[NSP Report 44] Changes in the Korean Peninsula Security Order After the Global Financial Crisis

Professor of North Korean Studies at Myongji University. Professor Hwang Ji-hwan holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado at Boulder and previously served as a Senior Researcher at the Institute for 통일 (Unification) Studies, Seoul National University. His research interests include the North Korean nuclear issue, Northeast Asian international relations, and security issues, and he has published various papers. His major works include “International Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis” (IRI Review, 2008), “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspective” (World Affairs, 2005), and “North Korea’s Nuclear Policy Through the Lens of Prospect Theory” (The Journal of International Politics, 2006).

I. The Global Financial Crisis and the Korean Peninsula Security Order

The global economy appears to be gradually recovering from the recent financial crisis. However, the financial crisis that originated in the United States was exceptional in its nature and scale, necessitating attention to its long-term impact. In particular, this financial crisis is expected to bring about long-term changes in the geopolitical world order, and the Korean Peninsula cannot be an exception to its influence.

The current financial crisis is perceived as ultimately leading to the relative decline of the United States and the rise of other nations, thereby shaping a new geopolitical world order (Renard 2009). Especially during the recovery process from the financial crisis, countries like China have shown relatively faster adaptability compared to the United States, suggesting that a realignment of the balance of power through geopolitical changes is inevitable in the future Northeast Asian order. Above all, China has played the role of a regional power by achieving an average annual economic growth of 10% over the past 30 years, but it is assessed to be expanding its influence by taking a more active stance following the financial crisis. While it remains questionable whether China will become a superpower that rivals the United States globally, at the very least, the Northeast Asian security order can no longer afford to ignore the influence of a growing China and the dynamics of US-China relations. The impact of these changes in US-China relations is bound to be even greater on the Korean Peninsula. From the perspective of the Korean Peninsula, particularly concerning the ROK-US alliance, the North Korean issue, and the Northeast Asian peace order, the variables of China's rise and the shift in US-China relations carry more weight than global or East Asian dimensions. Therefore, the security order surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which was formed based on the unipolar order of the United States after the end of the Cold War, is likely to undergo fundamental changes, and the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula must be analyzed within this new world and Northeast Asian order.

This paper aims to illuminate the new security environment facing the Korean Peninsula based on the changing world and Northeast Asian orders following the global financial crisis. It will particularly focus on major security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula that have been actively discussed since the end of the Cold War: the ROK-US alliance, the North Korean issue, and the potential changes in the peace order of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. These security issues have undergone significant transformations since the end of the Cold War (Hwang Ji-hwan 2007). The ROK-US alliance has experienced reductions in US Forces Korea, relocation of US military bases, and adjustments in strategic flexibility and wartime operational control during the process of US military transformation in the 21st century. The North Korean issue has posed a significant challenge to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula since the early 1990s, causing nuclear crises and concerns about regime survival. Furthermore, despite several attempts by Northeast Asian countries to establish a peace order amidst the unstable security environment surrounding the peninsula, these efforts have not yielded significantly successful outcomes.

The security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which has experienced significant changes since the end of the Cold War, is now at a juncture of readjustment based on the shifting geopolitical power balance following the recent global financial crisis. Therefore, analyzing how the geopolitical power dynamics of the world and Northeast Asian orders will alter the security environment around the Korean Peninsula after the global financial crisis is crucial. The key variables are the potential relative weakening of the United States and the relative rise of China in military, diplomatic, and economic dimensions due to the repercussions of the financial crisis around the Korean Peninsula. Changes in US-China relations will lead to shifts in Japan-US relations and Japan-China relations in Northeast Asia, which will be a core factor in the changing security environment around the Korean Peninsula. Analyzing how these geopolitical changes around the Korean Peninsula will impact its security environment is a critical element for Korea's future. Moreover, with the intensification of the crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula following the Cheonan incident in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November, geopolitical shifts around the peninsula have the potential to further exacerbate the situation.

II. The Future of ROK-US Relations

1. US Foreign and Security Strategy and Korea

The National Security Strategy (NSS) report released by the Obama administration in May 2010 reflects the changed status and influence of the United States after the global financial crisis (NSS 2010). The Obama administration argues that the global distribution of power is currently shifting and that for US national security strategy to succeed, it must pursue strategy by observing 'The world as it is today.' The 'world as it is today' that the United States faces is an acknowledgment of the reality that even the most powerful nation on Earth, the United States, cannot effectively address global challenges alone.

