[NSP Research Report] US-China Hegemonic Competition and Science and Technology Innovation

Abstract

The hegemonic competition between the United States and China is also occurring in terms of science and technology and innovation. Science and technology, in particular, are the driving forces behind military and economic power. Therefore, examining China's challenge and the US's position in science and technology and innovation contributes to assessing the future of both countries' military and economic power and the direction of hegemony. This study combines the long cycle theory of world politics leadership with innovation research to understand the implications of the ongoing US-China innovation competition for 21st-century world political hegemony. It compares the characteristics and achievements of the innovation systems of both countries. Furthermore, it examines China's efforts to lead the leading sector of the sixth K-wave, as discussed in long cycle theory, and evaluates these efforts to identify the development potential and limitations of China's innovation capabilities. In conclusion, at the current stage, while China is predicted to surpass the US in terms of R&D personnel output and R&D investment, it has not yet significantly narrowed the gap with the US in R&D outcomes such as academic papers and patents. However, the emergence of numerous innovative companies in China and the formation of innovation ecosystems in some regions are noteworthy achievements. While it is difficult to say that the center of global innovation has shifted from the US to China, it is clear that China is emerging as a new hub for innovation. China's continuous efforts to enhance its innovation capabilities, backed by explicit attention to technological innovation, inevitably pose a significant challenge to the US, the leading country in innovation. In other words, the US-China technological innovation competition is accelerating amidst a situation where China's position, marked by a mixture of confidence and inferiority due to its rapid capability enhancement yet still lagging behind the US, intersects with the US's uneasy superiority, which cannot afford to ignore China's pursuit.

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I. Problem Statement

The hegemonic competition between the United States and China is one of the most significant topics in 21st-century world politics. Will the US maintain its hegemonic status in the 21st century despite slowing economic growth, declining exports, and various domestic and international challenges? Can China's economic growth be sustained, and can China emerge as a hegemonic power surpassing the US? World political hegemony is constructed and exercised based on various factors, including military and economic power, as well as soft power such as norms and values, and the nation's will and vision. To understand 21st-century world politics centered around US-China competition, it is necessary to observe and comprehensively evaluate the hegemonic competition between the US and China in various domains.

This study analyzes the aspects of China's hegemonic challenge, particularly in terms of science and technology and innovation. Since ancient times, science and technology have been the core drivers of military power and weapon system development that determine the outcome of wars. Furthermore, since the Scientific Revolution in the West and the subsequent Industrial Revolution, science and technology have been the most crucial factors driving national economic growth. The rational and objective worldview inherent in science and technology provided an important foundation for the emergence and realization of modern values such as democratic progress. In other words, science and technology have been recognized not only as drivers of military and economic power but also as values representing rationality and universality. Examining China's challenge and the US's position from the perspective of science and technology and innovation allows us to understand the efforts each country has made for continuous innovation in a changing environment and their respective outcomes, thereby contributing to assessing the future of both countries' military and economic power and the direction of hegemony.

The US and China, recognizing the importance of technological innovation in strengthening their respective positions in the 21st century, have made various efforts to enhance their innovation capabilities and have achieved outstanding results in certain areas. This study aims to examine the technological innovation efforts and outcomes of both countries and consider their implications for the 21st-century hegemonic competition. To this end, it will first review existing research on science, technology, innovation, and world political hegemony to explore the relationship between them. Subsequently, it will compare and examine China's challenge in science and technology innovation and the current state of innovation in both countries, based on existing research on science and technology inputs, outputs, and policies. Furthermore, it will analyze the achievements and limitations of China's challenge in science and technology innovation by examining how China's challenge is unfolding in the leading sectors driving global economic growth.

II. Technological Innovation, Hegemony, and Changes in the World Political Order

1. Debates on China's Foreign Strategy: Peaceful Development Theory vs. Strategic Competition with the US

Research on world political hegemony and science and technology innovation has been conducted separately. This study aims to expand the understanding of the relationship between world political hegemony and innovation by integrating findings from hegemony research in international politics and innovation studies, and to examine the ongoing US-China hegemonic competition from the perspective of science and technology innovation. In international politics, research on world political hegemony has been discussed in theories such as Hegemonic Stability Theory, which focuses on the stability of the international political economy and the role of the hegemonic power, and Power Transition Theory, which explains the hegemonic competition among great powers. Hegemonic Stability Theory argues that the role of the hegemonic power is crucial for openness and stability in the international political economy (Gilpin 1983; Kindleberger 1973; Webb and Krasner 1989). According to Power Transition Theory, the hegemonic power is the central state leading the hierarchically formed international order with overwhelming capability and intention (Kugler 2011; Organski 1958). The theory posits that a crisis within the system begins when one of the great powers emerges as a challenger to the hegemonic power through industrialization and national strength, and that the possibility of interstate war increases when the challenger's national strength catches up to that of the hegemonic power. These theories, which perceive hegemony as dominance or leadership based on overwhelming power superiority, have drawn attention to the existence of hegemonic powers in the international political economy, focusing on the role of hegemonic powers, hegemonic succession, and war. However, they only briefly mention industrialization and economic growth as conditions for a country to rise to hegemony, without specifically analyzing the factors and circumstances that lead to the rise or decline of hegemonic powers.

The Long Cycle Theory of World Political Leadership explains the succession of hegemonic powers in the world political economy with a focus on technological innovation (Modelski and Thompson 1996). They use the concept of leadership rather than hegemony, arguing that leadership has been replaced in a roughly 100-year long cycle since 1500 and has coevolved with Kondratiev waves (hereafter K-waves), which have occurred approximately every 50 years through technological innovation. Kondratieff argued that periods of recession and prosperity in the world economy, based on indicators such as prices, wages, and savings rates, have repeated in cycles of 40-50 years (Kondratieff 1935), and Schumpeter suggested that these cycles are related to technological innovation (Schumpeter 1939). Unlike Schumpeter's development of K-waves, which focused on the dynamism of the modern capitalist economy, Modelski et al. trace back to the Song Dynasty in China, arguing that there have been 19 K-waves since 900 AD, with the rise and fall of a hegemonic power coinciding with every two K-waves. They view K-waves not as general business cycle indicators such as GDP, prices, or recessions, but as being composed of the rise and growth of leading sectors, with innovation occurring cluster-like in these sectors, driving the circulation of the world economy. Technological innovation in leading sectors occurs intensively in specific regions and countries, and the country leading the leading sector rises to become a hegemonic power by leading the restructuring of the world political-economic order and norm system. The US emerged as the world hegemonic power by leading sectors such as electricity, steel, electronics, oil, and automobiles since the late 19th century, establishing a US-led world political structure and norm system, and has maintained its hegemonic status by leading the information and communication technology innovation that has occurred since the 1970s. The current world economy is seen as being in the declining phase of the 19th cycle, with the 20th cycle beginning to emerge.

Author

Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Konkuk University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Diplomacy and received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North Carolina. His main research areas include international political economy, political economy of foreign investment, science and technology and international politics, the internet and international politics, and science and technology diplomacy. His books and edited volumes include "Network and National Strategy" (2015, co-authored), "North Korea in the World Seen Through Networks" (2015, co-authored), and "Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers" (2013, edited).