[Research Report] A New Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

1. Introduction

On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its first test of a hydrogen bomb, followed by the launch of Kwangmyongsong-4 on February 7 using long-range missile technology. This marks the sixth North Korean nuclear crisis since the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991 (see Table 1). In light of the vicious cycles experienced over the past quarter-century, this sixth nuclear crisis presents three significant characteristics that warrant particular attention. First, North Korea's nuclear and missile technology, which has continuously advanced despite the recurring cycles of nuclear crises, has demonstrated the potential for developing hydrogen bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) following the sixth nuclear crisis. If a breakthrough in the cycle is not found this time, North Korea will likely showcase more strategically significant advancements in nuclear weapons and delivery systems during a potential seventh nuclear crisis. Second, these nuclear and missile tests were a preview of the "brilliant blueprint" that the Kim Jong-un regime, now in its fourth year of rule, intends to present at the 7th Party Congress in May, the first in 35 years. Immediately after the nuclear test, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement declaring, "As long as the extremely hostile policy of the United States toward North Korea is not eradicated, there can be no halting or abandoning our nuclear development, even if the sky falls." This suggests that the Kim Jong-un regime will continue to pursue the path of parallel economic and nuclear development, even if it faces a second "arduous march" in the process of building a "strong and prosperous state" in the 21st century. Third, in the previous five nuclear crises, the involved parties attempted to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through sanctions and negotiations, but ultimately failed to prevent North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. Facing the sixth nuclear crisis, the United Nations (UN) is on the verge of its seventh, more strengthened, sanctions resolution through the Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the Security Council). South Korea, the United States, and Japan are actively pursuing more robust multilateral and unilateral sanctions than ever before, demonstrating their resolve to break the cycle of viciousness this time. These sanctions efforts, including South Korea's suspension of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, face the challenge of eliciting a change in North Korea's new policy direction, given China's limited participation.

Amidst the triple challenges of North Korea's advanced nuclear technology, the Kim Jong-un regime's strong nuclear armament policy, and the effectiveness issues of international and South Korean sanctions, preventing the vicious cycle of a seventh nuclear crisis requires a new comprehensive approach. This approach should move beyond the simplistic solutions of sanctions and negotiations that have failed over the past quarter-century, and instead focus on strengthening effective economic sanctions, establishing a new security regime for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, exploring new diplomacy for North Korean denuclearization, and promoting North Korea's self-initiated denuclearization.

2. Strengthening Effective Sanctions

Since the early 1990s, the six rounds of sanctions imposed by the international community, including the UN, on North Korea's nuclear and missile development have encompassed various measures. Regarding the sources of funding for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) manufacturing and proliferation, extensive sanctions have been placed on North Korea's trade and finance. Restrictions such as inspections and port entry bans are in place for the movement of prohibited items. Sanctions have also been imposed on the activities of individuals, entities, and diplomats involved in WMD-related matters. The import of luxury goods, related to the maintenance of the North Korean regime, is also restricted. Nevertheless, the core issue is that these sanctions are not being sufficiently implemented. Many member states lack the motivation and effective implementation mechanisms to enforce sanctions related to North Korea's WMD, and post-sanction reporting to the UN also shows limitations. Despite North Korea's continuous violations of UN resolutions through ongoing nuclear and missile tests, a multilateral and effective UN-level system capable of imposing crippling sanctions on North Korea remains inadequate.

Concurrently, there is the difficult question of whether comprehensive economic sanctions beyond those related to WMD are feasible. China and Russia, permanent members of the UN Security Council, have adopted a cautious stance on broad economic sanctions, believing that extensive sanctions on North Korea could impact the lives of its citizens and, furthermore, threaten the stability of the North Korean regime itself. Russia has tended to cautiously agree to strong sanctions on North Korea's nuclear program, as it co-created the non-proliferation regime with the United States during the Cold War and continues to seek influence in shaping the East Asian order. China, on the other hand, views North Korea as a geopolitical asset within the geopolitical landscape of East Asia, characterized by strategic competition with the United States. Consequently, China opposes high-level sanctions, considering the potential collapse of the North Korean regime resulting from extensive sanctions. China harbors suspicions that South Korean and U.S. sanctions might lead to or tolerate the collapse of North Korea. Therefore, China continues its efforts to prevent the collapse of North Korea, which carries a significant risk of negatively impacting its own strategic interests in Northeast Asia.

