[NSP Report 68] Reading North Korean-Style International Politics in the US-China Era: The Legacy of the Invincible Myth of Juche Diplomacy

Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). Advises on policy development related to North Korea and the Korean Peninsula. Served as Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Unification (2006) and as an administrator at the National Security Council (NSC) (2003-2006). Holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University. Major research areas include the history of Korean diplomacy, Korean foreign policy, and East Asian international relations. Major publications include "Confucian Thought and the Imagination of Modern International Politics," "A Study on the History of the Formation of the Modern State Concept in Korea," "Hwanjae Park Gyu-su and the International Politics of Simu," "North Korea and the Architecture of North Korea Policy in the Kim Jong-un Era," "North Korean Nuclear Threat and South Korean Identity Politics in 2006," "Rebuilding the Inter-Korean Relations," "Understanding the Dokdo Issue," "North Korea's Strategic Choices and East Asian International Politics in 2013," and "Confucian Grand Strategy of Korea in the Qing Dynasty and its Contemporary Implications."

I. Reading the Situation in a North Korean Style and Strategic Choices

The policies of successive North Korean regimes were responsive to domestic political and international political demands. Kim Il-sung's 'Juche line' was aimed internally at consolidating Kim Il-sung's power base by eliminating rivals such as the Yenan faction and the Soviet faction in the power struggles within North Korea in the 1950s, while externally, it served as a means to maximize North Korea's diplomatic resources amidst the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split of the 1950s-60s.

Kim Jong-il's 'Military-First line' was a choice made to secure the political support of the military, the most reliable force, amidst the crisis of the North Korean system, which was so precarious that it had to endure the so-called 'Arduous March' in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the Military-First line implied a determination to use nuclear weapons as a means of regime survival in the face of the worst possible international political environment surrounding North Korea, marked by the collapse of the socialist bloc and the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union and China.

The 'Byungjin line' put forth by the Kim Jong-un regime can also be understood as a strategic choice to respond to the domestic and international challenges faced by the North Korean system since 2012. Internally, it appears to be an attempt to boost economic vitality through various reform measures, acknowledging the inherent limitations of the Military-First line, while simultaneously preempting conflicts between the old and new generations. In other words, the 'Byungjin line' was presented as a solution to reconcile mutually contradictory demands. Externally, it is interpreted as an intention to secure the stability and autonomy of the Kim Jong-un regime by gaining recognition as a nuclear-armed state from major powers such as the United States and China.

Thus, the policies of successive North Korean regimes generally have a certain relationship with the domestic political and international political situations faced by the North Korean system. This study aims to primarily address the international political aspects. Specifically, it seeks to examine how accurate and successful North Korea's interpretation of and response to international politics have been. The period covered is from the late Kim Jong-il regime, when the foundations of the US-China era began to form, to the present Kim Jong-un regime, roughly from 2009 to 2013.

To put it bluntly, while Kim Il-sung's Juche line and Kim Jong-il's Military-First line, based on judgments that corresponded to the flow of international politics, secured the survival of the North Korean regime, Kim Jong-un's actions over the past two years do not appear particularly smart. If the Juche line and Military-First line were strategic choices that had matured over a long period, the Byungjin line gives the distinct impression of being hastily conceived and immature.

The external utility of the Byungjin line has been in jeopardy from the outset due to the simultaneous rejection by neighboring countries such as South Korea, the United States, and China. Despite strong warnings from neighboring countries, the Kim Jong-un regime pushed ahead with the launch of a long-range rocket in December 2012 and a third nuclear test in February 2013, testing the resolve of the new governments in neighboring countries. Following international sanctions against North Korea, the regime rapidly escalated the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, attempting to alter the strategic landscape. However, North Korea's so-called "situation-changing" attempts, which lasted for several months in 2013, proved to be a strategic failure, and North Korea's reckless challenge to great power politics centered on the US and China culminated in humiliating special envoy diplomacy and overtures for dialogue.

