Global Governance and the Nuclear Security Summit

2012 EAI Special Report_ Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

The East Asia Institute's Center for Asian Security Studies launched the 'EAI Nuclear Security Summit Research Team' in March, about a year before the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, with the aim of analyzing the nuclear security policies of major countries and proposing desirable nuclear security policies for Korea. After approximately 10 months of research, the report <Global Governance and the Nuclear Security Summit> was published, and a presentation was held on February 13, 2012, coinciding with the report's release.

Authors

Kim Sung-baeSenior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Strategy. He advises on policy development related to North Korea and the Korean Peninsula. Prior to joining the Institute for National Security Strategy, Dr. Kim Sung-bae served as a Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Unification (2006) and an administrator at the National Security Council (NSC) (2003-2006). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University.

Shin Sung-hoProfessor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. Professor Shin Sung-ho received his Ph.D. in International Politics from The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and has held positions as a Research Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) under the U.S. Department of Defense, a Visiting Fellow at the Northeast Asia Program of the Brookings Institution in the U.S., and a Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington. His research interests include East Asian security and national strategy, the ROK-U.S. alliance and the Korean Peninsula, and demographic changes and Northeast Asian international politics. Recent publications include "The Role of the United States in Middle East Peace Negotiations" (Journal of International Area Studies, 2010), "To Be or Not To Be: South Korea’s East Asia Security Strategy and Dilemma of Unification" (The International Spectator, 2009), and "Two Approaches to Nuclear Terrorism: Bush and Obama" (National Strategy, 2009).

Lee Sang-hyunDirector-General for Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Dr. Lee Sang-hyun earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and has worked as a researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He served as a Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Security Studies Division at the Sejong Institute before becoming Director-General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in May 2011. His primary research areas include international politics and security, ROK-U.S. relations, and North Korean issues. Recent publications include "South Korea's Non-Proliferation Diplomacy and Nuclear Policy," "China's Rise and U.S. Response: Security Implications for Korea" (National Strategy, 2011), "National Security Strategy of the Lee Myung-bak Government: The Vision of ‘Global Korea’ and Its Challenges" (The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, 2009), "Prospects for Obama Administration's Foreign and Security Policy and North Korea Policy" (Journal of Defense Policy Studies, 2009), "Diplomatic Environment and the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored, Sejong Institute, 2009), "ROK-U.S. Alliance in a Period of Adjustment: 2003-2008" (co-authored, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 2009), "East Asian Community: Myth and Reality" (co-authored, East Asia Institute, 2008), etc.

Chun Jae-sungProfessor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. Professor Chun Jae-sung graduated from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University, and served as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Sookmyung Women's University. Recent publications include "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory" (East Asia Institute, 2011), "A Critical Examination of Postmodernism and Realism on Constructivist International Relations Theory" (Journal of International Politics, 2010), "The Rise of Great Powers and Response Mechanisms: Theoretical Analysis and European Cases" (Defense Research, 2009), and "Theoretical Study on the Emergence of Modernity in European International Politics" (Journal of International Politics, 2009).

Chun Jin-hoProfessor, Department of International Cooperation, Kwangwoon University. Professor Chun Jin-ho received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Tokyo and has served as a professor at the Center for Japanese Studies, Kookmin University, a policy advisory member for the Ministry of National Defense, and a visiting researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan. His research focuses on Japanese foreign policy and ROK-Japan relations. Recent publications include "International Politics of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident" (Journal of International Politics, 2011), "Changes in Japan's Security Perceptions of China" (Journal of ROK-Japan Military Culture Studies, 2011), and "The Hatoyama Democratic Party Government's Foreign and Security Policy toward the U.S." (Journal of Japanese Studies, 2010).

