[EAI Working Paper] Changes in Social Conflict Structure and the Reality of Political and Ideological Polarization as Seen by Koreans

Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has conducted the <Korean Identity> survey four times over the past 15 years (2005-2020). As the second working paper series based on the 2020 survey results, titled “The Korean Political World: Political Differentiation, Democracy, and Government,” we have published a working paper authored by Jeong Han-wool, Senior Researcher at the Korea Research Public Opinion Division. This report examines changes in perceptions of various social conflicts and social cleavage structures in Korean society. According to the author's analysis, since the 2000s, social conflicts in Korea have evolved into a pluralistic structure encompassing both traditional interest-based conflict factors and identity-based conflict factors. Koreans actually distinguish between traditional social conflict factors such as class, education, region, and generation, and identity-based conflict factors such as environment, gender, immigration and refugees, and LGBTQ+ issues, perceiving them as independent dimensions. Furthermore, the recent trend where perceptions of party-ideological conflict overlap and are perceived as a single dimension, while being segmented from perceptions of other social conflict factors, is a noteworthy finding. In reality, the overlap between party attitudes and subjective ideological identity is strengthening, but the degree of overlap between other social cleavages (generation, class, region) and party/ideological identity is stagnating or easing. Additionally, a phenomenon is observed where perceptions and attitudes of progressive identity groups and conservative identity groups, and progressive party supporters and conservative party supporters, converge on individual issue areas and policy debates. In particular, among Koreans, conflicting attitudes where progressive and conservative values coexist in the areas of the ROK-US alliance, freedom-order, and growth-public economy are consistently observed. Nevertheless, the author's suggestion that the illusory phenomenon of intensifying political conflict and ideological polarization in reality is a result of both major parties and camps focusing on 'partisan mobilization' instead of policy confrontation after the impeachment process, and a side effect of the rise of new media with distinct political leanings, is worth considering.

※ The following is the introduction to this working paper. Please refer to the attached file above for the full text.

I. Introduction

The social cleavage structure of a society, where various social conflicts coexist, influences its political system (partisan cleavages) and ideological cleavage structure (ideological cleavages). Political parties and systems are entrusted with the role of 'representing conflict' arising from the sharp clashes of interests among social groups over resource allocation, as well as the roles of 'political coordination' and 'social integration' to resolve conflicts through democratic procedures and institutions and to derive social consensus. While the former is a matter that determines the level of 'representation' in democracy, the latter is a matter connected to the 'accountability' of democracy. Meanwhile, ideology provides value systems and belief systems that represent specific interests in the conflict relations between social groups, justifying them, and functions to mobilize voting choices and collective action that align with interests by consolidating social groups (van Dijk 1998). Among the various social conflict cleavage structures, which cleavages are mobilized and which social groups are represented (or suppressed) influences the nature of the political/party system and ideological conflicts (Kwak Jin-young 1998; Seong Kyung-ryung 2009; Jang Hoon 2006).

In the case of Korea, during the authoritarian era, social conflicts were equated with regime instability and thus became a taboo subject, a period during which modernization and economic growth were pursued intensively. Various political, social, and economic conflict factors were suppressed. After democratization in the 1990s, social conflicts, such as the backlash from socially vulnerable classes like workers, farmers, and the poor, which had been suppressed during the authoritarian era, and the process of realizing their interests, were both an indicator of the normalization of democracy and an inevitable consequence.

Since the 2000s, concerns have been growing that social conflicts in Korea are changing from a relatively simple conflict structure to a pluralistic and complex conflict structure, and that this is intensifying polarization by overlapping with political-ideological conflicts. New conflict issues such as environment, gender, immigration and refugees, and LGBTQ+ issues, which were not included in traditional conflict categories like class, education, region, and generation, are emerging. Differentiation within traditional conflicts is also deepening. Class conflict is not only structured as labor versus capital, but also as conflict within corporations (large corporations vs. SMEs) and within labor (regular vs. irregular workers). Regional conflicts are also shifting from the traditional Gyeongsang-Jeolla conflict to conflicts between the Seoul metropolitan area and other regions, and intra-regional conflicts surrounding national projects are becoming severe. There is a growing sense of the problem that party politics and ideology, which should act as representatives of various social conflicts and mediators of social cohesion by coordinating the interests of groups, are failing to keep pace with these changes. There are even serious concerns that they are becoming the core point that exacerbates social conflicts and cleavages, and that political polarization and social conflicts are intensifying (Abramowitz 2010; Lee Jae-yeol 2011; Lee Hyun-woo et al. 2016).

