[NSP Report 53] Challenges and Prospects of Korean Maritime Policy in the 2010s

Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University. His research and teaching interests include East Asian political economy, international trade policy, and East Asian territorial disputes. Dr. Gu Min-kyo has published Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer), which analyzes various maritime disputes in East Asia and explores the possibilities for a new maritime order. He has also published numerous articles in leading international academic journals such as Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Perspective, European Journal of East Asia Studies, Global Asia, and Journal of East Asian Studies. Dr. Gu holds degrees from the Department of Diplomacy and the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University. He earned a Master's degree in International Political Economy from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley in 2005, with a dissertation on East Asian territorial disputes. Dr. Gu worked as a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the University of Southern California's Institute of International Relations (CIS), Korean Studies Institute (KSI), and Department of International Relations for two years, and served as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration at Yonsei University (2007-2010).

I. Introduction

The maritime domain is a complex and multi-layered space where traditional security and non-traditional security, such as the transport of human and material resources (sea lines of communication: SLOC), resource development, and the environment, converge. The maritime domain is also a crucial policy area for examining the immediate challenges of South Korean foreign policy in the 2010s and deriving future prospects. It is said that "whoever rules the sea rules the world." While the ultimate goal of South Korean foreign policy is not "world domination," the sea cannot be neglected. Nations that rule the world, both in the past and present, will undoubtedly rule the seas in the future, and our traditional and non-traditional security will be influenced by the power of those maritime hegemons.

As is well known, the post-war international order in East Asia has revolved around strong territoriality. Given the geographical space where perpetrators and victims of imperialist aggression coexist, and the temporal context in which long-standing animosities cast a long shadow, East Asian states have adhered more rigidly to the principles of the territorial state and the inviolability of state sovereignty than states in other regions (Moon and Chun 2003). Underlying East Asian nationalism, which has manifested in various forms such as irredentism, resource nationalism, or territorial nationalism, is a territoriality that is at times aggressive and at times defensive. While territorial disputes in the region have not escalated into full-scale physical conflicts since World War II and the Korean War, largely because inland border issues have mostly been resolved, a significant and widespread area of unresolved territorial issues remains: namely, disputes over islands and maritime boundaries (Gu 2011).

If one were to identify the areas with the highest potential for maritime disputes globally, it would undoubtedly be the maritime region of East Asia, encompassing the Northwest Pacific, the East Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea (Park 1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1983d; Kim 2004; Valencia 2008, 2010; Koo 2009; Van Dyke 2009). In Northeast Asia, periodic and recurring diplomatic confrontations between South Korea and Japan, Japan and China, and Russia and Japan over sovereignty of Dokdo, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the Northern Territories/Southern Kuril Islands show no signs of resolution. Furthermore, the latent conflicts between North and South Korea and between the US and China in the Yellow Sea, as evidenced by the diplomatic tensions triggered by the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, could shatter the delicate regional balance of power and interests at any moment. The South China Sea, where China's increasingly overt claims of sovereignty are provoking not only Southeast Asian nations but also the United States, is as perilous a region as the Yellow Sea, East Sea, and East China Sea. The dispute between China and Vietnam in May 2011, sparked when a Chinese patrol vessel cut the cable of a Vietnamese oil and gas exploration ship in the South China Sea, nearly led to armed conflict. In the summer of the same year, the atmosphere further deteriorated as the involved parties successively conducted military exercises in the region. Although the United States' formidable maritime projection power provided stability to the East Asian maritime order for some time after the end of the Cold War, signs are emerging that this is now facing a serious challenge from China.

Maritime issues in East Asia have evolved within diverse geopolitical, economic, and legal contexts. More specifically, they form a multi-layered issue structure centered on sovereignty disputes, resource development, boundary delimitation, and environmental protection. A characteristic of recent regional maritime disputes is their simultaneous occurrence, underpinned by the transition in the balance of power in East Asia, represented by the rise of China and the relative weakening of the United States. However, from a more universal and normative perspective, East Asian island and maritime disputes have unfolded in close connection with boundary delimitation issues concerning territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The persistent conflicts among regional states reflect the limitations of the international maritime regime. In other words, East Asian maritime issues lie at the intersection of a series of events, institutions, and trends. Therefore, establishing a comprehensive maritime policy requires a clear recognition and understanding of this multi-layered structure.

