Strategies for Constructing a Multilateral Order in East Asia for Coexistence and Prosperity: Beyond the Northeast Asian Peace Cooperation Initiative

EAI Research Report on the Northeast Asian Peace Cooperation Initiative

Author

Professor and Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and served as a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently the Director of the Japan Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. His main research areas include Japanese and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and global governance. Recent research achievements include "Conceptual History of Regional Space: Korea's 'Northeast Asia'," "Complex Strategies of Trade and Investment in the Korea-US FTA," "Competition in Building Regional Multilateral Economic Institutions in East Asia," and "Japanese Market Opening Between American Pressure and Korean Challenge."

Introduction

Since the dawn of the 21st century, the regional order in East Asia has undergone a profound transformation. The cooperative atmosphere that once characterized the design of multilateral institutions, under the banner of an East Asian community, has significantly weakened, replaced by a competitive dynamic among major powers. The power transition between the United States and China has challenged the U.S.-centric security order. While economic multilateralism has been institutionalized in various forms with the advancement of globalization, identity conflicts stemming from the process of modernization have resurfaced, destabilizing traditional diplomatic relations. East Asia has entered an era of regional order reconstruction. The United States, under the banner of the "Asia rebalance," has intensified its engagement in Asia on multiple levels, including strengthening traditional alliance networks, expanding partnerships, promoting regional multilateral institutions, increasing trade and investment centered on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), forward deploying military forces, and pursuing a values-based diplomacy emphasizing democracy and human rights. This strategy aims to reinforce existing orders, based on alliances for security and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) for economic relations, by adding new layers and maintaining leadership. However, under conditions requiring a scaled-back strategy due to relative economic decline, the U.S. has sought active roles from its allies to effectively manage and engage with China, which has emerged as a major power. Under the Abe administration, Japan has responded agilely to this, intensifying efforts to contain China with the U.S.-Japan alliance at its core.

Another pillar of regional order reconstruction is China. In line with its growing national strength, China is expanding its definition of core interests, pursuing anti-access and area-denial strategies to limit U.S. military influence in the Western Pacific, maintaining assertive positions in the East and South China Seas, and responding to economic issues such as pressure for RMB appreciation on a case-by-case basis with the U.S. Furthermore, China has begun to propose its own norms and institutions for defining values and behavioral standards. Criticizing the Cold War-era alliance system as the basis for East Asian security order, China has put forth the norm of "new security concepts" centered on common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, and proposed the "Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia" (CICA) as a regional security multilateral organization, excluding the U.S. In economic terms, China has criticized U.S.-led globalization, which emphasizes the efficiency of competitive markets, and has advocated for comprehensive development norms that prioritize sustainability, equality, and diversity. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2014, serves as a financial and development institution, while the Free-Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), proposed at the last APEC meeting, is presented as an alternative to existing institutions like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the TPP vigorously pursued by the U.S.

Witnessing the rivalry between the U.S. and China in East Asia, experts offer conflicting predictions, ranging from the advent of a China-centric "Asian century" to the emergence of a new Cold War between the U.S. and China or an unstable multipolar system. However, empirically, U.S. military dominance in East Asia remains largely intact. Despite its rising economic power, China maintains a cooperative stance in diplomacy, relying on it for engagement. Meanwhile, non-major powers (middle powers) in the region are enhancing their influence not by aligning with or bandwagoning on major powers, but through various forms of hedging and participation in multilateral institutions.

These observations suggest the possibility of constructing or reconstructing a regional order in a manner different from existing predictions. The construction of a regional order inherently possesses a normative character, unfolding as a complex process of reaching consensus among its constituents regarding the definition of values, rights, and obligations (Goh 2013). It is a process of discursive contestation and strategic negotiation over the nature of the new regional order, where a state's bargaining power is determined not only by traditional power such as military or economic strength, but also by soft power, including knowledge and culture, and the ability to connect with various actors (network power). While major powers typically lead in selecting appropriate partners for problem-solving, generating and sharing knowledge with them, and building solidarity with diverse actor networks, middle powers like South Korea can also fully exercise their capabilities.

