[NSP Report 52] Future Asian Security Order and South Korea's Response Strategy

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. Earned a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and worked as a fellow at the East-West Center in the United States. Primary research areas include international security and international relations theory. Author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War, and notable academic articles such as “Causes of North Korean Belligerence,” “Ties That Bind?: Assessing the Impact of Economic Interdependence on East Asian Alliances,” and “A Nuclear North Korea and the Stability of East Asia.”

I. Introduction

This paper forecasts the nature of the security order in Asia in 2025 and seeks the most suitable security strategy for South Korea. The core argument of the paper can be summarized as follows.

By 2025, four great powers will exist in Asia. China and the United States, as first-tier great powers, will each form their spheres of influence and lead regional politics through mutual competition. The United States, superior in naval and air power, will exert leadership in maritime regions, while China, with its superior army, will exercise leadership in adjacent continental regions. Second-tier great powers, India and Russia, will not become dominant powers but will act independently, serving as balancers with limited influence in their respective regions. Japan will actively play a supporting role for the United States, moving to contain China. Within this framework, South Korea's best option is to adopt a balancing policy towards its most geopolitically threatening continental neighbors (China and North Korea). As part of this, it is necessary to pursue military cooperation through role-sharing with maritime powers such as the U.S. and Japan, and to focus on developing its own army and air force capabilities. Depending on the situation, military alliances with India or Russia could also be beneficial.

To elaborate on this argument, the remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. Chapter II forecasts the balance of power in future Asia. It then identifies the nature of the security order that will emerge from the interaction of each country's policies (Chapter III) and seeks the most suitable South Korean security policy for the future security landscape (Chapter IV). Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and presents their implications.

II. Balance of Power

By 2025, a four-great-power system will be established in Asia. The United States and China will be first-tier great powers, while Russia and India will be second-tier great powers. No single country will possess overwhelmingly superior national strength to become a potential hegemon. In summary, Asia's balance of power will be a balanced multipolar system (Mearsheimer 2001, 334-359).

1. Latent Power

Table 1 estimates the latent power of major Asian countries using Gross Domestic Product and comprehensive national strength as indicators. Latent power here refers to the tangible and intangible resources (economic power, population, technology, natural resources, etc.) that can be used to develop military capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001, 60-67). In terms of latent power, the United States will be at the apex, with China closely following. These two countries will be significantly superior to others. India and Japan will lag considerably behind the U.S. and China but will possess the foundation to develop sufficient military strength to resist them. Russia and South Korea are projected to have relatively weak latent power.

[Table 1] Projection of Latent Power of Major Asian Countries in 2025

Source: International Futures ver. 6.54

2. Military Power

In the security domain, the most crucial factor determining power is military strength. In this aspect, the United States and China will hold a significant advantage over other countries. Overall, the U.S. will be superior to China (especially in naval and air power), but China will lead in army power. India and Russia will be considerably weaker than these first-tier great powers but will possess sufficient army and nuclear capabilities to maintain their great power status. Japan will not ascend to great power status as it will not convert its latent potential into military strength.

(1) U.S.-China Strategic Balance

In terms of military power, China will be generally inferior to the United States. Above all, due to its economic inferiority, China's defense spending will not match that of the U.S. According to research by the RAND Corporation, China's military expenditure in 2025 is projected to range from a minimum of $65.4 billion to a maximum of $197.3 billion, whereas U.S. military spending is estimated to reach $583.9 billion. The cumulative defense spending by 2025 will also see the U.S. hold an overwhelming advantage. While China could reduce the military spending gap by dedicating a larger proportion of its Gross National Product to defense for an extended period, similar to the former Soviet Union, such a military-first policy would be difficult to adopt under normal circumstances due to the significant risk of hindering economic development and exacerbating social discontent. The disparity in military spending will limit investment in defense technology research and development, leading to backwardness in the defense industry. Consequently, China will inevitably rely on imports for advanced weaponry and military technology. However, as most of China's partners lag behind the U.S. and its allies in technological capabilities, overcoming the significant gap in military technology through foreign dependence will be difficult. Inferiority in defense spending and technology will particularly lead to a disadvantage in nuclear capabilities, which are capital and technology-intensive. While China may possess sufficient nuclear deterrence against the U.S., it will not be able to achieve nuclear parity (Lyon 2009, 17).

