[NSP Report 51] The Post-Crisis World Order and the International Politics of the Environment: The Present and Future of Climate Change Response Systems

Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. Professor Shin Beom-sik graduated from the Department of Diplomacy and the Graduate School of Seoul National University and received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russia. He served as the Secretary-General of the Association for Slavic Studies. His main research areas are Russian foreign policy and Eurasian international relations. His major publications include "Eurasian Challenges and International Relations in the 21st Century" (edited) (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2006), "Russia's Choice: Post-Soviet Transition and Changes in State, Market, and Society" (co-authored) (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2006), Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula (co-authored) (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2007), and "Russia's Perspectives on International Politics" (Acta Slavica Iaponica, 2009).

I. Introduction

This paper aims to examine the present and future of the international politics of the environment, which has shown new aspects since the global economic crisis, focusing on efforts to establish a climate change response system. In the environmental field, which poses the most profound and extensive challenges in predicting human life in the 21st century, the question of what response system humanity will establish for climate change is a very important practical question. Phenomena that humanity has never experienced since its existence on Earth are emerging, and the possibility of being rushed to respond to them is increasing. Perhaps humanity may have to change the foundation of civilization it has built based on the consumption of fossil fuels.

However, it is questionable whether the international politics of the environment, as a field for responding to climate change, is adequately addressing these challenges. The following characteristics of the international politics of the environment clearly illustrate the difficulty of this task.

First, while most countries agree in principle that greenhouse gas emissions, identified as the cause of climate change, must be reduced (mitigation), the question of who will bear how much of this burden becomes a very serious issue, as it can significantly hinder the economic growth of individual countries. Climate change is a domain of international politics where the need for a response to a universal threat and the conflict of national interests are paradoxically intertwined.

Second, while it is true that global efforts are required to find solutions to problems that occur on a 'global' scale due to climate change, the impact and disasters caused by rising atmospheric temperatures due to global warming vary by region, leading to differentiated response systems in each region. Climate change can cause various disasters such as floods, famines, and typhoons due to various regional feedback mechanisms, not just simple temperature and sea-level rise (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). Therefore, the differentiation and prioritization of regional solutions may vary.

Third, the damage caused by the impacts of climate change can vary depending on how well each country and society can adapt. Developing countries, which are more dependent on resources and have lower economic power, will have less capacity for adaptation, making them more vulnerable to climate change. This implies that climate change can further complicate the issue of inequality in wealth and economic power that exists at the national level. This characteristic is a major factor in forming differences and confrontational fronts between developed and developing countries in the international politics of the environment.

Fourth, many studies examining responsibility for climate change have focused on greenhouse gas emissions and responsibility by country. Interestingly, there are significant differences in emission levels based on class and capital. For example, the top 10% of the population in developed countries emit 7.5 times more greenhouse gases than the bottom 10% of the population in developed countries, and 155 times more than the bottom 10% of the population in developing countries. Furthermore, poorer populations are much more vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change than wealthier populations. Therefore, the international politics of climate change and the environment are also linked to the issue of 'global justice' concerning existing global inequalities (Adger, et al. 2006, 131-154).

Ultimately, climate change is creating a problem of multi-layered and complex spatial politics (Barnett 2007, 1361-1363) that encompasses issues of the globe, regions, developed/developing countries, and social classes, demanding multi-layered responses. Therefore, responding to the challenge of climate change cannot be confined to the individual state level but must involve simultaneous international and global efforts. Consequently, the international politics of the environment cannot be resolved solely through existing exclusive methods such as great power-centrism, fragmented internationalism, or green left movements. Moreover, as environmental issues are intrinsically linked to science and technology, trade, and security, the international politics of the environment requires a complex approach.