Moreover, the 21st century is characterized by network governance, where diverse state and non-state actors form networks across multiple issue areas to autonomously manage and coordinate issues. The world order of the 21st century is complex, with the overlapping of modern order, characterized by power struggles and balance of power, and a post-modern transition towards governance through networks. Therefore, possessing the aforementioned new forms of power is becoming a determinant of national strength (Ha Young-sun 2006; 2012; Ha Young-sun & Kim Sang-bae 2012). In this context, middle powers like South Korea face the risk of being drawn into difficult balancing acts between the U.S. and China or into alignment diplomacy that sacrifices diplomatic autonomy. However, they are also positioned to play a significant role in the competition to reconstruct the regional order.

In the process of transforming the East Asian order, South Korea must be capable of providing ideas and knowledge to design a regional order that evolves harmoniously through coexistence, preventing the competition between major powers from becoming hegemonic and avoiding confrontational and violent scenarios that lead to dichotomous choices. Specifically, it is necessary to design a multilateral institutional framework that accommodates the competing institutions of the U.S. and China while ensuring active spaces for middle powers. Although multilateralism is not entirely free from the influence of major power politics, within a multilateral framework, it is possible to mitigate asymmetrical distribution of benefits arising from power relations with major powers. Furthermore, through the forum for discussion provided by multilateral frameworks, non-major powers can express their interests by utilizing norms, rules, and procedural mechanisms, and can form networks with like-minded states and non-state actors to advance common interests. Henceforth, South Korea's regional diplomacy should prioritize the design and operation of regional multilateral institutions, elevate this as a policy priority, and pursue a complex diplomatic strategy that integrates bilateral and mini-lateral diplomacy.

Characteristics of the East Asian Regional Order

While the current East Asian regional order, like its Western counterpart, has historically been characterized by the logic of power struggles and balance of power in the security domain and the logic of transnational capital governed by market discipline in the economic domain, it also exhibits several differences from the West. Firstly, East Asia underwent a rapid and compressed transition from a traditional hierarchical order based on the concept of "Hwa-i" (Sino-centric world order) that divided the world into China and the "barbarians" under the guise of ritual (Ye), to a modern international order. This transition occurred without sufficient time for adjustment and filtering. Consequently, elements of the traditional order persist in the consciousness and sentiments of regional actors, and there are tendencies to revive elements of the traditional order as alternative models for the future order. Simultaneously, imperialism since the late 19th century remains in the realm of collective memory, acting as a constraint on bilateral relations among East Asian countries. We observe that Japan's recent militarization poses a security threat to neighboring countries by reminding them of the history of imperialist colonization in the 20th century. The 21st-century East Asian regional order is characterized by the logic of modern balance of power in security, post-modern governance logic in economics, and the significant influence of collective memory in the realm of identity, alongside security and economic logic.

Secondly, the three domains of security, economy, and identity in the East Asian order are not independent but interconnected, forming a nexus. This nexus leads to positive or negative spillover effects between the domains. The challenge in East Asia today lies in the difficulty of establishing a virtuous cycle among the different domains of the regional order. Unlike in the post-war West, where deepening economic interdependence led to economic prosperity, reduced security competition, and further strengthened economic ties, thereby fostering the formation of a regional collective identity (a virtuous cycle of economy-security-identity), such a structure has not materialized in East Asia. In East Asia, although security competition between states weakened with the end of the Cold War, state-centric nationalism has engendered competition in other forms. Despite rapid deepening of economic interdependence within East Asia, security competition has not significantly diminished. Even with active exchanges among civil societies, a regional identity transcending national borders has not easily formed due to the persistence of nationalist sentiments. Instead, nationalist confrontations triggered by historical issues have led to excessive securitization and hindered economic cooperation. The simplistic liberal theory that finds the source of regional multilateral cooperation and integration in increasing economic interdependence is difficult to apply in East Asia.

In summary, the East Asian regional order is complex. The security-economy-identity nexus holds the potential for both virtuous and vicious cycles. Therefore, the greatest challenge for a prosperous and coexisting East Asia is to create a virtuous cycle of cooperation among security, economy, and identity. To achieve this, unlike the functionalist approach of "starting with the easy and moving to the difficult" (선이후난), which begins with areas where cooperation is possible and then moves to difficult and sensitive issues, it is necessary to pursue a simultaneous approach to the following three tasks... (to be continued)

This report is a revised and supplemented version of Chapter 1 of the book "Strategies for Constructing a Multilateral Order in East Asia for Coexistence and Prosperity" (scheduled for publication by the East Asia Institute in 2015), co-authored by Son Yeol, Jeon Jae-seong, Lee Yong-wook, Park Jong-hee, and Lee Jeong-hwan.