[NSP Report 49] The World Cultural Order in the 21st Century After the Economic Crisis

Professor, School of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea. Professor Kim Jun-seok received his bachelor's and master's degrees in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. His major publications include "A Historical Re-examination of Confederation: The United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union" (The Korean Journal of International Studies, 2008), "Normative Power and the European Union" (Journal of International Area Studies, 2009), and "The Normative Basis of European Identity" (Journal of International Area Studies, 2009).

I. Economic Crisis, Relative Decline of the US-led World Order, and Transformation of Cultural Order

Directly linking economic changes to cultural changes is generally not easy. Therefore, discussing how the global economic crisis has affected or will affect the transformation of the world cultural order is an inherently difficult task. However, although it is still perceived very faintly, the outbreak and persistence of the economic crisis, and the relative decline of the US-led world order it has brought about, are potentially causing certain changes in the cultural sphere and appear likely to do so.

Asking what culture means here would only blur the focus of the discussion. This is, in fact, a question that is very difficult to answer accurately. In this chapter, culture will be defined in a common-sense, general manner, encompassing as much as can be reasonably agreed upon by everyone. According to this definition, culture can be understood as a concept that includes civilization, religion, knowledge, identity, values, norms, and institutions in a broad sense.

Then, what changes will the global economic crisis, which has cast a dark shadow over almost all countries worldwide in the early 21st century, bring to the world cultural order? At the most general level, changes in the distribution of international power due to the economic crisis are likely to trigger conflicts and tensions between cultures that previously held relative advantages and those that were disadvantaged. This is because dominant cultures, with the reduction of their power, will likely become more cohesive and inward-looking, while disadvantaged cultures, with a relative increase in their power, will likely raise their voices more. Of course, these relative shifts in cultural standing will not escalate into full-blown confrontation and conflict. However, at least a state of coexistence with tension between different cultures, values, identities, and worldviews is likely to persist.

In relation to this line of inquiry, it is necessary to re-examine the validity of Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' theory, which emerged in the early 1990s and garnered significant attention. In fact, Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory is no longer seriously discussed by international relations scholars due to its theoretical simplicity and extreme conclusions. The numerous criticisms raised, as much as the great impact it had, made it taboo to re-discuss the theory of the clash of civilizations. However, despite all the drawbacks and limitations raised over time, the Clash of Civilizations remains an important theory and is at least a very useful starting point for discussions about culture at the international level. In particular, many have rejected his theory by arguing that Huntington understands culture/civilization from a primordialist perspective, and while agreeing with the intent of such criticism, it is also true that one wonders whether sociological and postmodern anti-essentialist concepts of culture, which unilaterally oppose the 'reification' of culture and civilization, are truly suitable for the analysis of international culture.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that Peter Katzenstein has recently proposed utilizing a concept of civilization, a significantly softened version of Huntington's essentialism, as an important conceptual framework for international political analysis. According to Katzenstein, instead of assuming a single civilizational core, it is important to recognize the layered and multidimensional nature of civilizations. This means that various cultural programs can exist within a single civilization. If such diversity is acknowledged, civilization can still be an important social science concept. Through Katzenstein's approach, we may be able to seek an appropriate compromise between Huntingtonian essentialism and postmodern de-essentialism (Katzenstein 2010).

With these points in mind, the following will primarily depict the competition and conflict between the United States and China to secure their respective influence and standing within the world cultural order, both before and after the economic crisis. In particular, it is proposed to understand the 'cultural competition' between the two countries as a competition centered around the 'standard of civilization'.

II. Transformation of the Western Cultural Sphere: Focusing on US Democracy Promotion Policies

For a long time, countries in the Western cultural sphere of North America and Europe have maintained their identity and status as disseminators of universal culture and promoters of the 'standard of civilization.' While there may be some differences of opinion regarding the overall pattern, it is no exaggeration to say that at least prior to the 20th century, the transmission of culture between different regions of the world was largely a one-way street from the West to non-Western regions. European countries, as states of civilization, presented 'desirable' political, social, economic, and cultural norms to non-Western countries, which these countries accepted, sometimes under duress and resignation, and sometimes willingly. The rules and norms of the modern international political system, which first emerged and took root in Europe in the 16th-17th centuries, also spread as a new standard of civilization to non-European countries with the overseas expansion of European powers.

