A Strong Alliance, Divided Public Opinion: A Joint Survey of South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and China

EAI, in collaboration with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) in the U.S., the Genron NPO in Japan, and the Horizon Research Consultancy Group in China, conducted a joint public opinion survey on South Korea-U.S.-Japan relations. This report is a Korean translation of the English report published by CCGA, based on the results of public opinion surveys in the four countries.

Overview

The ROK, the U.S., and Japan have a strong trilateral relationship centered on their alliance with the U.S., engaging in intergovernmental coordination and cooperation on various shared interests and threats. However, in the face of China's rise, mutual distrust between South Korea and Japan hinders the development of this trilateral relationship, despite the U.S. emphasizing its importance.

Public opinion in the ROK, the U.S., and Japan mirrors the dynamics of intergovernmental relations. Majorities in all three countries perceive their relationship with the other two as important and support the continued U.S. military presence in Asia. However, public opinion diverges on broader issues that affect the solidity of the regional alliance.

The first challenge is that the publics in South Korea and Japan view their security alliance not as a trilateral arrangement but as a bilateral issue with the U.S. This reflects a significant level of underlying distrust between the two nations. While majorities in both countries express confidence in their relationship with the U.S., only a minority in each country believes the other would act responsibly on international issues.

The survey results suggest that the shared perception in both South Korea and Japan that U.S. security commitments are essential for their own security is what binds public opinion in these two countries. While a majority in both South Korea and Japan view U.S. military support positively for their own defense, they are not favorable towards the U.S. deploying troops to defend the other country. This is particularly evident among South Koreans, with only a small minority expressing a positive view on U.S. forces defending Japan.

A second challenge for regional cooperation is how the U.S. can advance its Asia rebalance policy. Despite public support for a continued U.S. military presence, only one in ten people in South Korea and Japan supports an increased U.S. troop presence in the region. While the U.S. continues to reassure its key Asian partners, South Korea and Japan, of its commitment to their defense, public support for military strengthening measures, such as increasing naval power in the Asia-Pacific, remains low.

A third challenge concerns the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance after Korean unification. More than 70% of Americans favor maintaining the alliance post-unification, but 40% believe U.S. troops should withdraw even if the alliance continues. South Koreans are divided on the presence of U.S. forces, with 49% supporting their continued stationing and 44% opposing it.

Beyond issues related to the trilateral alliance, another significant challenge is how China's growing influence will affect regional dynamics. The joint survey across the ROK, U.S., Japan, and China indicates that while publics in all four countries agree on China's increasing influence, their expectations regarding how China will wield this influence differ. Only about two in ten Japanese and one-third of Americans believe China will act responsibly on international issues. In contrast, a majority of South Koreans believe China will handle international matters responsibly.

Finally, the East Asian perspective from China differs significantly from that of the ROK, U.S., and Japan. While Chinese respondents consider the U.S. relationship most important among their bilateral ties with the ROK, U.S., and Japan, a majority (45%) do not believe the U.S. will act responsibly on international issues. Contrary to South Korea and Japan, a majority of Chinese (58%) believe the U.S. troop presence in South Korea and Japan should be reduced, and between 56% and 82% oppose scenarios where the U.S. deploys troops to defend regional allies. Chinese respondents also express considerable concern about potential deterioration of relations and conflict with Japan, unlike their Japanese counterparts.

Introduction

The trilateral relationship among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan has been a cornerstone of East Asian security for over 60 years. Despite occasional turbulence, the past five years have seen relative stability. The three countries continue to cooperate to mitigate threats, address international issues, and protect their core national interests. While public opinion on the trilateral relationship is generally positive, a closer examination reveals fissures that warrant attention.

The survey results highlight the severity of distrust between South Korea and Japan. This mutual distrust is a critical issue that must be addressed, as it can limit the efforts and willingness of policymakers to advance national security interests. Furthermore, perceptions of China differ among the ROK, U.S., and Japan, with significant divergence, particularly between South Korean and Japanese views, on how China will exercise its newly acquired influence. Finally, given potential differences in public opinion between the U.S. and South Korea regarding the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance after Korean unification, discussions on the future of the alliance in the context of unification are necessary.

