[NSP Report 63] Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and Japan: Negotiations for the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations in 1972

Professor and Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has been a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently the Director of the Japan Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. His main research areas include Japanese politics, international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and global governance. His recent publications include “A Conceptual History of Regional Space: Korea’s ‘Northeast Asia’,” “The Complex Strategy of Trade in the Korea-US FTA,” “Competition in Constructing Regional Multilateral Economic Institutions in East Asia,” and “Japanese Market Opening Between American Pressure and Korean Challenge.”

I. Introduction

The century-long competition between China and Japan, which began with Japan's rapid rise through the Meiji Restoration and modernization as a peripheral state in the Sinocentric world, reached a historical turning point with the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. According to Premier Zhou Enlai's expression, it was a return to the long "normal state" of 2,000 years of friendly relations since the Qin Dynasty. However, the bilateral relationship, which had been seeking a new era, has increasingly devolved into strategic and military competition, becoming a major threat to the stability and prosperity of the East Asian region.

Prior to 1972, Japan's relations with China were constrained by U.S. policy toward China and U.S.-Japan relations, following the establishment of the Cold War order in East Asia with the San Francisco Peace Treaty six years after Japan's defeat in 1945. Japan faced pressure to become an outpost for the U.S. containment of China and had to choose between Taiwan and China. Although Japan signed a peace treaty with Taiwan (Republic of China) in 1952, it maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan while simultaneously pursuing a pragmatic policy of accumulating economic ties with mainland China based on the principle of separating politics from economics. However, in 1957, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's visit to Taipei led China to abandon the principle of separating politics from economics. The Eisaku Sato administration, which held power for a long period in the 1960s, was fundamentally pro-Taiwan and was preoccupied with normalizing relations with South Korea and the return of Okinawa, thus failing to pursue improved relations with China, which was in turmoil due to the Cultural Revolution.

The historical event that decisively changed this atmosphere was the détente between the U.S. and China in 1971-1972. Since the confrontation between the U.S. and China had been the decisive obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations in the postwar period, the opening of a new phase in U.S.-China relations presented Japan and China with an opportunity to usher in a new era. The détente began as the interests of the Chinese government, which needed to formulate a new security strategy following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the shift of its main enemy from the U.S. to the Soviet Union, aligned with those of the Nixon administration, which sought to reverse the trend of relative decline and extricate itself from the quagmire of the Vietnam War. However, the announcement of Henry Kissinger's visit to China on July 15, 1971, shocked Japanese society, which had not anticipated such a rapid U.S. approach to China, to the point of being called the 'Nixon Shock,' and significantly undermined the political foundation of the pro-Taiwan, pro-U.S. Sato administration. Furthermore, the vote on China's representation in the UN on October 26, which led to Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations (UN) and the People's Republic of China's admission as a member and permanent member of the UN Security Council, caused a major domestic political backlash in Japan. Amidst these domestic and international changes, the Kakuei Tanaka administration came to power in July 1972, and the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations gained momentum.

However, the party that actually led the negotiations was China, headed by Premier Zhou Enlai. The frank conversations held between the U.S. and China (Kissinger and Zhou Enlai) in 1971 revealed Zhou Enlai's stark views on Japan and his strong vigilance towards Japan. Nevertheless, what were the strategic factors that led him to actively pursue normalization negotiations with Japan? What did Japan want? What is the historical and strategic significance of Sino-Japanese normalization? Existing studies on the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations have addressed these questions (Lee 1976; Kim Hee-deok 2002; Sonoda Yoshihide 2003; Mōri Kazuko 2006; Kō Motomei & Hattori Ryūji 2012; Son Ki-seop 2012; Choi Eun-bong & Oh Seung-hee 2012). This article focuses on analyzing the U.S. and Chinese strategies toward Japan during the Sino-Japanese normalization negotiations. Specifically, it analyzes how the U.S., which was not entirely pleased with the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, managed Japan, and how Japan and China responded, based on an analysis of primary sources such as Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and the Japanese negotiation documents "Record and Verification - Negotiations for the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations and the Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship" (Ishii Akira et al. 2003). The article concludes by offering contemporary implications of the Japan-China-U.S. relationship in 1972.

II. China's Strategy Toward Japan

In the U.S.-China talks of 1971-1972, Zhou Enlai was the one who raised the issue of Japan. The reason he raised this issue was his concern about Japan's role in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from Asia. The strategies toward Japan discussed by the leaders of both countries are highly interesting. Zhou Enlai articulated the "threat of Japan" as follows:

The Japanese have a tendency toward expansionism. Japan's economic expansion will inevitably lead to military expansion... If the United States withdraws all its troops from Asia, is it not the objective of the United States to strengthen Japan's capacity as a vanguard to control Asia? (Mōri 2004, July 9, 1971)

Zhou Enlai expressed concern about "the ambitions of Japanese militarists." He repeatedly voiced concerns such as whether Japan intended to militarily advance to the Strait of Malacca, its lifeline, from Taiwan, and whether Japanese forces would advance into the Korean Peninsula after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. He then briefly outlined the threat of Japan. He argued that Japan's imperial system is the "foundation of the system supporting militarism," that militarism was reviving, and that U.S. policy toward Japan supported this, strongly criticizing the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security system based on this perception.

