[NSP Report 32] China's Alliance Policy in the 21st Century: Changes and Continuities

Professor Cho Young-nam (趙英男) has been a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, since 2002. After receiving his Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University in 1999, he served as a visiting researcher at the Center for Modern China Studies, Peking University, a visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science, Nankai University, and a visiting scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute in the United States. His major publications include Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), The Path of China in the 21st Century (Paju: Nanam, 2009), The Development of Parliamentary Politics in China (Seoul: Politeria, 2006), Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era (Paju: Nanam, 2006), and Chinese Political Reform and the National People's Congress (Seoul: Nanam, 2000). Recently, he has been researching China's parliamentary system, the rule of law (法治), and changes in state-society relations.

1. Introduction

On May 27, 2008, the day South Korean President Lee Myung-bak officially visited China, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang (秦剛 2008) responded to a reporter's question about the Chinese government's view on the ROK-US alliance by stating that the ROK-US military alliance is a "product of history" and that it is "impossible to handle current security issues with military alliances from the Cold War era." He also advocated for the establishment of a "new security concept (新安全觀) based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation," emphasizing that "strengthening exchanges between countries, promoting mutual trust, and enhancing cooperation to jointly maintain regional security is the only effective path" in the Asian region. This statement by the Chinese spokesperson drew attention from the South Korean media not only because it was a diplomatic discourtesy timed with the South Korean president's official visit to China but also because China had unusually directly criticized the ROK-US alliance.

China had previously criticized the US-Japan alliance, which had been continuously strengthened since the mid-1990s, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which had continuously expanded and strengthened its role, including its military intervention in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, based on the new security concept. However, it was unprecedented for the Chinese government to criticize the ROK-US alliance in this manner, coinciding with the South Korean president's visit. This criticism can be interpreted as a result of China's concern that the Lee Myung-bak administration, which emerged in February 2008, shifted South Korean foreign policy towards pro-US sentiment, and as part of that policy shift, the ROK-US alliance was changing in nature to resemble the US-Japan alliance, thereby strengthening its role in containing China. However, considering the reality that China still maintains the ROK-China alliance, a relic of the Cold War, the Chinese government's position of criticizing the ROK-US alliance as a "product of history" is not tenable.

Regardless of the reasons for criticizing the ROK-US alliance or its validity, the Chinese spokesperson's remarks pose important research questions for us. Specifically, what alliance policies has reform-era China pursued, and how will they change in the future? For example, in a reality where the Asian security order is dominated by a US-led bilateral alliance system involving five countries—South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia—known as the "hub and spokes" system, what policies has China pursued to secure its own security while emerging as a global power? Furthermore, what policies has China pursued regarding the ROK-China alliance, and how will they change in the future? Finally, what impact will China's changing alliance policies have on the Korean Peninsula and the Asian security order? How should South Korea respond to China's alliance policies?

However, existing research on China's alliance policy is indeed very limited. To be blunt, while there are relatively many studies systematically analyzing China's foreign policy during the reform era, particularly its great power diplomacy, relations with neighboring countries (Asia), multilateral diplomacy, and public diplomacy in the post-Cold War period, there are few studies specializing in China's alliance policy. Existing research on China's alliance policy primarily focuses on China's response to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance or analyzes the changes in ROK-China relations since the establishment of diplomatic ties. This lack of research on China's alliance policy is reminiscent of Snyder's (1990) observation that alliance studies are also very scarce in international politics.

The scarcity of research on China's alliance policy is likely due, first and foremost, to the very low importance of alliances in China's foreign policy during the reform era. In short, the core principle of China's foreign policy during the reform era has been "non-alignment" (不結盟), and China claims to have adhered to this principle to this day. However, even considering this fact, two issues remain. First, during the Mao Zedong era, China's foreign policy was centered on alliance or quasi-alliance policies with the US and the Soviet Union; therefore, it is necessary to seriously examine why the principle of non-alignment was proclaimed during the reform era and how well China has actually adhered to this principle. Second, like other countries, China pursues alliance policy as one aspect of its overall foreign policy and in close connection with other policies. Analyzing China's alliance policy solely from the perspective of responding to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance presents a problem of narrow perspective. In other words, a serious examination is needed of the content and significance of China's alliance policy from the perspective of China's entire foreign policy and how it has actually been pursued. From this perspective, we can consider the possibility that China has actively pursued alliance policies in line with adjustments to its own foreign policy, rather than merely as a response to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance.