To adequately respond to global challenges, it is necessary to prepare for the future through cooperation with countries that can bring about change. The National Security Strategy (NSS) recognizes that such countries are emerging as new major actors, creating new 'emerging centers of influence.' The tendency to emphasize international cooperation is similarly evident in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) released in February 2010 (QDR 2010). The fact that the 'balanced strategy' concept, emphasized by Secretary of Defense Gates, has been refined and particularly highlighted as 'rebalancing' in the QDR signifies that the Obama administration's foreign and security strategy, unlike that of the Bush administration, is moving away from a strategy focused on hard power to reflect a relative decline in power. Therefore, the changes in the Obama administration's foreign policy can be summarized as smart power, which combines hard and soft power, the restoration of the status of balance and international institutions, and a multilateral approach (Lee Sang-hyun & Ha Young-sun 2010).

As such, the Obama administration's National Security Strategy presents international cooperation as the most important policy foundation, reflecting the relative decline in US influence. In its National Security Strategy (NSS), the Obama administration particularly emphasizes that as the G20 has emerged as the premier international economic forum amidst the global financial crisis, countries like Korea are taking on greater global and regional roles, and it expects these new central countries to contribute more to the world order. The relative decline of the United States and the 'rise of the rest,' accelerated by the global financial crisis, demands a significant expansion of roles for Korea, which forms one axis of new central countries, and this will be a major variable in the future of ROK-US relations.

While the global financial crisis did not newly trigger changes in ROK-US relations, it did transform the ongoing alliance transformation process into a new phase. Since the 21st century, the United States has emphasized the war on terror and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as core foreign and security policy issues, promoting the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) and the transformation of alliances and realignment of overseas bases as key priorities. In this process, the ROK-US alliance also became a major subject of transformation, resulting in adjustments to key elements of the alliance, such as the reduction of US Forces Korea, the realignment of US military bases, strategic flexibility, and wartime operational control (Hwang Ji-hwan 2007). While the transformation of the ROK-US alliance over the past decade has primarily focused on readjusting the US role and policies on the Korean Peninsula, recent changes in the alliance are concentrating discussions on expanding and redefining Korea's role not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in the global order (Shin Sung-ho & Ha Young-sun 2010). With Korea's growing national capabilities, evidenced by its hosting of the G20 Summit in 2010 and the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, this alliance transformation has an unavoidable aspect.

2. ROK-US Strategic Alliance and Korea's Role

The 'Future Vision for the ROK-US Alliance,' adopted by Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Obama on June 16, 2009, outlines a new blueprint for the alliance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009/6/16). In this declaration, the ROK and the US agreed to build a 'comprehensive strategic alliance encompassing bilateral, regional, and global domains, based on a solid foundation of shared values and mutual trust.' In readjusting the ROK-US alliance, they also agreed that 'the Republic of Korea will take the lead role in defending Korea based on the alliance, and the United States will support this with sustained and capable military power stationed on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and beyond.' Furthermore, the ROK and the US pledged to 'closely cooperate to address global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, poverty, human rights abuses, energy security, and pandemics,' and to 'enhance cooperation in peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization, and development assistance, as is being done in Iraq and Afghanistan,' and to 'strengthen cooperation in multilateral frameworks aimed at global economic recovery, such as the G20.' Thus, the 'Future Vision for the ROK-US Alliance' declared that Korea and the United States will 'strive to achieve common alliance goals through strategic cooperation at all levels.'

The significance of this declaration in the transformation process of the ROK-US alliance can be summarized as the Koreanization of Korean defense and the expansion of Korea's role in global issues. Therefore, the future vision of the ROK-US alliance aims for Korea to become the center of security on the Korean Peninsula with US support, and at the global level, for Korea's role to extend beyond the Korean Peninsula and cooperate with US global strategy. This alliance transformation process has been continuously discussed through the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP), as well as the '2+2 meeting,' the first ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministers' meeting held in July last year. It can be assessed as presenting a new strategic master plan that encapsulates a future-oriented development of the ROK-US alliance. Since the conclusion of the 'ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty' in 1953 following the Korean War, the ROK-US alliance has been defined as an asymmetric alliance where Korea absolutely depends on the US for security. However, the ROK-US alliance has now taken a step further towards a more symmetric alliance where Korea actively seeks to expand its role, which can be evaluated positively... (continued)