Perceptions of the Trilateral Relationship Among South Korea, the United States, and Japan

Citizens in South Korea, Japan, and the United States generally agree that the trilateral alliance is important. Majorities of South Koreans (98% important, 71% “very” important) and Japanese (89% important, 69% “very” important) believe their relationship with the United States is important. Americans also see their relationships with Japan (88%) and South Korea (83%) as important, but they are somewhat less likely than their counterparts to describe these relationships as “very” important, suggesting a slightly lower level of conviction [Figure 1].

[Figure 1] Perceptions of the Importance of Bilateral Relationships

Despite poor political relations between South Korea and Japan, publics in both countries appear to hold pragmatic views of the bilateral relationship. While fewer than half of respondents in each country describe the bilateral relationship as “very” important, absolute majorities consider it important. Nonetheless, distrust is a key feature of the bilateral relationship at the public level. Only 48% of South Koreans believe Japan will act as a responsible international citizen, and only 25% of Japanese believe South Korea will do so [Figure 2].

Americans are also uncertain about whether South Korea will act as a responsible international citizen. While 66% of Americans believe South Korea is a reliable partner (compared to 78% for Japan), only one-third (36%) are confident that South Korea will act responsibly in international affairs. By contrast, 58% believe Japan will act responsibly in international affairs. This represents a significant gap in trust between the United States’ two most important allies in Asia.

Notably, South Koreans are more likely to trust the United States and China than their own country to resolve international problems. South Korea is the only country in the survey where respondents express this view, suggesting a lack of clarity about South Korea’s role on the world stage and insufficient trust in national leadership.

[Figure 2] Perceptions of Trust in the Ability to Handle International Problems

Americans express more confidence in their own country than in regional allies to handle international problems, a finding that helps explain strong support for the U.S. military presence in the region. A 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) survey found that 64% of Americans favor the long-term presence of U.S. troops in Japan, and 55% favor the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.

The Rebalance to Asia

The survey findings on the U.S. rebalance to Asia present a significant challenge for regional policymakers. The United States continues to signal its commitment to allies, including its willingness to use force if necessary to defend them. However, despite the rise of China creating a more natural environment for increased U.S. military engagement in the region, the United States faces public opposition in both South Korea and Japan—and even within the United States itself—to implementing such a strategy.

Public opinion in the United States regarding the rebalance to Asia, announced by President Obama in 2011, has been mixed. Proposed at a time when conflict in the Middle East was easing, the rebalance signaled Asia’s growing importance to the United States. A 2012 CCGA survey found that 54% of respondents favored the rebalance, which involves shifting U.S. diplomatic and military resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia. Support rose to 60% in 2014 but has since declined, with 49% of Americans favoring the policy in 2015. This likely reflects growing concerns about the threat of extremist militants in the Middle East.

While this year’s survey did not specifically ask about the U.S. rebalance to Asia, other polling suggests that publics in both South Korea and Japan have some level of support for the policy. A 2012 Asan Institute for Policy Studies survey found that 55% of South Koreans favored the rebalance. In a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, 58% of Japanese and 50% of South Koreans—compared to 47% of Americans—responded that an increased U.S. military presence in the region is “good because it helps keep the peace.” Additionally, polling by the East Asia Institute from 2010–2015 shows increasing support for the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, rising from 48% in 2010 to 66% in 2015.

A 2015 CCGA survey asked publics in South Korea, Japan, and the United States about the appropriate size of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Majorities in all three countries (53% of Japanese, 61% of South Koreans, and 64% of Americans) prefer to maintain the current level. Support for increasing the U.S. military presence in the region, meanwhile, is very low. Compared to those who favor reducing troop levels, support for an increase is half as large in the United States and Japan and two-thirds as large in South Korea [Figure 3].

[Figure 3] Perceptions of the Appropriate Size of the U.S. Military Presence in the Asia-Pacific

China’s Challenge

China’s rise as a great power in East Asia is altering regional dynamics. Analysis of CCGA polling data suggests these shifts are becoming more pronounced over time. In surveys conducted from 1998 to 2012, Americans were asked whether Japan or China was more important to U.S. interests. In 1998, Americans believed Japan was more important than China (47% Japan, 28% China). By 2012, however, 70% of respondents said China was more important, while only 27% chose Japan.