However, there have also been consistent arguments that the problem is not that politics and ideology amplify social conflicts by overlapping with social conflict factors, but rather that politics and ideology are detached from social group conflicts. Furthermore, stable foundations for political conflict are possible when the party system reflects new social cleavages (Kwak Jin-young 1998; Choi Jang-jip 2002; Bartolini and Mair 1990). Existing studies have primarily analyzed the overlap between social cleavages and party/ideological alignment based on social concentration, defined as "the degree to which supporters of a particular party are concentrated in specific groups within the social cleavage structure," or "how comprehensive the distribution of support for each party is within a group" in voting or party support. Discussions have particularly focused on regional, generational, class, and ideological conflict structures, with debates centering on whether generational and ideological cleavages, which have prominently emerged since the 2000s, have replaced regional cleavages (Kwak Jin-young & Kim Eun-kyung 2018).

While numerous discussions have taken place regarding this matter, several limitations are apparent. First, with the exception of some studies, most have focused on cross-sectional research at specific points in time rather than examining longitudinal trends (Kwak Jin-young & Kim Eun-kyung 2018; Lee Kap-yoon 2011). Consequently, there is a limitation in observing changes over extended periods. Second, most studies have concentrated on (1) regional, (2) generational, (3) ideological, and (4) class (socioeconomic conflict) cleavages in relation to political cleavages (Kang Won-taek 2016; Kwak Jin-young & Kim Eun-kyung 2018; Lee Kap-yoon 2011; Lee Nae-young 2011; Yoon Kwang-il 2018). While these discussions are important, theoretical discussions on new conflicts not explained by existing cleavages (e.g., Hyehwa Station protest, the phenomenon of men in their 20s, anti-refugee movements) are difficult to find (Lee Young-ra & Lee Sook-jong 2018). Third, most discussions assume that conflicts between social groups are conflicts of interest, and there is insufficient academic and policy interest in 'identity-based social conflicts,' which have been identified as a key characteristic of new social conflicts, and consequently, research outcomes in this area are also lacking (Jeong Han-wool, Song Kyung-jae, & Heo Seok-jae 2019).

Therefore, this study first proposes the necessity of distinguishing between 'interest-based social conflict' and 'identity-based social conflict' as a theoretical framework for analyzing new conflict factors emerging in Korean society, in addition to existing traditional cleavage structures. Based on this framework, it analyzes the long-term changes in the structure of social conflict perceptions in Korean society. For this purpose, it utilizes data from the "Korean National Identity Survey," conducted every five years from 2005 to 2020 by the East Asia Institute and JoongAng Ilbo in collaboration with Korea University's Asiatic Research Institute (2015), the Center for East Asian Co-existence and Cooperation Research (2020), and Korea Research.

Furthermore, this study aims to focus on the conditions under which the positive functions of political-ideological cleavages operate, rather than solely emphasizing their positive or negative aspects. As mentioned earlier, social conflicts can serve as a driving force for strengthening group unity and fostering social change and innovation, and political polarization also clearly has a positive function of enhancing citizens' political awareness and participation (Wagner-Pacifici and Hall 2012). For the positive functions of social conflict and ideological polarization, as well as their negative functions, refer to the studies by Abramowitz (2010) and McCarty (2019).

However, for the overlapping phenomenon of social conflict with political and ideological cleavages to function positively, it is necessary first that (1) the party/ideological system reflects socioeconomic realities (enhancing the degree of overlap), and (2) the reflected demands and interests must be transformed into actual policy confrontations and issue competition. Only then can it be considered an expansion/strengthening of the social base of parties/ideologies in a strict sense. A mere concentration of political and ideological alignment within specific social groups only shows a superficial overlap and can occur due to partisan solidarity rather than social group interests (Abramowitz 2010; McCarty 2019).

With this problem awareness, this study proceeds in the following order. First, using survey results from 2005 to 2020, it analyzes the changes in the structure of Koreans' perceptions of social conflict and empirically examines whether Koreans actually distinguish and perceive traditional interest-based social conflicts from new identity-based social conflicts. Second, it multidimensionally examines the extent to which actual political and ideological cleavages overlap with social conflict factors. Third, it will present the findings of an exploration into whether political-ideological polarization is actually intensifying and, if so, what the reasons are.

■ Author: Jeong Han-wool Senior Researcher and Research Designer, Korea Research. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Korea University. He has served as Deputy Director of the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Research Professor at Korea University's Institute for Peace and Democracy, and Solution Designer at Yeoshijae. His main research areas include political behavior, electoral politics, and perceptions of foreign security. His recent publications include <Trends and Prospects of Generational Voting Research, and the 21st General Election> (2020), <Koreans' New Security Perceptions: Changes and Continuities> (2019), and <Changes in South Korean National Identity: The Rise of 'Two Nations-Two States Identity'>(2017).

■ Managed and Edited by: Seo Ju-won, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) jwseo@eai.or.kr

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