[NSP Report 74] Russia's "New Eastern Policy" and Northeast Asian Geopolitics: Changes in Regional Power Structures, Russia's Potential and Limitations

Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. Professor Shin Beom-sik graduated from the Department of Diplomacy and the Graduate School of Seoul National University and received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russia. He served as the Secretary-General of the Korean Association of Slavic Studies. His main research areas are Russian foreign policy and Eurasian international relations. His major publications include "Eurasian Challenges and International Relations in the 21st Century" (2006, editor), "Russia's Choice: Post-Soviet Transition and Changes in State, Market, and Society" (2006, co-author), "Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula" (2006, co-author), and "Russia's Perspectives on International Politics" (2008).

I. Problem Statement

Currently, the competition between the US and China to lead the establishment of the Northeast Asian regional order forms the fundamental fault line of Northeast Asian geopolitics, and as this competitive dynamic constrains both countries, it remains uncertain whether this dynamic will provide new opportunities for regional states to expand their influence or whether the competition between the two powers will shrink the space for neighboring countries. In the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia, each country is striving to formulate new strategies to at least defend its position or, more proactively, to seize opportunities to expand its influence. However, as it appears nearly impossible for any single or two countries to build or lead a new Asian order through sheer power, the need and demand for establishing regional security cooperation mechanisms that can manage regional conflicts and make regional politics stable and predictable are growing daily. These demands, intertwined with the transitional nature of global and regional orders, are clashing with the various possibilities for change in the Northeast Asian region, leading to increased interest in the role of Russia, which has experienced a rapid decline in influence and a short-lived recovery in the Northeast Asian arena since the end of the Cold War.

Unlike the United States and China, who find themselves in a dilemma of "alliance entanglement" regarding the Korean Peninsula issue, Russia, as a state with diplomatic relations with both South and North Korea, can pursue a more flexible approach. It appears that Russia hopes to solidify its status as a strategic actor in Northeast Asia, which it had lost, by enhancing its voice and influence on the Korean Peninsula issue based on this possibility. The situation Russia most wishes to 'avoid' concerning the Korean Peninsula is one of war, conflict, or escalating tensions. It would want to 'maintain' its position as a stakeholder in Northeast Asia and a party to the Six-Party Talks, which it has carefully rebuilt as a state with diplomatic relations with both Koreas within the context of the peninsula's division. However, as China's rapid rise and expanding influence increase Russia's burden, Russia may be tempted to exploit the 'gaps' in US-China competition by mobilizing its available assets to transform the power dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula from a bipolar US-China structure to a tripolar or quasi-tripolar US-China-Russia structure. Of course, it is difficult to definitively ascertain the extent of Russia's internal capacity and will to pursue this. What is clear is that, regardless of Russia's contribution, the conflict or tension situation on the Korean Peninsula that Russia wishes to 'avoid' is still being managed with difficulty, and Russia's status as a party to the Korean Peninsula issue, which it wishes to 'maintain,' is somehow being preserved. Therefore, the task facing Russia today is, "What more can be 'gained' in this region?" (Shin Beom-sik 2013a).

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's foreign policy in Northeast Asia has often manifested as a pursuit of "opportunistic advances." To this end, managing relations with China well and restoring/strengthening relations with North Korea have been crucial policy options. Now, efforts to promote substantive cooperation with South Korea and Japan are increasingly important, linked to Russia's strategy of finding future growth engines as well as enhancing its regional influence. However, no less important is the establishment of cooperation mechanisms with the United States in Northeast Asia, which is inevitably the most crucial pillar for consolidating Russia's regional position. Yet, the United States does not appear to want Russia to strengthen its position in Northeast Asia, and despite the increased burden from China's rise, it does not seem to desire an enhanced role for Russia as a Northeast Asian actor (Севастьянов 2008). Particularly after the events in Ukraine, the United States has been gradually intensifying sanctions against Russia globally. In response, Russia is adjusting its strategic framework by managing relations with European countries, accelerating Eurasian integration, and further strengthening strategic cooperation with China in Asia.

This article aims to analyze Russia's status fluctuations, newly encountered challenges, and responses within the context of Northeast Asian geopolitical dynamics by examining the relationships among major geopolitical actors. To this end, first, it will analyze the principles of Russia's Northeast Asia policy as reflected in key Russian foreign and security policy documents from the perspective of continuity and change. Second, it will analyze the objectives, achievements, and limitations of the strategic initiatives of Putin's third term, referred to as the "New Eastern Policy," within the Northeast Asian geopolitical landscape. Third, it will interpret the implications of this Russian "New Eastern Policy" based on the Northeast Asian power structure to analyze Russia's presence, status, potential, and limitations in regional politics. Finally, it will discuss the implications of this analysis for South Korean diplomacy in relation to the future of Northeast Asian politics.