In analyzing China's alliance policy, the author believes it is necessary to pay attention to the concept of 'soft balancing' proposed by T.V. Paul and others. First, they point out that in the post-Cold War era, at both the global/system level and the regional/subsystem level, the hard balancing advocated by traditional realism—namely, the formation of alliances and military buildups by other great powers targeting the hegemonic power, the United States—has not occurred. At the same time, they argue that the concept of soft balancing is necessary to analyze these phenomena in post-Cold War international politics. In other words, an expansion of the concept of balance of power (hard balancing, soft balancing, asymmetric balancing) is needed. According to this, soft balancing refers to implicit, non-aggressive coalitions formed among great powers to neutralize rising or potential threat powers. For soft balancing, countries use various means such as concluding informal agreements (ententes) rather than implicit understandings or formal alliances, or forming temporary coalitions using international institutions to limit the power of threatening states. Examples include cooperation between Eastern European countries and NATO to contain Russia, cooperation between the US and India to contain China, Sino-Russian cooperation in the late 1990s to contain the US, and cooperation between Russia, France, and Germany in the UN Security Council to oppose the US invasion of Iraq (Paul 2004, 3-4, 14-16; Fortman, Paul, and Wirtz 2004, 369-370). Although the concept of soft balancing still has some issues—such as the difference between soft balancing and simple alignment between states, and a lack of specific details regarding soft balancing—the author believes it is more appropriate for understanding China's alliance policy in the post-Cold War era than any other existing concept or theory.

However, there is a problem when applying the concept of soft balancing to China's alliance policy during the reform era. According to Paul, soft balancing can emerge under certain conditions in the post-Cold War era at the global and regional levels, such as the formation of a US-led quasi-unipolar system, increasing economic globalization, and the rise of transnational terrorism as a common enemy (Paul 2004, 16). However, as will be analyzed in detail later, China has implemented soft balancing policies instead of the traditional realist balance of power policies (i.e., military buildup and alliance formation) since the early 1980s, even before these global and regional conditions were met. This demonstrates that soft balancing policies can be pursued not only by changes at the global and regional levels but also by changes at the domestic level, meaning that soft balancing policies can be shaped by various factors at the global, regional, and domestic levels.

Similarly, Deng (2008: 6-7, 270, 275) argues in his analysis of China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era that it is clearly different from China's past foreign policy as well as the balance of power policies described by realism. In short, China has not pursued internal or external balancing policies against the United States, the hegemonic power in East Asia. Instead, he argues that China has pursued a strategy of enhancing its international status to resolve its numerous domestic issues, maximize the benefits of globalization, and expand its power and positive perception in the international community. Although Deng's research does not specifically analyze China's alliance policy and some of his arguments require careful examination, his assertion that China has not pursued realist balance of power policies against the United States is considered tenable.

In contrast to the above arguments, Ross (2004) analyzes post-Cold War Chinese diplomacy from the perspective of balance of power politics. He argues that a bipolar system led by the US and China has formed in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, and both countries are pursuing hard balancing policies against each other. For example, the United States is strengthening military alliances, deploying forces forward, increasing defense spending, and securing strategic nuclear superiority (especially by building missile defense systems) to further expand its military advantage in the East Asian region. In response, China is pursuing policies such as increasing defense spending and military capabilities (including modernization of strategic missiles), strengthening its economic base, and securing international support to limit US power. Meanwhile, according to him, the bipolar balance of power system is relatively stable due to the specialization of weapon systems between the two countries (the US being a maritime power and China a continental power) and regional isolation, and this system will simultaneously contribute to regional stability in Asia.

However, there are several problems with Ross's argument. First, it is questionable whether the East Asian international order in the post-Cold War era can be viewed as a bipolar system led by the US and China, rather than a unipolar or quasi-unipolar system led by the US. Some scholars, unlike Ross, argue for a unipolar or quasi-unipolar system led by the US (Goldstein 2003b; Mastanduno 2003). Second, it is questionable whether China's military modernization and arms buildup can be seen as a hard balancing policy against the United States. While the US Department of Defense views it this way, many scholars consider China's arms buildup as a limited capacity enhancement focused on self-defense (especially resolving the Taiwan issue). Finally, it is problematic to analyze China's balancing policy by focusing solely on internal balancing while neglecting the external balancing aspect, namely alliance formation, which is one pillar of balancing policy. Specifically, it is problematic to analyze internal balancing (military buildup) and external balancing (strengthening of US alliances in East Asia) simultaneously when analyzing US balancing policy, but to omit this when analyzing China.

