Changes in the Real Situation of North Korean Defectors in China and Policy Directions

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 29

Author

Dr. Kim Soo-am, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University and has served as a standing member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His research interests include North Korean human rights, aid to North Korea, and humanitarian issues between North and South Korea. He has published numerous papers and research reports, with recent works including “Aid to North Korea and Public Consensus,” “The UN Human Rights Regime and North Korean Human Rights: Focusing on ‘Strategy’ and ‘Relationship’,” and “The Significance and Characteristics of the Helsinki Final Act: Focusing on the Human Rights Agenda.”

I. Problem Statement

In the 1990s, North Koreans, who had relied on state distribution, faced extreme starvation due to severe food shortages caused by economic hardship. At the time, leaving the country without the authorities' permission was considered an act of treason and was subject to severe punishment. Nevertheless, North Koreans, driven to despair by starvation, risked punishment and crossed the border into China to seek food. However, as North Korea's economic difficulties persisted, the nature of defection, which initially involved crossing the border simply to obtain food and return, began to change. An increasing number of defectors began to stay in China to earn money.

As the number of North Korean defectors staying in China increased, China, as the primary stakeholder, could not help but address the issue of defectors as a major concern. China approached the issue of defectors not from a human rights or humanitarian perspective, but from a strategic viewpoint based on its political and security interests with North Korea. In particular, China firmly maintained its position that defectors were not 'refugees' but 'illegal border crossers' who had illegally crossed the border between China and North Korea for economic purposes. Accordingly, China arrested defectors and forcibly repatriated them to North Korea. However, as international criticism intensified, China did allow some defectors who had entered diplomatic missions in China to resettle in third countries, thus incorporating some humanitarian considerations. Despite these partial forward-looking measures, the forced repatriation of defectors has continued, leading to a primary focus both domestically and internationally on the international legal status of defectors and the issue of forced repatriation.

Since the onset of the defection wave in the mid-1990s, the patterns of defection have been changing during the prolonged process of this phenomenon. Firstly, the push factors within North Korea and the pull factors from outside, such as China and South Korea, have also changed. Notably, there have been significant changes in the motivations for defection. Furthermore, the gender ratio of defectors has drastically shifted from being male-dominated to female-dominated. These North Korean women have been involuntarily married to Chinese men, and in this process, the human rights of children born to these defected women and Chinese men have emerged as a major issue. Additionally, as the number of defectors settling in South Korea increases, the connection between those who have already arrived and their families remaining in North Korea is acting as a factor that alters the nature of defection.

As these changes indicate, the issue of North Korean defectors has taken on a complex nature throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, it is necessary to accurately identify the complex nature of the defector issue resulting from the prolonged defection phenomenon and to develop countermeasures. Above all, the approach must consider that the defector issue inherently involves a strategic dimension requiring a change in the attitude of China, the key stakeholder. This paper aims to identify the changing patterns of defection and propose alternatives that can induce a change in China's attitude.

II. Changes in the Patterns of North Korean Defectors Residing in China

Over the nearly 20 years since the 'Arduous March,' the nature of defectors within China has also undergone changes during the ongoing defection wave. Therefore, a thorough examination of these changes in the characteristics of defectors is a prerequisite for establishing effective policies for them.

1. Decrease in the Number of North Korean Defectors Residing in China

Because China classifies defectors as illegal border crossers, it does not permit access by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or NGOs. Consequently, there is no systematic way to investigate the number of defectors. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately ascertain the number of North Korean defectors residing in China. However, since the mid-1990s, defector support organizations and experts have estimated the number of defectors through sample surveys. Due to this estimation method, considerable discrepancies have been observed among different reporting entities. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that the number of defectors in China peaked in the late 1990s, coinciding with the period of the 'Arduous March' in North Korea.

The number of defectors residing in China, which peaked in the late 1990s, has been observed to continuously decrease in the 2000s. Although discrepancies in numbers persist among reporting entities, a majority view estimates the number of defectors to be around 100,000 in the early 2000s. By the mid-2000s, the number of defectors was assessed to have further decreased. Based on its February 2005 survey results, the U.S. Department of State estimated the number of overseas defectors, which forms the basis of U.S. policy on defectors, to be between 30,000 and 50,000. Good Friends also reported in August 2005, based on field research conducted in rural areas of the Northeast Three Provinces within a 500 km radius of the border, that the number of defectors was around 50,000.

By the late 2000s, the number of defectors is estimated to have further decreased to the range of 20,000 to 50,000. Noland and Haggard of the Peterson Institute estimated in 2008 that the number of defectors in China had significantly decreased to approximately 20,000 to 40,000. Currently, some private organizations estimate the number to be between 12,000 and 20,000. What are the factors contributing to the overall decrease in the number of defectors residing in China? Firstly, as discussed later, the overwhelming majority of new defectors hope to go to South Korea, which does not lead to an increase in the number of defectors residing in China. Secondly, defectors who have resided in China for a long time are continuously entering South Korea. In the absence of an increase in the number of defectors residing in China due to new defections, factors such as crackdowns by Chinese public security on defectors, resulting in unstable legal status, and the punishment by North Korean authorities after forced repatriation, compel defectors to seek resettlement in third countries. This departure of defectors from China to resettle in third countries acts as a factor reducing the number of defectors within China. While the international migration routes for defectors have diversified to include the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, the increasing number of defectors leaving China to settle in South Korea makes the pull factors in South Korea the core reason for the decrease in the number of defectors residing in China. Since 2002, the number of defectors entering South Korea has exceeded 1,000, and since 2006, more than 2,000 defectors have entered South Korea annually. With a sharp decrease in new defections and a steady increase in the number of existing defectors in China entering South Korea, it is judged that the number of defectors residing in China is continuously decreasing. Thirdly, Chinese authorities are continuously arresting defectors and forcibly repatriating them to North Korea.

While the overall number of defectors is decreasing, their stay in China is becoming prolonged. Therefore, it is necessary to establish practical protection measures that consider both the reduction in numbers and the prolonged stay.

2. Changes in Defection Motives

Along with the decrease in numbers and the prolongation of stay, it is necessary to consider changes in defection motives from the perspective of push factors. There are changes occurring in defection motives, which are a key push factor. Firstly, there is an increase in defections motivated by the pursuit of a 'better life' compared to life in North Korea, rather than defections for mere survival as in the early days. Consequently, there is a qualitative change in economic motives themselves. Secondly, defections prompted by the recommendations of North Korean defectors who have already arrived in South Korea have significantly increased.

As shown in [Table 1], among the 606 defectors who entered South Korea from 2010 to October of this year and were surveyed by KINU, 402 responded regarding their defection motives. Examining the defection motives of these 402 individuals, economic reasons still account for the largest proportion at 39.1%, but recommendations from family members already in South Korea are also significantly high at 25.7%. Dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime is also indicated at 12.6%. As such, defection motives such as dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime, fear of punishment, and the desire to go to South Korea are likely to be influenced by the North Korean authorities' potential to punish them as perpetrators of anti-state and anti-national crimes, such as treason, thereby affecting the determination of the international legal status of defectors... (continued)