Power Transition and U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy Toward China

EAI China Studies Panel Report No. 2

Author

Kim Young-jin (金永鎭)_Professor, School of International Studies, Kookmin University. Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Berlin. Author of works including "China's Marketization and Labor Politics," "China's Urban Labor Market and Society," and "Beyond Market Liberalism: Karl Polanyi's Socio-Economic Theory." Recently, his interest has shifted to ancient China, and he has published articles such as "The Scale of the State, Democracy, and China's Political System in Western Political Thought," "A Study on the Geographical Size and Structural Concepts of Ancient China," and "Foreign Relations and the Prefecture-County System Strategy during the Formation of the Chinese Empire - Focusing on the Xiongnu and Qiang."

I. Introduction

Perhaps the most significant trend in contemporary international politics is the rise of China and the ensuing power transition. A key concern related to this is whether and how this power transition will entail changes to existing international rules and institutions (Mann 2007). The degree of change that a power transition can bring to the existing order varies. It can lead to the establishment of an entirely new order by a new great power, be partially adjusted, or result in minimal change with only the leading power shifting within the existing order. During a power transition, the incumbent great power seeks to constrain the new great power by having it operate within the framework it has established. Some observers in the United States suggest that if China's rise cannot be controlled, it should be guided in a way that does not disrupt the 'existing order.' In other words, even if the United States' hegemonic position weakens, it is necessary to establish institutional mechanisms to control the rising China within certain bounds, and U.S. policy toward China should proceed in this direction (Lieberthal 1995; Ikenberry 2008).

What, then, constitutes the 'existing order'? While there is no absolute consensus on this, it generally refers to the rules and institutions established by the West since modernity, namely market economies in economics and democracy in politics. The domestic and international political and economic order of the modern West can be summarized as follows in [Table 1] (Karl Polanyi 1944, 3).

[Table 1] The Modern Western Order as a Hegemonic Foundation for the United States

The model above summarizes the political and economic order of Europe for approximately 100 years in the 19th century. The hegemony of the United States, which emerged after World War II, replacing Britain, was also essentially based on this model.

Since World War II, the market economy has expanded further, both within societies and internationally, becoming an almost universal order. Despite socialist experiments, they ultimately proved unable to resist this powerful current. Internationally, economic systems such as the Bretton Woods System, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) were established sequentially after 1944. This aimed, above all, at expanding free trade with the dollar as the key currency. Security alliances with Europe, Japan, and others were crucial international political structures that enabled the domestic and international functioning of this market economy order. So, from a present and future perspective, how are these economic and political orders developing and how will they develop?

First, regarding the economic order, the status of the market economy today appears robust. Although China was a victim of imperialist aggression as a variant of capitalism that emerged since modernity, its recent resurgence over the past few decades has been through the modern Western order of market economy and globalization. If China's rise was not only possible in the form of a global expansion of the market economy but also based upon it, then the outcome of the power transition would not signify the emergence of an entirely new order. Rather, even if China's influence expands, it would be confined to lower levels such as international currency and the environment, presupposing the continuation of the existing order. In this sense, the likelihood of the existing economic order being replaced by a new hegemonic power is low.

Of course, some scholars propose the concept of the so-called Beijing Consensus as a counterpoint to American-style capitalism. American-style capitalism can be particularly summarized by the Washington Consensus, first proposed by John Williamson of the Institute for International Economics (IIE) in 1989. He presented ten proposals as prerequisites for economic aid to Latin America by the WTO. These included minimizing fiscal deficits, concentrating public spending in areas with high economic efficiency or potential for income distribution improvement, tax reform to broaden the tax base and lower tax rates, financial market liberalization, exchange rate unification, reduction of trade barriers, removal of barriers to foreign direct investment, privatization of state-owned enterprises, elimination of regulations that restrict competition, and protection of private property (Williamson 2005, 33-43). These elements form the basic content of market liberalism led by the United States.

Meanwhile, Joshua Cooper Ramo, who officially introduced the Beijing Consensus in 2004, summarized three key characteristics of China's economic development strategy. First, it is 'innovation and continuous experimentation.' This is particularly contrary to the complacency inherent in the Washington Consensus. In other words, recognizing that there are no immutable answers for all situations, as in physics, it is about 'creating change faster than the problems created by change.' Second, 'sustainability and equality' are paramount. This is because when a society is in an unstable and contradictory state, the measure of progress should not be mere quantitative growth like GDP, but the qualitative improvement of people's lives. Third is economic 'self-determination,' such as financial sovereignty (Ramo 2004, 10-11).

Within China, various interpretations of the Beijing Model have been presented. Professor Yu Keping (兪可平), considered relatively moderate, recently based his interpretation on China's experience, highlighting active foreign opening policies, a balance of reform, development, and stability, a combination of market and government regulation, gradual economic and political reforms, coordinated and sustainable development of society and nature, equal emphasis on efficiency and fairness, reform of economic and social systems alongside democratic governance reform, and cooperation between government and the private sector (Yu Keping 2006; Yan Jian 2006, 94-101).

