[NSP Report 64] China's Rise and Japan's 21st Century Diplomatic Strategy: Diversification of a Normal State

Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University. He graduated from Yonsei University with a degree in Political Science and International Relations and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley. He has held positions as a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a postdoctoral researcher at the UC Berkeley APEC Study Center, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, and an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Yonsei University. His recent publications include:Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration? (co-edited), Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions (co-edited), among others. He has also published numerous articles in journals such as the Korean Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, The Pacific Review, and Asian Survey. His main research areas include East Asian regionalism, global FTA networks, and the institutional balancing strategies of East Asian states.

I. Challenges for Japanese Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Between Global Power Realignment and Domestic Political Change

Japanese diplomacy in the 2010s stands at a critical juncture. The Shinzo Abe administration, which took office in 2012, has pursued the exercise of 'collective self-defense' through constitutional revision based on 'proactive pacifism.' Concurrently, it has demonstrated highly ambitious diplomatic initiatives, including the adoption of the National Security Strategy as a comprehensive basic guideline for foreign and security policy and the establishment of the 'National Security Council' as its institutional foundation. The Abe administration has achieved considerable diplomatic successes, such as garnering support for collective self-defense from the United States, the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, Russia, Australia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, amidst numerous challenges ranging from China's rise to North Korea's nuclear threat, recent Japanese diplomacy has shown a conservative trend, evidenced by territorial disputes over Dokdo and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with South Korea and China, Prime Minister Abe's remarks in April 2013 suggesting a revision of the Murayama Statement, and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. This trend has led to conflicts with neighboring countries and drawn criticism both domestically and internationally. The Abe administration's actions can be understood as an attempt to fundamentally redefine the direction of Japanese diplomacy in the context of the realignment of global and regional orders, symbolized by China's rise, and a period of domestic political change.

There have been several instances in the past, including the late 1980s, when intense domestic discussions in Japan revolved around new directions for diplomacy. The Yoshida Doctrine, which served as the cornerstone of Japan's post-war foreign policy for an extended period, was characterized by its emphasis on high economic growth and a passive stance on international issues. The Yoshida Doctrine could be maintained as the guiding principle of Japanese foreign policy for such a long time because Japan not only achieved a national consensus on foreign policies that supported high economic growth but also succeeded in establishing the institutional framework for their systematic implementation. However, in the 1990s, Japan failed to exert diplomatic influence commensurate with its position as the world's second-largest economy on the international stage and starkly revealed the limitations of economic diplomacy in the wake of the Gulf War. This period saw Japanese diplomacy disparaged as 'free-rider diplomacy,' 'checkbook diplomacy,' and 'karaoke diplomacy.' In other words, Japan was confined to implementing policies within the framework determined by the United States and failed to gain international recognition for its economic contributions, leading to intense domestic criticism (Inoguchi and Jain 2000). Anxiety over power shifts, fundamental changes in the nature of international politics, a rapidly evolving regional security environment, and a yearning for a new national identity all contributed to a comprehensive reevaluation of the Yoshida Doctrine, which was predicated on high economic growth and diplomatic passivity.

As the perception grew that an excessive reliance on economic power was no longer viable, Japan could not avoid attempting to actively expand its position both regionally and internationally (Green 2001). It was against this backdrop that Ichiro Ozawa's advocacy of the "normal state theory" initiated a full-fledged discussion on the direction of Japanese diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Ozawa argued that "Japan should aim to become a normal state by pursuing active international contributions, including military ones" (小沢一郞 1993). Based on this, Japan rapidly established the legal framework for increased international contributions through the enactment of the Law Concerning Measures to Support Peacekeeping Operations in 1992, the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act in 2001, amendments to the Law Concerning Cooperation for Peacekeeping Operations, and the enactment of the Law Concerning Special Measures for the Reconstruction Assistance to Iraq in 2003. However, fundamental limitations were revealed in that the ultimate outcome of becoming a normal state was the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance, as seen in the revision of the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines in 1997.

The Abe administration, which returned to power in 2013, is once again seeking to change the basic direction of Japanese foreign policy. However, the challenges facing the Abe administration differ from the past in that they involve simultaneous domestic political changes and power realignments at the international level. Domestically, there is a growing need to establish a "new grand strategy" based on a newly forming ideological landscape (Samuels 2007), while externally, diplomatic adaptation to China's rise and the North Korean nuclear threat in the post-Cold War era is urgently required (Pyle 2007). Furthermore, whereas the geopolitical situation in the international and regional arenas in the early post-Cold War period involved structural and gradual changes, the challenges confronting Japan in the 21st century are more direct and concrete. While concerns about China's rise in the early 2000s were somewhat vague, based on the expectation that China's sustained economic growth would eventually lead to changes in Sino-Japanese relations, the issues Japan must address in the 2010s, as exemplified by the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, are highly specific, requiring immediate and strategic responses. The situation regarding North Korea's nuclear issue is also vastly different from the early 2000s when there seemed to be a glimmer of hope for resolution with the Six-Party Talks. Thus, in the 2010s, Japan finds itself in a grave reality where it must respond immediately to current issues while engaging in deep strategic considerations regarding structural changes.

