[Foreword] Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: The Path to Advanced North Korea in 2032: Building a Complex Network State

Professor Ha Young-sun is a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and currently serves as the Chairman of Global Net 21 at the East Asia Institute. He graduated from the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, obtained a Master's degree in Political Science from the same university, and received a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. His recent publications include "The East Asian Community: Myth and Reality" (2008), "World Politics of Transformation" (2007), "Network Knowledge State" (2006), "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (2006), "Vision and Tasks for the ROK-US Alliance" (2006), "Grand Strategy for South Korean Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Building a Network State" (2006), "History of South Korean Diplomacy and International Politics" (2005), "Seeing the Changing World Clearly" (2004), "A Century-Long Plan for the Korean Peninsula" (2004), and "World Politics in Cyberspace" (2001).

Abstract

Over the past 15 years, the military-first policy has sought to pave the way to a strong and prosperous nation through nuclear development, the military-first economy, and the establishment of Kim Jong-il's loyalist forces. However, facing a vicious cycle of economic sanctions and nuclear tests, sluggish economic growth, and challenges in establishing a succession system, it has failed to resolve the three major dilemmas of security, economy, and politics. Therefore, for the Kim Jong-il succession system to remain on the stage of the 21st century and be a protagonist, a two-stage advanced co-evolution strategy is required. The first stage strategy is 'Transition and Reform,' which requires North Korea to move away from the military-first policy, pursue a new survival strategy without nuclear weapons, conceive a new peace regime that weaves a complex network, and implement an economy-first policy that pursues North Korean-style reform and opening. Simultaneously, externally, South Korea and surrounding powers must move beyond the dichotomy of sunshine policy and sanctions to co-evolve with North Korea, establish a triple complex peace regime encompassing inter-Korean, East Asian, and multilateral dimensions, and create an international cooperation system for North Korean prosperity for the first-stage strategy to succeed. The second stage strategy is 'Transformation,' where North Korea must pursue transformation into a 21st-century complex state not only in security and economy but also in culture, environment, knowledge, and politics, in line with the 21st-century civilizational standard of a 'complex network state.' Similar to the first stage, international co-evolution efforts are necessary, requiring the construction of an East Asian community and the weaving of a complex network among South Korea, the US, and China. If North and South Korea succeed in weaving a 21st-century complex network through co-evolution and unification, the Korean Peninsula will demonstrate the potential for a new civilizational standard.

1. Introduction

2012 marked the year the North Korean leadership officially declared its intention to open the doors to a strong and prosperous nation. However, the reality is bleak. Despite the efforts of the military-first ideology, subjective security anxieties have deepened, leading the nation down the path of an over-militarized state. Despite efforts at currency reform, it suffers the tragedy of being the world's poorest nation. Due to excessive spending for excessive security, adequate investment in culture, environment, and knowledge—the fundamental stages of advancement in the 21st century—is impossible. Finally, the military-first, leader-centric system that has dominated domestic and international rule in North Korea faces the unavoidable challenge of establishing a succession system due to Kim Jong-il's health, and the prospect of a succession system pursuing a new path of economy-first (先經) politics instead of military-first (先軍) politics remains uncertain.

In the 1990s, North Korea faced triple hardships. Internationally, it experienced the epochal upheaval of the collapse of the socialist international order in 1991. Domestically, it faced the death of President Kim Il-sung in 1994. The Kim Jong-il succession system, amidst the "Arduous March" where a significant portion of the population starved to death, newly declared the construction of a strong and prosperous nation as the state goal for the 21st century in 1998. On May 22 of that year, a Rodong Sinmun editorial stated that a strong and prosperous nation was "a bold blueprint for our General to lead Joseon and brilliantly illuminate the 21st century." North Korea claimed that while numerous nations and peoples throughout human history had pursued strength and prosperity, history had not witnessed a truly completed strong and prosperous nation. For a strong and prosperous nation in the 21st century, it emphasized that the North Korean method of building a strong and prosperous nation, centered on the leader, begins with "creating a nation strong in ideology, then firmly establishing the military as the pillar of the revolution, and thereby achieving remarkable leaps in economic construction, is our General's Juche-based method for a strong and prosperous nation."

After designating 1999 as a year of new transition towards building a strong and prosperous nation in its New Year's joint editorial, North Korea, in its 2010 joint editorial, still presented the strong and prosperous nation approach, with a strong nation in politics and ideology, a strong military, and a strong economy as its three pillars, as its survival strategy for the 21st century. However, it emphasized the construction of a strong economy that would dramatically improve the people's livelihood alongside the development of heavy industry, following the established strong nations in politics and ideology and military.

In pursuit of building a strong and prosperous nation in the 21st century, North Korea, in its joint editorial "Our Party's Military-First Politics is Invincible" on June 16, 1999, argued that "in an era of intense struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialist, self-reliant forces, the military must be emphasized to achieve the socialist cause in a protracted confrontation with imperialism." It proclaimed military-first politics as "the perfected political method of our era." It further explained that "the military-first politics is a leadership method that resolves all issues in revolution and construction from the principle of prioritizing the military, and advances the entire socialist cause by placing the military as the pillar of the revolution," and that it is "a method that guarantees the self-reliant status of the masses and maximizes their creative role through the strengthening of the revolutionary army."