This complexity of international environmental politics has become even more intricate against the backdrop of global power shifts occurring in the wake of the financial and economic crisis that struck the world in late 2008. The global economic crisis, in particular, has significantly influenced the direction of efforts to establish a climate change response system. Global efforts within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to address climate change appear to be entering a new phase, marked by the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009 amidst the global economic crisis. The Copenhagen Conference exhibits the following distinctions compared to previous efforts: First, efforts to form new leadership have begun with the return of the United States, which had been passive in establishing a climate change response system, to this global political process, and the strengthening of China's influence. Second, the existing structure of global inequality in the environmental field and the resulting differences in positions have become clearly highlighted. Third, the conflict between global efforts centered on the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC and efforts to reform it has become distinct. Depending on whether these new challenges are resolved, international politics will stand at a crossroads: either 'return to normalcy,' characterized by traditional great power-centered interest conflicts, or form a new global governance system different from what has existed thus far (Foreign Affairs July/August/1996; Washington Post June/17/2009; Giddens 2009). The world must now choose whether to proceed with past modern responses or to move towards establishing a new global environmental governance system in line with the changes of the times.

To examine the current status and future prospects of these global and international efforts, this paper will first analyze the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the international politics of climate change, then analyze the confrontational dynamics in the international politics of climate change around the Copenhagen Conference, and based on this, predict how the international politics of climate change, which possesses characteristics of both great power politics and global governance, will unfold in the future.

II. The Global Financial and Economic Crisis and the Climate Change Response System

The global financial and economic crisis can be assessed as having had an overall negative impact on the formation of the climate change response system.

First, the global economic crisis has severely contracted national economies, thereby heightening and spreading concerns about the negative effects of the climate change response system on economic recovery and growth. Unlike previous financial crises that began in vulnerable countries or regions and spread to others, this global economic crisis was destructive, originating in the United States, the center of the global economy, and simultaneously plunging the world economy into recession. This economic crisis has undoubtedly had a negative impact on efforts to improve the Kyoto system, which has been developed under the UNFCCC, and on the formation of new leadership by the United States, which returned to the international politics of climate change after the Obama administration took office. The opportunity created by the launch of a U.S. Democratic government with a positive stance on environmental governance and the widespread consensus on the need for global efforts to address climate change lost considerable momentum when confronted with the storm of the global economic crisis. The global economic crisis poured cold water on the efforts to establish a climate change response system just as they were reaching their peak.

Second, it has further sharpened the confrontation between developing and developed countries, one of the greatest challenges in forming a climate change response system. Some argue that the decline in global economic activity due to the economic crisis reduced oil consumption, thereby lowering and stabilizing oil prices, which in turn naturally reduced greenhouse gas emissions, thus temporarily diminishing the need for efforts toward a climate change response system. However, despite these arguments, the economic crisis has amplified concerns about the negative impact of greenhouse gas emission reduction measures, required by a climate change response system, on economic growth. In particular, the heightened concerns and backlash from developing countries, which are unprepared for such a low-carbon system, and their rigid stance have made it difficult to reach compromises between developed and developing countries in climate change negotiations. While the Kyoto Protocol, within the framework of the UNFCCC, succeeded in regulating mandatory emission reduction measures for developed countries, the post-Kyoto system faces the challenge of inducing broader participation in these mandatory reduction measures. The widening gap between the positions of developed and developing countries in this situation undoubtedly acts as a highly negative condition for future negotiations.

Third, the negative impact of the global economic crisis on leadership formation in the political process of establishing a climate change response system cannot be overlooked. The global economic crisis, particularly the European financial crisis that emerged after 2010, has weakened the momentum for establishing a climate change response system by negatively affecting the leadership of the European Union (EU), which has been at the forefront of the climate change response system centered on the Kyoto Protocol. Some argue that Europe is the de facto loser of the global economic crisis based on this situation. Europe, which has hitherto led the discussion on climate change response systems, now faces various challenges (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Peichert and Meyer-Ohlendorf 2007). It is questionable whether European countries, facing severe economic crisis damage and needing to implement austerity measures and develop exit strategies, can actively promote a climate change response system. Furthermore, the partial success of the United States in establishing new leadership and the rise of China as a veto power representing the interests of developing countries have made leadership formation in the political process of establishing a climate change response system much more complex. In a situation where the countries expected to play a leading role in establishing a climate change response system are facing immediate crises and the leadership in this political process is in disarray, the driving force to propel the global process of establishing a climate change response system appears weak... (to be continued)