Given the trajectory of China’s military, technological, and economic power, publics in all three countries expect China’s regional influence to grow over the next decade [Figure 4]. It is therefore unsurprising that publics in all three countries consider their relationship with China to be important. However, they differ in their views on how China will wield its expanded influence, which helps explain why South Korea and Japan hold different attitudes toward China. These differences help explain why South Korea and Japan seek common ground on their relationship with the United States but diverge on their approach to China.

[Figure 4] Perceptions of China’s Regional Influence over the Next Decade

China and Japan

Under Prime Minister Abe, Japanese attitudes toward China have taken a distinct turn. Relations between China and Japan have cooled considerably since Abe took office, and this has been reflected in public opinion. Japan is the only country among the three where a majority of respondents do not describe their relationship with China as important (42% important). This dynamic is mirrored in China, where very few respondents consider their relationship with Japan important (12%). Distrust is also a key feature of the bilateral relationship in both countries. Only 15% of Japanese believe China will act as a responsible international citizen, and only 14% of Chinese believe Japan will do so.

Public opinion in China and Japan suggests no clear consensus on how to improve bilateral relations. In Japan, 2 in 10 respondents believe that cultural exchanges, strengthening political and security ties, cooperating on global issues, or deepening economic ties would most help improve relations. In China, one-third believe that strengthening political and security ties is the best way to advance the relationship, a clearer preference than among the Japanese. Nonetheless, the lack of a clear public consensus in either country on how to improve relations indicates the difficulty of improving the bilateral relationship.

[Figure 5] Perceptions of How to Improve China-Japan Relations

South Korea and China

South Korea presents a contrasting picture, maintaining consistently friendly relations with China since President Park Geun-hye took office. This friendly relationship is reflected in public opinion, with a majority of South Koreans (71%) trusting China to act as a responsible international citizen. However, Chinese respondents do not share this view. Only 47% of Chinese respondents hold the same opinion of South Korea.

While the development of South Korea-China relations has raised concerns among experts about potential harm to U.S. interests, South Korean publics view their relationships with both China and the United States as equally important. However, they emphasize different aspects of these relationships. For South Korea-U.S. ties, they highlight security and political dimensions, whereas for South Korea-China ties, they emphasize economic aspects. While 70% of South Koreans believe it is important to enhance economic ties with China, only 15% believe it is important to enhance political and security ties to advance the relationship [Figure 6].

[Figure 6] Perceptions of How to Improve South Korea-China Relations

However, South Korea’s focus on the economic dimension of its relationship with China may prove to be a limitation. Survey data reveal that South Koreans hold a dual perception of the Chinese economy. China is seen as a huge market for South Korean products and South Korea’s largest trading partner—hence the need to strengthen economic ties—but it is also perceived as a potential threat. A 2012 Asan Institute for Policy Studies survey found that 53% of South Koreans viewed China as an economic threat, a figure that rose to 72% in 2014. This likely reflects the increasing number of people who see China as an economic threat as Chinese companies erode the position of South Korean firms both in China and abroad.

The United States and China

The U.S. government has consistently stated that its policies are not intended to contain China and has publicly encouraged better relations between South Korea and China. It has also welcomed Japan’s efforts to expand its military role.

American views of China appear to align with these government positions. Since 2006, roughly two-thirds of Americans have consistently favored accommodating China’s rise over containing it, and a 2015 survey found that a majority of Americans consider their relationship with China to be very important (55% very important, 33% somewhat important). In China, meanwhile, only 23% describe their relationship with the United States as very important, but 79% of Chinese consider the relationship important overall and more important than their bilateral relationships with South Korea or Japan.

Regardless of how important they consider each other, a lack of mutual trust remains a problem. Only 34% of Americans believe China will act as a responsible international citizen, and 46% of Chinese believe the United States will do so.

Chinese distrust of the United States is partly rooted in attitudes toward the U.S. military presence in the region, perhaps linked to fears that the United States is seeking to contain China. Clearly, a majority of Chinese respondents (58%) believe the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific should be reduced.

While security ties are the most discussed aspect of the U.S.-China relationship, relatively few Chinese believe that strengthening political and security ties is the best way to improve the overall relationship (19%) [Figure 7]. Instead, Chinese respondents prefer to strengthen economic ties with the United States (45%). Americans, meanwhile, are more evenly divided on how to improve the U.S.-China relationship. Twenty-nine percent of Americans favor strengthening economic ties, and 33% favor strengthening political and security ties. The divergence in views on strengthening political and security ties is particularly concerning, given the risks of miscalculation in East Asia.

