[NSP Report 69] From Adversary to Tacit Ally: The United States' Approach to China in the Early Détente Period

Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea. Professor Ma Sang-yun earned his bachelor's and master's degrees in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Oxford, UK, for his research on U.S. domestic political intervention surrounding South Korea's democratization issues in the 1960s. He served as Dean of the Office of International Affairs at Catholic University and was a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and the Woodrow Wilson Center in the United States. His primary research areas include U.S. foreign policy, ROK-U.S. relations, and the diplomatic history of the Cold War. His recent publications include "The Decision to Deploy Korean Troops to Vietnam and the Role of the National Assembly," "South Korean Diplomacy and National Interest in the Early 1970s: An Evaluation Through Morgenthau's Theory of National Interest," "Anatomy of a 'Special Relationship': The Blair Government's Liberal Internationalist Foreign Policy and Anglo-American Relations," and "The Obama Administration's Security Strategy and the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Beyond Realist Off-Shore Balancing."

I. Introduction

The United States and China were the principal parties in the Asian Cold War. The two nations participated in the Korean War, engaging in fierce combat against each other, which resulted in profound mutual distrust and vigilance. In the United States, China was perceived as a more dogmatic communist state than the Soviet Union, and in the context of the Cold War, improving relations with an adversarial nation was difficult to imagine. However, despite this Cold War-era distrust and vigilance, both nations began to seek improved relations in the early 1970s. President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 was the highlight of this process, making the improvement of U.S.-China relations the most noteworthy event in international politics during the détente period.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the causes behind the United States' attempt to improve diplomatic relations with China during the détente phase in the early 1970s, examine the negotiation process, and evaluate the international political consequences of the U.S.-China rapprochement. While the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China warrants examination from both perspectives, this article primarily focuses on U.S. foreign policy and seeks to answer the following questions: For what reasons did the United States pursue improved relations with China, a principal adversary in the Cold War confrontation? What were the difficulties encountered during the negotiation process to improve relations with an adversarial nation, and how did the United States attempt to overcome them? How can the roles of President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger be assessed in this process? What were the outcomes of the U.S.-China negotiations, and what implications do they hold for contemporary U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-China relations?

The improvement of U.S.-China relations is a significant historical event in itself, worthy of historical research. However, it also presents a compelling research topic from a contemporary perspective. This is because the dramatic shift in U.S.-China relations in the early 1970s offers important implications for understanding current U.S.-China relations and the evolving geopolitical landscape around the Korean Peninsula in at least two aspects. First, contemporary international politics is characterized by the rapid rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. While U.S. power remains formidable, the nation has been perceived as focusing primarily on economic recovery since the 2008 financial crisis, leading to relative neglect of foreign policy (Nasr 2013). This relative decline in U.S. power was also observed in the early 1970s, and how the United States diplomatically responded at that time can provide a useful benchmark for understanding current U.S. foreign strategy.

Second, the most pressing issue in contemporary international politics is the future direction of U.S.-China relations. Is the established hegemonic power, the United States, heading towards confrontation with the rising China? Or will the two nations build and strengthen a more cooperative relationship in the future? Without the gift of foresight, it is impossible to expect answers beyond subjective opinions. However, the historical experience of the United States transforming a communist adversary, China, into a "tacit ally" through diplomatic engagement in the early 1970s offers a mirror through which we can indirectly illuminate today's issues. The complexity of the U.S.-China relationship equation presented in the early 1970s was by no means less challenging than today's issues. Research into the solutions of that era can provide some assistance in finding solutions for today's problems and forecasting the future.

Research on the U.S.-China relationship and bilateral negotiations in the early 1970s, based on declassified diplomatic documents, began to emerge in Western academia in the mid-2000s. However, domestic research remains scarce. While some studies on the politics and diplomacy of the Park Chung-hee administration have partially addressed U.S.-China relations due to the significant direct and indirect impact of the U.S.-China détente in the early 1970s on South Korean politics and international relations (Hong Seok-ryul 2012), U.S.-China relations themselves have not been the primary subject of research. In this regard, this study is expected to make a modest contribution to the study of modern U.S.-China relations in our academic community.

II. Origins of U.S.-China Détente

1. Relative Decline of U.S. Power

In January 1969, Nixon was inaugurated as the 37th President of the United States. Nixon was known as an anti-communist. He had firmly established this image since his tenure as Vice President in the Eisenhower administration. Nixon was also a realist and an internationalist. He firmly believed that international politics is fundamentally based on power and that the United States should lead the international order.