This paper aims to analyze the following three aspects to understand China's alliance policy during the reform era. First, this study will analyze the adjustments in China's foreign policy during the reform era and the resulting changes in its alliance policy (Chapters 2 and 3). This includes an analysis of the new security concept that emerged as a core theory of Chinese foreign policy since the mid-1990s. Through this, we will understand that soft balancing policies can be formed not only by changes in the international environment but also by changes in domestic factors within China, such as shifts in the Communist Party's line, re-evaluation of the international situation and adoption of new foreign policy guidelines, and the emergence of new foreign policy theories (new security concept). At the same time, we will see that China is pursuing its alliance policy systematically and consistently based on certain foreign policy guidelines and theories, rather than through ad hoc, immediate responses. Second, this study will analyze the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and China's response to it (Chapter 4). The US-Japan alliance is the greatest security threat from China's perspective. Therefore, by analyzing China's attitude and policies towards the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, we can understand how China's alliance policy has unfolded in the context of a changed regional security environment.

Finally, there will be specific case analyses. These include two cases. The first is an analysis of the ROK-China alliance (Chapter 5). The ROK-China alliance is currently China's only military alliance, and through its examination, we can understand the changes in bilateral alliances led by China. The second is an analysis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Chapter 6). This organization is a regional multilateral security organization proactively created by China, based on a strategic partnership with Russia, to address security and other pressing issues in the Central Asian region. Through its analysis, we can understand how China is responding to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance through multilateral approaches.

In this regard, this study will not include an analysis of China's policy towards the ROK-US alliance in its scope. This is because, until recently, the ROK-US alliance has not been a major concern for China for two reasons. First, with the development of ROK-China relations, China has not felt a strong need to pay close attention to the ROK-US alliance. Second, from China's perspective, the ROK-US alliance is merely a peripheral element supporting the US-Japan alliance (Zhang Weiwei 2007; Shi Yuanhua & Wang Weimin 2006). In the future, depending on changes in ROK-China relations and the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance, particularly its role in containing China, China's interest and concern regarding the ROK-US alliance may increase more than before, and signs of this are already emerging. China's position on the ROK-US alliance can be somewhat understood through the analysis of the US-Japan alliance.

Based on the above analysis, this paper will argue that during the reform era, particularly in the post-Cold War period, China has pursued soft balancing policies as described by Paul and others, rather than the hard balancing described by realist balance of power theory, and that this will not change in the short term. First, from a theoretical perspective, China has excluded traditional realist alliance policies from its foreign policy guidelines based on the 'principle of non-alignment' since the early 1980s, and this has been further strengthened by the new security concept proposed in the 1990s. Furthermore, in terms of actual diplomacy, China has responded flexibly to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, perceived as the most serious security threat, through limited military buildup, maintaining friendly relations with both the US and Japan, and advocating for regional multilateral security mechanisms. In addition, China has proactively weakened the ROK-China alliance from a 'blood alliance' to a simple cooperative relationship between states, and has responded to the US alliance system through joint cooperation with Russia, such as forming a strategic partnership and establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Finally, let us examine several key concepts related to alliances. According to Snyder (1997, 4-5), alliances possess three characteristics. First, an alliance is an association for military or security purposes; second, it is formed between states; and third, it targets states outside the alliance. Accordingly, an alliance can be defined as a "primary instrument of national security policy" and "an association between states concerning the use or non-use of force against states outside the alliance under specific conditions." Furthermore, means that validate alliances include joint military planning, expressing support for an allied state in conflict with a third country, and publicly declaring alliance commitments. Meanwhile, alliances can be categorized as bilateral or collective alliances based on size; unilateral alliances (guarantees), bilateral alliances, or multilateral alliances based on the nature of obligations; equal or unequal alliances based on the symmetry of the relationship; and offensive or defensive alliances based on purpose. Lastly, special types of alliances that do not involve military support include neutrality pacts and non-aggression treaties (Snyder 1997, 12-13). This paper will use the key concepts according to Snyder's terminology...(continued)