[Figure 7] Perceptions of How to Improve U.S.-China Relations

Potential Conflict Scenarios and Expected Outcomes

Asia experts identify territorial disputes as the most likely cause of conflict in East Asia, but publics in South Korea, the United States, China, and Japan believe conflict is more likely to arise from broader issues such as competition over energy and economic resources, inter-Korean relations, and nuclear proliferation. In general, South Koreans and Japanese do not appear to be particularly concerned about relations between South Korea and Japan, or between China and Japan, or across the Taiwan Strait [Figure 8].

[Figure 8] Perceptions of the Causes and Likelihood of Conflict Among Major Powers in Asia

Of the four countries surveyed, Japanese respondents see a lower likelihood of conflict arising from all potential causes. Although a majority of Japanese believe conflict is possible due to competition over key energy resources (59%) and tensions between North and South Korea (59%), their response rates are notably lower than those of other countries. Only 4 in 10 believe that China-Japan relations are potentially dangerous (39%), and only 2 in 10 believe the same about South Korea-Japan relations (22%).

South Koreans believe conflict is more likely to occur in all situations than do Japanese respondents. For example, a majority of South Koreans believe conflict is somewhat or very likely to arise from China-Japan relations (56%) and South Korea-Japan relations (54%). However, even more South Koreans believe that competition over energy and economic resources, nuclear proliferation, and tensions between North and South Korea could lead to conflict among major Asian powers.

Although the specific options on the survey questionnaires differ somewhat by country, Chinese and Americans appear to view the situation differently. Chinese respondents believe conflict is most likely to arise from competition over energy and economic resources. They also identify China-Japan relations (72%) as a potential cause of conflict, a higher percentage than for Japan. Two-thirds of Chinese respondents believe conflict is possible due to nuclear proliferation (65%) and tensions between North and South Korea (63%), as well as the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific (65%).

Americans’ views on potential conflict arising from competition over energy and economic resources, inter-Korean relations, and nuclear proliferation are not significantly different from those of Chinese respondents. Two-thirds of Americans, like their Chinese counterparts, identify the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific as a potential source of conflict, and a higher percentage of Americans than Chinese believe China’s military buildup will cause conflict (79% U.S., 59% China).

Attitudes Toward North Korea and the Use of Force

As the survey results indicate, inter-Korean tensions remain a key security concern in the region, particularly for South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The CCGA found in separate questions that a majority of Americans consider North Korea’s nuclear program a serious threat. Slightly fewer Americans (57%) consider Iran’s nuclear program a threat. A majority of Americans favor resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic means, and support for the use of force to end North Korea’s nuclear program is low [Figure 9]. Americans are more reluctant to accept the addition of North Korean nuclear weapons than they are to dispatch military forces to destroy North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

[Figure 9] U.S. Attitudes Toward Handling North Korea

If the United States and North Korea were to engage in military conflict, it would most likely occur during a severe escalation of inter-Korean tensions. Americans are divided on whether the United States should use force to defend South Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion (47% favor, 49% oppose). In contrast, support for the use of U.S. force in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan has remained largely unchanged over 17 years (28% favor, 2015 survey).

This limited U.S. support for defending South Korea leaves room for questioning U.S. defense commitments in South Korea, but it is important to understand the context. U.S. public support for deploying troops has remained at a high level since 2014, and support for deploying U.S. troops to defend South Korea has steadily increased since reaching a low of 19% in 1974.

There are other situations in the East Asian region where the use of U.S. military force may be required, and public support varies by country and situation. Approximately one-third of South Koreans (36%) responded that they would support the dispatch of U.S. troops to defend Taiwan if China invaded it, while 27% expressed support for U.S. intervention if North Korea attacked Japan, and another 27% if China launched a military attack on Japan first. However, 91% of South Koreans support the deployment of U.S. troops if North Korea invades South Korea.

Meanwhile, a majority of the Japanese public supported the deployment of U.S. forces to defend South Korea (57%) and Japan (71%) in the event of an attack by North Korea. Furthermore, a majority of Japanese citizens also expressed a desire for the use of U.S. forces to defend Japan if China were to take preemptive military action against it (56%).

