[NSP Research Report] The US-China Competition and North Korea

Abstract

North Korea's foreign relations have been significantly influenced by changes in the power competition among the great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula. From the early Cold War period after World War II, it was greatly affected by the competitive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Cold War ended and a unipolar order led by the United States began to form in the early 1990s, North Korean leaders started to recognize that the power structure around the Korean Peninsula was shifting unfavorably for North Korea. However, with the rapid economic and military rise of China in the 21st century, the unipolar order of the United States transformed into a power competition between the US and China, leading to a new shift in North Korea's security environment in Northeast Asia.

The rise of China, which desires the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, and the changes in US-China relations have also had a profound impact on North Korea's foreign policy. From this perspective, this paper analyzes how the structure of US-China competition has influenced North Korea's foreign relations. North Korea's foreign policy between the United States and China presents a complex picture. Of course, North Korea's foreign policy in the era of US-China competition is not a return to the policies pursued during the Cold War era of US-Soviet competition. Since conducting its nuclear weapons test in October 2006, North Korea has pursued an offensive policy, which was possible because North Korea perceived that the external environment around the Korean Peninsula was no longer the US-centric unipolar order immediately after the end of the Cold War. In the context of US-China competition, North Korea's foreign policy is clearly revealed through its nuclear tests and the international community's sanctions against North Korea. This paper examines North Korea's foreign policy through the process of North Korea's nuclear tests and the international community's sanctions in the 2010s.

Main Text

Following North Korea's third nuclear test, the possibility of changes in North Korea-China relations was mentioned, but China's policy toward North Korea did not significantly change. Although China partially implemented sanctions against North Korea despite North Korea's backlash, China did not envisage the worst-case scenario of the North Korean regime's collapse. China did not take extreme measures such as halting oil and food aid, which are the most crucial parts of its assistance to North Korea. It is known that China provided substantial food aid to North Korea in mid-2013. From this perspective, it is assessed that China at the time desired a soft landing for the North Korean issue and prioritized stability in North Korea-China relations. China was wary of the potential negative impact of instability originating from North Korea on China's economic growth and foreign strategy.

After North Korea's third nuclear test, an alliance dilemma, where North Korea sought to avoid both entrapment by China and abandonment by China, was partially at play in its policy toward China (Snyder 1984). China has strived not to undermine its strategic interests because of North Korea. Conversely, North Korea has endeavored not to be overwhelmed by China's influence or abandoned by it. In this context, China sought to leverage the US-China competition to strengthen its influence not only over North Korea but also over the entire Korean Peninsula. North Korea, too, has attempted to use the US-China competition as leverage in its policies toward China and inter-Korean relations, while simultaneously creating certain checks and balances.

Ultimately, following North Korea's fifth nuclear test, despite UN Security Council Resolution 2321, China opposes unilateral sanctions by the US, South Korea, and Japan and adheres to its fundamental principles regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated, "China urges North Korea and all relevant parties to remain calm and exercise restraint, refrain from any further actions that may escalate tensions, and urges all parties to thoroughly abide by and implement UNSC resolutions and strive to restore and resume dialogue to manage and control the current situation on the Korean Peninsula." Chinese media, while condemning North Korea's nuclear test, have emphasized that the North Korean nuclear issue is a problem between North Korea and the US/South Korea, and have criticized the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system more than the North Korean nuclear issue. This indicates that while China cannot accept North Korea's policy of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy, it accepts the demand for peace talks, signifying that China's strategy is being pursued within the framework of denuclearization and peace talks.

While externally forcing changes in the nature of the North Korean regime might seem like a way to change North Korea in the short term, in reality, external coercion is unlikely to be feasible as it would provoke significant backlash even within the external environment. Particularly, if the US-China relationship continues to be one of competition, such policies would be difficult to implement. Internal change in North Korea could begin with the ongoing marketization within the country. Therefore, policies that promote the further activation of North Korea's marketization could be more effective in achieving North Korea's denuclearization in the long run. Additionally, efforts toward informatization are needed to enhance North Korea's external openness. Ultimately, managing the current situation in the short term while developing policies that can bring about a change in the regime's nature in the long term will be the strategy for pursuing change in North Korea under the US-China competitive framework.

Author

Professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Diplomacy and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Colorado State University. His main research areas include the North Korean nuclear issue, Northeast Asian international relations, and security issues. His major publications include "International Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," "Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspective," "The Second Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy," and "Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power," as well as "North Korea's Nuclear Policy through the Lens of Prospect Theory" (2006).