However, in the late 1960s, the United States and the international order were undergoing significant changes. The United States remained the world's strongest power, but it was gradually becoming weary. Above all, the Vietnam War exacerbated American fatigue. When the Johnson administration fully committed to the Vietnam War in 1965, no one anticipated its prolonged duration. It was believed that the communist forces would be quickly eradicated with the deployment of large-scale regular U.S. troops, thereby maintaining the anti-communist front in Vietnam, the Indochinese Peninsula, and by extension, East Asia. However, the war dragged on, and the United States seemed to be mired in a quagmire.

By the end of 1968, the United States had suffered 30,500 combat deaths among its 536,000 troops deployed in Vietnam. Over 1.65 million tons of bombs were dropped on North and South Vietnam, and more than 500 aircraft were lost. The annual war expenditure of $20 billion was also a significant burden. The proportion of defense spending to GDP increased from 7.9 percent in 1966 to 9 percent in 1967 and 9.7 percent in 1968. The United States had been facing issues of current account deficits and consequent gold outflows since the late 1950s, and the increase in fiscal expenditure due to the Vietnam War further exacerbated these problems. Gold outflows continued, and inflationary pressures also rose, leading to the U.S. economy experiencing inflation of nearly 5 percent in 1968 (Young and Kent 2004, 348-349).

Domestically, anti-war sentiments began to grow. Initially, the American public had generally responded favorably to the Johnson administration's decision to intervene in Vietnam. However, as the war prolonged, anti-war movements emerged and expanded. In particular, the large-scale offensive launched by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong during the Lunar New Year in 1968, which demonstrated the resilience of the communist forces, marked a turning point in American public opinion regarding the war. Youthful dissent and resistance against the established order were expressed (Gaddis 2010, 14), and public opinion sympathetic to these sentiments began to form. Thus, in the late 1960s, the United States was facing mounting domestic political and economic difficulties.

The international order was also undergoing changes, particularly in the shifting balance of global power. Firstly, Western Europe and Japan had achieved economic resurgence after the devastation of World War II. Key Western European nations, such as France and Germany, began to pursue more independent foreign policies, backed by their increased economic strength and confidence. French President Charles de Gaulle pursued an independent course, withdrawing France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1966. Germany, following the establishment of a grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party in December 1966, initiated its Ostpolitik under the leadership of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt of the SPD, seeking improved relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Amidst these developments, the United States grew concerned about the weakening cohesion of the West against the Soviet Union.

Secondly, and more importantly from the U.S. perspective, was the strengthening of Soviet military power. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union had focused intensive efforts on expanding its nuclear capabilities and delivery systems. By around 1968, it had achieved strategic weapon capabilities on par with the United States. Both the U.S. and the USSR now possessed second-strike capabilities against each other (Ha Young-sun 1989, 232). From the U.S. standpoint, this signified a loss of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

Of course, the Soviet Union also faced its own difficulties. Economic stagnation persisted, and divisions within the communist bloc became apparent. Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania pursued independent courses, and, as will be discussed later, the conflict with China intensified. This means that U.S. power was not unilaterally weakening. The United States was still the world's strongest power. However, it was clear that the United States was experiencing a relative decline in its international standing and needed time for domestic recovery. The foreign policy of the Nixon administration, which took office in 1969, could not but start from this recognition of reality.

Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger, a professor of international politics at Harvard University, as his National Security Advisor. Although Kissinger was undoubtedly a supporter of the Republican Party and knowledgeable in international affairs, his appointment was somewhat unexpected. This was because Kissinger had long advised Nelson Rockefeller, a rival Republican presidential candidate, rather than Nixon. However, Nixon and Kissinger shared a commonality as thorough realists and internationalists. Both also preferred compromise through discreet negotiations over overt diplomatic approaches and were willing to bypass official bureaucratic channels and proceed across hierarchies when necessary. Most importantly, they faced the critical challenge of how to maintain American influence and secure U.S. national interests amidst the changing international environment characterized by America's relative decline, and they shared the recognition that diplomacy was crucial in addressing this issue (Hanhimäki 2013, 37-39).

How did Nixon and Kissinger intend to respond to the changing international political environment facing the United States? In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the speeches and writings of Nixon and Kissinger prior to their assumption of top policy-making positions. Firstly, in a speech delivered at the Bohemian Club on July 29, 1967, Nixon expressed his thoughts on U.S.-Soviet détente. He mentioned the changing international balance of power, noting that the Soviet Union was beginning to surpass the United States in nuclear warhead tonnage and would achieve parity with the U.S. in delivery systems by 1970, with China also expected to possess nuclear delivery capabilities soon. Nixon emphasized the need for the United States to invest in maintaining its military superiority and cautioned against the argument that possessing nuclear capabilities equal to the Soviet Union would be sufficient. However, Nixon believed that trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries should be expanded economically, and diplomatically, he argued that "tension should be reduced by dialogue with Soviet leaders to minimize the possibility of miscalculation and to seek areas of agreement."

