[NSP Report 55] Kim Jong-un's North Korea and the Policy of Co-Prosperity and Complexity toward North Korea

Kim Sung-bae

Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). He advises on policy development related to North Korea and the Korean Peninsula. Prior to joining INSS, Dr. Kim Sung-bae served as a Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Unification (2006) and as an administrator at the National Security Council (NSC) (2003-2006). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University.

Cho Dong-ho

Professor of North Korean Studies at the College of Social Sciences, Ewha Womans University. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania and previously served as a Senior Research Fellow, Head of the North Korean Economy Research Team, and Director of the Planning and Coordination Office at the Korea Development Institute (KDI). He currently holds positions as Standing Member of the Economic, Scientific, and Environmental Committee of the National Unification Advisory Council, Member of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Joint Research with China Experts, Policy Advisor to the Office of the Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Unification, and Budget Analyst Advisor to the Budgetary Analysis Office of the National Assembly Budget Office. He also serves as Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute, a regular columnist for Chosun Ilbo's "Morning Forum," and a foreign affairs, unification, and security advisor to SBS. His primary research areas include the North Korean economy and inter-Korean economic cooperation. Recent publications include "Changes in North Korea-China Relations and Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation," "An Evaluation of the Situation Facing the North Korean Economy Today and Prospects," "Limitations of a Planned Economy," and the co-edited volume "North Korea 2032: A Co-Prosperity Strategy for Advancement."

I. The Era of Complex US-China Diplomacy and the Search for a New North Korea Policy

For the past 60 years, South Korea's policy toward North Korea has unfolded in close connection with the global and regional order. Although North Korea policy during the Cold War saw minor changes due to the interplay of détente and the new Cold War, it fundamentally remained within the bounds of adversarial coexistence, attributable to the Cold War order at the global and regional levels. President Roh Tae-woo's Northern Policy, exemplified by the "July 7 Declaration" (1988), was a response to the global trend of détente and marked the first shift in South Korea's North Korea policy from containment to engagement. While President Kim Young-sam's North Korea policy oscillated between moderation and hardline stances due to the outlier issue of the North Korean nuclear program, it could not reverse the trend of détente. The North Korea policies of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, regardless of their specific designations, were extensions of engagement policy in that they sought change in North Korea through exchange and cooperation. President Lee Myung-bak's North Korea policy, while maintaining the existing engagement policy under the motto of coexistence and co-prosperity, presented a somewhat complex picture by pursuing regime change in North Korea through policy tools such as sanctions, in addition to the Sunshine Policy, likely as a result of domestic identity politics and the variable of North Korea's power succession. While striving to differentiate itself from previous administrations, the Lee Myung-bak administration also explored engagement policies, such as sounding out the possibility of inter-Korean summit talks. However, following the shooting of a South Korean tourist at Geumgangsan Mountain in July 2008 and the deterioration of Chairman Kim Jong-il's health later that year, which accelerated the establishment of a succession system in North Korea, coupled with the second nuclear test in May 2009 and the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents in 2010, opportunities for systematically pursuing engagement policy were lost. Today's debates surrounding South Korea's North Korea policy largely show convergence in policy goals but divergence in policy tools. The problem lies in the fact that the underlying issues concerning North Korea policy are confined within the limits of domestic identity politics and the post-Cold War era, failing to capture the global and regional upheavals that transcend the post-Cold War context.

Since the turn of the 21st century, the world order has undergone fundamental changes in all aspects, including international political actors and arenas, moving beyond mere post-Cold War dynamics. While a unipolar system centered on the United States seemed to operate temporarily in the early post-Cold War era of the 1990s, the 21st century has witnessed a rapid increase in China's national strength and the emergence of the US financial crisis in 2008 and the European debt crisis in 2011, leading to a realignment of the global and regional order centered around the two major powers, the US and China. The fate of global governance will depend on whether the US-China relationship evolves into a stable and cooperative one, fitting the description of a G2 system or the era of US-China relations, or devolves into an unstable and conflict-ridden one amidst inevitable competition. In particular, the East Asian regional order is inevitably a direct projection of the US-China relationship due to China's dual nature as a global power and a regional state. The international political stage is characterized by the simultaneous unfolding of various arenas beyond traditional security and economic concerns, including environment, energy, information, and knowledge, while diverse issues are clustered, creating chain reactions internally and externally. Notably, economic crises and the narrowing gap in economic power between the US and China have made the economy a core driving force.