Executive Summary

The Nuclear Security Summit, initiated in 2010, originated from the U.S. security strategy to prevent further terrorism, particularly nuclear terrorism, following the 9/11 attacks. The George W. Bush administration opted for a direct solution of a global war on terror, but this resulted in global backlash against American unilateralism and severe budget shortages compounded by the 2008 economic crisis. The Obama administration established a new strategy of multilateral nuclear terrorism prevention and made various efforts to curb nuclear terrorism. President Barack Obama, through his Prague speech in April 2009 advocating for a 'world without nuclear weapons,' has emphasized nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Nuclear Security Summit represents a U.S.-led international regime and a tangible, concrete outcome of the Obama administration's first term in its strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism. Nuclear security, as a comprehensive concept to counter the illicit acquisition and trafficking of nuclear materials by non-state actors and terrorist groups, and acts of terrorism against nuclear facilities, constitutes one aspect of preventing nuclear terrorism.

Theoretically, the Nuclear Security Summit is an international regime proposed by the United States with hegemonic authority within the ongoing unipolar military order, thus strongly influenced by power dynamics. However, it is also simultaneously based on the common interest of states in preventing the illicit acquisition of nuclear materials and attacks on nuclear facilities, and rooted in the shared norms and values of states against nuclear terrorism, thus functioning with elements of identity. Therefore, the Nuclear Security Summit can be viewed as a process of disseminating U.S. power and interests, but also as a process of establishing, spreading, and coordinating norms of nuclear security. The first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 had a very narrow and specific agenda of 'physical protection of nuclear materials,' making it easier to reach consensus on mutual interests and identity. However, as the Nuclear Security Summit progresses, it has the potential to expand beyond addressing the agenda of low-level nuclear material protection to encompass broader and more significant nuclear security issues, as well as general nuclear-related issues.

The most significant issue emerging in the discussion of expanding the agenda of the Nuclear Security Summit is nuclear safety. Prior to the Fukushima accident, nuclear safety and nuclear security were perceived as separate issues, difficult to reconcile. However, following the Fukushima accident, there has been a growing movement to recognize nuclear safety and nuclear security as interconnected issues. Nevertheless, there is no established model yet for how to technically define nuclear safety and nuclear security and link them. Since it is realistically difficult to establish a comprehensive concept encompassing both nuclear security and nuclear safety at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, efforts to explore the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety are required. The Seoul Summit adopted specific international and regional cooperation measures on nuclear safety; if the Nuclear Security Summit can function as a global governance and global regime after the Seoul Summit, this will be recorded as a major achievement of the Seoul Summit.

Given that the relationship between the United States and China is a crucial axis of international politics in the first half of the 21st century, the U.S.-China relationship surrounding the Nuclear Security Summit is also an important aspect. Due to China's economic rise and the relative decline of the United States, the U.S.-China relationship often exhibits competition or conflict on various global issues. However, the nature of the U.S.-China relationship in terms of the nuclear order differs from general issues. China does not consider the U.S. a competitor in the nuclear strategy domain. While the fundamental concept of U.S. nuclear strategy is based on the effect of preemptive strikes to forcibly disarm adversaries, China's nuclear strategy is summarized by 'no first use,' highlighting a stark contrast. There are also significant differences in the U.S. and China's positions regarding nuclear energy. The United States is the world's largest nuclear power producer, with 104 nuclear power plants generating 30% of the world's nuclear power and 20% of U.S. electricity. However, since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, not a single new nuclear power plant has been constructed in over 30 years. The Obama administration's effort to resume nuclear power plant construction, the first in 30 years, has stalled due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011.

China is pursuing nuclear energy as a strategic initiative at the governmental level to meet its rapidly increasing energy demand across all sectors due to economic growth and to address environmental problems such as air pollution, which have emerged as serious side effects. As of 2011, China has 14 operating nuclear power plants, with 25 under construction and over 50 more planned, making it expected to become the world's largest producer of nuclear energy with approximately 100 nuclear power plants by 2030.

In this context, China approaches the Nuclear Security Summit from the perspective of symbolizing U.S.-China cooperation. It is actively cooperating from the standpoint of overall management of U.S.-China relations rather than the importance of nuclear security itself. Rather, China considers the resumption of the Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea-U.S. negotiations as its core interest, and simultaneously, given the increasing number of nuclear power plants, nuclear safety issues are of greater concern, making it likely that China will align with the nuclear safety agenda proposed by South Korea and Japan.

