[NSP Report 72] The Current Status and Tasks of South Korea's East Asia Regional Strategy and Korean Peninsula Strategy

Director of the Center for Asian Security Studies at the East Asia Institute and Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He graduated from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University in the United States. He previously served as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Sookmyung Women's University. His recent publications include "Is Politics Moral?", "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory," and articles such as "A Critical Review of Postmodernism and Realism on Constructivist International Relations Theory," "A Theoretical Study on the Emergence of International Politics in Europe," and "The Rise of Great Powers and Response Mechanisms: Theoretical Analysis and European Case Studies."

I. Introduction

This article examines how the South Korean government perceives and strategically plans to respond to the changing US-China relations in the 2010s, and more broadly, the East Asian international order. It also assesses the appropriateness of such strategies. In particular, considering the rapid changes in the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula following the détente in the early 1970s, this paper explores what implications current South Korea can draw from that historical experience.

In the 21st century, China's rise has continued rapidly, while the relative decline of the United States has become evident since the 2008 economic crisis. Along with the shift in the balance of power, both countries are seeking strategic changes. The U.S. has been pursuing a "pivot to Asia" strategy since around 2010, and China, under the Xi Jinping administration, has been comprehensively implementing a great power strategy. In June 2013, the U.S. and China declared a "new type of great power relationship" during their summit, signifying an agreement to find common ground in their respective regional strategies and maintain a cooperative state for a certain period. Competition will persist within this cooperative framework, and the cooperation-competition dynamic between the two great powers will significantly impact neighboring countries (Shambaugh 2013). It remains uncertain whether the new type of great power relationship between the U.S. and China will translate into a new type of relationship in the policies of neighboring countries towards great powers, and whether relationships among neighboring countries will also result in a new type of relationship (Campbell 2013).

The Korean Peninsula is a prime example. The key question is whether South Korea and North Korea, as respective allies of the U.S. and China, can establish a new type of inter-Korean relationship while the U.S. and China pursue a cooperative relationship within the framework of a new type of great power relationship. During the détente period, the U.S. and China established a cooperative relationship and encouraged South and North Korea to pursue a "mini-détente." Although there was a brief period of inter-Korean reconciliation, confrontation and competition were restored between the two Koreas in less than three years. This past experience demonstrates that even in a regional order heavily influenced by great powers, the relationship established between great powers cannot be directly reflected in the relationships between neighboring countries. Conversely, this implies that for improved relations between great powers to positively impact neighboring countries, the neighboring countries themselves must make their own independent efforts.

Currently, South Korea has long suffered from the North Korean nuclear issue, and more broadly, the North Korean issue. The environment surrounding the North Korean issue has changed since the early post-Cold War era and through the period of the war on terror following the 9/11 attacks. In the future, the issue is likely to unfold anew within the context of the U.S.-China power competition in East Asia. Therefore, in resolving the North Korean nuclear and North Korean issues, South Korea needs to link its East Asia strategy and its North Korea strategy in a virtuous cycle, while closely monitoring changes in U.S.-China relations.

This article will examine the current North Korea policy and East Asia policy of the Park Geun-hye administration, and analyze the impact of changes in U.S.-China relations from the perspective of policy recommendations.

II. Current Status and Tasks of South Korea's East Asia Regional Strategy

1. Development of the U.S. Pivot to Asia Policy

Currently, East Asia is experiencing a simultaneous transition towards a post-Westphalian or post-modern order, characterized by overall shifts in the balance of power and the complexification of state-centric modern state systems. The unipolar system centered around the U.S., which had been maintained since the end of the Cold War, is now facing a phase of relative decline or strategic retrenchment due to severe fiscal deficits resulting from the war on terror and the 2008 economic crisis (Brooks, et al. 2012; Beckely 2011). In contrast, China has maintained economic growth of around 9% and, despite the global economic crisis, has continued its economic expansion without significant slowdowns through government-led stimulus measures. Nevertheless, the U.S. retains its status as a leading power, and its military-technological superiority and diplomatic leadership continue to endure (Drezner 2013, 52-79). On the other hand, China, which is accelerating its military buildup, will experience a lag before its economic growth translates into military power (Johnston 2013; Schweller and Pu 2011).

The shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China has led to strategic changes, bringing the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy and China's great power strategy into direct engagement. The currently established new type of great power relationship and its maintenance phase are seen by the U.S. as an opportunity to secure the economic, diplomatic, and political strategic space necessary for a resurgence of its hegemony, and by China as a period to foster a stable and sustainable economic development environment and strengthen its domestic foundation through the construction of a "moderately prosperous society" (xiaokang shehui). Whether the U.S. will regain its hegemonic status through economic recovery in the future, or whether China will ascend to a post-xiaokang hegemonic position after consolidating its domestic base, remains to be seen.

Beyond the shift in the balance of power between the two great powers, East Asia is undergoing a broader transformation of the international order. As evidenced by the numerous FTA agreements, regional economic integration has accelerated, with increased intra-regional trade and more intricate production networks. With the democratization of more countries, domestic civil societies have developed, and East Asian civil society networks have also grown. Furthermore, the establishment of various East Asian regional multilateral cooperation mechanisms has created an international environment that imposes normative constraints on power competition among states. Consequently, the traditional state-centric, hard-power-oriented modern international politics is gradually giving way to a strengthening trend towards network governance.

In this context, the South Korean government requires a complex strategy that adequately prepares for both the intensifying balance of power and the grand trend of post-modern transition. Previous South Korean administrations have partially attempted to address these movements, but a unified strategy that integrates them has yet to materialize.

2. The Park Geun-hye Administration's Northeast Asia Regional Strategy and Tasks

The Northeast Asia regional strategy presented by the Park Geun-hye administration thus far exhibits the following characteristics: First, while there are bilateral strategies towards neighboring great powers, an overall regional strategy is lacking. The Park administration has put forth its regional strategy as strengthening the alliance with the U.S., enhancing strategic cooperation with China, strengthening and diversifying strategic cooperation with Russia, principled diplomacy towards Japan, and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. However, it remains questionable whether these individual strategies were formulated with sensitive awareness of the bilateral shift towards a new type of great power relationship between the U.S. and China, and the accompanying regional changes.

During her visit to the U.S. in May, President Park Geun-hye held a summit with President Obama and agreed to continue the comprehensive strategic alliance inherited from the Lee Myung-bak administration. The objective was to solidify the cooperative framework on the North Korean nuclear issue and gain support for the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2013a). Since then, South Korea and the U.S. have continuously consulted on major pending issues, including the conditions for the return of wartime operational control, cost-sharing for U.S. Forces Korea, the revision of the Atomic Energy Agreement, and the relocation of U.S. military bases. Notably, as North Korea has pursued a parallel development strategy since March, refusing denuclearization, both South Korea and the U.S. have been making sustained efforts to create conditions for resuming denuclearization talks.

Despite these efforts, strategic consultations between South Korea and the U.S. regarding China's rise have yet to produce clear concepts and visions. The U.S. is simultaneously pursuing its pivot to Asia strategy and its new type of great power relationship strategy with China. Through the pivot to Asia, the U.S. is actively pursuing political, diplomatic, military, economic, and socio-cultural engagement in Asia, with the strengthening of existing alliances at its core. While the pivot to Asia strategy does not solely consist of a strategy towards China, the U.S. has a profound interest in how it will manage its future relationship with China. Meanwhile, these U.S. strategies—the pivot to Asia and the new type of great power relationship—are compatible. The U.S. seeks to deepen its cooperative relationship with China while accumulating the economic and diplomatic strength necessary to restore its leadership. The new type of great power relationship strategy can provide the U.S. with the time needed for these endeavors. South Korea must increasingly define its approach to the U.S.-South Korea relationship within the context of the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy, which can be achieved through coordination between the regional order envisioned by the U.S. and the regional order pursued by South Korea. It is crucial whether South Korea can pursue a comprehensive strategic alliance with the U.S. while possessing a clear vision for the regional order. However, the reality is that consultations on regional strategy, including China, have not been active between South Korea and the U.S.

This situation is in stark contrast to 1972. During the détente, the U.S., through improved relations with China, sought to reduce its military involvement in East Asia, re-examine the Taiwan issue from a new perspective, weaken its security commitments to South Korea, and encourage reconciliation between South and North Korea. The Park Chung-hee administration, mindful of these U.S. regional strategies, simultaneously accepted U.S. recommendations for dialogue with North Korea to pursue the <7.4 Inter-Korean Joint Communiqué> while also demonstrating strategic acumen by pursuing military and economic strategies to counter North Korea's approach towards the South. Currently, the U.S. is pursuing a new type of great power relationship with China for the time being, anticipating future U.S.-China competition. It is therefore necessary to examine whether South Korea is pursuing its U.S.-South Korea alliance strategy with awareness of the sensitive strategic relationship between the U.S. and China... (to be continued)