.S. strategy toward China will emerge as a critical pillar of ROK-U.S. relations. South Korea has previously redefined its vision for the medium- and long-term future of the alliance when the strategic environment surrounding it changed. Now, as the U.S. renews its military leadership and intensifies strategic competition with revisionist states like China and Russia, it is time to present a comprehensive future for the ROK-U.S. strategic alliance that serves South Korea's national interests. A broad vision for ROK-U.S. relations was presented at the ROK-U.S. summit in 2021; therefore, a conceptualization of the vision for the ROK-U.S. military alliance is needed from 2022 onwards.

The core objective of U.S. military strategy is effective military deterrence against China and maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. First, the U.S. is pursuing the independent strengthening of its military capabilities against China. Since late 2020, it has announced the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and is seeking ways to effectively contain China through sustained budget increases. To effectively counter China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, the U.S. is conceptualizing responses encompassing land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains through the concept of multi-domain operations and is on the verge of establishing a full-fledged Multi-Domain Task Force. Given that the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy aims to prevent changes to the status quo by China through military force, military competition between the U.S. and China is expected to continue for a considerable period.

Second, the U.S. is actively pursuing the strengthening and upgrading of relationships with its allies worldwide. The Quad's revitalization was already pursued during the Trump administration, and the Biden administration has continued this by solidifying solidarity through summits. The Biden administration is encouraging various forms of participation from Asian allies and partner countries, centered around working groups, beyond the four Quad nations. While efforts will initially focus on strengthening cooperation among the four countries, concrete measures for expanding participation are likely to be developed gradually. Ahead of the ROK-U.S. summit in May 2021, the U.S. defined the Quad as an open, flexible, and issue-based forum, making efforts to reduce South Korea's burden of participation. The Moon Jae-in administration also felt burdened by participating in the Quad, viewing it as a means of containing China, and thus sought to diversify forms of cooperation by accepting Quad agendas centered on practical cooperation.

Through the G7 summit and NATO summit in June 2021, the U.S. deepened cooperation with Europe, expanded the scope of cooperation, and intensified pressure on China. While mentioning the possibility of cooperation with China, it criticized China's attempts to alter the status quo and specifically cited human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. NATO countries, judging that China poses a multifaceted threat and systemic competition, have decided to announce a new strategic concept at their summit in 2022. NATO's creation of a strategic concept that mentions China's systemic competition for the first time in its history foreshadows a containment of China extending across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Third, the U.S. emphasizes the importance of connectivity among its allies. In this context, it repeatedly mentions the importance of ROK-Japan cooperation. The U.S. is well aware of the difficulties in bilateral issues between South Korea and Japan and avoids taking sides, but it can be expected to attempt active mediation. Beyond bilateral ROK-Japan issues, U.S. demands for ROK-Japan cooperation on Indo-Pacific security issues will continue. Among the various conflict zones in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea are likely to be common interests for the ROK, U.S., and Japan.

In their respective summits in 2021, the ROK and the U.S., and the U.S. and Japan, explicitly stated their emphasis on freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce in the South China Sea, as well as stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait. While Japan is certain to be militarily involved in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait for the defense of the East China Sea, South Korea holds a different position. Nevertheless, South Korea can suggest a diplomatic deterrent effect against China's alteration of the status quo in Taiwan by including a clause in the ROK-U.S. summit joint statement implying that South Korea may offer diplomatic opposition and specific responses if China uses force against Taiwan. The U.S. will seek effective security cooperation among its allies and between itself and its allies by envisioning diverse roles for its allies in conflict zones within the Indo-Pacific region.

South Korea's next government will face the task of coordinating the respective Indo-Pacific strategies agreed upon at the 2021 ROK-U.S. summit into concrete policies. If the fundamental principles of the summit are not preserved due to a change in government, or if they are not developed into concrete policies, distrust between the new South Korean government and the U.S. could deepen.

At the 2021 summit, both countries declared that the ROK-U.S. relationship is "beyond the Korean Peninsula, grounded in our shared values and based on our respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific region." Therefore, the specific Indo-Pacific strategy that South Korea's next government will formulate becomes a very important factor. Since both countries "pledge to oppose all acts that undermine, destabilize, or threaten the rules-based international order and to maintain an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific region," South Korea's more specific strategic objectives are needed.

In a speech at the State Department on February 4, 2021, President Biden mentioned plans for the realignment of U.S. forces stationed overseas. Even during the Trump administration, the 2018 National Defense Strategy reportedly mentioned the redistribution of forces stationed overseas, which were concentrated in Northeast Asia, to effectively contain China. To date, containment of China has not been developed into a concrete strategy within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, changes in U.S. strategic concepts, shifts in cooperation formats with allies for multi-domain operations, the establishment of alliance cooperation systems, the development of new weapons for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and the realignment of overseas forces are likely to cause changes at the concrete policy level.

V. The Next Administration's Strategy Toward the U.S.

The policy tasks facing South Korea's next administration are as follows: First, clearly defining its stance on regional and global governance that aligns with its values. After the Trump administration, the U.S. abandoned its previous liberal leadership, and the Biden administration has made significant efforts to restore it. As a result of the Biden administration's efforts in its first year, many allies and partner countries are responding positively, and a community of democracies is likely to be launched within 2021. South Korea should actively participate in the community of democracies, pursue issue-based participation in the Quad to the greatest extent possible, and ultimately aim for full membership. When the Quad was launched in 2004 following the Sumatra earthquake in Indonesia, China also participated and contributed to disaster relief. South Korea must emphasize the premise that the Quad should align with its regional vision and not exclude any specific country, such as China, while securing concrete benefits through cooperation with the Quad.