The United States and Japan, judging that economic sanctions limited to WMD and luxury goods have their limitations, have implemented unilateral sanctions against North Korea. Notably, the United States swiftly passed its own sanctions bill against North Korea following North Korea's fourth nuclear test and the launch of Kwangmyongsong-4. The sanctions bill, enacted through votes in the U.S. House and Senate and signed by the President, mandates sanctions on individuals and entities for North Korean actions related not only to WMD but also to human rights, cyber activities, and luxury goods procurement. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of the Treasury can designate major entities of concern for money laundering, enabling financial sanctions that could be applied to the Kim Jong-un regime's funding for governance. The bill also includes broad economic sanctions that can penalize the trade of minerals, particularly graphite and coal, which could be used to fund WMD, and incorporates a "secondary boycott" provision that mandates sanctions on third-country individuals and companies trading with North Korea.

Considering the United States' extensive influence, including its economic power, if the international community, including third countries, joins the robust sanctions led by the United States, effects beyond existing UN-level sanctions can be anticipated. In line with this, the Park Geun-hye administration of South Korea, a key party involved, has suspended operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which had been expected to contribute to North Korea's long-term change. However, the overall effectiveness of these sanctions will largely depend on the stance taken by China, the linchpin of economic sanctions against North Korea. Furthermore, if U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea expand, an agreement between the U.S. and China will be crucial. If the U.S. imposes sanctions on Chinese individuals, companies, and financial institutions without China's agreement, U.S.-China relations will inevitably deteriorate. Ultimately, the key lies in the extent to which the United States, which values economic and strategic cooperation with China, is willing to risk deteriorating relations with China to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and the extent to which China is prepared to damage its cooperative relationship with the U.S. due to differences in their North Korean nuclear policies... (Continued)

Authors

Kim Byung-yeon Professor of Economics at Seoul National University. He concurrently serves as Vice Dean of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies and Director of the BK21 Plus Program at the Department of Economics, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Oxford, UK, and has previously held positions as a professor at the University of Essex, UK, and Sogang University. His primary research areas include transition economies and applied econometrics, with a focus on former socialist countries and North Korea. He served as a member of the National Economic Advisory Council from 2011-2012 and currently holds positions as a committee member (convenor of the economic division) of the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation, a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an internal evaluation committee member for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Wi Sung-lac Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He has served as Ambassador to Russia and Chief Negotiator for Korean Peninsula Peace Process. During the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, he was in charge of North Korean nuclear affairs as Director-General for North American Affairs. From March 2009, he led the government's North Korean nuclear policy as Chief Negotiator for the Korean Peninsula Peace Process. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and joined the foreign service through the 13th Foreign Service Examination in 1979, serving as a diplomat for the Republic of Korea for approximately 36 years.

Lee Hee-ok Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Sungkyunkwan University. He has served as the Director of the Institute of China Studies at Sungkyunkwan University since its inception. His main research areas are political changes in China and international relations in Northeast Asia, and he has authored single-authored books such as "Exploration of China's New Socialism," "Exploration of China's New Democracy," and "Research on China's Grand National Strategy." He has been a visiting professor at the University of Washington, USA, a guest professor at Ocean University of China, a distinguished professor at Nagoya University, Japan, and a visiting scholar at Peking University. He currently holds concurrent professorships and visiting professorships at institutions such as Capital Normal University, Jilin University, Tianjin Foreign Studies University, and the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University. He also serves as an overseas editorial board member for prominent Chinese journals such as "Northeast Asia Forum," "China Strategy Report," and "Contemporary Korea."

Chun Jae-sung Director of the Center for International Relations at EAI, and Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He concurrently serves as the Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University, USA, and previously served as an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Sookmyung Women's University. He is currently a committee member (convenor of the diplomacy and security division) of the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. His main research areas include international political theory and the history of international relations. His recent publications include "Is Politics Moral?", "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory," "A Critical Review of Postmodernism and Realism on Constructivist International Relations Theory," "A Theoretical Study on the Emergence of European International Political Modernity," and "The Rise of Great Powers and Response Mechanisms: Theoretical Analysis and European Case Studies."

Ha Young-sun Chairman of EAI, and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington, USA, and has served as a professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. He is currently a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council and a civilian member of the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. His books and edited volumes include "Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011," "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "Korea-Japan New Era and Symbiotic Complex Networks," and "World Politics in Transition."

* This report is based on in-depth discussions and consensus reached among participants following the "North Korea Nuclear Test Response Strategy" seminar held at the East Asia Institute on February 3, 2016.