China's Climate Policy and Sino-US Relations under the Post-Kyoto Regime

EAI China Panel Report No. 5

Author

Won Dong-wook (元東郁)_Professor and Head of Chinese Studies, Department of International Studies, Dong-A University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Chinese Language and Literature and obtained master's and doctoral degrees in International Politics from Peking University. He has also served as a Senior Researcher at the Northeast Asia and North Korea Research Center of the Korea Transport Institute and as a specialist member of the Economic Cooperation Subcommittee of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative. His main research areas include China's environment, energy, transportation and logistics, and East Asian cooperation. Recent papers include "Analysis of Changes in China's Position in International Climate Negotiations: Focusing on Process and Drivers" (2011), "The Light and Shadow of North Korea-China Economic Cooperation: Focusing on the 'Changji-tu Development Plan' and Cross-Border Joint Development between North Korea and China" (2011), "China's Policy Toward North Korea and the Dilemma of Alliance: Focusing on the Cheonan Incident" (2010), "New Changes in China's Energy Diplomacy and the Energy Cooperation Game between South Korea and China" (2009), and "East Asian Regionalism and China's Strategy" (2009).

I. Introduction

In response to the human and global crisis of climate change, the international community has made sustained efforts for over two decades to build global governance. In the course of these efforts, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 as a basic framework for international response to climate change, and the 'Kyoto Protocol,' which stipulated emission reduction obligations for developed countries, was signed at the third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) in 1997. However, despite these achievements, the governance structure of the international community, based on the self-help efforts of individual countries, revealed significant limitations. In other words, the impact on the interests of individual countries arising from the actual process of responding to climate change, as well as the reordering of the international political and economic order that the establishment of a medium- to long-term climate regime would bring about, has led to complex and multi-layered conflicts of interest between developed and developing countries, and within developed and developing countries. The exclusion of reduction obligations for developing countries, including China, and the passive and negative attitude towards the climate regime, such as the withdrawal of the United States, which has played a leading and core role in establishing the international regime, were major reasons for delaying the substantive entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, which contains actual regulations on greenhouse gas emissions. Although the Kyoto Protocol eventually entered into force in February 2005 with Russia's ratification, the passive and negative attitude of the United States, in particular, had a negative impact on delaying the substantive actions of major developing countries, including China, and thus delayed the formation of global governance capable of effectively responding to the common human crisis of climate change.

Nevertheless, the international community's efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change have continued. At the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP-13) held in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007, the 'Bali Roadmap,' a negotiation process to discuss the post-Kyoto regime after 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol's implementation plan is completed, was adopted. This was an effort to build a new level of global governance to respond to climate change, encompassing both developed and developing countries, and it was followed by the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) in Copenhagen in December 2009, the 16th Conference of the Parties in Cancun in December 2010, and the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP-17) held in Durban in November 2011. However, these international efforts to build a post-Kyoto regime failed to achieve substantive results due to the refusal of major developing countries, including China and India, as well as the United States, to commit to mandatory emission reductions. In other words, the international climate negotiations, held with new expectations, ultimately ended in vain and entered a more complex and multi-layered trajectory. Therefore, can the international climate negotiations, spanning 20 years since the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, no longer guarantee effectiveness? Does international climate negotiation now require a new framework beyond the UN? Is the substance of the post-Kyoto regime a transition from a multilateral regime of all member states under the UN to a new climate governance system based on the G2 structure of the United States and China?

As is well known, the roles of the United States and China are of great significance in the process of building the post-Kyoto regime. As the representative of developed countries and the representative of developing countries, respectively, these two countries are not only major responsible parties accounting for over 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions that actually cause climate change, but they are also key actors determining the success or failure of international negotiations to build the post-Kyoto regime. Furthermore, the US and China, which have been criticized by the international community as an 'alliance of denial' (New York Times April/20/2007), have been relatively free from the reduction obligations of the Kyoto Protocol, but they face certain limitations in continuously expressing their refusal in the discussions on the post-Kyoto regime. Nevertheless, since the launch of the Obama administration, the United States has been actively responding to climate change domestically while also pursuing efforts to build a new international climate regime led by the US, independent of the UN framework. Despite increasing pressure from the international community for mandatory emission reductions, China is strengthening policy measures for energy conservation and greenhouse gas emission reduction at the domestic level, while still maintaining its refusal of mandatory reductions. In particular, despite differences in opinion and potential conflicts regarding climate issues beyond the existing UN framework between the US and China, cooperation is being enhanced, focusing on technological areas.

This paper will examine the policy measures China, as a key actor emerging in response to the post-Kyoto regime, is exploring at domestic and international levels, and how it is responding to international pressure for greenhouse gas emission reductions based on these measures. It will also consider the cooperation and conflict between the US and China as key parties related to the post-Kyoto regime, and further analyze the possibility of G2 as a new global climate governance system. Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to forecast the future of Sino-US relations and the post-Kyoto regime surrounding the climate issue. While an analysis of the US position and policy on climate change since the launch of the Obama administration is necessary, this paper will focus on China's climate policy for reasons of space and in line with the overall purpose of the book.