This paper aims to review North Korea's interpretation of and response to the international situation over the past few years and evaluate how well they align with the realities of international politics. In particular, it focuses on the fact that this period coincides with the advent of the so-called US-China era, and examines the accuracy of North Korea's reading of the US and China. Furthermore, to consider the temporal variable of the advent of the US-China era and to draw a clear comparison with the Kim Jong-un regime, the analysis will begin with the late Kim Jong-il regime.

II. Kim Jong-il's Final Three Years: The Waning Military-First Era and Survival Diplomacy

From the latter half of 2008, Kim Jong-il's health rapidly deteriorated due to a cerebral infarction, prompting him to expedite the process of successfully concluding his life's achievements and establishing a stable succession system. Kim Jong-il viewed space development and acquiring nuclear-armed state status as the greatest achievements of the Military-First era, and thus focused on consolidating these. He intended to solidify his accomplishments sufficiently before the advent of 2012, the centenary of Kim Il-sung's birth and the first year of a "strong and prosperous nation." This was the main reason why North Korea designated 2009 as the year of "revolutionary great upsurge" and conducted its second nuclear test.

With the election of President Barack Obama in November 2008, who expressed willingness to engage in direct dialogue with rogue states, it was widely predicted that negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue would accelerate. Although the Six-Party Talks had stalled in December 2008 due to verification issues, North Korea appeared to have no reason to refuse an opportunity for direct negotiations with the United States. However, before the Obama administration's review of its North Korea policy was even completed, North Korea launched a long-range rocket in April 2009 and conducted a second nuclear test in May. This signifies the extreme urgency of North Korea's domestic political needs. The regime had to hastily conclude the achievements of the Military-First line and accelerate the establishment of a succession system. It likely also believed that negotiations with the Obama administration could be pursued from a more advantageous position after the second nuclear test. However, it is important to note that these actions by the late Kim Jong-il regime were not a disregard for the international political situation but rather a highly sensitive response.

More interestingly, the late Kim Jong-un regime's period overlaps with the time when the foundations of the US-China era were being laid. Following the Lehman Brothers crisis in the US in 2008, the role of emerging economies became prominent, with the G20 summits held to respond to the global economic crisis, and China's rapidly growing national power began to attract attention. In particular, since 2009, proposals for a Group of Two (G2) meeting have been advocated by figures like Zbigniew Brzezinski. Against this backdrop, US-China summit meetings were seen as a signal heralding the dawn of the US-China era. However, the US-China era unfolded with intensified competition as well as cooperation between the two countries, and after the summit in November 2009, patterns of conflict and containment became more pronounced. Since 2010, the US and China have continuously experienced friction over issues such as arms sales to Taiwan, meetings with the Dalai Lama, appreciation of the Yuan, and the Google issue.

