[EAI Working Paper] Generational Analysis of Korea-Japan Relations 1: Korea-Japan Relations. A 'Self-Centered' Foreign Outlook, Japan as 'Consumption', 'Fairness' Over Anti-Japan

Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has published a working paper titled “Generational Analysis of Korea-Japan Relations: Korea-Japan Relations as Seen by the Youth Generation (MZ Generation),” the first report in a series, authored by Oh Seung-hee, Senior Research Fellow at EAI. This paper analyzes data collected over the past seven years from the <Korean Perceptions of East Asia Survey>, which EAI has conducted annually with Japan's Genron NPO since 2013. The author argues that Korean perceptions of Japan have gradually changed, particularly among individuals aged 19-39, and that these changes reflect the characteristics of the MZ generation, who view the world through a 'self-centered' lens, engage with Japan as consumers, and prioritize the value of 'fairness'.

※ The following is the introduction to the working paper. Please refer to the attached file above for the full text.

I. Introduction

In 2019, Korea-Japan relations deteriorated to their worst state since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1965. In July 2019, Prime Minister Abe implemented strengthened export control measures targeting key semiconductor materials from South Korea (such as photoresist, hydrogen fluoride, and polyimide). In August, Japan decided to remove South Korea from its list of trusted trading partners (the "white list"). In response, the South Korean public voluntarily launched a boycott of Japanese goods, and the South Korean government characterized Japan's export control measures as economic aggression, retaliating with its own export control measures against Japan, a declaration to terminate the Korea-Japan Military Information Protection Agreement (GSOMIA), and efforts toward domestic production. Ultimately, just before GSOMIA was set to expire, the South Korean government made another unpredictable decision to suspend the termination notice of GSOMIA.

In 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic plunged the world into crisis, exchanges between Korea and Japan were further severed. On August 4, after a public notice of seizure of Japanese corporate assets took effect, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide hinted at retaliation if Japanese corporate assets were sold. On August 7, Nippon Steel Corporation (formerly Sumitomo Metal Industries) filed an immediate appeal against the Korean court's order to seize its domestic assets. The liquidation of assets has been postponed for the time being, and discussions surrounding the termination of GSOMIA remain, foreshadowing a linkage and vicious cycle of historical, economic, and security issues, as well as their politicization. August has returned, and Korea-Japan relations remain in a state where finding a solution is difficult.

The worst Korea-Japan relations, ongoing since 2019, present a challenge to reflect on past bilateral relations and consider what future relations should entail. Therefore, what are the perceptions of the Korean people regarding Japan, and how do the Korea-Japan conflicts of 2019 represent a change from previous views of Japan?

To examine Korean perceptions of Japan, this study intensively analyzed the results from the past seven years (2013-2019) of the <Korean Perceptions of East Asia Survey>, conducted annually by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in collaboration with Japan's Genron NPO since 2013.[1]Among the surveys conducted since 2013, common questions were analyzed to observe trends, and specific issue-related questions were analyzed in depth. To reflect the worsened Korea-Japan relations after July 2019, questions related to Japan from the <Midterm Evaluation of the Moon Jae-in Administration>[2] conducted in October 2019, and questions related to Japan from the <Korean Identity> public opinion survey[3] conducted in May 2020, were referenced to supplement the analysis.

In the process of analyzing the accumulated survey data on Japan by the East Asia Institute, particular attention was paid to the perceptions of South Korea's youth generation regarding Japan and Korea-Japan relations. The youth generation, comprising those in their 20s and 30s, is sometimes referred to as the 'MZ generation,' composed of Millennials and Generation Z. Although not a formally established academic concept, the term MZ generation collectively refers to Millennials, born from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s (or early 2000s), and Generation Z, born from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s.[4]

Key characteristics of the MZ generation include: 1) familiarity with digital environments; Generation Z, in particular, are Digital Natives who utilize digital devices as fluently as their native language. 2) They pursue diverse life experiences (often referred to as 'Damanchu' - seeking diverse encounters). 3) They engage in 'Meaning Out,' expressing their tastes, beliefs, and convictions.[5] 4) They value work-life balance (Waralbell) and, in consumption, pursue 'Balance Is Best' (Balance Ikseon), prioritizing balance for optimal satisfaction. 5) They view the world from a 'self-centered' perspective (Mysider), prioritizing their own satisfaction. They may save money in daily life but make bold purchases for themselves, engaging in 'Flex' behavior to showcase their success and wealth.

While there are various other characteristics, the values and preferences of the MZ generation can be summarized as prioritizing individual happiness over group happiness, sharing over ownership, experiences over goods, pursuing balance, and valuing the expression of personal convictions.