II. Analysis of Key Documents: Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept, Military Doctrine

The key documents that illustrate Russia's fundamental principles of foreign, security, and military policy, and the associated policy thinking trends, include the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Концепция Внешней Политики Российской Федерации), the Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation (Концепция Национальной Безопасности Российской Федерации), and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации). These documents, resulting from extensive discussions among key officials within the Russian government, are not mere rhetoric but serve as important indicators for understanding the strategic orientation of Russia's foreign, security, and military policies. Although each document addresses different domains—foreign affairs, security, and military—they are all written from a common worldview and reveal a shared policy orientation.

Russia's Concept of Foreign Policy outlines its fundamental view of international politics, foreign policy objectives, and policy directions for each region. Examining the 2000 and 2008 versions of the Concept of Foreign Policy, which are important for understanding recent trends, reveals that Russia's primary concerns have shifted from the military confrontation and nuclear weapons of the Cold War era to non-military areas such as the economy, politics, science, and technology (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации 28 июня 2000 года 2000/6/28; Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации 15 июля 2008 года 2008/7/15). Russia also pays attention to the increasing threats and challenges in non-traditional security areas, such as terrorism and organized crime, and emphasizes the importance of and respect for the role of the UN in international politics.

The 2000 document outlines seven core objectives for Russian foreign policy: first, preserving national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; second, establishing a stable and just democratic world order; third, creating a positive external environment for economic development; fourth, maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries; fifth, building harmonious relations with other nations; sixth, guaranteeing the rights and interests of Russians living abroad and compatriots; and seventh, promoting Russia's positive image. Russia's priorities for addressing global issues include: first, shaping a new international order; second, promoting international security; third, developing international economic relations; fourth, managing and stabilizing international human rights relations; and fifth, providing information support for foreign policy activities.

The 2008 Concept of Foreign Policy document maintains the content of the 2000 version while highlighting significant differences that reflect recent changes in Russian foreign policy. First, economic issues are given greater prominence in the 2008 Concept of Foreign Policy compared to the 2000 version. The establishment of a stable and just democratic world order, which was the second main objective of Russian foreign policy in 2000, was relegated to the third objective in 2008, with the creation of a positive external environment for economic development and modernization taking its place. This demonstrates the Russian government's strong emphasis on Russia's economic development and modernization. It can also be seen as reflecting heightened domestic awareness of the need to strengthen internal capabilities and the associated sense of crisis regarding limitations.

Second, the emphasis on a multipolar order and the critical tone towards US unilateralism have softened. The 2000 document frequently mentions a multipolar order, with the establishment of a stable and just democratic new international order being its second main objective. It also explicitly criticized the US-led international order, stating that "tendencies toward establishing a unipolar international order through the economic and military dominance of the United States are strengthening." However, the 2008 document reduces references to a multipolar order and, while it may offer a negative assessment of unilateral actions by any specific state on the international stage, it does not explicitly name the United States and refrains from overt criticism of the US-led unipolar international order. While this could be interpreted as a restraint in expressing dissatisfaction with the US, it might also suggest Russia's aspiration for greater freedom of action as it regains confidence as a great power.

Third, the Russian government's direct confidence is also evident. The second chapter of the 2008 Concept of Foreign Policy, "The Contemporary World and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Современный Мир и Внешная Политика РФ)," begins with the premise that "new Russia has established a firm foundation for its national interests and has come to play a full role in international politics." This confidence was not present in the 2000 Concept of Foreign Policy and represents a new facet of Russian diplomacy. It would not be unreasonable to judge that this foreshadowed actions such as the Georgian War and the Crimean crisis, which demonstrated the pursuit of national interests based on power.

Fourth, the Russian government has consistently emphasized international law and the role of the UN, a stance maintained in the 2008 Concept of Foreign Policy. Russia added "the rule of law in international relations" as its second priority for resolving global issues. This item was not mentioned in the 2000 document but specifically emphasizes the importance of the UN Security Council and Charter and the obligation to comply with international law. This can be understood as Russia's attempt to present a new level of aspiration to complement the unilateral resolution of international issues, alongside the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.

The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation is the central document for understanding Russia's security policy. Concepts of National Security were published in December 1997 and January 2000, respectively. The "National Security Strategy 2020" (Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года), published in May 2009, replaced the previous Concept of National Security (Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации 1997/12/17).

Compared to the 2000 Concept of Foreign Policy, the 2000 Concept of National Security shares many commonalities in its fundamental view of international politics and policy orientation. This is evident in the fact that the 2000 Concept of National Security, from its outset, criticized unilateralism and emphasized the emergence of a multipolar order. It also explicitly stated that "there are states that are attempting to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily, and in other aspects."

In particular, the 2000 Concept of National Security defines Russia's "national interests" as the sum of interests that must be realized at the individual, societal, and state levels, encompassing not only domestic politics, economy, and society but also international, informational, military, border, and environmental spheres. Consequently, Russia's concept of security is presented based on "comprehensive security," which includes not only military security but also other areas such as the economy and environment. It outlines policies that the Russian government should pursue in specific areas like the economy, demographics, and environment. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of strengthening the economic base, pointing out that Russia's national interests can only be realized through sustainable economic development.