Furthermore, in an essay titled "Asia after Vietnam," published in the influential foreign affairs journal Foreign Affairs in October 1967, Nixon called for a new Asian policy. Nixon criticized the United States' preoccupation with the protracted Vietnam War and argued that U.S. foreign policy should pursue a new Asian policy detached from Vietnam. The assertion that "Asia today must be prepared to take care of its own security," with the United States playing a supporting role, was later formalized as the Nixon Doctrine. Of particular note in this essay was his discussion of China. Nixon argued that China, with its population of one billion, could not remain in international isolation forever. He contended that if China continued to threaten other nations without changing its ways, the world could not be secure, and therefore, efforts should be made to bring China into the international community (Nixon 1967, 113-125; U.S. Department of State 2003b).

In "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," an essay published in 1968, Kissinger viewed the fundamental task of American foreign policy as creatively responding to the structural changes in international politics, namely the emergence of a new multipolar order. He recognized that while the bipolar order between the U.S. and the Soviet Union formed after World War II still existed militarily, it was transforming into a multipolar order politically. According to Kissinger, in a politically multipolar order, the United States could no longer unilaterally lead the stability of the international order based on overwhelming power. Therefore, although the United States remained a superpower in material terms, its role was to create a structure that could elicit cooperation from other major powers on the political level. Kissinger also argued that the United States should promote international stability by reaching agreements with other major powers on the nature of the international order, while simultaneously pursuing its own national interests. In this context, Kissinger believed that the United States needed diplomatic flexibility, meaning that diplomacy should not be overly constrained by domestic public opinion, which tended to be moralistic and legalistic (Kissinger 1968; U.S. Department of State 2003c).

Nixon's and Kissinger's assessment of the geopolitical situation continued after the inauguration of the Nixon administration. In a White House press conference in December 1969, Kissinger stated the basic direction of U.S. foreign policy as follows: "We are at a point where we must build American foreign policy on new foundations. For the past twenty years, American foreign policy has been conducted according to the principles that guided the Marshall Plan." However, "conditions have changed significantly. The roles of other countries have grown in today's world. They are regaining their confidence. New nations are emerging. Communism is no longer a monolithic force. Therefore, we face the challenge of building international relations on a less unilaterally American basis than before (U.S. Department of State 2003d)."

The report "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace," submitted by President Nixon to Congress in February 1970, also reflects Kissinger's ideas. In this report, Nixon pointed out that the international political order maintained since World War II was coming to an end, ushering in a new era. He identified partnership with other nations, U.S. strength, and a willingness to negotiate as principles for establishing a lasting peace structure (U.S. Department of State. 2003e).

In summary, Nixon and Kissinger conceived a new foreign strategy to diplomatically respond to America's relative decline. This strategy aimed, above all, to alleviate competition with the Soviet Union and overcome various domestic and international difficulties. Of course, the Cold War adversarial mentality towards the Soviet Union had not entirely disappeared. For instance, Nixon emphasized investments to maintain U.S. military superiority. This reflected a strong intention to buy time, predicated on a long-term confrontation.

The new strategic conception also included an intention to reduce foreign intervention, particularly in Asia. Given the adverse impact of the Vietnam War on U.S. power and standing, it was unsurprising that achieving an honorable exit from the conflict became a top policy priority. In this context, Nixon also emphasized the need for improved relations with China. This aligned with Kissinger's perception that the international order was transitioning from a bipolar system with U.S. dominance to a multipolar system. While Kissinger's primary focus was on relations between Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and he may not have been as interested in China as Nixon, Kissinger envisioned managing international relations by leveraging the power dynamics among major powers, rather than solely through U.S. unilateral action. From this perspective, the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship at the time began to be perceived as a significant opportunity for U.S. foreign policy strategy (MacMillan 2008, 109)...(continued)

The new strategic conception also intended to reduce external intervention, particularly in Asia. Given the adverse impact of the Vietnam War on U.S. power and prestige, it was not surprising that extricating itself honorably from the conflict became a top policy priority. In this context, Nixon also emphasized the need to improve relations with China. This could also align with Kissinger's perception that the international order was shifting from a bipolar order based on overwhelming U.S. dominance to a multipolar order. While Kissinger's primary concern was the relationship between Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and he did not focus on China as much as Nixon did, Kissinger envisioned managing international relations by leveraging the power dynamics among major powers, rather than exercising U.S. power unilaterally. From this perspective, the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship at the time began to be perceived as a significant opportunity for U.S. foreign policy strategy (MacMillan 2008, 109)... (continued)