This study is organized as follows. Section II examines the impact of the new balance of power in East Asia, particularly the structural changes brought about by the rise of China and the decline of the United States, on the existing East Asian maritime order within the context of events, institutions, and trends. It also re-examines the significance of the UNCLOS as a normative arbiter, representing the culmination of maritime norms developed to date, from the perspective of the new East Asian balance of power. It specifically points out that despite the normative and practical significance of the Convention, the ambiguity of its key provisions presents significant limitations in resolving specific disputes among East Asian states. It is noteworthy that the recent confrontation between the United States and China in the East Asian seas is also unfolding around the UNCLOS. Section III analyzes the baseline methods and boundary delimitation principles adopted by the three Northeast Asian countries: South Korea, Japan, and China. It also reviews the significance and limitations of bilateral provisional measures as a primary means of regional maritime governance. Based on this, Section IV seeks multilateral solutions for securing non-traditional security, such as joint resource development, regional maritime environmental protection, and ensuring navigational safety, based on a declaration to freeze sovereignty disputes that are difficult to resolve immediately. It also examines the significance and limitations of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in which South Korea has participated since the second North Korean nuclear test in 2009, as a multilateral forum for preventing the proliferation of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the region. Finally, Section V provides a future outlook for the East Asian maritime order and draws policy implications.

II. The East Asian Maritime Order in Transition

1. Intensifying Hegemonic Competition between the US and China and the Emergence of New Maritime Dynamics

In East Asia, particularly in its maritime regions, the complex balance of power and interests no longer allows any single country to exercise dominance. South Korea has played a role in maintaining a balance between continental and maritime powers among its neighboring great powers, albeit with limitations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has shown structural limitations in addressing maritime disputes in the South China Sea due to principles such as non-interventionism, but has recently demonstrated some institutional resilience and adaptability. Japan has sought to establish its position by checking China, a regional rival, through its alliance with the United States, but is gradually losing its status as a traditional maritime power due to prolonged economic stagnation and a lack of political leadership. Meanwhile, China's more aggressive maritime policy and naval expansion are causing significant instability in the East Asian region. China is seeking a new balance in the regional maritime order, but its apprehension towards being bound by institutions or norms it did not design is perpetuating new uncertainties for its neighbors. Further complicating matters, the United States, departing from its previous lukewarm stance, has recently shown an intention to actively engage in East Asian maritime issues again.

The East Asian maritime order in transition is becoming increasingly unstable due to fluid geopolitical and geo-economic factors in the region, with the rising and increasingly assertive China and the re-engaging but still ambivalent United States at its center. Major incidents in the East Asian seas in recent years include Japan's distortion of history textbooks regarding the sovereignty of Dokdo (July 2008), China's provocation against the US Navy surveillance ship Impeccable in the South China Sea (March 2009), the sinking of the Cheonan (March 2010) and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (November 2010) due to North Korean provocations, the rare earth dispute between China and Japan (September 2010), the dispute between China and Vietnam caused by a Chinese patrol vessel cutting the cable of a Vietnamese oil and gas exploration ship in the South China Sea (May 2011), and the opening of China's aircraft carrier era following the successful test voyage of its first aircraft carrier, the Varyag (August 2011). These incidents reveal the overwhelming frequency and significance of China's involvement. This series of events can be seen as both a cause and an effect of the new regional maritime dynamics shaped within the institutional context of the UNCLOS, discussed later.

As is well known, China's growing importance in the overall East Asian economy has historically served to ease political and diplomatic tensions between China and its neighbors through economic incentives. However, in the absence of Cold War-era strategic controls, China is now pursuing an active maritime policy to maximize its own interests. While not all experts agree on the worst-case scenario, the current trend suggests that as China demonstrates its power directly and indirectly to its neighbors, including the United States, these neighbors are likely to accelerate their efforts to maintain a balance of power by taking measures such as military buildup (Holmes and Yoshihara 2010; Kato 2010; Van Dyke 2009; Valencia 2008, 2010). During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were primarily interested in their geopolitical interests and had limited territorial ambitions in East Asia. However, China, as a rising regional power, possesses both geopolitical and territorial ambitions, which has profound implications for the East Asian maritime order. Although debatable, China's policy towards East Asian maritime disputes has been significantly influenced by irredentist ambitions. Economic considerations have also influenced China's confrontational maritime policy, as securing sea lanes for the transport of energy and raw materials has become a priority for China. In particular, since China became a net importer of crude oil in 1993, energy issues have become a major cause of disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea (Koo 2009).