[Figure 10] Public Opinion Survey on the Use of U.S. Military Force in the Region

Implications of Future Unification

Inter-Korean unification is a frequently discussed topic, but no substantial progress has been made in recent years. While unification through the collapse of North Korea is the most likely scenario, a voluntary unification, particularly one led by the South Korean government, would be the optimal outcome for all involved parties. In the event of unification through North Korea's collapse, the ROK-U.S. alliance would likely be maintained for at least the short to medium term. In the case of voluntary unification, extensive societal discussions on the ROK-U.S. alliance and the presence of U.S. forces are expected to take place in both countries over a long period.

Eighteen percent of the American public responded that the ROK-U.S. alliance should be terminated upon unification. However, there has been a shift in public opinion regarding the maintenance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the presence of U.S. forces in Korea since the first related poll was conducted in 2010. In 2010, the proportion of respondents who believed that U.S. forces should be maintained after unification was higher than the proportion favoring withdrawal; however, as of 2015, the opposite trend is observed [Figure 11].

[Figure 11] American Perceptions of the Alliance Relationship After Inter-Korean Unification

The discussion on the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance, which is arguably the most important aspect of post-unification, will naturally take place in South Korea. Although unification is currently more of an idea than a tangible project, nearly a majority of South Koreans hold the position that "U.S. forces should be maintained even after peaceful unification" (49% in favor, 44% against). Since alliances can endure regardless of the presence of U.S. forces, opposition to the continued stationing of U.S. troops after unification is unlikely to affect the alliance itself.

Japanese citizens also appear to support the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea after unification. Forty-five percent are in favor of this, while 29% believe that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula. However, Chinese citizens have expressed a different stance, with approximately two-thirds (66%) responding that there is no need for U.S. forces to remain on the Korean Peninsula after peaceful unification is achieved.

Conclusion

While the governments of South Korea, the United States, and Japan consistently emphasize the strengths of their trilateral alliance, public opinion reveals clear vulnerabilities within this alliance that warrant discussion. Numerous issues need to be addressed, ranging from overcoming the rift in ROK-Japan relations and building trust in the trilateral approach toward China, to matters concerning the unification of the Korean Peninsula; however, resolving all these issues will not be easy.

Both South Korea and Japan fully recognize the importance of their bilateral relationship. Restoring this relationship requires political leadership at the domestic level.

The three countries of South Korea, the United States, and Japan need to maintain appropriate distance based on trust while acknowledging each other's different approaches toward China. Although there are currently no signs of a long-term and comprehensive shift in South Korea's policy toward China, and its perspective on the bilateral relationship with the United States remains very positive, the process of developing friendly relations between South Korea and China still requires careful observation. However, South Korea's friendly relations with China should be welcomed, and this should encourage China's sustained engagement in discussions on various issues. ■

Methodology

Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) – United States

This report is based on the results of a 2015 public opinion survey on foreign policy conducted by the CCGA. The survey was administered by the market research firm GfK to 2,034 adults aged 18 and over residing throughout the United States via its national online survey program, KnowledgePanel, from May 15 to June 17, 2015. The margin of error is ±2.2 to ±3.1 percentage points, varying by question.

Genron NPO – Japan

Genron NPO's survey was conducted from April 9 to April 30, 2015, among 1,000 adults aged 18 and over. The survey selected 50 regions in Japan based on 2010 demographic data and sampled 20 individuals from each region. The method used was a drop-off/pick-up survey, where questionnaires were delivered to respondents and collected a few days later. The margin of error is ±4.6 to ±6.0 percentage points, varying by question.

East Asia Institute (EAI) – South Korea

EAI's survey was conducted by Korea Research from April 17 to May 17, 2015, among 1,010 adults aged 18 and over. The survey used stratified sampling based on region, gender, and age, and was conducted through face-to-face interviews. The margin of error is ±3.1 percentage points.

Horizon Research Consulting Group – China

Horizon Research conducted a public opinion survey from August 25 to September 11, 2015, among 3,000 residents in 29 provincial-level cities aged 18 and over. Sampling was conducted using probability proportional to size (PPS), and the survey was administered through face-to-face interviews. The margin of error is ±1.8 percentage points.