II. The Post-Kyoto Regime and China's Climate Policy

1. The Substance and Direction of the Post-Kyoto Regime

Since the commencement of international climate negotiations in 1990, international political struggles over issues such as the division of greenhouse gas emission reduction obligations have intensified daily. Essentially, climate issues are not confined to environmental problems but are intertwined with economic and political issues, and the development process of the international climate regime can be seen as a complex and subtle microcosm of international politics, concentrating the dilemmas of various global issues facing the world today. Looking back at the development of the international climate regime, the 'UN Framework Convention on Climate Change' adopted in 1992, which established a long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and a set of basic principles, is the first important milestone. The 'Kyoto Protocol,' adopted at the Kyoto Conference (COP-3) in 1997, is the first legally binding document under the framework of this convention, designating developed countries and economies in transition as Annex I Parties, stipulating quantified reduction targets, and introducing three market-based international cooperation mechanisms, making it the second important milestone. Considering that negotiations began in earnest in 1995, there was a arduous process of 10 years until the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005. Although its environmental effectiveness was significantly diminished by the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol system in 2001 and the exclusion of major developing countries like China and India from the list of obligated countries, the Kyoto Protocol represents a significant step forward taken by humanity through concrete action to address the agenda of mutual destruction posed by climate change.

Discussions on the post-Kyoto regime, in preparation for the period after 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol expires, began early at the 11th Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention and the first Meeting of the Parties (COP-11/MOP-1) held in Montreal, Canada, in December 2005. At this conference, two negotiation tracks were adopted, officially launching new negotiations and heralding the opening of the post-Kyoto regime, which was increasingly intense and fraught with various variables. Furthermore, in November 2007, the 'Bali Roadmap' was adopted at the 13th Conference of the Parties on Climate Change (COP-13) held in Bali, Indonesia, deciding to conclude the long-term dialogue on action. In addition, unlike the Kyoto Protocol negotiation track (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol: AWG-KP), which discusses additional reduction commitments for Annex I Parties, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) was established to discuss reductions, adaptation, technology, and finance for all parties to the climate change negotiations, including developing countries, thereby launching a new comprehensive negotiation process. However, at the Copenhagen Conference (COP-15) in December 2009, which was intended to decide on the post-Kyoto regime after 2012, despite the presence of heads of state from over 100 countries worldwide, a binding and concrete agreement could not be reached due to disagreements between developed and developing countries, as well as conflicts of interest among various groups formed around their respective interests. Consequently, this conflict structure persisted at the subsequent Cancun Conference (COP-16) in December 2010 and the Durban Conference (COP-17) in November 2011, and the discussions on building the post-Kyoto regime within the multilateral framework of the UN ultimately failed to achieve final results.

Despite these limitations, the discussions related to the post-Kyoto regime have brought about a certain shift in the process of international climate negotiations. First and foremost, the recent landscape of international climate negotiations is expanding beyond the UN framework to more diverse multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms such as the G20, APEC, and G2. Furthermore, a transition is being sought from the tripartite structure of the 'Umbrella Group,' the European Union, and the G77+1 (Group of Developing Countries) to a G2 structure of joint governance between the US and China, which together account for over 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This is also a result of the lack of a binding agreement related to the post-Kyoto regime and the continued sharp conflict of interests among negotiation groups, leading to considerable doubt and disappointment regarding the UN cooperation framework for addressing climate issues.

Second, there is a lack of leadership crucial for the success of international climate negotiations. That is, the European Union, which played a role as a substantive leader in the construction of the Kyoto regime, has significantly reduced its capacity and willingness in international climate negotiations related to the construction of the post-Kyoto regime due to the impact of the financial crisis. Indeed, the voice of the European Union has somewhat diminished in the Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban conferences, and it has not played a significant role. Although the United States and China, the world's largest carbon emitters that did not fulfill their reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, are playing active roles in the international climate negotiation process under the UN system, it remains questionable whether they can move from an 'Alliance of denial' to an 'Alliance of implementation' and exercise leadership as 'responsible major powers' in international climate negotiations.

Third, a more complex and multi-layered structure is being formed for the construction of the post-Kyoto regime, with disagreements among negotiation groups regarding international climate negotiations, as well as divergent voices emerging within each of the so-called 'three major groups.' Disagreements on emission reduction approvals and financial contributions have arisen among EU member states. The 'Umbrella Group' also showed internal differences in their positions after the Copenhagen Conference, contrary to their initial stance of opposing the establishment of greenhouse gas reduction plans. Furthermore, within the G77+1 developing countries' group, internal disagreements have emerged with the formation of BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), and even within BASIC, certain differences in positions exist... (to be continued)