[NSP Report 36] The Obama Administration's Foreign and Security Policy Stance and Key Agendas

Dr. Lee Sang-hyun holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently the Director of the Security Studies Division at the Sejong Institute. He previously served as a researcher at the Institute for East Asian Studies and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. His primary research areas include international politics, security, ROK-US relations, and North Korean issues. His recent publications include National Security Strategy of the Lee Myung-bak Government: The Vision of ‘Global Korea’ and Its Challenges (2009), ‘Prospects for the Obama Administration’s Foreign and Security Policy and North Korea Policy’ (2009), ‘Diplomatic Environment and the Korean Peninsula’ (co-authored, 2009), ‘ROK-US Alliance in an Era of Adjustment: 2003-2008’ (co-authored, 2009), ‘East Asian Community: Myth and Reality’ (co-authored, 2008), ‘Knowledge Order and East Asia: Transformation of World Politics in the Information Age’ (co-authored, 2008), ‘The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula’ (co-authored, 2008), and ‘Transformation of the ROK-US Alliance’ (co-authored, 2008).

I. The Dawn of the Obama Era and the Changing International Security Environment

The international security environment facing the Obama administration is highly fluid, and unlike in the past, the United States cannot unilaterally lead it with overwhelming superiority. The current international system is witnessing shifts in the distribution of power among actors and across regions in international relations. Fareed Zakaria’s (2008a) The Post-American World, which Obama reportedly read avidly as a candidate, describes the transformation of the 21st-century international order as the ‘rise of the rest.’ It posits that large, but previously economically stagnant, countries like China and India are experiencing rapid economic growth due to globalization, leading to a relative decline in American hegemony within the international order. This is not precisely a decline of the United States, but rather the rise of nations beyond China and Asia, and consequently, the international order is transitioning into a ‘Post-Americanism’ era.

The defining characteristic of the post-American world order is, in a word, ‘complexity.’ While the political-military order may remain unipolar, dominated by the United States, in all dimensions other than military—economy, industry, finance, society, and culture—power distribution is shifting away from U.S. dominance. Since the mid-1980s, political-military violence has been on a global decline, yet the information revolution has led to the sensationalization and amplified impact of military security conflicts, which are now transmitted in real-time to global citizens. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to unilaterally resolve international issues by leveraging military power. Despite political-military turmoil, the total size of the global economy has more than doubled in the past 15 years, and trade has increased by 133% during the same period. Wars, terrorism, and civil conflicts may have temporarily caused global economic downturns, but they have ultimately been overwhelmed by the tide of globalization. The result of globalization and the expansion of the international economy is the eruption of neo-nationalism, fueled by the economic growth of emerging powers—particularly China, India, and Brazil. The proliferation of diverse national perspectives, amplified and disseminated by the information revolution, and the increase in vocal actors mean that consensus on major international issues is becoming increasingly difficult. This implies that while the United States remains a superpower, it can no longer lead or resolve international issues single-handedly (Zakaria 2008b).

The U.S. National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) report on the future international order (NIC 2008) also projects that the international order will become more complex by 2025, with the United States becoming a ‘less dominant nation.’ Around 2025, the international order will become more multipolar due to the emergence of new actors such as China, India, and Russia, coupled with economic development driven by globalization, population growth, and regional disparities. New transnational security agendas will emerge, with food, energy, and water becoming critical strategic resources, intensifying competition over them. Confrontations surrounding climate change, new technologies, and energy distribution are also expected to intensify. Terrorism, international conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will remain significant international security concerns. As a result of globalization-driven polarization, terrorist organizations will persist, and their capabilities will be enhanced by easier access to advanced technologies. However, ideological confrontations will fade, and conflicts will primarily stem from the repercussions of globalization and shifts in the global balance of power.

These changes in the international order actually began long ago. While the international order has become increasingly complex since the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration adhered to a unipolar norm of action centered on military power, which became one of the most significant factors contributing to the failures of its foreign policy. Attention is now focused on how the Obama administration will overcome this legacy of unilateral diplomacy.

II. The Obama Administration's Foreign and Security Policy Stance

The guiding principles of the Obama administration's foreign and security policy can be summarized as the resolution of international issues through dialogue, cooperation, multilateral security frameworks, and partnerships. Obama has criticized the Bush-Cheney administration's foreign policy for its refusal to engage in diplomatic approaches through dialogue. This not only projected an image of American unilateralism and arrogance to the outside world but also posed a serious obstacle to developing and consolidating American leadership. American unilateralism has been a primary cause of the spread of anti-American sentiment globally.