The deterioration of relations between China and its neighbors provides an opportunity for the United States to re-emerge in the East Asian region. For example, the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan in the fall of 2010 reaffirmed to Japan that the United States is the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security interests, despite China's deep dissatisfaction with US intervention. This led to a temporary resolution of the diplomatic conflict between the US and Japan, which had arisen in early 2010 over the relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa. In a similar vein, Vietnam has rapidly improved relations with the United States in many aspects in recent years to counter China, its main rival in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese government is pursuing a strategy of internationalizing the dispute by drawing other countries into multilateral negotiations. Partially responding to these diplomatic efforts by the Vietnamese government, the US Obama administration has emphasized that while the US will remain neutral in the sovereignty disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, it will intervene if freedom of navigation is threatened (Valencia 2010).

As will be explained in more detail in the following section, the new competition between the US and China over the East Asian maritime domain is intertwined with international legal debates regarding the types of military activities that can be conducted by one country within another's EEZ. As seen in the collision between a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet in 2001 and the Chinese provocation against the US Navy surveillance ship Impeccable in 2009, China's aggressive actions against US military activities in its EEZ can lead the two great powers into dangerous confrontation. As discussed in the following section, under the UNCLOS, a coastal state has complete control over all living and non-living resources within its EEZ and can restrict scientific research by other countries. However, the United States argues that its vessels conducting survey activities in other countries' EEZs are justified under the principle of freedom of navigation guaranteed by the UNCLOS. Naturally, China does not accept the US claim. China characterizes these activities as 'maritime scientific research' and asserts that consent from the coastal state is required for such activities within the EEZ. However, China's position is inconsistent with its own unilateral survey and surveillance activities within the EEZs of Japan and Vietnam. Therefore, this issue is highly contentious (Koo 2010).

This confrontation between the US and China was also evident during the joint maritime exercises between South Korea and the United States following the sinking of the Cheonan. After the Cheonan incident, the US and South Korea announced large-scale joint maritime exercises involving the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington in the waters around the Japanese archipelago and the Korean Peninsula. The two countries had originally planned to conduct exercises in the Yellow Sea as well, but this was abruptly canceled due to strong protests from China. China reacted very sensitively to US participation in naval exercises in these waters, most of which are included in China's military operational areas and EEZ, and conducted preemptive naval exercises. In fact, China's unilateral claims over the Yellow Sea cannot be justified as China has not officially agreed on EEZ boundaries with South Korea. Meanwhile, following North Korea's sudden shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, the US and South Korea conducted joint naval exercises, including the USS George Washington, in the Yellow Sea without significant obstruction from China. However, the prevailing view is that China's silence does not indicate a willingness to change its future actions. This series of diplomatic friction between the US and China indicates the difficulty for all stakeholders to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the scope of permissible military activities in the semi-enclosed waters of East Asia (Koo 2010).

Against this backdrop, prior to the 18th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting held in Bali, Indonesia, on July 22-23, 2011, the prevailing view in diplomatic circles, both domestically and internationally, was that the South China Sea issue, with its complex entanglement of conflicts between ASEAN and China, and between the US and China, would emerge as the main agenda item. However, China took a step back by expressing a forward-looking stance that "the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is self-evident and all countries should be its beneficiaries," and thus it did not escalate into major controversy beyond diplomatic rhetoric containing principled positions from the involved parties. Instead, the United States, which had been closely watching China's actions, welcomed the agreement between China and ASEAN on guidelines for a code of conduct to ease tensions in the South China Sea. This was a significant contrast to the ARF meeting held in Hanoi, Vietnam, in July 2010, where US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statement that "the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea is directly linked to US national interests" had triggered a confrontation between the US and China... (continued)