Zhou Enlai's theory of Japanese militarism is difficult to view as mere 'Japan bashing.' He continuously raised the theory of the Japanese threat, appearing to believe in the early 1970s that Japan might revert to militarism. However, while it is true that Japan did not sever ties with militaristic forces during the post-war settlement process, it is clear that the mainstream political forces, namely the conservative mainstream led by Shigeru Yoshida, pursued a creative strategy of distancing themselves from the pre-war militaristic tradition, entrusting security to the US through the Japan-US alliance, and instead focusing on economic growth as the core ideology of the new conservatism (Pyle 2008). The interpretation that the Sato administration was deviating from the Yoshida line in the 1970s, for instance, viewing the 1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué and the ongoing Fourth Defense Buildup Program in Japan at the time as signs of a return to the pre-war era, was a mistaken judgment in hindsight. This was purely a case of limited military expansion within the framework of the Japan-US alliance and a purely defensive posture.

Despite this, Zhou Enlai's more realistic reason for vigilance against the revival of Japanese militarism and his persistent raising of the issue lay in the Taiwan problem. Since the late 1960s, Japan had been expanding its influence in Taiwan. The Sato administration provided Taiwan with yen loans totaling $150 million, driving Taiwan's export-oriented industrialization, and bilateral trade volume rapidly increased, which the Chinese government denounced as "economic aggression." In terms of security, the fourth clause of the Nixon-Sato Communiqué, which confirmed the return of Okinawa, declared that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was extremely important for Japan's security, the so-called "Taiwan clause." This gave China the impression that Japan intended to share the military role of the U.S. in the Asian region, provoking backlash. China sought to preemptively block the possibility of Japan filling the power vacuum created by the U.S. retrenchment in the Taiwan issue.

There is a possibility that Japanese armed forces may enter this region, including Taiwan, before the United States withdraws. This is because Japan and Taiwan have maintained the treaty concluded by Chiang Kai-shek, the so-called peace treaty, and continue to emphasize it today (Mōri 2004, July 7, 1971).

In summary, the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations was not a direct issue in China's pursuit of U.S.-China détente. On the other hand, the Taiwan issue, which would arise if Japan filled the power vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal, was a very important matter. Therefore, the task of severing Japan-Taiwan relations by preemptively blocking the possibility of Japan taking over the defense of Taiwan became significant. To this end, it was necessary to make the United States pay attention to Japan's potential threat.

Kissinger responded to Zhou Enlai's persistent theory of Japanese threat as follows:

According to the theory I taught in college, if we [the U.S.] withdraw from Japan, we may allow Japan to rearm and the balance of power between Japan and China across the Pacific may be disrupted. However, this is not U.S. policy. In fact, if Japan rearmed on a large scale, it might repeat the policies of the 1930s (Mōri 2004, July 9, 1971).

Kissinger articulated the so-called 'bottle cap theory,' stating that U.S. policy is aimed at "preventing Japan from pursuing aggressive policies." On February 22, 1972, during a summit meeting, Nixon repeatedly stated, "I cannot guarantee it, but we [the U.S.] can exert strong influence over Japan, and I am confident that our policy can prevent Japan from taking risks with South Korea and Taiwan" (reprinted in Mōri Kazuko 2006, p. 64, February 22, 1972).

Conversely, Zhou Enlai expressed hope in the "Japanese people" who desired peace and advocated for Japan's neutralization rather than the bottle cap theory based on alliance. In response, Kissinger stated in his report to President Nixon:

We [Zhou Enlai and Kissinger] agreed that Japan's expansionism is dangerous, but we did not reach an agreement on how to prevent it. [...] China holds strong preconceptions on this issue and at the same time maintains an ambiguous stance. While concerned about the re-militarization of Japan, they argue that U.S.-Japan military cooperation must be checked. [...] I [Kissinger] emphasized that if Japan were to become neutral as they wished, a crude nationalism would emerge. (reprinted in Mōri Kazuko 2006, p. 65)

In fact, Kissinger was quite critical of Japan, as briefly mentioned earlier. He stated, "China traditionally has a global perspective, but Japan's perspective is insufficient and lacks long-term vision, so between a strong Japan and a strong China, the latter is not expansionist," and asserted, "I have no [naive] illusions about Japan" (Mōri Kazuko 2004). For him, China was a more reliable partner in the international political game than Japan.

Nixon's view of Japan was no different. During his visit to Beijing in February 1972, he stated:

We hope that Japan will change from its past militarism. If the United States does not provide security to Japan, Japan will first pursue the strengthening of its military power, having lost all memory of war, based on its highly productive economy, and second, it may choose the option of approaching the Soviet Union as an alternative to the United States (reprinted in Mōri Kazuko 2006, p. 64).

The United States stated its intention to exert influence over Japan and other countries with which it had security relations and received economic assistance, to prevent them from pursuing policies contrary to China's interests. Zhou Enlai confirmed Kissinger's and Nixon's distrust of Japan on several occasions and believed that since the U.S. did not fully trust Japan despite being an ally, it would act to control Japan's ambitions. Amidst this, Zhou Enlai began to reveal the true intentions of his strategy toward Japan. He told the Japanese people that a great change was occurring and that Japan was different from the Japan of the 1930s, and that if the U.S. and China thwarted the Japanese government's expansionist policies and supported its peace policy, the situation would improve. He also believed that as long as the U.S.-Japan alliance served as a bottle cap, Japan would have limited room to exert influence over Taiwan. China could now pursue a strategy of checking the Soviet Union and isolating Taiwan through the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan.

Zhou Enlai's fundamental perception of Sino-Japanese normalization was the same as that of the U.S.-China détente. Just as he had eased U.S.-China relations by utilizing the mutual checks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union within the context of Sino-Soviet confrontation, he approached Sino-Japanese relations from a similar perspective. Therefore, the biggest challenge in achieving normalization was Japan's willingness. The key issue was whether Japan could declare an end to its relations with Taiwan, something the U.S. had not done, and proceed with Sino-Japanese normalization... (to be continued)