[NSP Report 67] Finding the Truth about North Korea in 1972: The Promotion and Abrogation of the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué

Chairman of the East Asia Institute. Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. Member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council. Graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, earned a Master's degree in Political Science from the same university, and a Ph.D. in International Politics with a dissertation on North Korea's nuclear issue from the University of Washington. Served as a Visiting Research Fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Professor at Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations, Director of Seoul National University's Institute for International Studies, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Association of Peace Studies. Authored a column titled "Ha Young-sun's Column" for The Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo for seven years, and led study groups such as the Korean Diplomatic History Study Group, the Radio Wave Study Group, the International Politics of the Information World Study Group, and the East Asia Institute Study Group. His books and edited volumes include "10 Major Tasks for Korean Diplomacy in 2020: Complexity and Resonance," "History of the Formation of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea 2," "Theory of Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "Ha Young-sun's International Politics Columns 1991-2011," "The Young People in History," "Crisis and Complexity: The World Order After the Economic Crisis," "A 12-Hour Story of Unification," "Networked World Politics," "North Korea 2032: Resonance Strategy for Advancement," "New Alliances in the 21st Century: From Cold War to Complexity," "History of the Formation of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea," "The East Asian Community: Myth and Reality," "World Politics in Transition," "Networked Knowledge State," "Grand Strategy for Korean Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Building a Networked State," "Peace Studies in the 21st Century," "Internationalization and Globalization," "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and the World Order," and "War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula."

I. Introduction

On August 15, 1945, the Korean Peninsula awoke from the nightmarish colonial rule of Japanese imperialism. However, the joy of liberation was short-lived. In the process of forming the Cold War order centered around the United States and the Soviet Union, Korea experienced the pain of division and faced the global tragedy of the Korean War. The Korean War marked the full-scale construction of the Cold War order as a military confrontation on a global scale. Built solidly amidst the fierce rivalry between the US and the USSR, the new structure seemed unlikely to crumble easily. However, the Cold War order began to undergo structural changes in the 1970s. Globally, the US and the USSR attempted détente, a relaxation of tensions, while in East Asia, the US and China initiated a historic improvement in relations, and China and Japan normalized diplomatic ties. The Korean Peninsula was no exception. Although nearly 20 years had passed since the end of the war, Korea and North Korea, still in a state of armistice, began to show new movements from August 1971, leading to the announcement of the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué> the following year, 1972, based on the "Three Principles of Unification": independence, peace, and national great unity. However, the mini-détente on the Korean Peninsula did not last long. A significant divergence in perspectives emerged from the first meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee co-chairmen in October to discuss the implementation of the joint communiqué, and ultimately, after three meetings of the co-chairmen and the committee, North Korea effectively declared the abrogation of the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué> on August 28, 1973. The promotion of the mini-détente on the Korean Peninsula shattered like a midsummer night's dream in just two years. However, to realize this unfulfilled dream in the 21st century, it is crucial to make a concerted effort to accurately reconstruct how the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué>, the core of the mini-détente, was promoted and subsequently abrogated.

This study borrows the method employed by David Hockney, a master of contemporary pop art, to reconstruct the forest paths of Woldgate in his native East Yorkshire in a three-dimensional manner, in order to restore the promotion and abrogation of the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué> (Hockney 2010). In November 2010, Hockney used nine video cameras attached to a car, each capturing different angles, to compose a single screen of his hometown's forest paths through continuous shooting, and finally attempted to contrast two screens: one on a clear day and one on a snowy day. The joint research project "Korean Peninsula in 1972, Korea in 2014" aims to illuminate the present-day Korean Peninsula by using six cameras—representing North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Japan—to contrast the frustration of the 1972 mini-détente with the situation in 2014.

This paper attempts to capture the mini-détente on the Korean Peninsula in the early 1970s from the perspective of the North Korean camera among the six cameras. Due to the extremely limited subjects that can be captured compared to other cameras, this study seeks to find the truth about North Korea in 1972 by interpreting the minimal data left by the closed North Korean political power through an hermeneutic lens, applying Hans-Georg Gadamer's fusion of visions (Horizontverschmelzung) (Gadamer 1989, 298-306; 578-579). As a first step, it will summarize the past vision of the "three revolutionary forces" since 1964, which critically influenced the formation of the North Korean political power's vision centered around Kim Jong-il in 1971-1973. Second, it will analyze how North Korea viewed the reality of the "three revolutionary forces" it faced in the early 1970s when choosing the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué>. Third, it will interpret why North Korea abrogated the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué> while envisioning the future of the "three revolutionary forces."

II. The Influence of the "Three Revolutionary Forces" Vision

10:00 AM on July 4, 1972. Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced that the Director of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency, Lee Hu-rak, had visited Pyongyang in May, and the Vice Premier of North Korea, Park Sung-chul, had visited Seoul. They announced the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué>, proclaiming "Independence, Peace, and National Great Unity" as the three principles of unification, aiming to ease tensions and promote exchanges in various fields, and establishing a South-North Coordinating Committee. It was, in a word, a tremendous shock. It was difficult to imagine a meeting between the core powers of South and North Korea, who regarded each other as hostile nations denying each other's existence. Moreover, South Korea's principled agreement to the three principles of unification proposed by North Korea was astonishing. First, to find the background truth behind North Korea's promotion of the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué>, this study will trace how North Korea's vision in the early 1970s was formed under the influence of the "three revolutionary forces" vision of the 1960s.

Despite the armistice on July 27, 1953, the hostile relations between South and North Korea were not easily improved. However, the common perception in both South and North Korea that war was inevitable for unification began to show a new change in the 1960s. In February 1964, at the 4th session of the 8th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, North Korea's Kim Il-sung declared for the first time that the cause of national unification would be achieved by strengthening the "three revolutionary forces" in his speech "Let Us Strengthen the Revolutionary Forces in Every Way to Realize the Cause of National Reunification" (Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee 1964). He elaborated on the specific methods in a lecture delivered on April 14, 1965, at the Al-Ahram Institute of Social Sciences in Indonesia, titled "On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (Kim Il-sung 1965/04/14):

It can be said that the unification of our fatherland and the nationwide victory of the Korean revolution ultimately depend on the preparation of the three revolutionary forces. First, by successfully carrying out socialist construction in the northern half of the Republic, further strengthening our revolutionary base politically, economically, and militarily. Second, by politically awakening and firmly uniting the people of South Korea, thereby strengthening the revolutionary forces in South Korea. Third, by strengthening the unity between the Korean people and the international revolutionary forces.

North Korea's vision of achieving unification through war transformed into a vision of revolutionary unification in response to the new circumstances of the 1960s. Kim Il-sung subsequently outlined a more concrete plan for unification based on strengthening the three revolutionary forces.

We have repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate the issue of peaceful national reunification at any time and any place with any democratic figures in South Korea who possess national conscience, provided that they come to power, advocate the withdrawal of US troops, release political prisoners, and guarantee democratic freedoms. ... After driving out the US imperialist aggressor troops from South Korea, we proposed to the South Korean authorities on several occasions to reduce the armies of South and North Korea to 100,000 men or less each, conclude an agreement on non-use of force against each other, take a series of measures including economic and cultural exchanges and personnel exchanges between South and North Korea, and establish a democratic unified government through free general elections in South and North Korea in accordance with the independent will of the Korean people. ... It is impossible to even think of peaceful national reunification while the US imperialist aggressor troops and the current puppet regime remain in South Korea. To achieve national reunification, we must drive out the US imperialist aggressors, the main obstacle to the reunification of our fatherland, from South Korea, liquidate their colonial rule, overthrow the current military-fascist dictatorship, and achieve the victory of the revolution. Then, if a true people's government is established in South Korea, our country's unification will be smoothly realized by the united strength of the socialist forces in the northern half of the Republic and the patriotic democratic forces in South Korea.

North Korea's unification plan in the early 1970s involved, first, driving out the "US imperialist aggressor troops and the current puppets"; second, taking measures such as establishing a democratic government with national conscience, reducing military forces, concluding an agreement on non-use of force, and implementing various exchange and cooperation measures to achieve peaceful unification according to the will of the people; and finally, realizing unification through the united strength of North Korea's socialist forces and South Korea's patriotic democratic forces once a people's government was established in South Korea. In his report "On the Current International Situation and Promoting the Independent Reunification of the Fatherland" at the 5th session of the 4th Supreme People's Assembly on April 12, 1971, Foreign Minister Huh Dam presented the following 'Eight-Point Proposal for Unification' (Huh Dam 1971/04/12):

First, withdraw the US imperialist aggressor troops from South Korea. Second, after the withdrawal of the US imperialist aggressor troops, reduce the armies of South and North Korea to 100,000 men or less each. Third, abolish and nullify all treacherous and subordinate treaties and agreements concluded by the South Korean puppet regime with foreign countries. Fourth, establish a unified central government by holding free general elections in South and North Korea on a democratic basis. Fifth, guarantee complete freedom to engage in political activities for the free general elections in South and North Korea, and unconditionally release all political prisoners and patriots arrested and imprisoned in South Korea. Sixth, if necessary prior to complete unification, implement a South-North confederation as a transitional measure, while maintaining the existing different social systems in South and North Korea. Seventh, realize mutual trade and economic cooperation between South and North Korea, as well as exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as science, culture, arts, and sports, and enable correspondence and personnel exchanges between South and North Korea. Eighth, hold a South-North Political Consultative Conference composed of representatives from all political parties, social organizations, and all patriotic figures to discuss the aforementioned issues.

On June 10, 1971, North Korea informed the Romanian Party and Government delegation visiting Pyongyang that the outbreak of conflict between South and North Korea would inevitably involve the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the United States, and that Asian conflicts could trigger a global war if not handled carefully. Therefore, since all involved countries were cautious about war, North Korea explained that it was pursuing the "Eight-Point Proposal for Unification" through revolutionary means rather than war (Woodrow Wilson Digital Archive 1971-1972). It also pointed out, "If Park Chung-hee collapses, we can discuss the unification of our country with anyone who desires it," and emphasized, "The development of the situation in South Korea depends on the struggle of the democratic forces and people of South Korea."

III. Promotion of the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué

In response to the rapidly changing domestic and international situation, Premier Kim Il-sung sought to launch a "peace offensive for the realization of the South Korean revolution and national reunification" and declared in a speech on August 6, 1971, that he would consult with all political parties and organizations, including South Korea's ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party. North Korea explained that its peace offensive aimed to frustrate the Nixon Doctrine, which sought to make Asians fight Asians and Koreans fight Koreans, counter US efforts to modernize the South Korean military, perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula, and militarize Korea, thwart Japanese infiltration into Korea, and prevent US-ROK-Japan cooperation (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009h).

North Korea explains that the purpose of its peace offensive is to strengthen the revolutionary forces in South Korea, in addition to strengthening international revolutionary forces, as follows:

Another purpose of the peace offensive is the removal of fascist oppression in South Korea. The South Korean puppet government is attempting to intensify fascist oppression against the South Korean people under the pretext of North Korea's invasion plans. North Korea has no intention of invading. This must be proven to the South Korean people. At the same time, we must not provide the South Korean government with an excuse to oppress the people and democratic forces. The revolutionary forces in South Korea must be strengthened as soon as possible. To achieve this, the oppressive measures and anti-communist hysteria of the South Korean reactionary forces must be prohibited. Through the peace offensive, North Korea intends to open the doors between the South and the North, influence the South Korean people with North Korean ideology, and thereby achieve democratization in South Korea (Woodrow Wilson Digital Archive 1972a).

On September 20, 1971, South and North Korea held the first preliminary meeting of the South-North Red Cross conference in Kaesong. The talks continued but faced difficulties in reaching an agreement on the agenda. On November 20, Chung Hong-jin from South Korea and Kim Duk-hyun from North Korea, who were responsible for the inter-Korean dialogue, held a separate, unofficial meeting. Through difficult negotiations that began in Panmunjom and proceeded through Pyongyang and Seoul, they finally agreed on an exchange visit between Lee Hu-rak and Kim Young-joo by the end of March 1972. Consequently, Director of Intelligence Lee Hu-rak made a historic visit to Pyongyang on May 2, 1972. Director Lee Hu-rak held two meetings with Kim Young-joo and met with Premier Kim Il-sung at the Mansudae Presidential Palace in Pyongyang from 00:15 to 01:30 on May 4.

After exchanging greetings, Director Lee Hu-rak first stated that it was President Park's intention to pursue unification independently. Premier Kim Il-sung then repeatedly emphasized the "Three Principles of National Unification: Independence, Peace, and National Great Unity." Director Lee Hu-rak responded, "I believe unification will surely be achieved by making these three principles the pillars of unification. President Park's thoughts are the same." Director Lee Hu-rak met with Premier Kim Il-sung again on the afternoon of May 4, from 1:00 PM to 2:10 PM. At this meeting, Premier Kim Il-sung stated, "We believed that President Park was colluding with the US and Japan to resolve the issue of unification, and that we were concerned about a South Korean invasion. However, since I have stated that we will not wage war, those concerns have been eliminated. The remaining issue is national unity, which can be resolved through further research and discussion." He concluded by saying, "Two misunderstandings have now been cleared up. First, we are not trying to wage war in collusion with the US and Japan. Second, we are not attempting to invade the South or achieve unification through communist revolution. These misunderstandings have been resolved. The remaining issue is unity, which can be resolved through further study and discussion" (Kim Il-sung 1992-2012b; Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009b; Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009c). Vice Premier of North Korea, Park Sung-chul, arrived in Seoul on May 29 and, in his first meeting with Director Lee Hu-rak, summarized the results of the Lee Hu-rak-Kim Il-sung meeting in early May as follows (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009d):

We had thought that those in power in South Korea intended to rely on the United States and Japan, and that the South believed we intended to invade the North. These were the fundamental issues that caused mutual misunderstanding and distrust between the South and the North. However, during the recent Pyongyang meeting, they stated that they have no intention of relying on foreign powers and will never lose their independence in relations with the US and Japan, and we affirmed that we had no intention of invading the South from the outset and no intention of imposing our system on South Korea. ... Given the principled agreement on the fundamental stance for national unification, we believe that our future task is to substantively resolve the concrete issues for national unification based on the principles already agreed upon.

In two meetings with Director Lee Hu-rak, Vice Premier Park Sung-chul discussed specific issues such as the establishment of the Coordinating Committee, other committees, and the issue of publicizing the agreed contents. He also met with President Park Chung-hee on May 31 from 7:00 PM for 40 minutes, reading a prepared statement stating, "We agreed on the Three Principles of National Unification in the Pyongyang meeting, resolved the fundamental issues of misunderstanding and distrust, and should foster mutual trust and promote national great unity." President Park Chung-hee responded that he "greatly welcomed the agreement on the three principles of unification" and, while agreeing to the creation of a consultative body, suggested a phased approach considering the current mutual distrust, and opposed the public disclosure of the agreed contents (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009i).

The South-North working-level teams prepared the agreement for the South-North Joint Communiqué from June 21 to 30 and jointly announced it at 10:00 AM on July 4 in Seoul and Pyongyang (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009e). On July 17, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Lee Man-seok briefly explained the background of the promotion of the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué> to socialist allies and summarized its contents (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2009f). He also stated that the core of the communiqué, the Three Principles of Unification, was first proposed by Premier Kim Il-sung when he met Lee Hu-rak and was perfectly agreed upon by President Park Chung-hee, thus effectively demonstrating the South Korean government's defeat. Vice Minister Lee Man-seok summarized the impact of the <July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué> in terms of strengthening the revolutionary forces in South Korea and international revolutionary forces.

He first favorably assessed the strengthening of revolutionary capabilities in South Korea. He stated, "The South Korean people unanimously agreed that the Joint Statement was a major event and supported it with joy and enthusiasm," and "South Korean opposition parties and prominent figures protested the government's resumption of direct dialogue with North Korea without the participation of all political parties," and "The opposition parties demanded the abolition of the Anti-Communist Law and emergency measures." He particularly pointed out that the South Korean leaders were showing noticeable differences. This was in conjunction with his mention that exchanges and visits between social organizations, individuals, and sports figures in North and South Korea should be improved, and that Director Yi Hu-rak stated at a press conference that dialogue with North Korea should be expanded, the Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law should be revised to fit the current situation, and a new order should be created. Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil, however, stated in response to a parliamentary inquiry regarding these discussions that there was no need to change the Anti-Communist Law and emergency laws, that not just anyone could travel to North Korea, and that listening to North Korean broadcasts was not permitted. In other words, he reversed the statement.

Regarding the evaluation of strengthening international revolutionary forces, Lee Man-seok was more cautious, stating, "The United States rhetorically welcomed the communiqué, but on the other hand, it wants to support and assist the puppet regime." On July 5, the US State Department declared that the modernization of the South Korean military would continue despite the joint communiqué, that the scale of US troops would not be reduced, and that unification should take place under UN supervision.

North Korea, cautiously analyzing the impact of the joint communiqué, stated that through continued struggle, it would ensure that all South Korean leaders participate in future negotiations. It also aimed to detach South Korea from the United States and Japan and prevent it from receiving further support from them. Another focus for North Korea was to prevent the United States and Japan from interfering in the internal affairs of the Korean Peninsula any longer. Through these proactive measures, it intended to remove the existing barriers between South and North Korea and establish broad and comprehensive solidarity. Vice Minister Lee Man-seok finally concluded that it would be desirable for the socialist allies to pressure South Korea into comprehensive negotiations with North Korea, thereby "isolating South Korea domestically and internationally," and requested active and comprehensive support for the further isolation of South Korea.... (to be continued)