[NSP Report 42] Changes in the International Military and Security Order After the Economic Crisis

Dr. Lee Sang-hyun, Head of the Security Research Office at the Sejong Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and has served as a researcher at the Institute for Korean Relations and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. His primary research areas include international politics, security, ROK-U.S. relations, and North Korean issues. His recent publications include "The East Asian Community: Myth and Reality" (co-authored) (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2008), "Knowledge Order and East Asia: Transformation of World Politics in the Information Age" (co-authored) (Paju: Hanul, 2008), "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime" (co-authored) (Seongnam: Sejong Institute, 2008), "Transformation of the ROK-U.S. Alliance" (co-authored) (Seongnam: Sejong Institute, 2008), "National Security Strategy of the Lee Myung-bak Government: The Vision of ‘Global Korea’ and Its Challenges" (The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, 2009), "Prospects for the Obama Administration's Foreign and Security Policy and North Korea Policy" (<Defense Policy Review>, 2009), "Diplomatic Environment and the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored) (Seongnam: Sejong Institute, 2009), and "ROK-U.S. Alliance in a Period of Adjustment: 2003-2008" (co-authored) (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 2009).

I. Introduction

The various ongoing changes at the global level are significantly impacting the international military and security order. The current international system is witnessing shifts in the distribution of power among actors and regions in international relations. Fareed Zakaria describes the changes in the 21st-century international order as the "rise of the rest" (Zakaria 2008). This refers to the phenomenon where large, but economically stagnant, countries such as China and India are experiencing rapid economic growth due to globalization, leading to a relative decline in U.S. hegemony within the international order. To be precise, this is not so much a decline of the United States as it is the rise of other countries like China and India, and as a result, the international order is transitioning into a "Post-Americanism" era.

The U.S. National Intelligence Council's (NIC) report on the future of the world order, "Global Trends 2025," also projects that the international order will become more complex by 2025, with the United States remaining a superpower but becoming a "less dominant nation" than it is today. Around 2025, the international order will become more multipolar due to the emergence of new actors such as China, India, and Russia, coupled with economic development driven by globalization, population growth, and regional disparities. Furthermore, new transnational security agendas will emerge, with food, energy, and water becoming highly strategic resources, intensifying competition over them. Confrontations surrounding climate change, new technologies, and energy distribution are also expected to intensify. Terrorism, international conflicts, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will remain significant international security issues. As a result of polarization due to globalization, terrorist organizations will persist, and their capabilities will be enhanced by the easy acquisition of advanced technologies. However, ideological confrontation will disappear, and the primary causes of conflict will be the aftereffects of globalization and shifts in the global balance of power (NIC 2008).

A common point highlighted in various analyses of the future global order is the relative weakening of U.S. hegemony and the rise of China. Although the sources and estimation methods differ, most studies consistently point to a gradual decrease in the United States' weight in the international order, while emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil show remarkable progress. According to Goldman Sachs' projections, China's economy is expected to surpass that of the United States to become the world's largest around 2030 in terms of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Goldman Sachs 2007). As of the end of 2010, China's GDP had already surpassed Japan's, making it the second-largest in the world.

However, on the other hand, debates about the continued hegemonic position of the United States persist. While some discuss the decline of U.S. hegemony, the view that the international order cannot be discussed without the United States remains strong. Josef Joffe, publisher of the German news magazine "Die Zeit," dismissed the theory of U.S. hegemonic decline as a baseless trend that repeats every decade in an article for "Foreign Affairs." He emphasized that the reality of no other country being able to replace America's power and sense of mission remains unchanged, defining the U.S. as the "default power." In other words, he stressed that the U.S. is the fundamental axis of the international order, and nothing can be discussed without it.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States spent $607 billion on defense in 2008. This amount, representing approximately 40% of global defense spending, exceeded the combined defense expenditures of the 2nd through 10th ranked countries ($476.7 billion). Joffe is also skeptical about the claim that China's rise threatens the United States. He predicts that China will grow old before it becomes rich. According to the UN's "World Population Prospects," China's median age (the age of the person in the middle when the population is lined up) is projected to rise sharply from 33 in 2005 to 45 in 2050. In contrast, the median age in the United States is projected to be 41 in 2050, making it the youngest among major powers (Joffe 2009). Considering all these factors, including various forms of soft power, it is difficult to imagine China surpassing the United States.

How will these global changes be specifically reflected in the future types of international military and security orders and U.S. responses? The following will focus on the changes in the nature of the international order after the global financial crisis, the transformation of military and security threats, and the U.S. response to the rapid rise and military modernization of China.

II. Changes in 21st Century Military and Security Threats

The core of the changes in the overall international security environment since the post-Cold War era, 9/11, and the global financial crisis can be summarized as shifts in power among major actors, changes in the nature of warfare, transformations in economic structures, and the emergence of major actors due to regional integration. The emergence of a complex international order intertwined with the "rise of the rest," and a multipolar/non-polar network-based international order, necessitates changes in the forms of military and security threats and responses.

