The Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations: Focusing on Changes Since the Global Financial Crisis

EAI China Studies Panel Report No. 3

Author

Shin Jong-ho (申鍾浩)_ Research Fellow, Center for Unification and Northeast Asian Studies, Gyeonggi Research Institute (GRI). Graduated from the Department of Chinese Language and Literature at Hanyang University and obtained a Ph.D. in International Politics from Peking University. Previously served as a lecturer at Hanyang University and a legislative researcher in the Foreign Affairs and Security Team at the National Assembly Research Service (NARS). His main research areas are Chinese politics and diplomacy, and East Asian international relations. Recent research includes "Characteristics of China-Taiwan Exchange and Cooperation and Implications for Inter-Korean Relations" (2010), "China's International Crisis Management Behavior and Implications for Sino-US Relations" (2010), "Development of China's Soft Power Diplomacy and its International Political Implications" (2009), "China's Multilateral Security Cooperation Strategy and Sino-US Relations: Focusing on ARF, SCO, and the Six-Party Talks" (2008), among others.

I. Introduction

Historically, the Taiwan issue has been the most central and sensitive matter affecting Sino-US relations. This is because the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China and is inseparably linked to US factors. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China has consistently regarded the Taiwan issue as a core matter related to its sovereignty and territory, based on the 'One China' principle. Meanwhile, the United States began to actively intervene in the Taiwan issue following the Korean War, and despite reaching a principled agreement on resolving the Taiwan issue during the normalization of Sino-US relations in the 1970s, the US has utilized the Taiwan issue as a 'strategic card' to contain China.

During the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, Sino-US relations surrounding the Taiwan issue fundamentally unfolded with the US taking the lead and China responding. That is, the US, based on so-called 'strategic ambiguity,' used the Taiwan issue as a 'card' to check China's expansion of influence in Northeast Asia, while simultaneously maintaining relations with Taiwan as an important market for US weapons and goods. In response to this US policy towards Taiwan, China reacted sensitively, asserting that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair, but focused its policy on preventing conflicts arising from the Taiwan issue from escalating into a deterioration of overall Sino-US relations, rather than confronting the US head-on.

However, with the relative decline of the US and the visible rise of China around the 2008 global financial crisis, the importance of the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations has diminished compared to before. Instead, the newly emerged 'China factor' is exerting greater influence on Sino-US relations. Sino-US relations surrounding the Taiwan issue are also gradually shifting from the previous pattern of 'US-led, China's response' to 'weakening US leadership, China's active offensive.' In other words, as the US, needing to seek strategic cooperation with China in resolving the financial crisis, and China, expecting US concessions and respect on the Taiwan issue, find common ground, the importance of the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations is relatively declining. Furthermore, the recent strengthening of cross-strait relations (兩岸關係) is also serving as a significant factor in the reduced sensitivity of the Taiwan issue to Sino-US relations.

This paper focuses on the point that the status of the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations has significantly weakened since the 2008 global financial crisis. It proposes three key variables that have the greatest impact on this change (US factors, China factors, and cross-strait relations) and examines how these variables have brought about changes in Sino-US relations surrounding the Taiwan issue. To this end, it will first examine Sino-US relations surrounding the Taiwan issue during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and then analyze how the status of the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations has changed since the global financial crisis through the three key variables. The conclusion will offer a prospect for future Sino-US relations concerning the Taiwan issue.

II. Sino-US Relations Surrounding the Taiwan Issue During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

The so-called 'Taiwan issue' can be fundamentally considered an internal affair of China, originating from the Northeast Asian situation surrounding China in the late 19th to early 20th centuries and the outcome of the Chinese Civil War (國共內戰) in the 1940s. However, it began to escalate into an international issue when the United States intervened in the Taiwan issue in 1950, triggered by the Korean War. Particularly after the People's Republic of China regained its permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1971, and despite the 'One China' principle being recognized as a universal principle by the international community, including the US, fundamental differences in perception between the two countries regarding the resolution of the Taiwan issue persisted, making it the most acute issue of Sino-US conflict to this day.

1. China's Perception and Policy on the Taiwan Issue

(1) China's Perception of Taiwan: An Internal Affair and Object of Unification

Following its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki (馬關條約). However, after Japan's defeat in World War II, the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) began exercising sovereignty over Taiwan in October 1945, based on the provisions of the 'Cairo Declaration' of November 1943, which stipulated that "Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands, territories stolen by Japan, shall be returned to China." This marked the genesis of the Taiwan issue. Subsequently, the complexity of the Taiwan issue deepened when the Nationalist government, defeated in the Chinese Civil War, relocated to Taiwan and formed a confrontational relationship with the People's Republic of China.

Since 1949, China has regarded the Taiwan issue as a core matter related to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is, historically, Taiwan is an inalienable territory of mainland China; therefore, for China, the resolution of the Taiwan issue is the most critical strategic issue related to national security interests represented by national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unification, and the recovery of independence, and it is an internal affair of China (中共中央文獻編輯委員會 1994, 348). In particular, since 1971, when China was recognized by the international community as the sole legitimate government representing China, its conviction that the Taiwan issue is an inherent internal affair of China has become even stronger.

From China's perspective, the fundamental resolution of the Taiwan issue means cross-strait unification. In accordance with the internationally recognized 'One China' principle since 1971, China maintains that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and therefore, it cannot recognize any form of Taiwan's independence or secession. It also holds the position that unification must be achieved, even if by force if necessary. For these reasons, China has consistently expressed immediate and firm opposition whenever the US continued arms sales to Taiwan or pursued policies that encouraged Taiwan's independence. Notably, although China shifted its approach from a potentially forceful method to a peaceful one after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1987, its continued emphasis on resolving the Taiwan issue under China's leadership, within the scope of not compromising China's sovereignty, is significant evidence that China perceives the Taiwan issue as its own internal affair.

Furthermore, China perceives the Taiwan issue as a critical matter that can exert a decisive influence on Sino-US relations as well as the strategic structure of the Northeast Asian region. The core objective of China's security strategy is to create a peaceful and stable international security environment for the realization of China's reform and opening up and socialist modernization. To this end, one of China's medium- and long-term strategic goals has been to avoid military confrontation with the United States, the most realistic and potential threat country affecting its security, not only during the Cold War but also in the post-Cold War era (閻學通 1997). Therefore, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait hold immense strategic value for China's maritime transportation and maritime security in terms of China's national security and development strategy, serving not only as a crucial buffer for the maritime security of China's southeastern coast but also as an advanced base for national defense and security.

(2) China's Policy Towards Taiwan: A Combination of Hardline and Softline Approaches

China's policy towards Taiwan from 1949 to 2008 can be divided into three stages. The first stage, from 1949 until December 1978, when the reform and opening-up policy was decided, involved China pursuing both the liberation of Taiwan by force and the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. After expelling the Nationalist government from the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party recognized the unification with Taiwan as an unfinished war of liberation, thus attempting to resolve the Taiwan issue through military means. However, China's policy of attempting to liberate Taiwan by force became practically impossible in the 1950s due to the US intervention in the Taiwan issue... (continued)