[NSP Report 34] Japan's 21st Century Alliance Strategy: Power Transition, Transformation, and Rebalancing

Professor Son Yeol is at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has previously served as a professor at Chung-Ang University, a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo, and a visiting professor at Waseda University. His research interests include Japanese politics and economy, international political economy, and East Asian regionalism. His recent publications include "East Asia in the 21st Century: Competing International Societies" (2009), "The Politics of Soft Power: Japan's Changing Identity" (2009), Japan’s East Asian Community (2009), and Japan Between Alliance and Community (2009).

I. Introduction

In November 2009, President Obama visited Japan and launched a charm offensive. After drawing attention with a deep bow, nearly 90 degrees, to the Emperor, he recalled in a speech at Suntory Hall that the first foreign leader he met after taking office was the Prime Minister of Japan, and that it was the first time in over 50 years that the U.S. Secretary of State had chosen Asia as the first destination for an inaugural trip, with Japan being the first country visited. He then declared that the United States is an Asia-Pacific nation, that he possesses a "Pacific identity," and that the U.S.-Japan relationship is an "indestructible partnership." He emphasized that the U.S.-Japan relationship must deepen cooperation beyond being a military alliance cornerstone for regional stability and prosperity, extending to global issues such as economic recovery, balanced growth, climate change, non-proliferation, and human security (Obama 2009).

Up to this point, there appears to be no difference from the Bush administration's policy toward Japan. However, Japan's position within the U.S. strategy for East Asia is changing. If Bush's U.S.-Japan alliance was the cornerstone of East Asian diplomacy, Obama seeks to employ a complex regional strategy, recognizing the limitations of existing alliances. He emphasizes a partnership with China, adding that this does not signify a weakening of the alliance with Japan. Furthermore, he intends to actively utilize multilateral organizations such as ASEAN and APEC. He also highlights soft power diplomacy that extends beyond military and economic domains. In essence, this can be understood through the concept of the "power of balance" as articulated by Campbell (2008), the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The United States aims to achieve a balance beyond the modern concept of power balance, encompassing balance across different issue areas, balance between bilateral and multilateral approaches, balance between hard power and soft power, and balance among diverse actors. In East Asian relations, it seeks to create a more layered and complex network centered on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Behind this new strategic conception lies the recognition of the limitations of the hard power-centric strategy demonstrated by the Bush administration during the War on Terror, leading to a renewed search for the significance of alliances from a soft power perspective (Armitage and Nye 2007b). This is an attempt to remedy the side effects caused by an excessive reliance on military power. More importantly, it reflects the impact of declining U.S. hard power (economic strength) following the subprime crisis in September 2008. The United States is facing its greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression and is preoccupied with stabilizing its own economy. As its capacity to invest hard power externally shrinks, it must compensate with soft power. While U.S. soft power discourse until 2007 tended to complement hard power's excess, by early 2009, soft power discourse reflected the regrettable situation of a declining superpower needing to compensate for the erosion of hard power. Clinton's smart diplomacy (Clinton 2009a), Gates's strategy of balance (Gates 2009), and Campbell's "power of balance" (2008) emerged from these considerations. The idea of strengthening cooperation with allies and other friendly forces, while simultaneously and judiciously utilizing new bilateral and multilateral strategic relationships, has gained traction.

Japan faces a triple dilemma. First, it must prepare for the uncertainties arising from the relative decline in U.S. capabilities and commitment in East Asia. This means adapting to the new strategic relationship configurations pursued by the United States, which may involve increased roles and burdens imposed by the U.S., or conversely, actively responding to the U.S. "passing" on Japan. Second, this dilemma is amplified by the new geopolitical environment Japan has encountered since the turn of the 21st century, with the rapid rise of China at its core. A nation with a different political system and with whom Japan has experienced identity conflicts over historical issues is rapidly catching up. The economic reversal between the two countries is virtually imminent, and the gap in military spending is widening, not just reversing. Finally, the Japanese economy is experiencing unprecedented difficulties due to shrinking export markets in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. With a relative decline in hard power being evident, its diplomatic options are constrained.

Japan will inevitably encounter limitations if it attempts to leverage the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 21st century with the same mindset as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the early 20th century. In the early 20th century, Japan was able to form an alliance with Great Britain, the global hegemon at the time, and consistently pursue national strength and prosperity to defeat Russia and dominate Asia. However, the strategic environment of 21st-century East Asia, with its different international political units and characteristics of the arena, makes it impossible to achieve success through traditional strategies of balancing power and self-strengthening (Ha Young-sun 2006). As a core state in the 21st century, the United States perceives East Asia not as a traditional arena of power balance centered on nation-state nodes or traditional interdependence, but as a complex of diverse actors (nodes) engaging in relatively horizontal, flexible, and multi-layered relationships across various domains. In this arena, the U.S. aims to be both a designer and administrator of an "iAsia" network, characterized by integration, innovation, and investment, to borrow the expression "power of balance" (Campbell 2008, 25-26). Here, alliances take on new meaning. While traditional alliances are institutions formed based on the size and characteristics of nodes, new alliances can be defined as complex alliance networks that coordinate and regulate relationships where actors with different attributes interact at different levels within a network-based conception of connecting nodes and links. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. pursues complex alliances with Japan in areas such as military affairs, counter-terrorism, economy, environment, and energy, and at bilateral, regional, and global levels, while simultaneously pursuing networked alliances that judiciously utilize multilateral relationships. Japan is thus being newly positioned within a more complex network.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, which emerged after overthrowing the long-standing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule, faces the critical task of navigating the new strategic environment. The DPJ government cannot navigate the 21st century solely through modern alliances. As an alternative, Hatoyama has presented new foreign policy strategies of an equal relationship with the United States and the promotion of an East Asian community (Hatoyama 2009). However, a mere relative shift from alliance to community will not suffice to navigate 21st-century East Asia. East Asia is a complex space, requiring the exploration of new forms of alliances through more complex thinking.

This paper aims to analyze the changes in Japan's alliance policies and their driving factors within the context of the 21st-century strategic environment. The structure is as follows: The next section describes the strategic environment Japan faces, with the core being the perception of threat arising from China's dual rise in both hard and soft power. Section III analyzes the process by which specific strategies emerge amidst differing perceptions of alliances within Japan. The transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the promotion of an East Asian community will be key case studies. Section IV will project the challenges of rebalancing as a result of these two strategies and the response of the Hatoyama administration... (to be continued)