Why, then, should we focus on the MZ generation? The MZ generation is growing into a core group in South Korean society, serving as the primary consumer base that gathers information through social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, and wielding political influence. The characteristics of the MZ generation in their perception of Japan and Korea-Japan relations are noteworthy because they are distinct from previous generations and are influencing the overall average, driving changes in Korean perceptions of Japan.

This paper analyzes the characteristics of the MZ generation's perceptions of Japan and Korea-Japan relations, focusing on the keywords: a 'self-centered' foreign outlook, Japan as 'consumption,' and 'fairness' over anti-Japan sentiment. The analysis method involved focusing on the responses of individuals aged 19-29 and 30-39 from the annual surveys. We adopted a method of comparing the responses of individuals aged 19-29, corresponding to Generation Z, and those aged 29-39, comprising the Millennial generation, with the average and other age groups.[6]During the analysis, it was observed that the Millennial and Generation Z cohorts sometimes exhibited similar tendencies and at other times displayed differences. Therefore, instead of grouping the 19-29 and 30-39 age groups as a single MZ generation, we comparatively analyzed the trends, differences, and commonalities of Millennials and Generation Z separately.

The structure of this paper is as follows: Chapter II analyzes the MZ generation's perceptions of Japan, examining their responses regarding impressions of Japan and Japan's national identity. Chapter III reviews the MZ generation's perceptions of Korea-Japan relations, exploring how the characteristics of the MZ generation are reflected in their responses to questions about the past, present, and future of Korea-Japan relations. Chapter IV summarizes the characteristics of the MZ generation's views on Japan and discusses whether Korean perceptions of Japan are changing. Chapter V discusses the implications of the MZ generation's views on Japan and the changes in Korea-Japan relations for the diplomatic policies of both countries.

[1]The survey was conducted annually around May-June for approximately 17-20 days through face-to-face interviews using paper questionnaires with 1,000 adult men and women aged 19 and above nationwide. Participants were randomly selected after proportional allocation by gender, age, and region according to resident registration population statistics. The maximum permissible sampling error for a sample of 1,000 respondents at a 95% confidence level is ±3.1%p.

[2]Conducted from October 24 to 29, 2019, over six days, the survey involved 1,000 adult men and women aged 19 and above nationwide, using mobile phones and email. The maximum permissible sampling error at a 95% confidence level was ±3.1%p.

[3]Conducted from May 6 to 27, 2020, the survey involved 1,003 adult men and women aged 18 and above nationwide through face-to-face interviews. Participants were randomly selected after proportional allocation by gender, age, and region. The maximum permissible sampling error at a 95% confidence level was ±3.1%p.

[4]University Tomorrow Research Center. 2018. *Trend MZ 2019*. Hanbit Biz; University Tomorrow Research Center. *Millennial-Z Generation Trend 2020*. Wisdom House.

[5]'Meaning Out' is a portmanteau of 'Meaning' (referring to conviction) and 'Coming out' (meaning to emerge from the closet), signifying the expression of one's political or social beliefs through consumption (Seoul National University Consumer Trend Analysis Center, 2017).

[6]According to the classification for studying the aging effect and cohort effect, individuals aged 18-29 can be classified as Generation Z, 30-39 as Millennials, 40-49 as Generation X, 50-59 as the 386 Generation, and those aged 60 and above as the post-war and pre-war generations (Park Young-deuk, Lee Jae-mook, 2016). This study focuses on the MZ generation and, when necessary, confirms differences through comparison with previous generations.

■ Author:Oh Seung-hee_Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Ewha Womans University. Her research areas include Japanese foreign policy, Korea-China relations, and foreign policy analysis. Her major publications include "70 Years of Post-War Korea-China Relations: From the Mao Zedong-Yoshida Shigeru Era to the Xi Jinping-Abe Era" (2019, co-authored), "Abe Administration's Asia Policy: The Othering of Asia for a Strong Japan," *Japan Studies* (2018), and "Japan's Post-War Struggle for Recognition and the Normalization of Korea-China Relations: A Recognition Theory Approach to the One-China Principle," *Korean Political Science Review* (2017).

■ Planning and Editing: Oh Seung-heeSenior Research Fellow, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) seungheeoh@eai.or.kr

[EAI Working Papers] are academic reports that identify the core issues of major domestic and international affairs and provide in-depth analysis. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not related to EAI and are solely the views of the respective authors.

Attachment: [EAI Working Paper] Generational Analysis of Korea-Japan Relations_1. Korea-Japan Relations.pdf