One of South Korea's objectives for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit could be to reframe the North Korean nuclear issue and highlight South Korea's efforts to resolve it. However, given the nature of the Nuclear Security Summit, which aims to prevent nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, it is difficult for the North Korean nuclear issue, which deals with proliferation by states, to become a core agenda item. Rather, it would be a more appropriate approach for South Korea to strategically utilize the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to lead global security norms and take the initiative in inter-Korean affairs. Furthermore, as co-chairs of the summit, South Korea and the U.S. can easily draw attention to the North Korean nuclear issue and express their positions on North Korea's denuclearization, which can be released in the form of press releases. Since the leaders of all Six-Party Talks participants except North Korea will be present, the North Korean nuclear issue can be discussed in depth during separate bilateral or multilateral meetings.

Regarding the specific agenda items for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, the South Korean government should set the following three objectives:

Objective 1: The South Korean government should strive to make the Seoul Summit a meeting that contributes to the realization of a 'world free from nuclear and radiological terrorism,' a major task of international security in the post-Cold War era, by presenting practical visions and implementation measures for nuclear security.

If the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 had a 'declarative' nature, setting forth the basic principles and direction of nuclear security, the Seoul Summit will have the significance of advancing from the stage of declaration to the stage of 'implementation'.

Objective 2: While faithfully addressing the core themes of the Washington Summit—countering nuclear terrorism, protecting nuclear materials and facilities, and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials—the Seoul Summit should strengthen nuclear security norms by expanding the scope of discussion.

First, regarding nuclear safety, which has become a major international issue following the Fukushima incident, the Seoul Summit should discuss the synergistic effects between nuclear security and nuclear safety in preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism, without diluting the focus of nuclear security discussions. Furthermore, the Seoul Summit should more deeply discuss measures to enhance the protection of radioactive materials, which were insufficiently addressed during the 2010 Washington Summit.

Objective 3: As the host country, South Korea should strive to ensure that the Seoul Summit yields substantial results through the voluntary announcement of meaningful nuclear security measures by participating countries.

For effective prevention of nuclear terrorism, it is important not only to adopt outcome documents at the summit but also for each participating country to take measures to enhance nuclear security.

The Nuclear Security Summit can hold long-term significance in terms of South Korea's middle power diplomacy strategy. First, the successful hosting of the Nuclear Security Summit will play a role in enhancing South Korea's reputation and status as a practitioner of middle power diplomacy, following the successful hosting of the 2010 G20 Summit and the 2011 Development Cooperation Forum. Second, as the Nuclear Security Summit is a U.S.-led regime, its successful hosting can have a certain impact on consolidating ROK-U.S. relations. Third, the Nuclear Security Summit can provide a positive opportunity to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean issues. Although the North Korean nuclear issue is a matter of non-proliferation and unrelated to the agenda of the Nuclear Security Summit, South Korea's continuous raising of the issue of North Korean denuclearization and nuclear security, and drawing attention to it, can serve to amplify the international community's awareness of the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear issue. Fourth, the Nuclear Security Summit can serve as an opportunity to accelerate the overseas expansion of South Korea's nuclear industry by publicizing the development trends of the South Korean nuclear sector to the world.

To achieve these objectives, the following efforts are necessary:

1. Prepare for future resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the peaceful use of nuclear energy by fostering a culture of nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation, and nurturing excellent human resources to lead it.Inform the public about the significance of the Nuclear Security Summit and national interests through appropriate channels to garner social consensus for hosting the meeting and, at the same time, foster a sound nuclear culture.

2. To this end, it is essential to find ways to indirectly address safety issues by concurrently holding expert meetings, business forums, and NGO meetings, in addition to the summit.Considering the limitations of the current government-level agenda being restricted by U.S. needs, holding various types of meetings concurrently is one of the essential tasks.

3. Prepare for the post-Seoul meeting schedule while continuously pursuing agenda expansion that can be agreed upon by many countries. This not only enhances the role of network manager and mediator in middle power diplomacy but also makes a substantial contribution to advancing global governance related to nuclear and atomic energy. Considering the possibility that no further Nuclear Security Summits may be held after the objective of nuclear security is achieved, it is also important to present a roadmap for post-Seoul meeting management...(continued)