Our most pressing security issue, North Korea's nuclear program and the North Korean issue, cannot be exempt from these global and regional dynamics. The international political trends surrounding the Korean Peninsula in recent years have shown that the North Korean nuclear and North Korea issues have effectively become subjects of great power politics, primarily involving the US and China. The differing reactions and subtle conflicts displayed by the US and China following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents suggest that both countries are addressing the North Korean issue within the context of US-China relations. The fact that the Korean Peninsula issue was discussed with greater weight than expected at the US-China summit in January 2011, and that agreements regarding the North Korean issue, such as the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, were reached relatively smoothly, was part of the stable management of US-China relations. China's strong endorsement of the Kim Jong-un regime following Kim Jong-il's death, and the US's hope for stable power succession in North Korea, can be interpreted as a desire to avoid rapid changes in East Asia due to a sudden upheaval in the North Korean system. Meanwhile, while the North Korean nuclear and North Korea issues are security concerns on the Korean Peninsula, they can also trigger chain reactions with other security issues such as China's own stability or territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia, as well as global economic crises or environmental and energy issues. Above all, if China's own instability increases, North Korea will be directly affected, and if China is put on the defensive regarding issues of sovereignty and territory, which it considers its core interests, it cannot be ruled out that China may expand its definition of core interests to include the North Korean issue. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear and North Korea issues act as global and regional economic risks, and the prominence of energy issues will increase Russia's involvement in the North Korean issue.

In formulating and pursuing future North Korea policy, we must consider how these global and regional dynamics will be projected onto the North Korean issue. Simultaneously, there is a need to actively utilize the North Korean issue and North Korea policy in establishing South Korea's overall foreign policy and implementing its external strategy. This is because the North Korean issue and North Korea policy can serve as highly effective diplomatic resources, whether we participate directly as architects in building the East Asian order or pursue a middle power diplomacy strategy. To present a North Korea policy for the 2010s, looking ahead over the next decade, a precise analysis and forecast of North Korea's choices and the future of its regime are required. Naturally, this must begin with an assessment of the Kim Jong-un regime, which will determine North Korea's fate.

II. Stability and Leadership Type of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Since being designated as successor by Kim Jong-il in January 2009, Kim Jong-un has undergone intensive succession training. In September 2010, at the 3rd Party Congress held for the first time in 44 years, he ascended to the position of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, becoming the second-in-command. Just days after Chairman Kim Jong-il's death on December 30 of last year, Kim Jong-un was appointed Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army in accordance with the so-called "10.8 Last Instruction" left by Kim Jong-il. Furthermore, following the Party Congress in September 2010 when Kim Jong-un rose to the position of successor, he is expected to be appointed General Secretary of the Party at the upcoming Party Congress on April 11, and there is also a possibility that he will succeed to the position of Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the 5th session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly on April 13.

If Kim Jong-il was a "contested successor" who officially obtained the status of successor through fierce power struggles, prolonged succession training, and the accumulation of achievements, Kim Jong-un is a "chosen successor" who rapidly ascended to the ranks of successors, benefiting from his father's prestige. Kim Jong-un's leadership has not yet been sufficiently tested, and it is difficult to definitively conclude that his power base is firmly consolidated. Nevertheless, the reasons for anticipating that the Kim Jong-un regime will take root relatively stably lie in North Korea's unique political system of the supreme leader and succession system, and its political structure, which makes it difficult for alternative political forces to emerge. North Korea, learning from the chaos that occurred during the power transitions in the Soviet Union and China, created a succession system where the "successor upholds the leader's ideology and leadership" in handling all matters. It is difficult for political forces to challenge a successor who receives the political backing of the supreme leader as an absolute power. While some predicted the emergence of a collective leadership system or a hybrid system where the successor and the ruling elite form an alliance after Kim Jong-il's death, this appears unlikely at present. A collective leadership system is fundamentally at odds with North Korea's supreme leader system. One of the core arguments North Korea presented to justify the supreme leader system was the perceived flaws of collective leadership (Kim Il-sung 1996, 109-110). Even if the successor's political leadership and power base are relatively weak, it is highly probable that the power elite will make the rational choice to maintain their vested interests through an alliance with the successor, rather than risk the political repercussions of challenging the successor through an independent alliance, and this is the main argument for a hybrid system. Currently, key figures in the party and military, such as Jang Song-thaek, Kim Kyong-hui, and Ri Yong-ho, appear to be supporting Kim Jong-un, giving the impression of a hybrid system. However, a hybrid system is at best temporary and transitional, and will eventually lead to either a one-man rule system or a collective leadership system (Jeong Young-tae, Lee Gyo-deok, Jeong Gyu-seop, Lee Ki-dong 2010, 51-52). Given that a collective leadership system is empirically and ideologically difficult to establish in North Korea, it is highly likely that the outcome will be a one-man rule system centered on Kim Jong-un.

Assessing the Kim Jong-un regime approximately two months after its inauguration, his power base appears to be relatively solid. Kim Jong-un is not only officially holding the position of North Korea's supreme leader but is also strengthening his role as such. At the start of the new year, he attended a performance with high-ranking party, government, and military officials on January 1st, and hosted a state banquet on Lunar New Year's Day, demonstrating his consolidation of control over North Korea's power elite. The central figure of the 70th birthday celebration of Kim Jong-il on February 16th was effectively Kim Jong-un. During the military parade, held for the first time on Kim Jong-il's birthday, military leaders such as Chief of Staff Ri Yong-ho, Minister of People's Armed Forces Kim Yong-chun, and General Pak Jae-kyong lined up before Vice Chairman Kim Jong-un, performing a scene of pledging loyalty. Furthermore, from January to February of this year, Kim Jong-un has visited military units and economic sites more than ten times, seamlessly performing the role of supreme leader previously carried out by Chairman Kim Jong-il.