China will lag behind the U.S. particularly in naval and air power. Due to geopolitical reasons, China must maintain a strong army, thus it cannot focus on developing naval and air power. This is evident from the fact that despite steady force build-up, the navy currently accounts for just over one-tenth of China's military (Ross 2009, 56). The naval fleet is divided and assigned to military regions commanded by army generals. The fact that most active-duty generals in the Central Military Commission, the supreme military command, and all top commanders of military regions are from the army further reveals the relatively low policy focus on naval and air forces (Jeong Seong-jang 2011; Minnick 2010). China must possess a considerable army to contain continental great powers like Russia and India and to control smaller neighboring countries. Even in the current situation where there is no apparent military threat from the continent, ground forces constitute three-fifths of the Chinese military (Ross 2009, 56). Even if relations are currently friendly, China cannot afford to lower its guard against India and Russia, traditional rivals and potential competitors (Tow 2001, 27-32). Military preparedness against them is essential, especially since border disputes cannot be considered fully resolved. There is also potential for conflict due to issues with neighboring countries. China could become embroiled in disputes with India over Pakistan and Myanmar. China has continued military support for these border countries with which India is in a tense relationship, and India is deeply concerned and vigilant about this (Swaine 2005, 279). There is a risk of geopolitical competition with Russia over Central Asia, which was part of the former Soviet Union. An army is also necessary to maintain and expand influence over neighboring smaller countries. These countries cooperate with China not purely out of willingness but out of fear of its power. Indeed, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, nationalist resistance against Chinese encroachment has intensified, leading to violent unrest (Higgins 2010). Furthermore, an army is needed to control border regions inhabited by ethnic minorities yearning for independence, such as Tibet and Xinjiang.

In contrast, the United States, not bordering any great powers, is in an advantageous position to concentrate its defense spending on developing naval and air power. Therefore, it will be very difficult for China, economically inferior, to catch up with U.S. naval and air power. Although the U.S. faces the challenge of dispersing its military forces across multiple regions, it can minimize this weakness by reducing its involvement in other relatively stable regions, including Europe, and prioritizing Asia. The U.S. has recently been redeploying its naval forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific (O’Rourke 2012, 40-42). It can also offset the disadvantages of geographical distance by utilizing military bases in Asia.

The U.S. can also expect support from more regional allies compared to China. East Asian maritime nations, including Japan, while having relatively smaller economies, can develop significant capabilities by focusing on naval power due to their geopolitical status as island nations. These countries will also provide military bases to the U.S. In contrast, China lacks allies with strong naval forces. The Chinese navy faces difficulties in power projection due to the absence of overseas military bases. It is highly uncertain whether China will be able to secure major overseas bases by 2025. (A prime candidate could be Myanmar, with which China has maintained close military cooperation, including building oil pipelines and allowing the use of naval facilities.)

However, China will hold an advantage over the U.S. in army power. As explained earlier, China has significant geopolitical interests that necessitate the development of a strong army. In contrast, the U.S., not bordering any great powers, does not require an army as large as China's. China also has an advantage over the U.S. in terms of human resources essential for army development. By 2025, China's population will exceed 1.4 billion, while the U.S. population will be only 350 million (International Futures ver. 6.54). Thus, with a greater resolve and resource base than the U.S., China will lead in the bilateral army power competition.

(2) Russia and India

In terms of overall military power, Russia and India will lag significantly behind the first-tier great powers. According to RAND Corporation estimates, China's defense spending in 2025 will be at least twice and up to 7.3 times that of India. The gap between the U.S., the strongest power, and India will be even larger. Russia, with a weaker economy than India, will fall even further behind.

However, India and Russia will maintain their great power status by possessing strong army and nuclear capabilities. India will be able to develop an army capable of confronting China by leveraging its improved economy and comparable population. By 2025, India's population is estimated to be around 1.39 billion, approaching China's population (1.41 billion) (International Futures ver. 6.54). Furthermore, the proportion of young people aged 20 to 34 in its population structure will be higher than in China (Wolf, Jr., et al. 2005, 18). India is also striving to improve the quality of its army, including deploying new Russian-made and indigenously developed tanks as part of its equipment modernization program. Moreover, based on its improved technological capabilities and financial resources, India will be able to build an effective nuclear deterrent. India is developing and deploying new ballistic missiles with extended ranges.

Although Russia lags in population and financial resources, it will secure self-defense and deterrence capabilities against China based on effective military technology and nuclear power. Russia, facing a declining population, will be unable to overcome its quantitative disadvantage against China in its core strength, the army. The Russian military has already accepted this reality and is developing its forces based on asymmetric principles (Epifanov 2011, 124). Nevertheless, if the comprehensive military organizational reform initiated in 2008, based on brigade-centric structures and officer corps reductions, and equipment modernization through increased budgets are successful, it could maintain qualitative competitiveness (McDermott 2011; Epifanov 2011, 133). Furthermore, Russia will make significant efforts to compensate for its overall army inferiority with its superior nuclear capabilities (Kipp 2011). Thus, based on strong resolve and current quantitative and qualitative advantages, it will be able to maintain superior nuclear capabilities against regional great powers, including China... (to be continued)