1. Unipolarity, Non-polarity, and the G2 Era

The global financial crisis is further accelerating the multipolarization of the international order. The G-7/8 system has now expanded to the G-20. As markets have become globalized, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between economics and diplomacy. Finance and markets are no longer subordinate politics but have become high politics (Burrows and Harris 2009, 35-37). The structure of international politics has been rapidly changing since the end of the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, international relations scholars diagnosed that the United States had entered a unipolar moment (Krauthammer 1990, 91). However, that unipolar system ended as a "moment," and the international system is transitioning to a new order. The unipolar era is slowly transitioning to a "G2 era" due to the rise of China. Furthermore, the argument is being made that the world has now entered a non-polar order.

Richard Haas defines the characteristic of the 21st-century international order as non-polarity. Such an order is not dominated by one, two, or a few countries, but is composed of numerous actors with various types of power. The 20th-century international order evolved from a multipolar system to a bipolar system, and with the end of the Cold War, it transitioned to a unipolar system. However, as the distribution of power within the international system becomes dispersed, a non-polar system is characterized by multiple centers of different kinds of power.

Today's international order appears outwardly multipolar, with important roles played by China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, and Russia, in addition to the United States. However, what fundamentally distinguishes the current international order from the classical multipolar system is that while multiple centers of power exist, a significant number of them are not states. In reality, Haas explains that one of the most important characteristics of today's international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power. Today, nation-states are challenged from above by regional and international organizations, from below by various paramilitary organizations, and from the sides by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. In short, power in international relations today is dispersed "in many places and in many hands" (Haas 2008).

U.S. primacy is being challenged in various aspects today. However, despite the relative weakening of the United States and widespread anti-American sentiment, no rival has emerged to replace the U.S. The reasons are that the power gap between the U.S. and other countries remains too large, and on the other hand, the U.S. is not perceived as threatening the national interests of other countries to the extent that it would provoke the formation of hostile alliances. Furthermore, the U.S. role is crucial in maintaining the free flow of goods, people, technology, and investment that all countries in the world today rely on for economic activity. Nevertheless, the unipolar system is over.

There are three reasons for this. First are historical factors. Just as states develop, other organizations also develop. The rise of these organizations is an unavoidable reality with advancements in technology and productivity. Second are U.S. policies. The U.S. established several centers of power while rebuilding the post-war order, which is one of the reasons for the relative weakening of its power. "Imperial overstretch," such as the Iraq War, which excessively drained U.S. power, has also contributed to this. Third, in addition to the growth of states or other organizations, or the failure of U.S. policies, it is an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has significantly expanded the cross-border flow of almost everything in the world—emails, drugs, greenhouse gases, goods, people, viruses, and even weapons—in terms of quantity and speed.

The characteristics of a non-polar system give rise to new threats and vulnerabilities. Nuclear proliferation cases like Iran or North Korea, energy, and terrorism are representative examples. How can the changes in the international political order in this non-polar era be explained? The international order in the network age encompasses aspects that are difficult to explain through the realist perspective focused on great powers.

There are various theoretical perspectives for explaining changes in the international order. First, from the realist perspective, the mainstream theory of traditional international relations, namely structural realism and hegemonic stability theory, posits that the most important factor influencing state behavior is the distribution of power among states. International institutions and regimes are byproducts of the balance of power among great powers, and the formation of international regimes depends on the existence of hegemony. International regimes are formed and maintained in a unipolar system where a hegemon with absolutely superior power exists, but when that hegemon declines, the international regime also declines. Therefore, the hegemon plays a crucial role as a "stabilizer" in maintaining the world economic system (Kindleberger 1973, 305).

Meanwhile, institutionalists, unlike hegemonic stability theory which focuses on the structure of international politics, emphasize the positive functions and effects provided by international regimes. They adopt a functionalist approach, arguing that egoistic and rational states form and maintain international regimes to gain institutional benefits (Keohane 2005). Therefore, they emphasize the positive effects of institutions in reducing transaction and information costs that hinder cooperation among states, rather than focusing on specific forms of multilateralism. In other words, the subjects that form international institutions are multiple states that share common interests. They create international institutions as a means to overcome market failures caused by free-riding by states. As long as the number of states participating in international cooperation to establish international institutions exceeds a critical point, international institutions can be formed. This critical point can be met by a coalition of a few states or the participation of a hegemon. Therefore, international institutions can be sufficiently created through the cooperation of non-hegemonic states when a consensus on the necessity of institutions is formed among major powers. Furthermore, once formed, international institutions can influence state behavior, enabling international cooperation to continue and expand.

Finally, the recently popular theory of network power focuses on the new characteristic of the 21st-century international order: networking. Networks are defined as 'sets of interconnected actors that enable beneficial cooperation' (Grewal 2003, 89-98; 2005, 128-144; 2008). The central element of a network is the standard. A standard is a specific way of connecting members within a network, meaning a shared norm or practice that facilitates cooperation among members. Network power is the influence that the standard of a particular network exerts on its members or non-members... (continued)