In this regard, it is unlikely that any signs of instability will emerge in the Kim Jong-un regime's power base in the short term. However, in the medium to long term, challenges to the Kim Jong-un regime lurk everywhere. If Kim Jong-un fails to demonstrate effective political leadership in response to North Korea's chronic economic difficulties and the international community's pressure for denuclearization, he will maintain a structurally unstable power. While the likelihood of North Korea falling into political instability within the next few years is not high, it cannot be guaranteed that it can maintain political stability in the medium to long term thereafter.

Within the contradictory dilemma of the inherent limitations of a third-generation succession, which must claim "succession of the military-first policy," and the structural pressure for "change" necessary for North Korea's long-term survival, the Kim Jong-un regime has few options. It is highly likely to find itself in an awkward position, unable to move forward or backward between inheriting the military-first policy and shifting its policy direction, which will only exacerbate regime instability. Therefore, North Korea ultimately has two paths to choose. One is to ignore the pressure for change and endure a "second arduous march" bound by the military-first policy through "second instruction rule." Kim Jong-un may continue to prioritize consolidating power through the military-first policy, neglecting economic reforms and denuclearization, and resorting to a reign of terror. While such a choice may serve to maintain power in the short term, it will deepen the structural contradictions within North Korean society in the medium to long term, thereby increasing political instability. The other path is to move towards a policy of prioritizing the economy and denuclearization through autonomous transformation. For the time being, the Kim Jong-un regime will have to place "Kim Jong-il's instruction rule" at the forefront, making it difficult to differentiate itself from the Kim Jong-il era. Moreover, given the characteristics of a power transition period, pursuing drastic changes immediately will be challenging. Nevertheless, cautiously exploring such a future would be another alternative.

Meanwhile, the Kim Jong-un regime is already exhibiting a subtly different leadership style compared to his father's era. The most striking aspect outwardly is Kim Jong-un's increased physical contact during military unit inspections, such as linking arms or firmly shaking hands with soldiers. His unusually lengthy handwritten letter to residents of Manpo City, Jagang Province, on January 14th (<KCNA>, 1/16/2012) is also interpreted as an effort to strengthen rapport with the North Korean populace. Another noticeable point is the simplification of the entourage during public field guidance tours, with only 4-5 individuals accompanying him, compared to the 10-20 who accompanied Chairman Kim Jong-il. This appears to be a streamlined team of aides organized to enhance contact with soldiers and residents. These are scenes rarely seen during Chairman Kim Jong-il's tenure and are noteworthy as they evoke the era of President Kim Il-sung, who emphasized the "mass line." While it is too early to make a definitive judgment, it is possible to interpret that Vice Chairman Kim Jong-un, who has already garnered attention for his physical resemblance to Kim Il-sung, is pursuing a leadership style closer to his grandfather's than his father's. Chairman Kim Jong-il relied on Kim Il-sung's instruction rule for a relatively long period of three years, and only after being re-appointed Chairman of the National Defense Commission in 1998, with strengthened powers under the constitutional revision, did he break free from the shadow of instruction rule by advocating for a "strong and prosperous nation" and the "military-first policy." However, the Kim Jong-un regime appears to be gradually concluding the period of mourning, culminating in the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il's birth on February 16th, and transitioning towards a celebratory atmosphere for the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth on April 15th. Here too, we can discern the Kim Jong-un regime's intention to highlight the Kim Il-sung bloodline, no less than Kim Jong-il's last instructions.

III. North Korean Nuclear Diplomacy in the Kim Jong-un Era: Kim Jong-un's Equidistant Diplomacy?

The Kim Jong-un regime is sending mixed signals in its foreign policy, including on issues of nuclear weapons and missiles. On one hand, it has shown a conciliatory stance by promising to halt all nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, through the "February 29 Agreement" with the United States. On the other hand, it announced the launch of a long-range rocket, dubbed "Kwangmyongsong-3," on March 16th, provoking strong reactions from the US and the international community. North Korea argues that the launch of an artificial satellite is a matter of peaceful use of space and does not violate the "February 29 Agreement" between North Korea and the US. However, the US maintains that a satellite launch vehicle is technically identical to a long-range missile and thus violates the "February 29 Agreement." The US plans to halt nutritional aid to North Korea and seek additional countermeasures if North Korea proceeds with the launch of "Kwangmyongsong-3," and North Korea cannot be ruled out from responding with a third nuclear test. North Korea is pursuing the launch of "Kwangmyongsong-3" as part of the celebrations for the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth and has been promoting it to the North Korean public, making its cancellation unlikely. Nevertheless, North Korea is also leaving room for negotiation by requesting international observers for the satellite launch and proposing the entry of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to monitor the halt of nuclear activities... (to be continued)