The Kim Jong-il regime explained the emphasis on military-first politics as a new political method by citing "changes in the situation surrounding the Juche fatherland" and "unprecedented difficulties facing revolution and construction" in the mid-1990s. The situational changes included the collapse of the socialist bloc, the death of Kim Il-sung, the military threat from the United States, and the "hardline policy" of the Kim Young-sam government. Consequently, the "created difficulties" were listed as follows: First, the collapse of the socialist market, which accounted for 70-80% of foreign trade, caused significant obstacles to economic construction. Second, economic sanctions by the United States and Japan "completely blocked international financial transactions" and attempted to "economically suffocate and wither" North Korea. Third, "catastrophic natural disasters such as floods, tidal waves, and droughts that have struck for several consecutive years" are cited. As a result, "severe food shortages, fuel shortages, and power shortages" occurred, and North Korea began its full-fledged Arduous March. North Korea recorded the situation at the time as follows: "History records the 900-day blockade of Leningrad during World War II as the most tragic disaster humanity has ever suffered. However, the days of blockade, which were much longer and more brutal than those 900 days, continued, and the days of having to repel attacks not from one enemy but from allied imperialist forces attacking from all directions, in a state of complete isolation where not just one city but the entire nation was surrounded by the enemy, were unprecedentedly harsh days that no one has ever heard of before."

North Korea identifies January 1, 1995, as the beginning of the military-first era to overcome the Arduous March. However, the full-fledged military-first era was officially formalized in 1998. At the first session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly held on September 5, 1998, Kim Jong-il was elected Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and the constitution was amended, establishing a military-first system centered on the National Defense Commission. Kim Yong-nam, who delivered Kim Jong-il's acceptance speech for the chairmanship of the National Defense Commission, explained that "the role of the Chairman of the National Defense Commission is the supreme position of the state that commands and directs the totality of the nation's political, military, and economic capabilities, defends the state system and the destiny of the people of the socialist fatherland, and organizes and leads the work of strengthening and developing the nation's defense capabilities and overall national power. It is a sacred and weighty responsibility that symbolizes and represents the honor of our fatherland and the dignity of the nation."

Decline of the Military-First Era

The military-first policy, chosen as the new political method for building a strong and prosperous nation in the 21st century, has failed to properly address the security, economic, and political issues facing North Korea over the past 15 years; rather, it has resulted in their worsening.

Vicious Cycle of the North Korean Nuclear Issue

The top priority of the military-first policy was the resolute defense of the Kim Jong-il leader-centric system following the collapse of the socialist international order. While the military-first policy officially pursued nuclear freeze and dismantlement of nuclear facilities in exchange for the construction of light-water reactors and the supply of heavy water under the 1994 Agreed Framework, and engaged in negotiations for improved North Korea-US relations, it did not abandon the development of nuclear weapons as the ultimate safeguard for regime security. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration's efforts to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation, even leading to Washington-Pyongyang talks, struggled to achieve tangible results due to North Korea's excessive security demands. Furthermore, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the United States began to treat nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism not merely as global security issues but as paramount national security concerns. The North Korean nuclear issue thus became a matter of life and death for both the United States and North Korea.

The Geneva Agreed Framework collapsed due to the issue of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program raised during the visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to Pyongyang in early October 2002, marking the beginning of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. Ultimately, the Six-Party Talks, mediated by China, reached an agreement in principle on the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the fundamental framework of the 2005 Joint Statement—the vicious quadrilateral relationship of nuclear abandonment, economic assistance, normalization of relations, and a peace regime—suffered the same fate as the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea proposed a package deal for nuclear abandonment, prioritizing the U.S. abandonment of its hostile policy toward North Korea, which included the lifting of economic sanctions and economic assistance, the establishment of a peace regime centered on the defense of the leader-centric system, and the improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations, stating that it could abandon nuclear weapons in accordance with these developments. Conversely, the United States emphasized the improvement of economic, military, and diplomatic relations with North Korea, prioritizing verifiable nuclear abandonment by North Korea.

Amidst financial sanctions against North Korea related to Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau, the Six-Party Talks failed to reach an implementation agreement as expected, and in October 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test. In 2007, a principled agreement was reached on the three stages for implementing the Joint Statement: disablement, declaration, and denuclearization. However, disagreements could not be easily resolved in the declaration and verification stages. North Korea declared the breakdown of nuclear negotiations in April 2008, reversed its freeze and disablement measures, and conducted a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. The North Korean nuclear issue, repeating the vicious cycle of economic sanctions and nuclear tests without finding a breakthrough, led North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-il, in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in early October 2009, to state his position: first, that "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" is the last instruction of President Kim Il-sung; second, that the hostile relationship between North Korea and the U.S. must be transformed into a peaceful one through bilateral talks; and third, that North Korea is willing to engage in multilateral talks, including the Six-Party Talks, after observing the results of North Korea-U.S. talks. Chairman Kim Jong-il reiterated North Korea's basic position during his visit to China in early May 2010.

However, the fate of nuclear military-first ideology is a matter of time. Nuclear weapons for the leader-centric system are not a guarantee of survival but a guarantee of death. If North Korea ultimately refuses the strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons, international sanctions led by the United States will intensify, and the possibility of the U.S. and China tacitly agreeing to the emergence of a pro-China regime without nuclear weapons will increase. The United States, which has made the war on terror and weapons of mass destruction its top security priority since 9/11, can hardly recognize North Korea's nuclear status under any circumstances... (continued)

[Foreword] The Path to Advanced North Korea in 2032: Building a Complex Network State

[No. 1] Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Politics

[No. 2] Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Diplomacy

[No. 3] Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Military

[No. 4] Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Economy

[No. 5] Study on North Korea's Co-evolution Strategy: Human Rights