The concept of security and main policy directions presented in the 2000 Concept of National Security are largely maintained in the "National Security Strategy 2020" (Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года 2009/5/12). However, differences are also found, which appear to be in line with the differences observed between the 2000 and 2008 Concepts of Foreign Policy. First, the National Security Strategy 2020, like the 2008 Concept of Foreign Policy, exhibits Russia's confidence and a more optimistic perception of the global situation. Russia's view of international politics in the 2020 strategy is more optimistic and confident than in the 2000 security concept (Dimitrakopoulou•Liaropoulos 2010, 38). While the 2020 document remains critical of unilateral actions by any single state, it avoids mentioning the United States and instead specifically criticizes NATO. Notably, it first mentions NATO expanding its military infrastructure into countries where Russia has significant interests. Furthermore, Russia criticizes NATO for disregarding and violating important principles of international law. This can be seen as a reflection of Russia's national security concerns and considerations, which aim to specify how its national interests are being infringed upon while avoiding direct confrontation with the US, without closing off possibilities for cooperation in other areas. Conversely, the 2020 document omits any mention of threats from states seeking to obstruct Russia, unlike the 2000 Concept of National Security.

Second, the comprehensive security concept, evident in the 2000 Security Concept document, is further elaborated in the 2020 document. The 2020 National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of economic development, the quality of life for Russian citizens, and socio-economic progress. Chapter 3 identifies the construction of a democratic state, civil society, and enhancing national economic competitiveness as long-term national interests. The main components of national security are specifically listed in order: defense, state and public security, improving the quality of life for Russian citizens, economic growth, strengthening science, technology, and education, improving healthcare, promoting culture, preserving the ecosystem, strategic stability, and equal relations with strategic partners. Finally, it presents unemployment rates, income inequality indices, debt-to-GDP ratios, public spending, and military modernization as key indicators of national security, demonstrating a more concrete elaboration of comprehensive security compared to previous documents.

The analysis of Russia's Concept of Foreign Policy, Concept of National Security, and National Security Strategy thus far reveals that, despite addressing different domains, these documents share a common worldview and policy orientation. Furthermore, Russia's Military Doctrine exhibits many commonalities with the aforementioned documents while also containing very specific details about Russia's military policy as a security-centric domain. Russia's Military Doctrine was published in 1993 and 2000, with a new Military Doctrine released on February 5, 2010.

The 2010 Military Doctrine assesses Russia's security environment, stating that while political and military threats have partially decreased, new threats have emerged in other areas (De Haas 2010, 3). Notably, the 1993 and 2000 Military Doctrines only mention "military threats" (военные угрозы), whereas the 2010 document also refers to "military dangers" (военные опасности), with "dangers" being described more specifically and taking precedence over "threats" (De Haas 2010, 3).

Military dangers, as defined in the Military Doctrine, are more specific than threats and are categorized into external and internal dangers in Articles 8 and 9, respectively. The external dangers listed first include NATO, followed by attempts by individual states to undermine strategic stability, military buildup in regions bordering Russia, deployment of strategic weapons and missiles, encroachment on the territories of Russia and its allies, interference in internal affairs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, violation of international agreements by individual states, and terrorism, totaling 11 specific items (Военная доктрина Российской Федерации 2010/2/5). Internal dangers facing Russia include general issues such as attempts to change Russia's political regime, infringement of Russia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and disruption of state functioning. Issues addressed in the Concept of National Security, such as energy, demographics, and socio-economic development, are not included.

Meanwhile, the "threats" facing Russia are described in more general and abstract terms than "dangers," such as a rapid deterioration of the military and political situation. Thus, Russia's perception of military threats has become more concrete through the "perception of dangers," highlighting the need for specific and practical responses to these dangers. This concrete perception of danger by Russia ultimately suggests that military measures may accompany the development of countermeasures.

According to the Military Doctrine, the priority partners for military and political cooperation are Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the United Nations (UN). This indicates that Russia has a high level of awareness regarding the military threats and dangers it faces due to NATO expansion and, simultaneously, holds high expectations for multilateral military security. A unique aspect of the latest Military Doctrine, unlike foreign and security policy documents from around 2010, is the absence of any mention of the special relationships Russia has with China and India (De Haas 2010, 4). For Russia, militarily important allies are the CSTO member states, and Russia states that an attack on CSTO member states will be considered an attack on Russia itself. This clearly illustrates the scope of Russia's alliances.

The analysis above suggests that Russia's foreign and security policy may be gradually shifting away from its initial internationalist stance towards strengthening an independent policy line aimed at recovering or asserting its great power status. Concerns about this potential shift began to emerge with the outbreak of the Georgian War and have become a more concrete policy reality with the recent events in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. This policy shift by Russia allows for an assessment that the international order, led by the United States since the end of the Cold War, is facing more significant pressure for change.

III. Putin's Third Term: Russia's Policies Toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

Russia's policies toward Northeast Asia present significant challenges in terms of security, military, and foreign policy principles. Before delving into a full discussion, let us examine the general characteristics of Russia's policies toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula during President Putin's third term (Shin Beom-sik 2013a, 151-152)... (to be continued)