The identity and status of these Western cultural sphere countries as cultural disseminators were somewhat eroded and weakened in the 20th century due to the outbreak of two world wars, the Cold War confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, decolonization, and the Non-Aligned Movement. However, with the end of the Cold War at the end of the 20th century, the superiority of Western-style liberal democracy over socialism was confirmed, and the United States established its position as the leader of the international order, leading Western countries to once again emphasize the dissemination of Western-style standards of civilization. For example, since the 1990s, the so-called 'Washington Consensus,' which centered on economic policy models such as 'Structural Adjustment Programs' (SAP) emphasizing fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation for effective economic growth, began to be adopted by various countries semi-compulsorily through international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or spread voluntarily through the intellectual hegemony of academic communities, primarily centered in American universities.

On a more political level, countries in the Western cultural sphere have attempted to disseminate institutions and norms such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the post-Cold War era. In particular, the promotion and spread of democracy have been a key foreign policy agenda for many Western countries. The spread of democracy has occupied a central position in the foreign policy tradition of the United States, dating back to President Woodrow Wilson or even earlier, and in the post-Cold War era, the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations have positioned themselves as faithful inheritors of that tradition. The Bush administration's justification for the 2003 Iraq War on these grounds also sparked controversy. The promotion and spread of democracy is also an important foreign policy objective for many European countries. At the end of the Cold War in 1990, the heads of state of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the 'Charter of Paris for a New Europe,' pledging to 'establish and strengthen democracy as the sole form of government in our member states.' Furthermore, NATO and EU member states have included democracy as a prerequisite for membership, contributing to the transformation of many Eastern European countries into democratic states.

The active advocacy of new standards of civilization by countries in the Western cultural sphere is not simply because they desire greater economic dominance or more security and peace (Ayers 2009). The dissemination of standards of civilization is now being exercised as a form of 'cultural power' beyond these dimensions (Hobson 2008; Clark 2009). That is, the standards of civilization of Western countries are becoming the criteria for distinguishing between civilized and uncivilized states. The United States and various European countries would want this process to be understood as the creation of new international norms. Or they would want it to be considered a process of deepening normative integration in the international community. However, from the perspective of non-Western countries, the presentation of standards of civilization by Western countries can be interpreted as a move to abandon the principle of equality between states, which was strictly maintained at least in name, and to introduce principles of exclusion and discrimination. Or it can be seen as an attempt to revive the distinction between civilized and barbaric societies of the past imperialist era, and to divide the international community into a small number of privileged states and the rest.

With the advent of the global financial and economic crisis and the concurrent, direct or indirect, erosion of America's hegemonic position, certain changes are being detected in the way Western cultural sphere countries present their standards of civilization. In the case of the United States, in particular, as the policies of promoting and spreading democracy pursued over the past two decades have clearly encountered limitations, voices demanding fundamental change are growing louder. Above all, criticism and reflection on the George W. Bush administration's democracy promotion policies play a significant role in this. The Bush administration's firm stance, which tolerated the use of military force for the sake of promoting democracy, as starkly demonstrated in the Iraq War where democratization was declared one of the war's main objectives, shocked many around the world. However, what was even more shocking about this aggressive US democracy promotion policy was that the targets of this policy were determined very selectively based on US strategic interests. For example, the United States has never seriously considered promoting democracy and human rights principles in Saudi Arabia, its most important ally in the Middle East and a 'semi-feudal authoritarian state.' On the other hand, there is no evidence yet that the relatively most 'democratized' country in the Middle East, Iran, which is currently in sharp confrontation with the United States, has been reflected in US policy towards this country, even partially.

Of course, there is no need to reiterate the fundamental issue of the conflict and compromise between realism and idealism in foreign policy here. No country unilaterally sacrifices realistic national interests to realize idealistic goals. However, the Bush administration's democracy promotion policy, with the stark contrast between the strength of its rhetoric and the actual content of its policies, and compounded by the fact that the actor implementing the policy was the United States, the world's sole superpower, faced criticism of being 'arrogant and hypocritical.' It is also considered a painful change that the policy of promoting democracy, which had been a bipartisan consensus within the United States, became a political issue between the Democratic Party-led political forces criticizing the policy's excesses and the Republican Party-led forces advocating for its continuation 'at any cost, bearing any burden' (Rachman 2009, 121)...(continued)