In response, Kim Jong-il keenly sensed China's rapid rise in national power and the advent of the US-China era, making a strategic choice to bet on China. That is, Kim Jong-il focused on securing political, diplomatic, and economic support from China by effectively utilizing the intensified conflict and containment between the US and China since 2010. Notably, Kim Jong-il's visit to China in May 2010 had two main objectives: to overcome the sanctions and diplomatic isolation against North Korea following the Cheonan incident in March 2010, and to secure China's political support for the establishment of Kim Jong-il's succession system. China indeed took a reserved stance on the Cheonan incident, thereby indirectly supporting North Korea, and explicitly expressed its displeasure when South Korea and the US conducted joint military exercises in the West Sea following the incident. Kim Jong-il's calculation to gain practical benefits by aligning with China amidst the competitive and containment relationship between the US and China proved effective. During the summit with President Hu Jintao on May 5, Kim Jong-il praised China by mentioning "China's national strength" and expressed his commitment to denuclearization and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, thereby saving face for China (<KCNA> 2013/05/08). Kim Jong-il's visit to China again in August of the same year, after a four-month interval, was motivated by the same context as the May visit. In particular, North Korea was scheduled to formalize the Kim Jong-un succession structure through the 3rd Party Representatives Conference in the fall of that year, and thus focused on gaining China's support for this. Ultimately, in his congratulatory speech on August 27, President Hu Jintao recalled Kim Jong-il's two visits to China within less than four months and effectively approved the Kim Jong-un succession structure by wishing "the Party Representatives Conference complete success on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (<KCNA> 2013/08/30). The strengthened strategic alliance between North Korea and China amidst the prevailing US-China conflict was also reaffirmed in the Yeonpyeong Island incident in November 2010. Despite the clear first strike by North Korea and civilian casualties in the Yeonpyeong shelling, China diplomatically supported North Korea by conventionally urging all parties to exercise restraint and calling for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The US-China summit in January 2011 can be considered a turning point in US-China relations. As symbolized by the extensive joint statement comprising 41 articles across six sections, the two countries reached agreements in a wide range of areas. While the joint statement in November 2009 merely emphasized "strategic trust" for the development of US-China relations, the January 2011 summit clearly defined US-China relations as a "cooperative partnership." Furthermore, the two countries assessed that they had formed a "model" of positive and cooperative relations despite differences in political systems, historical and cultural backgrounds, and economic development levels, and indicated their intention to pursue a new type of great power relationship (The White House January/19/2011). In other words, a new pattern of US-China relations began after the January 2011 summit, laying the groundwork for the so-called "new model of great power relations." One of the characteristics of this new model of great power relations is the clear cooperative tendency between the US and China on the Korean Peninsula issue. This is also because it is easier for the US and China to reach agreements on the Korean Peninsula issue compared to other core issues such as human rights, military affairs, and economics. During the January 2011 summit, the leaders of the two countries unusually devoted significant time to discussing the Korean Peninsula issue and presented agreements on the issue, including inter-Korean dialogue and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, as key achievements of the summit. North Korea closely monitored the US-China summit in January 2011 and reported its results relatively quickly and objectively (<KCNA> 2011/01/22). At that time, North Korea was keenly aware of the cooperative trend regarding the Korean Peninsula issue in US-China relations.

Kim Jong-il's response to the advent of the US-China era was to strengthen North Korea-China relations. Although US-China relations exhibit a complex pattern encompassing both competitive and cooperative elements, it was believed that strengthening strategic cooperation with China, which is rapidly emerging as a superpower, was the only way to guarantee the survival of the North Korean regime. This was the main reason for Kim Jong-il's third visit to China in May 2011, following his visits in May and August 2010. His last visit to China, after formalizing the succession system through the Party Representatives Conference in September 2010, was also an effort to further solidify North Korea-China relations for the stability of the future Kim Jong-un regime. In this context, the key to securing political, diplomatic, and economic support from China was the commitment to denuclearization and a shift towards an economy-focused policy.

Under the Kim Jong-il regime, North Korea maintained its commitment to denuclearization despite conducting nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. As is well known, the core of Kim Jong-il's Military-First line was nuclear weapons; although its sincerity was not recognized due to repeated deceptive tactics and broken agreements, the commitment to denuclearization itself was never abandoned. The commitment to denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks was a minimum condition for receiving China's support and was a key agreement in the summit meetings of May and August 2010 and May 2011. In particular, the May 2011 summit strongly reaffirmed the commitment to denuclearization, stating, "Recognizing that adhering to the goal of denuclearizing the entire Korean Peninsula, pursuing peaceful resolution through dialogue such as resuming the Six-Party Talks, and removing obstacles are in the overall interest of the Northeast Asian region, we agreed to maintain good communication and coordination" (<KCNA> 2011/05/26). Furthermore, the New Year joint editorial, which replaced Kim Jong-il's New Year address, set the goal of achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula from 2009, the year of the second nuclear test, until 2011, the year of Kim Jong-il's death. In his last recorded speech before his death, an interview with ITAR-TASS on October 13, 2011, he stated, "The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the dying wish of the great leader Kim Il-sung and the consistent position of the government of our Republic" (<KCNA> 2011/10/19). The denuclearization commitment quietly disappeared starting with the 2012 New Year joint editorial under the Kim Jong-un regime. Subsequently, in April 2012, the preamble of the socialist constitution was amended to include the status of a nuclear-armed state... (to be continued)