Furthermore, when the international financial crisis originating in the U.S. occurred in 2008, discussions about the China Model became active within China. For example, the prominent economist Professor Liu Guoguang (劉國光) argued that unlike contemporary capitalism characterized by globalization, neoliberalism, and monopoly capitalism, the China Model is characterized by socialist public ownership, the leadership of the Communist Party, state macro-regulation, and social equality (Liu Guoguang 2009). In reality, Ramo's explanation involves only minor modifications in micro-aspects; the Beijing Consensus fundamentally takes the market economy, the basis of capitalism currently led by the United States, as its premise. In fact, it could be considered more market-oriented in its emphasis on competition and change. Yu Keping's perspective is closer to a development model for developing countries rather than a universal economic model. Liu Guoguang's argument appears to be a residual logic from the socialist era, distant from China's reality and aspirations.

While there are indeed conflicts in the economic relationship between the U.S. and China, they do not seem to revolve around the principles of the market economy itself. The U.S. raises issues with China regarding dumping, intellectual property rights infringement, government subsidies, and market access. However, these are micro-operational issues reflecting the socio-economic development level, rather than a question of affirmation or negation of the market economy or free trade order. The U.S. raises similar issues with many other countries, including South Korea. Moreover, China and the U.S. have formed a close relationship through the market economy order, and they are already each other's most important trading and investment partners.

What, then, is the fate of liberal states, i.e., democracy, which serves as the political foundation of American hegemony? This appears to be more uncertain than the issue of the market economy. The protection of individual human rights and democracy has been presented as a major direction in U.S. foreign policy, partially since the late 1970s and more fully since the 1990s. However, it is constrained by various domestic and international political realities, such as the limitations of U.S. power, the U.S.'s passive stance towards multilateral institutions or international legal interventions necessary for effective human rights diplomacy, and conflicts in policy priorities (Dietrich 2008, 269). Furthermore, from a critical perspective, human rights and democracy are viewed negatively as a pretext for new interventionism after the collapse of socialism (Xing 1996, 33). In the relationship between China and the U.S., human rights and democracy, which were somewhat emphasized after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, clearly appear to have been relegated in priority in U.S. diplomacy toward China. This is related not only to the importance of economic interests in the relationship with China but also to the increasing limitations of influence due to China's rise.

Ultimately, human rights and democracy are inevitably linked to the political order after the power transition, as mentioned at the outset. From the U.S. perspective, it is desirable for China to transform into a country where human rights and democracy are better observed, as it seeks to establish certain political institutions and rules before the power transition. For instance, based on the Western notion that 'democracies are less likely to go to war,' the U.S. has strived to promote democratic institutions. This effort has been pursued not only at the individual state level but also in a more international and collective manner, in cooperation with Europe, Japan, and others. China considers democracy to be intrinsically linked to its own fate, not only because it relates to the survival of the Communist Party but also because it is complexly connected to issues such as ethnic minorities, economic development, and social stability. Therefore, the Chinese government seeks to strengthen its international standing by supporting authoritarian regimes in the international community. However, a minority continues to raise demands for Western-style political systems.

This study aims to examine the various diplomatic attempts by the U.S. to highlight human rights issues within China and bring about change. The crucial question is: does China's rise make it difficult for the U.S. to raise human rights issues? Or, conversely, is the U.S. raising these issues more actively with an eye toward the post-power transition situation, as discussed above? To answer this, an analysis of human rights diplomacy itself is necessary.

Existing research exhibits several characteristics. In the U.S. and South Korea, it has largely focused on describing the positions of China and the U.S. regarding human rights, the cultural and historical factors behind the differences in their views on human rights, and the logical contradictions and limitations of U.S. human rights policy itself (Harding 1997; Kim 2000; Nathan 2003). Although their arguments differ, analyses of human rights diplomacy itself are also lacking in China. The main trends generally involve analyses of the political background of human rights diplomacy, the perceptual differences between China and the U.S. on human rights, and issues of human rights and sovereignty. Regarding the political background of human rights diplomacy, emphasis is placed on its connection to the pursuit of U.S. influence or national interests, rather than a pure pursuit of universal values. In terms of perceptual differences on human rights, emphasis is placed on the respective focus on collectivism versus individualism, equality versus freedom, and socio-economic versus political aspects in each country. The universal application of human rights advocated by the U.S. is negated by emphasizing the uniqueness of individual countries. Similarly, the argument that human rights diplomacy contradicts sovereignty, the order of the modern nation-state, is emphasized because human rights are essentially an internal matter (Hong Guogi•Dong Guohui 2003; Han Yunchuan 2003; Li Hongxiang 2008; Yao Zehao•Chen Zhongling 2004)... (to be continued)