China, leveraging its immense economic power, managed to fend off the Trump administration's containment efforts while simultaneously attempting to fill the power vacuum created by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this ultimately met with considerable opposition. China has failed to demonstrate its potential as an alternative to the U.S. in regional and global governance through territorial disputes with neighboring countries, its so-called 'wolf warrior' diplomacy and expansionist policies globally, and its human rights abuses. China is expected to present a new diplomatic strategy in response to the Biden administration's strategy toward China and its Indo-Pacific strategy. It will be difficult to counter the U.S. and its allies with existing paradigms such as the 'new type of international relations,' 'community of shared future for mankind,' and 'Chinese Dream.'

South Korea needs to maintain strategic cooperative relationships with both the U.S. and China, prevent the destructive consequences of major power politics, represent the interests of middle powers, and clearly articulate the values and norms of international politics that it independently upholds, such as peaceful conflict resolution and the maintenance of the liberal international order. Since defining South Korea's identity and values should stem from its own autonomous perspective rather than from changes in international politics like U.S.-China relations, independent value-based diplomacy is necessary. By conducting diplomacy based on values derived from societal consensus as a democratic nation, South Korea can maintain an unwavering stance in the architectural competition between the U.S. and China.

Second, it is necessary to express a sophisticated and future-oriented stance based on calculations of national interest, separate from values, amidst the U.S.-China strategic competition. The ROK and the U.S. share common values regarding the future of the international order and should therefore strive to strengthen the overall ROK-U.S. alliance. Looking at more specific issue areas, the Biden administration has proposed climate change and the environment, health and pandemics, and nuclear non-proliferation as areas for cooperation, while territorial issues in the Indo-Pacific region will be areas of conflict and confrontation. The intermediate area of competitive issues spans a broad range, including economy, culture/norms, and technology.

South Korea needs to make efforts to foster more cooperative approaches in areas of U.S.-China cooperation and pursue ROK-U.S. cooperation. While pursuing cooperation with the U.S. in climate and health, South Korea can also emphasize the framework of U.S.-China cooperation as well as ROK-China cooperation. In areas of conflict and confrontation, South Korea must find ways to support the maintenance of the status quo without direct military involvement. South Korea is already bearing significant costs to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, and the U.S. is aware of this contribution. As the Korean Peninsula is a region where the U.S. and China could clash and confront, South Korea's military role in deterring North Korea and preventing China from attempting to alter the status quo on the peninsula can be seen as contributing a pillar to the Indo-Pacific strategy. In the South China Sea and regarding cross-strait relations, South Korea can exert diplomatic efforts to oppose the alteration of the status quo and maintain a transparent, open, and inclusive regional order.

In the competitive issue areas between the U.S. and China, which are the most challenging, South Korea must adopt issue-specific strategies to maximize its national interests where the interests of the U.S. and China sharply conflict. When acting in accordance with the norms and principles of each area, if China imposes unjust economic sanctions, a path for joint response through cooperation between the ROK and the U.S., or among allies, must be sought.

Third, the U.S.-China competition dynamic provides an advantageous situation for South Korea, given that fourth industrial revolution technologies are shaping future international politics. The U.S.'s policy of containing China leads to active support for its allies, so South Korea should leverage the competitive landscape to enhance its national power. At the 2021 ROK-U.S. summit, both countries agreed to cooperate in areas including climate, global health, eco-friendly EV batteries, strategic critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, emerging technologies such as 5G and 6G, supply chain resilience, migration and development, and people-to-people exchanges. Furthermore, they agreed to establish a comprehensive ROK-U.S. global vaccine partnership, including key areas such as science and technology cooperation, and the global expansion of production and related materials. Promising future areas of cooperation also include clean energy fields such as next-generation batteries, hydrogen energy, and carbon capture and storage (CCS), as well as emerging technology fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), Open-RAN technology, quantum technology, and biotechnology. Partnerships in private space exploration, science, and aviation research were also agreed upon.

The direction of these agreements from 2021 will be determined by the future development of strategic cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. The more aligned the strategic frameworks of the ROK and the U.S. are, the more the U.S. will strengthen technological cooperation with South Korea, and mutual trust in technological cooperation will be built. Furthermore, cooperation on regulatory platforms for future technologies is also important, so South Korea needs to pursue concrete measures for ROK-U.S. cooperation from a pragmatic perspective.

Fourth, the task of ROK-U.S. cooperation for North Korea's denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration, in consultation with the South Korean government, has secured continuity across administrations by inheriting the Singapore Declaration and partially accepting the Trump administration's North Korea policy. If South Korea's next administration shifts to a different nuclear and North Korea policy than the Moon Jae-in administration, the Biden administration's North Korea policy could face significant confusion. South Korea's next administration needs to effectively build upon the achievements and consensus of the Biden-Moon Jae-in administrations' North Korea policies.

Given the confirmed importance of U.S.-North Korea talks in the process of North Korean denuclearization, South Korea must be able to demonstrate to North Korea that it can mediate U.S.-North Korea relations within a comprehensive cooperative relationship with the U.S. Furthermore, it must accurately grasp the direction of the U.S.'s North Korea policy, draw out North Korea's cooperation, and strive to harmonize inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation with U.S.-North Korea reconciliation.■

■ Author: Chun Jae-sung_Director of the Center for National Security Studies at EAI and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung Director of Research, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr