[NSP Report 65] Background and Strategy of China's Détente with the U.S. in 1972

Professor of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women's University. Obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University. Served as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Unification and editor-in-chief of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, and is currently the chairman of the China Research Panel at the East Asia Institute. Her main research areas include China's foreign relations, China's ethnic minorities, and Chinese nationalism. Recent research includes "Changes and Continuity in the Foreign Policy of the Xi Jinping Regime," "The Impact of Rising Chinese Nationalism on Foreign Relations and Korea-China Relations," "China’s policy and influence on the North Korea nuclear issue: denuclearization and/or stabilization of the Korean peninsula?" (editor), "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-author), etc.

I. Introduction

In February 2012, Xi Jinping, then Vice President of China, visited the United States and proposed a new concept for Sino-U.S. relations called "a new model of major-country relations" (新型大國關係). Coincidentally, 40 years after President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 created a new history of Sino-U.S. détente, China proactively proposed a new détente between the two countries. Xi Jinping evaluated Nixon's visit to China 40 years prior as a historic event that broke the thick ice wall that had separated the two nations for decades. He then proposed the idea of striving to build a new model of major-country relations as the two countries entered the second decade of the 21st century.

The underlying intention of the new model of major-country relations envisioned by Xi Jinping can be glimpsed in his statement: "China welcomes the constructive role the U.S. plays in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and at the same time hopes that the U.S. will clearly respect the interests and concerns of China and regional countries" (<中国日报网> 2012/02/16). In essence, it is about mutual recognition and respect for core interests, coexistence, and shared prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

Forty years ago, China had no choice but to undertake a strategic gamble by accepting the U.S. proposal for détente to escape the threat of a pincer attack from the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Now, China is proactively proposing a new détente to the U.S. to create an environment conducive to completing its rise and, in particular, to preemptively defend against the formation of anti-China alliances.

While 40 years ago China had no choice but to grasp the hand of détente extended by the U.S. amidst fear and suspicion, it is now the U.S. and the international community that are hesitant and contemplating how to respond to China's new détente proposal, the "new model of major-country relations," with suspicion.

This article aims to revisit the historical events of 40 years ago with the current concerns in mind: what were the intentions and context behind China's proposal of a new model of major-country relations in 2012? What changes will China's rise and its new détente proposal bring to the international order and power dynamics? And what are the implications of the discussion on a new model of major-country relations for the Korean Peninsula? While a re-examination of the historical developments around 1972 may not provide definitive answers to current issues, the attempt to understand China's intentions and strategies within their historical context is meaningful. Just as China seeks lessons from its experience in 1972, discovering the changes and continuities between the proposed new model of major-country relations in 2012 and the events of 40 years ago holds significant value.

This article seeks to revisit the process leading to the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, focusing on China's perspective from two main angles. First, it re-examines the domestic and international background and perceptions that led China to respond to the U.S. overtures for détente. Second, it examines, at a more micro-level, the internal discussions and strategic judgments China made during the approximately two-year negotiation period with the U.S. from 1969 to 1972. Finally, based on this retrospective, it explores the influence and significance of China's historical experience in 1972 on the present.

II. The Meaning of China's 'Anti-Hegemonism' Diplomacy During the Cold War

During the Cold War, Chinese diplomacy was primarily driven by ideology and security. Immediately after establishing a socialist state through revolution, China faced an international environment where a bipolar system dominated by ideology was solidifying, making it impossible for its foreign policy decisions to be free from ideological influence. Particularly for Mao Zedong, who upheld the fervor of revolution as a primary basis for state governance through voluntarism (主意主義), advocating for world communist revolution and proletarian internationalism was an inherent foreign policy objective until the 1960s. Thus, upon its founding, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union, pursuing a 'lean to one side' (對蘇一邊倒) foreign policy and supporting the national liberation movements and revolutionary activities of communist parties or pro-communist forces in the Third World.

However, although China proclaimed world revolution and proletarian internationalism during the Cold War, its most crucial objective in actual foreign policy was national security. This can be confirmed through the changes in China's foreign policy strategy and theory during the Cold War. While periodization of changes in China's Cold War foreign policy strategy may vary slightly among scholars, there is a general consensus that changes occurred roughly every decade. Specifically, according to the so-called 'diplomatic theories' proposed in China, the period until the late 1950s was characterized by a 'lean to one side' diplomacy based on the theory of two camps; the 1960s saw an anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet strategy based on the theory of world revolution and anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism (反帝反修); and the 1970s witnessed a shift towards an international united front strategy against the Soviet Union, guided by the theory of three worlds.

China determined its foreign policy based on the 'friend-enemy concept' (友敵槪念), clearly distinguishing between friends and enemies in its relations with major powers, based on its assessment of who posed the greatest security threat. The 'anti-hegemonism' consistently advocated by China in its foreign relations during the Cold War was also an expression of the Chinese leadership's perception of the surrounding security environment. That is, the primary target of anti-hegemonism, regardless of minor variations in rhetorical emphasis or content, consistently represented the main threat to China.

In the 1950s, immediately after the founding of the People's Republic, Mao championed anti-U.S. and anti-hegemonism, despite the lingering uncomfortable relationship with the Soviet Union from the revolutionary period, and actively pursued a policy of wholeheartedly leaning towards the Soviet Union by signing a treaty of alliance. This was intended to offset the security threat posed by the United States, which was perceived as the greatest threat at the time. From Mao's perspective, the U.S. was the principal enemy, not only because it had actively supported the Kuomintang during the Chinese Civil War but also because it continued to support the Kuomintang government in Taiwan after the civil war and maintained a policy of containment against China. It was a concrete and realistic threat, especially given the direct military engagement during the Korean War.

In the 1960s, as the conflict with the Soviet Union escalated to border clashes, the perception of threat from the Soviet Union, in addition to the U.S., intensified. Consequently, China adopted a diplomatic strategy of maintaining an independent course, positioning itself against both superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, by proclaiming the theory of world revolution and anti-U.S. imperialism and anti-Soviet revisionism. While the theory of world revolution itself is an ideologically charged discourse, it was largely rhetorical in nature, emerging from the unavoidable situation of facing the threat of a pincer attack due to the formation of 'two fronts' (兩條線) resulting from the lack of improved relations with the U.S., despite the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union at the time (Zhang Xiaoming 1997, 7-10).

Through the extreme chaos of the Cultural Revolution (hereinafter referred to as CR), China, in the 1970s, advocated the 'theory of three worlds' as a last resort to escape diplomatic isolation and threats, seeking to develop relations with Third World countries and form an anti-hegemony united front as a counterbalancing force against the two hegemonic powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, having experienced border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969, China's sense of crisis regarding Soviet expansion reached its peak, leading it to perceive the Soviet Union as the greatest threat. China sought to improve relations with the U.S. as a realistic alternative to offset the Soviet threat. In other words, recognizing the Soviet Union as a more immediate threat than the U.S., which was mired in the Vietnam War, China pursued a strategy of 'allying with the U.S. to oppose the Soviet Union' (聯美抗蘇), using the U.S. to contain the Soviet Union.

As such, during the Cold War, China became deeply involved in the superpower relations of the bipolar U.S.-Soviet system and the so-called U.S.-China-Soviet strategic triangle, largely due to security considerations. This led to an abnormal situation where China, not being a global power, acted as if it were. Thus, China's foreign policy during the Cold War was centered on identifying the main enemy based on the judgment of which of the two superpowers posed a greater threat to China, and building an alliance to counter the threat posed by that main enemy. Consequently, while China's diplomacy at the surface appeared to be deeply involved in major power relations, playing a role akin to a great power, its substance was characterized by a defensive and reactive posture typical of a weaker nation seeking security.

In summary, throughout the Cold War, when ideology exerted a dominant influence, China outwardly presented foreign policy banners cloaked in ideology such as 'anti-imperialism,' 'anti-revisionism,' and 'anti-hegemonism.' However, in essence, the perceptions of security threats held by key leaders like Mao served as the primary variable determining the direction of foreign policy. Mao's perception of security threats at the time may have been exaggerated, influenced by factors such as its vulnerable physical security environment with the world's longest border stretching 22,000 kilometers, the historical experience of modern invasions symbolized by the 'century of humiliation,' and the fragility of its internal system and national strength.

Consequently, in the 1950s, China opted for an exceptional policy of alliance with the Soviet Union to secure national development and security interests. After experiencing diplomatic isolation in the 1960s, in the early 1970s, despite it being the Cold War era, China abruptly improved relations with its principal enemy, the United States, in an effort to secure its safety from the Soviet threat.... (continued)