Obama believes that complex issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics cannot be resolved by the United States alone without strong international cooperation. Therefore, he argues that the U.S. must demonstrate a willingness to engage at the table, including through direct meetings with leaders, not only with allies but also with adversaries. The world, he believes, will respond to these dialogue-based approaches by following U.S. leadership, enabling the joint resolution of challenges such as terrorism and the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Specifically, Obama and Biden intend to strengthen NATO member states to contribute to collective security. They also plan to encourage investment and reconstruction to enable NATO to establish more stable operations, make quicker decisions, and allow commanders greater flexibility on the battlefield.

Furthermore, beyond bilateral relations in Asia, they plan to strengthen new partnerships that facilitate continuous summit-level meetings, such as the Six-Party Talks, and the achievement of agreements on specific issues. By connecting infrastructure with countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia in East Asia, they aim to promote stability and prosperity and encourage China to coexist within international norms. Despite the deaths of over 4,000 U.S. soldiers since the war began, the current Iraqi government has been unable to rally its citizens and has not achieved the genuine political integration and coordination necessary for such momentum. This is viewed as a direct consequence of President Bush's failures.

In summary, the anticipated direction of change in the foreign policy of the new U.S. administration can be broadly characterized by 'integration and balance,' the restoration of the status of international institutions, and an emphasis on multilateral approaches. The Obama era is expected to see an increased utilization of international institutions and multilateral approaches to overcome the aftereffects of the Bush administration's unilateralism. The possibility of such a shift was already foreshadowed by the voices of self-reflection regarding unilateral diplomacy that began to emerge within the U.S. after the second term of the Bush administration. Proponents of 'ethical realism' in American diplomacy argue that policies in the U.S. war on terror should be pursued based on a combination of realism and morality, which can garner universal consensus (Lieven and Hulsman 2006). Advocates of smart power argue that pursuing security interests solely through hard power undermines U.S. credibility and leadership, thereby hindering American hegemony. They contend that by cultivating and combining soft power, rooted in America's original institutions, values, and culture, sustainable American hegemony can be maintained in the long term (Armitage and Nye 2007). Regarding the use of military force, the growing skepticism about American power and international leadership is the root of the legitimacy crisis, and legitimacy is gained when the content, procedures, and normative foundations of military action are just (Daalder and Kagan 2008).

Think tanks that supported Obama during the presidential campaign also presented various important foreign and security policy concepts.

'Responsible sovereignty' emphasizes the concept that the exercise of national sovereignty entails obligations and responsibilities towards other nations as well as one's own citizens. While traditional notions of sovereignty were based on the inviolability of borders and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, responsible sovereignty posits that states must be held accountable for the external effects of their domestic political actions (Managing Global Insecurity 2008). 'Strategic leadership,' as mentioned in the Phoenix Initiative report, means demonstrating through words and actions the use of American power and position for mutual benefit. Leadership in pursuing common goals is best achieved when it is followed by all nations. Strategic leadership relies heavily on political power that can substitute for and complement military force, and if faced with the ultimate decision to use military force, it must also consider whether it aligns with international obligations, not just national interests (Center for New American Security 2008). The core of 'sustainable security,' proposed by the Center for American Progress, is the appropriate combination of three approaches: U.S. national security, human security for the safety and well-being of individuals, and collective security for sharing the benefits of the entire world. The prerequisites for sustainable security are: first, legitimate principles that can unite the majority of the world's population; second, an increase in the strategic utility of the range of foreign policy tools; and third, the activation of the international system to function effectively (Smith 2008). Finally, the 'power of balance,' presented in a report by the New America Foundation, contrasts with the concept of the balance of power. While the balance of power primarily emphasizes the zero-sum aspect of interstate relations based on military strength, the power of balance emphasizes that states are merely one actor within the international system and can create win-win situations, rather than zero-sum outcomes, through diplomacy and trade (Campbell, Patel and Singh 2008). These terms all emphasize a balancing aspect against the unilateralism or biased foreign policy strategies of the Bush administration and suggest the direction of the Obama administration's foreign strategy... (continued)