Japanese diplomacy is not immune to the influence of domestic political changes. The general election in August 2009, which saw the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) win an absolute majority with 208 out of 480 seats, ending the long-standing rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), seemed to herald a new era of politics. However, the DPJ's limitations in translating its campaign pledges into policy led to the LDP regaining power in December 2012. Moreover, Japanese politics in the 2000s experienced frequent changes in prime ministers, leading to a 'political leadership deficit.' In the period of just over six years from the resignation of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who served for five years and six months, to the return of the second Abe administration in December 2012, there were seven prime ministers, with an average tenure of less than one year. To make matters worse, frequent instances of the ruling party in the House of Representatives differing from the ruling party in the House of Councillors since 1989 led to widespread public distrust in politics. In the so-called "twisted Diet" (ねじれ国会), numerous bills failed to pass due to discrepancies between the resolutions of the two houses, resulting in a paralysis of the Diet's legislative function (Ohya 2008).

In this domestic political context, the DPJ's diplomatic experiments ended in failure. In terms of foreign policy, the DPJ's time in power saw the Yukio Hatoyama government advocate a line of autonomy in relations with the United States, diverging from the U.S.-centric diplomatic policy, and propose the concept of an "East Asian Community." This indicated that Japanese diplomacy focused on testing new diplomatic possibilities distinct from the LDP's traditional diplomatic line (Kim Jemma 2012). However, the Hatoyama government failed to adequately resolve the issue of relocating the Futenma U.S. military base, revealing its limitations. This effectively meant the failure of the DPJ government's diplomatic experiments. Subsequently, the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet focused on mending relations with the United States, effectively returning to the LDP's past foreign policy.

The domestic political base of the Abe administration is considered the most robust since the Koizumi administration. Upon taking office, the Abe administration enjoyed a public approval rating of 70 percent. Furthermore, the LDP's return to power as the ruling party was solidified by winning 294 seats in the House of Representatives election in 2012, followed by securing 115 seats in the House of Councillors election in July 2013 and forming a coalition with the Komeito party, which won 20 seats, thus establishing a firm majority in both houses. The Abe administration's foreign policy was formulated from this strong domestic political foundation.

How, then, can the nature and methods of the Abe administration's foreign policy be characterized? On the surface, the Abe administration's diplomacy aligns with the extension of the normal state theory, focusing on enhancing Japan's military and security capabilities and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, the diplomatic tools and methods employed by the Abe administration appear far more multidimensional compared to the past when the normal state theory was widely disseminated. Specifically, while the existing normal state theory relied on a relatively simple approach of expanding Japan's diplomatic horizons by redefining the Japan-U.S. alliance, the Abe administration's diplomacy, while still centering on strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, seeks a more active role as a partner to the United States. Prime Minister Abe's statement, "In the future, Japan will be an active contributor connecting the regional and global security frameworks led by the United States," is understood as an effort to solidify Japan's position, moving beyond mere alignment with the U.S. (Mainichi Shimbun 2013/12/11). Furthermore, on the domestic front, Japan is institutionally strengthening its own diplomatic and military security capabilities. Regionally, it is building strategic reciprocal relationships with neighboring countries such as ASEAN, and globally, it is pursuing diplomatic solidarity based on universal values. Prime Minister Abe's assertion in an interview with The Wall Street Journal in October 2013 that he advocates proactive pacifism because Japan is being asked to exercise leadership not only economically but also in various other dimensions, including military and security, in the Asia-Pacific region, is also in this context (Wall Street Journal 2013/10/25).

Ultimately, the Abe administration's foreign policy can be summarized as an expansion and development of the normal state theory in terms of goals and orientation, and a multidimensional approach in terms of means and methods. What is noteworthy is that the focus of the Abe administration's foreign policy is ultimately narrowing towards China. From the perspective of strategically responding to China's rise, Japan is realigning the Japan-U.S. alliance, undertaking institutional reforms to strengthen its domestic diplomatic and security capabilities, and simultaneously pursuing multidimensional diplomacy by strengthening strategic cooperation with East Asian countries that share concerns about China's rise and pursuing global cooperation based on universal values.

II. Changes in the World Order and Domestic Political Dynamics

China's rise is causing structural changes not only in the world order but also in the regional order of East Asia. Japan's foreign strategy in response to the changes at the global and East Asian levels triggered by China's rise warrants attention in several respects. First, Japan's stance toward China's rise in economic terms is highly complex. In terms of economic scale, China surpassed Japan in 2010, becoming the world's second-largest economy and the largest economy in East Asia with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately 5.9 trillion U.S. dollars. China also surpassed Japan in foreign exchange reserves in 2006, with figures of approximately 3.2 trillion U.S. dollars for China and 1.1 trillion U.S. dollars for Japan as of 2011. With its vast economic scale and foreign exchange reserves, China is exerting a certain pressure for change on the world order. The scale of China's outward investment, which exceeded 50 billion U.S. dollars in 2010, indicates this change. Despite China's economic rise since the 2000s, the economic relationship between China and Japan has become even closer. Since reaching 184 billion U.S. dollars in 2005, the bilateral trade volume has continuously increased, reaching approximately 349 billion U.S. dollars in 2011 (People's Daily Online 2012/02/21). Notably, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the trade volume between Japan and China increased by nearly 50 percent, from 229 billion U.S. dollars in 2009 to 343 billion U.S. dollars in 2011. The Japanese domestic economy has not been able to escape its long-term stagnation, and amidst the unprecedented economic situation of the global financial crisis, the economic relationship between China and Japan has continued to expand and deepen. For Japan, China's rise is a factor driving change that promotes power realignment at the East Asian and global levels, while simultaneously serving as an opportunity factor that provides new momentum for economic prosperity through economic interdependence between the two countries...